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AN00150430-00000031-0115  
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Title
Title 直観論的価値論をめぐる諸問題  
Kana チョッカンロンテキ カチロン オ メグル ショ モンダイ  
Romanization Chokkanronteki kachiron o meguru sho mondai  
Other Title
Title The open questions about the theory of value in intuitionism  
Kana  
Romanization  
Creator
Name 小泉, 仰  
Kana コイズミ, タカシ  
Romanization Koizumi, Takashi  
Affiliation 慶應義塾大学  
Affiliation (Translated)  
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Place
東京  
Publisher
Name 三田哲學會  
Kana ミタ テツガクカイ  
Romanization Mita tetsugakukai  
Date
Issued (from:yyyy) 1955  
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Created (yyyy-mm-dd)  
Updated (yyyy-mm-dd)  
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Source Title
Name 哲學  
Name (Translated)  
Volume  
Issue 31  
Year 1955  
Month 3  
Start page 115  
End page 142  
ISSN
05632099  
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Abstract
I intended in my treatise to make clear the open questions about the theory of value in intuitionism. Most of intuitionstic theory of value are intimately connected with the objective theory of value. Far from that, they presuppose the latter. Accordingly, first of all, I tried to testify whether or riot we might approve of the objective theory of value, and then to find the open questions out. I believe that I found them in this theory by means of investigating the arguments in which the intuitionists regarded the value as an objective quality. For example, both Max Scheler and G. E. Moore, representatives of the intuitionists, asserted that the value is a non-natural simple quality. And both of them thought they could demonstrate the being and the characteristics of the value by means of comparing the value with colour. Accordingiy, I brought forward my argument in the following order: 1) Differences between value and colour, 2) Contingency of agreement about the value, 3) Changeability of value in accordance with the situations and the persons, 4) The characteristics of ethical judgment, which follow from the objective theory of value. (According to the intuitionists, all ethical judgments are synthetic, and either true or false.) I cannot but conclude through the above analyses that many open questions of intuitionism are derived from the connection between intuitionism and objectivism about value. I think the inttutionistic theory of value is by nature the subjective theory of it. Therefore, according to the intuitionists, we cannot help meeting the opposite estimations of the same value or the opposite ethical judgments, both of which are justified by them. Consequently, we must say that the theory of intuitionism has no ability to sufficiently resolve the social ethical problems. Therefore, lastly, I gave some suggestions as the clues to resolve these problems. That is, I suggested that we could find out the important keys to resolve the social ethical problems in the studies of the regels or the reasons that make the value valuable in society.
 
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日本語  
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Aug 24, 2010 09:00:00  
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Aug 24, 2010 09:00:00  
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/ Public / Faculty of Letters / Philosophy / 31 (195503)
 
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