Bernard Williams’view of reasons for action has two dimensions : individualistic and non-individualistic. These two dimensions apparently conflict with each other. In this paper, I argue that the conflict is only apparent. In Section 1, I explain the sense in which Williams’view is individualistic by looking at his reasons internalism.On my interpretation, Williams’internalism involves at least the following two main ideas:（i）that reasons are answers to first personal questions ;（ii）that intentional actions are explicable in terms of the agent’s possible deliberation. This makes Williams’view a species of‘formal’individualism. In Section 2, I point out that Williams nevertheless emphasizes the non-individualistic dimension of reasons : namely, the historical or cultural backgrounds of reasons for action.In Section 3, I consider Williams’discussion of thick concepts, in order to see how Williams holds together these two apparently conflicting dimensions. Finally, I conclude that Williams’view of reasons for action is to be construed as follows: whereas whether some consideration can be a reason for a particular agent depends on historical or cultural backgrounds and not on the agent’s desire, whether this consideration is does.

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