The historiographical category of 'British empiricism' consisting of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, has been frequently attacked as a 'myth'. In particular, the traditional view of Berkeley as the philosopher connecting Locke and Hume has been called into question. This paper reconsiders Berkeley's place in the canon in terms of a broader intellectual context in which the traditional association of Locke and Berkeley may be restored.
The key term in my reappraisal is 'experimental philosophy'. Starting from Stephen Gaukroger's recent suggestion that Locke's empiricism is best interpreted as a philosophical refinement of the seventeenth-century experimental philosophy, I argue that Berkeley can be seen from a similar perspective. While Gaukroger denies continuity between Locke and Berkeley, I oppose this assessment by highlighting Berkeley's connection with the Dublin Philosophical Society (DPS). I suggest that the dissemination of experimental philosophy from England to Ireland provides important background to the Locke-Berkeley connection. Then I will look at how William Molyneux, the founder of the DPS, saw Locke's achievement ; he observed in the Dioptrica Nova that the Essay provided a new logic significantly advanced by the experimental method. Lastly, I argue that Berkeley's New Theory of Vision can be read as a practice of experimental philosophy. I will observe that Berkeley's New Theory, which uses the language analogy as the general explanatory framework, is an application of Locke's semiotic study of 'the understanding' to the case of vision. And by looking at his treatment of the Barrovian case, I will clarify how his study of vision follows the method of experimental philosophy.
|
