Weak compositionality, which is now explicitly endorsed by Truth Conditional Pragmatists and some Relevance Theorists, is a new notion of compositionality that aims to reconcile a vast range of context-dependency of semantic content with the project of formal semantics. Since this notion allows a semantic content of a complex expression at a context to be determined by the semantic contents of its constituents at that context, its structure, and the context itself, many semantic phenomena or analyses which were labeled as non-compositional can still be compositional in this weak sense. In this paper, I examine the status of weak compositionality in two different respects and claim that this notion cannot have any significance in formal semantic inquiries. First, although Truth Conditional Pragmatics seems to need the notion, careful reflections on the way how utterance interpretations are modeled in this theory show that a simpler notion of compositionality is enough for the theory to derive semantic contents. I, then, turn my eyes on the formal definition of weak compositionality and clarify when and how the notion does or does not hold formally. This consideration leads us to a difficulty of identifying contextual factors which can play an expected role in the formal definition, and so I conclude that weak compositionality is just useless.

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