The purpose of this paper is to propose a view that scientific knowledge is a kind of institution. Generally it is thought that knowledge is different from institution in essence, because institutions such as political institution, educational institutions and so forth are produced artificially for some particular purposes whereas knowledge, let alone scientific knowledge, isn't. Knowledge is generally thought as true belief that corresponds with reality that exists independently of us human beings. However, is scientific knowledge inherently different from institutions?
In this paper, I argue that scientific knowledge can also be viewed as a kind of institution, and offer the conception of truth that follows from such a view. In section 1, it is shown that empirical knowledge including scientific knowledge is pragmatic convention. In section 2, I show that scientific knowledge can be understood as a kind of institutions and this understanding gives an explanation for holistic character and objectivity scientific knowledge has. In section 3, I propose the view that the concept of truth as correspondence with reality plays the important role of MacGuffin that promotes successive development of scientific knowledge.

特集 : 西脇与作君・樽井正義君退職記念
寄稿論文