I have endeavored hitherto in this journal to deduce all kinds of logics from the categorical modes of the being (i.e. ontological categories of Aristotle) and to characterize them as "Logics of Being" as I was strongly against the doctrine that treats all logics as a kind of mental technic or mental structure. I "ontologicalized" dialectical logic as a logic pertaining to the essence-category of substance, deductive logic as a logic pertaining to the attribute-category of quality, quantity, and relation, and inductive logic as a logic pertaining to the accident-category of action, passion, time, space and state. (These treatises were collected in my book "Sonzai no Ronrigaku Kenkyu" (Study on the Logic of Being) published from Iwanami 1944 Tokyo). In this treatise I attempted to characterize the fourth logic, i.e. login of value as a logic pertaining to the convenience-category of habitus. The 1st chapter treats critically different senses which the value-logic possesses according to the school of rtew Kantianism (Rickert), the school of phenomenology (Nicolai Hartmann), and the modern school of scholasticism (Johannes Hessen). The 2nd chapter defines from the apophantical point of view the character of value-predicate as a most free predicate which is added to the ultimate subject i.e. the substance according to the law of finality and this most extrinsical, only by the third party combinable convenience-connection between subject and predicate makes us possible to construct a system of value-predicates which at first sight appears to be quite independent from substance-subject. This is the reason why a Platonic predicatism is rather welcome in the domain of value-logic just in contrast of the Aristotelic subjectism in the domain of the other logics, dialectical, deductive and inductive. The 3rd chapter concludes with an ontological consideration that such categorical mode of being-predicate, 'ens per aliud et in alio', is nothing but habitus-category which on the One hand is, as it were, accidental and external to the substantial essence (per aliud), to which, the third party adds it a posteriori from the view-point of finality, and on the othei-hand, is, as it were, attributive and immanent to the substantial essence (in alio), due to the fact that, once, given to substance, it becomes an inherent fitting quality of the substance itself. The 4th chapter considers metaphysical phase of such value-cate gory and touches the question about natural value, coming from act of divine creation and cultural value, coming from act of human labour. Both this treatise and the former articles are not directly metaphysical researches but logicairesearches fromontological standpoint. They are, however, intended to offer useful preslippositions for theorectical construction of metaphysics, which covers whole real domains of being, i.e. the existential side of being, by making clear.the analogical contents of beigg, corresponding to the categorical modes of being, i.e. the essential side.of being.