I think that the problem of other minds arises already in the formation of my-self: the contrast between my mind and other minds is reduced to the contrast between my mind as it self and my mind as a person's mind. I have tried to explain this view in this paper which is divided into six sections. In §1 the problem is posed in a general way. In §2 phenomenological points of view and linguistic points of view are compared. The latter look upon the problem as a matter of grammar while the former look upon it as a matter of fact. In §3 the supposition that others have no minds as a matter , of fact is discussed. In this section I conclude that it is actually and grammatically possible though it is contradictory to our form of life. In §4 the supposition that I myself have no mind is examined. And here I come to the conclusion that it is absolutely impssible even if it is grammatically possible. In §5 the difference between the concept of human mind and that of my mind is made clear through the contrast between mind as faculty of differentiation and mind as private substance. In §6 the supposition of the reduction of my private substance is considered. In conclusion I have to say once again what I mentioned at the outset of this summary.