In this paper, I consider the problem of biological individuation by comparing the cases of organisms and species. Biologists try to understand the biological world through individuating living things or identifying biological individuals. Various criteria of biological individuation have been proposed, and philosophers of biology dispute about how to deal with them. Pluralism is traditionally a strong position in the philosophy of biology. The situation forms a striking contrast with that of the philosophy of physics, where monism and reductionism pervade. I show that the organism problem is real even if we assume gene selectionism. Moreover, I argue that organism eliminativism is sterile, and propose to retain "organism" as an umbrella term instead.
Ontological status of species has given rise to a heated controversy. The individuality thesis of species was influential, and the death of essentialism was proclaimed. But recently the new biological essentialism (e.g., the homeostatic property cluster view, relational essentialism) comes to the fore, and consequently the distinction between individuals and kinds becomes ambiguous. I show that "individuation" is an important business of biology even if we accept the new biological essentialism. Moreover, I argue that there is a synergy effect between biological individuation and understanding of the biological world, which I call "mutual penetration" after Nishiwaki (2012).

特集 : 西脇与作君・樽井正義君退職記念
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