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Item Type Article
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AA00260492-19980001-0001  
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Title
Title SELF-BINDING COALITIONS  
Kana  
Romanization  
Other Title
Title  
Kana  
Romanization  
Creator
Name 中山, 幹夫  
Kana ナカヤマ, ミキオ  
Romanization NAKAYAMA, Mikio  
Affiliation Faculty of Economics, Keio University  
Affiliation (Translated)  
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Place
Tokyo  
Publisher
Name Keio Economic Society, Keio University  
Kana  
Romanization  
Date
Issued (from:yyyy) 1998  
Issued (to:yyyy)  
Created (yyyy-mm-dd)  
Updated (yyyy-mm-dd)  
Captured (yyyy-mm-dd)  
Physical description
 
Source Title
Name Keio economic studies  
Name (Translated)  
Volume 35  
Issue 1  
Year 1998  
Month  
Start page 1  
End page 8  
ISSN
00229709  
ISBN
 
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URI
JaLCDOI
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Doctoral dissertation
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Abstract
Assuming away the possibility of binding agreements, we define a strategy for a coalition, called a self-binding strategy, that sustains the coalition independently of the strategies of all other players. It is shown that a market game in characteristic function form is one that can be derived from a strategic game in which every coalition has a self-binding strategy.
 
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Language
英語  
Type of resource
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Journal Article  
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Last modified date
Dec 18, 2009 09:00:00  
Creation date
Dec 18, 2009 09:00:00  
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/ Public / Faculty of Economics / Keio economic studies / 35(1) 1998
 
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