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AN00234610-20051001-0055.pdf
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:Nov 17, 2021 |
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| Title |
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BIS規制, 会計操作, 「追い貸し」
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| Kana |
BIS キセイ, カイケイ ソウサ, 「オイガシ」
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BIS kisei, kaikei sosa, "oigashi"
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Capital requirements, accounting discretion, and bad loans
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櫻川, 昌哉
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サクラガワ, マサヤ
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Sakuragawa, Masaya
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| Affiliation |
慶應義塾大学経済学部教授
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後藤, 尚久
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ゴトウ, ナオヒサ
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Goto, Naohisa
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| Affiliation |
北九州大学経済学部助教授
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慶應義塾経済学会
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| Kana |
ケイオウ ギジュク ケイザイ ガッカイ
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| Romanization |
Keio gijuku keizai gakkai
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2005
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三田学会雑誌
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| Name (Translated) |
Keio journal of economics
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| Volume |
98
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| Issue |
3
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2005
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| Month |
10
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| Start page |
431(55)
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453(77)
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| Abstract |
この論文では, 資本規制に強く規制された銀行が, 所定の資本比率を達成するために, 不良融資を追い貸しで存続させるメカニズムを分析する。銀行への経営統治が弱体であり, 政府が会計操作を許容するとき, 経営者に不良融資を存続するインセンティブが生じることが示される。後半では, 追い貸しの検証をこころみる。90年代以降, 地価下落が進むにつれて, 建設・不動産・金融への融資を増加させるという検証結果が見出され, 追い貸しがあった形跡を示唆している。
This paper analyzes the mechanism compelling banks that are heavily regulated by capital requirements to continue forbearance lending for bad loans to achieve a designated capital ratio.
It indicates that when the corporate governance of banks is weak and the governments allowed for window dressing, incentives emerge for managers to continue forbearance lending for bad loans.
In the letter half, we verify forbearance lending.
Empirical results reveal that as land prices declined since the 1990s, loans for construction, real estate, and finance increased, suggesting evidence of forbearance lending.
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| History |
| Jun 3, 2014 | | フリーキーワード, 本文 を変更 |
| Jul 23, 2015 | | 抄録, 本文 を変更 |
| Jul 23, 2015 | | 版 を変更 |
| Nov 17, 2021 | | JaLCDOI を変更 |
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