Item Type |
Article |
ID |
|
Preview |
Image |
|
Caption |
|
|
Full text |
AA00260492-20010001-0053.pdf
Type |
:application/pdf |
Download
|
Size |
:1.2 MB
|
Last updated |
:Dec 26, 2009 |
Downloads |
: 1574 |
Total downloads since Dec 26, 2009 : 1574
|
|
Release Date |
|
Title |
Title |
A BERTRAND MODEL OF TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
|
Kana |
|
Romanization |
|
|
Other Title |
|
Creator |
Name |
XU, Qing
|
Kana |
|
Romanization |
|
Affiliation |
Fraud Risk Management, American Express Cards
|
Affiliation (Translated) |
|
Role |
|
Link |
|
Name |
BATABYAL, Amitrajeet A.
|
Kana |
|
Romanization |
|
Affiliation |
Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology
|
Affiliation (Translated) |
|
Role |
|
Link |
|
|
Edition |
|
Place |
|
Publisher |
Name |
Keio Economic Society, Keio University
|
Kana |
|
Romanization |
|
|
Date |
Issued (from:yyyy) |
2001
|
Issued (to:yyyy) |
|
Created (yyyy-mm-dd) |
|
Updated (yyyy-mm-dd) |
|
Captured (yyyy-mm-dd) |
|
|
Physical description |
|
Source Title |
Name |
Keio economic studies
|
Name (Translated) |
|
Volume |
38
|
Issue |
1
|
Year |
2001
|
Month |
|
Start page |
53
|
End page |
70
|
|
ISSN |
|
ISBN |
|
DOI |
|
URI |
|
JaLCDOI |
|
NII Article ID |
|
Ichushi ID |
|
Other ID |
|
Doctoral dissertation |
Dissertation Number |
|
Date of granted |
|
Degree name |
|
Degree grantor |
|
|
Abstract |
We analyze environmental policy in a two country world in which national governments and polluting firms behave strategically. Two general issues are examined. First, we specify the conditions under which the pursuit of one-sided environmental policy by a country in a Bertrand game, will immiserize that country. Second, we examine the effects of pollution control by means of alternate price control instruments in a Bertrand game in which national governments care about global pollution but polluting firms do not. We find that there are reasonable circumstances in which the conduct of one-sided environmental policy is immiserizing. Next, we show that when the two countries are similar, the joint policy instrument is the most desirable pollution control instrument. However, when the two countries are dissimilar, there is no clear answer as to which control instrument is the most desirable.
|
|
Table of contents |
|
Keyword |
|
NDC |
|
Note |
|
Language |
|
Type of resource |
|
Genre |
|
Text version |
|
Related DOI |
|
Access conditions |
|
Last modified date |
|
Creation date |
|
Registerd by |
|
History |
|
Index |
|
Related to |
|