Part I of this paper has first discussed the dual relationship between the Cournot and Bertrand duopoly models in the absence of uncertainty, and has then proceeded to focus on various types of duopoly models facing a common risk of demand or cost. It has been shown that the welfare consequences of an information transmission agreement between the firms are clasified under four headings: own and cross variation effects, and own and cross efficiency effects. Part II of the paper will now turn to the situation under which each firm is subject to its own risk. We will show that as was seen in the case of a common risk, the welfare implications of information sharing are sensitive to many factors. They are: the type of competition (Cournot or Bertrand), the nature of uncertainty (demand or cost), the number of participating firms, and the degree and direction of physical and stochastic interdependence among demand or cost parameters. It will also be argued that our theoretical investigation of information pooling sheds new light both on the desirability of trade associations and on the merits or demerits of industrial policies.