This paper argues that the arguments for workplace democracy put forth by Dahl and Young are incomplete as they do not provide distributive principles of justice that can tell us how we should distribute the benefits and burdens of adopting workplace democracy among citizens. Dahl and Young hold that justice requires us to respect citizens' equal moral freedom to pursue their own ends. And on these grounds, they call for workplace democracy so that we can respect citizens' equal moral freedom in the workplace. However, although introducing workplace democracy out of our concern for justice would enable us to respect some citizens' moral freedom, I argue that it could prevent us from respecting other citizens' moral freedom; this is because some citizens may prefer the goods of undemocratic practices in workplaces. If this is the case, in order to respect the equal moral freedom of all citizens, we need to identify reasonable methods and the extent to which we should adopt workplace democracy by defining reasonable trade-offs between the goods of democratic and undemocratic workplace practices. Given this analysis, I further argue that such identification can be given by distributive principles of justice, and the arguments for workplace democracy need to be supplemented by the arguments for distributive principles of justice for workplace democracy.

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