This paper traces the development of that part of introspective phychology, which concerns the problem of the nature of affective process, during the first three decades of the present century, with especial reference to Titchener's views both before and after the publication of Nafe's experiment in 1924. The contents of the main chapters may be summarized as follows: The program of existential psychology. According to Titchener, the subject-matter of psychology is consciousness or existential experience regarded as dependent upon the nervous system, its method is intorspection or rather observation as he prefers to call it in his later years and its problem is to describe and explain the subjectmatter as in any other science. In his system, the concept of mental elements plays a leading role; he is par excellence a psychologist of elementarism. Titchener's view of affection (ca. 1908-1924). In this chapter, the writer outlines Titchener's view of affection as revealed principally in his "Psychology of feeling and attention", "A text-book of psychology" and "A beginner's psychology". Among the three possible views regarding the status of affection, i.e., 1) affection as an independent mental element, distinct from and co-ordinate with sensation, 2) as an attribute of sensation and 3) as a sensation, Titchener chooses the first as logically and experimentally most plausible. Affection is distinguished from sensation by the opposition of its qualities, P and U and by the lack of the attribute of clearness. Examination of Titchener's view of affection. This chapter reviews the experiments of T. Nakashima, B. Koch, M. Yokoyama and J. P. Nafe. The writer points out on the one hand that the results of Nakashima and Koch failed to support the doctrine that affection is an independent mental element and on the other hand questions the validity of Nafe's conclusion that P and U are petterns of specific sensory experiences, namely bright and dull pressures. With respect to his own experiment he writes that his conclusion that P and U are most universally and definitely statable as meanings is acceptable as far as concerns the results of the method of paired comparison. The final chapter is devoted solely to the discussion of Nafe's works. By a careful scrutiny of the introspective reports of the observers, the writer finds that they could not pay direct attention to P and U to the total exclusion of the (accompanying) sensory experience, showing that affective experience they had lacked the attribute of clearness. Thus, Nafe's statement, "affection is palpable; it stands up under observation" should be taken to mean that affection is cognitively and not attributively, clear and accordingly, P and U in his experiment may be best accounted for as meanings. He wonders why Titchener, knowing that affection lacks the attributive clearness, could accept Nafe's conclusion that P and U are sensations. (1) The word in parenthesis is inserted by the writer to make the statement clear.
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