In this paper, I aim to clarify the concept of possibility for an existence, or more precisely, for the exigence of existence (exigentia existentiae), Leibniz attributed to a contingent being (ens contingens). When Leibniz defines a contingent being, he always says `the essence (essentia) of contingent being does not contain its existence (existentia)'. But if the essence of a contingent being does not contain its existence, how can it be possible for the contingent being to have an existence? To solve this difficulty, it seems to be necessary first to examine the concept of existence for an necessary being (Ens necessarium), that is God; for Leibniz always cites the definition of God when he explains the existence of contingent being; according to him, the existence of God 'is contained in His essence', at variance with the existence of contingent being. This is a traditional argument for the existence of God. Leibniz thinks this argument would be sufficient, if the essence of God, which contains its existence, is conceptually possible; from this point of view, he says it is God's privilege to exist, if only His essence is conceptually possible. According to Leibniz, God will exist if only His essence is conceptually possible, because His essence contains the existence. It is impossible for God not to exist, for His essence does not contain 'non-existence'. In the case of a contingent being, however, is it not contingent for it to exist, even if its essence is conceptually possible. The reason for this seems to be obvious. The essence of a contingent being does contain neither existence nor non-existence. It must be possible for an contingent being both to exist and not to exist. It is noteworthy that, for Leibniz, we cannot clearly understand the notion of possibility for a contingent being, until we conceive the notion of of God, which excludes the possibility of non-existence. That is why Leibniz always cites the relation between God and creatures when he explains the existence of a contingent being.
|
