In this second part of the article. I concern myself with some difficulties in the following texts of the Categories: (1) ch. 2, 1a20-b9-Cat. makes use of " being in subject" as a criterion for the categorial distinction between substances and non-substances, and of "being said of subject" as a criterion for the inter-categorial distinction between individuals and universals, which creates ambiguity in the system of fourfold classification of beings where both criteria are used (cp. Top. A9, 103b29-39 where "being said of subject" is used both categorially for praedicamenta and inter-categorially for praedicabilia). (2) ch. 5, 2tall-b36-Cat. modifies the above "four beings" into primary substances (being neither in nor said of any subject), secondary substances (being said solely of primary substances) and accidents (being solely in primary substances) by restricting the inter-categorial use of "said of subject" in the category of substance, which must deny Top. A9 (103b37-39), SE 22 (178b37-39, 179a8-10), Met. Z13 (1039a1-2, a14-16), B6 (1003a8-9), K2 (1060b20-22), for the reason that the universal "what-is-it" essence, being other than the substantial "what-is-it" essence, expresses any one of the non-substantial attributes (otherwise the Third Man Argument will occur). (3) ch. 5, 3b10-23 Cat. modifies again secondary substances into universals that express such-and-such a substance, which does not correspond to what is described in Met. 414, Top. 46 where differentiae are said to express such-and-such a genus which in its turn expresses "what-is-it" in the definition of whatever belongs to any category.