In his later career, Donald Davidson developed his own brand of semantic externalism, which can be called "Triangular Externalism". According to Triangular Externalism, the fact that our utterances or beliefs have meaning presupposes the interrelations between (atleast) two subjects and common cause.
Furthermore, Davidson famously draws a remarkable anti-skeptical conclusion from his Externalism. One of the most important premises of skeptical arguments is that it is possible that most of our utterances and beliefs are false (e.g. it is possible that I am a brain in a vat and so my current utterances and beliefs about external worlds are mostly false). However, according to Davidson, if Triangular Externalism is correct, this premise cannot be true. So any attempts to draw skeptical conclusions from this premise would fail. In this paper, I shall give a detailed explanation of this anti-skeptical argument by clarifying his Externalism. Then I shall try to answer two objections against Davidson's argument. I conclude that with slight modification of the argument, Davidson can successfully answer them.

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