The basic inquiry, 'why should I be moral ?', is essentially to seek for the rationale of the validity itself of morals. That is, what is here to be asked is a reason why 'this-F should be moral in spite of no need to be so rationally. Nevertheless, without replying to this seriously, so far moral philosophy seems only to have been elucidating an aim and a meaning of moral judgements or activities so as to be in vindication of morals. Morals is there made an obvious premise as a system, and a moral agent is taken for merely a general-formal one who cannot but be subjct to that system. Then, to give another reply not as before, this paper aims at sorting out the structure of a primitive state of 'I-being-moral' from the ontological point of view. In short, apart from the regulative moral system, 'this-F will become aware of 'I-being' in a different way from the existence ruled over by that system. And with that 'this-F (namely the very unique Self as agent), who can be either moral or immoral, comes to express his own attitude intentionally and autonomically toward morals. Just this process should be moral, in other words 'ethical', that may be at the same time accompanied with the transformation of the world where 'this-I' appears.
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