This paper deals with our understanding of time, and aims to make clear its relationship with the levels or the 'orders' of consciousness. For this purpose, the author tried particularly to pay attention to the difference between a homogeneous, objective time and perspective modes of time. Consciousness is divided into two orders: one involves 'first-order intentions' and the other involves 'second-order intentions'. The second-order intentions take first-order intentions as their object. In other words, we comprehend these first-order intentions as the ones identified in an objective time by an act of second-order intention. An objective time in this sense is called a B series by J. McTaggart. A succession of perspective time, which he calls an A series and which he considers fundamental to time, is presented to the subject who has thoughts with second-order intentions. The author believes therefore that the distinction of an A and a B series, made by McTaggart regarding time, does not constitute difference in time itself but rather the difference in the structure of the intentionality of the thinking subject. Similarly, the author believes that what distinguishes the past and the future is the subject's second-order intentions about them, which have different modal properties.