The key point of the very often disputed problem concerning possibility or impossibility of deducing concepts of value, finality etc. from that of facts seems to be based upon inadequate interpretation of the two principal terms-'fact' and 'deduction'. This paper tries to give an adequate interpretation of these two terms. I) What is the fact? II) What does 'deduction' mean when used in this context ? Concerning the first problem, the author points out that there is maximum as well as minimum use of the word 'fact'. In its maximum use we can say of any sentential expression that it is a fact, meaning thereby that the said statement is confirmed. However, there are different types of confirming various kinds of statement. The confirmation of a statement like 'A is taller than B' may differ from that of statement like 'He is a good man' or 'He intends to do X' or 'It is a fiction invented by Mr. X' etc.. The difference suggests the minimum use of 'fact' as against 'value', 'finality' and 'fiction' etc.. To the second question, the author analyses a special meaning of deduction when it is said that dedustion of value, finality etc. from facts is possible. When we say, for instance ; "He wishes that somebody will do it. And this is exactly what he wishes to be done. So you should do it." We may in a sense be correct if we say that the last statement is somehow deduced from the antecedent ones. It is also clear that the deduction in this context does not mean deduction in formal logic. The author tries to elucidate the reason that enables this kind of reasoning in futher details.

橋本孝先生古希記念論文集