When we see sky at sunset, we have an experience of the bright red quality. Or when you pinch your arm skin, you experience sharp pain. Philosophers have called "subjective" qualities in these experiences "qualia". In philosophy of mind, qualia have been thought of as roadblock to naturalistic understanding of mind. In many arguments colors have been used as a typical example of qualia. Traditionally, ever since Locke classified color as "secondary quality", it has been regarded as mental property that is only in mind, and philosophers have discussed its ontological status. In recent years, philosophers have taken the existance problem of color to discuss intensively in accordance with the development of color science. At first glance, current discussions of qualia and secondary quality seem to have same frameworks: Some philosophers in one school argue that it is impossible to understand color naturalistically, and philosophers in the other school argue that it is possible. However, the conflict, which has been seemingly considered as one between subjectivism and objectivism, in the current discussion about color as secondary quality should be understood as one between internalism and externalism, discussion of qualia. In this paper, it is argued through our that internalism and externalism are not in opposed position, but rather they are compatible and complementary when we explain our color experiences.
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