In this paper, I will examine Leibniz's theory of final cause. In Discours de metaphysique or other texts, he often indicates that the natural law is the metaphysical principle rather than the geometrical one, and that natural phenomena are explained doubly: both by the effcient cause and by the final cause. However, he uses the latter in many contexts. For example, the whole field of physics, the natural law-the law of motion-, and the famous demonstration of Snell's law. Above all, I'll make clear the reason why he adopts the final cause in the establishment of the natural law and what the metaphysical principle really signifies. In fact, He uses that principle in the different situations: in the search for the natures of things and in the theorization with that result. In this paper, first, I describe the grounds for physics, that is, the contingent truth and the physical necessity. Second, I clarify the metaphysical factors in the natural law. Finally I'll show that the final cause is required for the rational construction of the physical theory in Leibniz.
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