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Emerging Japan and Competing Print Market: Japan's Shadow in the 1930s Dutch Indies¹⁾

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Political Implications of Printing Competition

In the 1930s Dutch Indies newspapers that were on the *persbreidel-ordinnantie* (Press Curbing Ordinance) watch-list were put under surveillance for a year.²⁾ The authorities constantly updated the list, but the degree of priority placed on this activity was subject to change depending on the socio-political condition. The changing priorities evident in the colonial state reflect the fact that external circumstances became more significant to the Indies state, as is implied in three-ways communications among the Governor-General, the Prosecutor General and the Director of Justice described blow.³⁾

Concern about external security was new to the colonial authorities. Indeed, most colonial states concentrated on only internal security matters, as external security was generally guaranteed by written agreements and/or treaties among Western colonial powers. From the Dutch point of view, dire developments in international context took place in the 1930s. These included the Great Depression, which reached the Indies in 1930; the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931; Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933, his suppression of all opposition, and reoccupation of Rhineland in 1934-1935; the February failed coup in Ja-

pan and the subsequently intensified militarization; the breakout of the Spanish civil war; Italy's occupation of Ethiopia in 1936; the Sino-Japanese war in China in 1937; war in Europe and the beginning of the formation of the Axis alliance in 1939; and, finally, the occupation of Holland in 1940.

How the Indies state would confront these rapid changes in the international situation during the 1930s became a significant policy decision that opened up possibilities for various (re)actions in the colonial society. An obvious problem for the Dutch authorities was Chinese reactions to Japan's aggression towards China.

Japan's Presence

In 1930, the census tallied 60.7 million persons living in the Indies. Out of the total, there were 1,233,000 persons in the "Chinese" category, which constituted about 2.3 percent of the population. Recent Chinese immigrants retained close contacts with their ancestral home, as historian C. F. Remer estimates based on Chinese emigrants' remittances to China in 1930. Funds transfer from the Netherlands Indies came to about 25 million guilders or 5.8 percent of the Foreign Asiatic income in the colony.⁴) Since the amount of remittances was small, it suggests that the Chinese had their own networks and maintained ties between the Indies and China.

In an article published in 1930, Amry Vandenbosch, a political science professor at Kentucky University, wrote of strong material and sentimental bonds between the Indies Chinese with China:

among the totoks (full-blooded) and also among large number of peranakans there is a very active Chinese national sentiment which expresses itself in forms that cause the government no little trouble and concern. [...] The Chinese schools recruited large number of teachers from this region, and these have done much to awaken Chinese nationalist sentiment. There is much propaganda from out

of China; the Kuomintang controls a considerable press in the Indies. Events in China are closely followed and when China has a grievance the press reflects it. [...] When Canton was still revolutionary Chinese conflict was transported to the Indies and disturbances took place. The boycott against Japan was observed with varying degrees of rigidity in different parts of the Indies, and in some places was maintained by terrorization. [...]

(the) Chinese in the Indies really do not constitute the danger politically that some people would have us believe. They are too practical to continue sending money to China for purely sentimental reasons without some tangible return. [...] Complaints are expressed in the Chinese press that they are making little economic progress. [...]

The [Chinese] Nationalist government has not forgotten about the Chinese colonies abroad, and its attitude in most respect is similar to that of its predecessors. It is demanding a new consular treaty with the Netherlands and also desires the assimilation of Chinese to Europeans in the East Indies.⁵⁾

But Vandenbosch also recognized that the majority of Chinese in the Indies were loyal Dutch subjects with only sentimental interest in China as the “long-continued turmoil in China has disillusioned many and caused a general decrease of interest in the homeland.”⁶⁾ Even though American and English scholars such as Vandenbosch and John S. Furnivall⁷⁾ claimed that by 1930 there was no longer such thing as the “Chinese question,” and that the Chinese were not politically dangerous, the above citation already signaled that the Chinese might eventually bring anxiety to the Dutch government in the Indies.

The timing of the publication of Vandenbosch’s article is worth noticing. In 1929, a year before the piece was published, the Chinese government passed a new Chinese citizenship act, which reaffirmed the principle of *jus sanguinis* and stipulated that a Chinese who wished to become a national of another country could only lose his Chinese citizenship with the permission of the Ministry of the Interior.⁸⁾ In other

words, this was the time when the question of citizenship reemerged as a diplomatic issue between China and the Netherlands, which is what appears to have prompted Vandenbosch to remark that the Chinese did not constitute a political threat to the Indies, while implying that their existence could cause a diplomatic headache for the Netherlands.

Vandenbosch later incorporated his article into his book, *The Dutch East Indies*,⁹⁾ which arguably became a standard introduction to the affairs of the Indies. Ten years after the article was published, Vandenbosch's view on the Indies Chinese question was also reproduced in a book published in Japan. Regardless of whether or not the author was a Chinese expert, the appearance of Vandenbosch's article as a Japanese publication deserves closer notice.

This article was published in a book entitled *Ranryo Indo niokeru Kakyō* (Overseas Chinese in the Dutch Indies), edited by *Mantetsu Tōwa Keizai Chōsa-kyoku* (the Research Institute of East Asian Economy of the South Manchurian Railroad Company, hereafter Mantetsu). Mantetsu was a Japanese enterprise that not only constructed and operated railways in Manchuria, but also undertook the construction of towns, harbor improvements, coal and iron mining, social infrastructure, and agricultural experimentation. It was also known for its intelligence activity; its research institute published a series of books on Asia including the Southeast Asian region. During the period of 1938 and 1940, it published a series of six-book series on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, one of which was the title mentioned above.¹⁰⁾ The series was printed in haste, because after the Sino-Japanese war broke out in July 1937, the Japanese government was preparing to establish a new Asian order. The general introduction for the series revealed two aims: first and foremost the task at hand was to understand to what extent overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia would collaborate with the Japanese in the near future, while the second aim was to examine the socio-economic influence of this population group.¹¹⁾ The text also maintained that in order for Japan to establish a new regional order, it had to build a direct relationship with seven million overseas Chinese in the region.¹²⁾

The book contains significant data on the Indies Chinese. It provides general demographic, economic, political and social data, while also showing to whom Japan was paying attention among the pro-Japanese prominent Chinese. The Matetsu team made use of Vandenbosch's article to map the political position of the Chinese in the Indies.¹³⁾ This does not mean that the team did not know or read Dutch sources. They referred to Dutch colonial publications such as *Vragen van den dag* (Questions of the Day), *Regeerings-almanak voor Nederlandsch-Indië* (Governmental-Almanac for the Netherlands Indies), and *Indische Verslag* (Indies Reports) to develop data on the Chinese political position in official colonial institutions. But since their intention in making this report was to seek out pro-Japan Chinese, they disregarded other categorizations that could have been made of the Chinese in the Indies according to political orientation, which included groups such as pro-China, pro-Holland and pro-Indonesia Chinese.¹⁴⁾ The reason behind Japan's attention to pro-Japan Chinese was obviously its intention to expand its activities in Southeast Asia.

From the 1920s onward Japan's economic expansion into Southeast Asia had increased rapidly, and by the 1930s its economic influence over the Indies could no longer be ignored.¹⁵⁾ The Indies-Japan trade relations constituted a major international challenge for the Indies government. In the 1930s Japan's economic presence became a burning issue in the Indies as well as elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Even the vernacular press reported on Japan's expansion in the Indies.¹⁶⁾ The ratio between imports and exports became quite unbalanced. While exports to Japan constituted only four percent of all exports, imports from Japan exceeded one-third of total imports. Under this condition, the Indies state issued an emergency ordinance to restrict imports of cement and beer from Japan, because it was concerned with rising economic protectionism after the Great Depression and with Japan's economic penetration. In order to resolve the situation, a series of Japan-Dutch trade negotiations took place. Informal talks began in late 1933, and formal talks resumed in June 1934. But while the Indies government sought to restrict

imports from Japan, it rejected Japan's requests for the expansion of exports and investments, maritime agreements between the two countries, and unrestricted immigration to the Indies. Because of this gap between the two governments, the negotiation broke down in late 1934. After this break in negotiations lasted more than one year, on 8 June 1936,¹⁷⁾ the two countries reached an agreement on cargo shipping. The Netherlands government agreed to a compromise on various points for it, resulting in the Hart-Ishizawa agreement on interim (intra-quarter) trades on 9 April 1937.¹⁸⁾ As had become clear in the trade negotiations, the Indies had a weak position against Japan's aggressive demands. The trade talks made the Indies government realized the challenges it faced in dealing with Japan. The negotiation process showed that a main motivation of the Indies state was the desire to appease the Japanese government.

The challenge posed by Japan for the Indies government was the major factor defining *persbreidel* in the latter half of the 1930s, except for those cases involving Dutch newspapers. Japan constituted the main security concern for the Indies government during this period. Patterns in the number of the colonial files being issued at the time reflected this shift of policy priority. The number of files on "movements," meaning political activities by "communists" and "extremists," which had constituted the major part of colonial mail report declined substantially as the 1930s proceeded. In the 1920s there were four or five hundreds files sent to The Hague every year on "communists," especially from 1923 to 1928, and several hundred on "communists" and "nationalists" from 1929 to 1933/34. But between the late 1920s and 1934, an almost equal number of files were produced on "Chinese," and from the middle of the 1930s, the files sent to The Hague on "Japanese" outnumbered all those on communists, nationalists, and the Chinese combined. This pattern again suggests that by the middle of the 1920s and the late 1930s the top security concern of the Indies government had evidently shifted from "communists" to "Japanese."

The Japan question did not solely derive externally, but took a dif-

ferent shape within the Indies colony, where was related to anti-Japanese actions and discourses among the Indies Chinese residents. Several waves of anti-Japanese actions had taken place up until the middle of the 1930s. In the 1920s there had been conflicts between the Indies government and the Chinese consuls over the use of the Chinese national flag on the days of national mourning, one of which was the day for commemorating the Twenty-one Demands on 25 May. The demands in question in the commemoration were those made by Japan on the Chinese government. During World War I, in January 1915 Japan had sent a set of demands to the nominal government of the Republic of China that resulted in two treaties signed in May 1915. Among other things, the treaties guaranteed special privileges for Japan in China much like those already enjoyed by major European powers, confirmed Japan's railway and mining claims in Shandong province, and gave Japan special concessions in Manchuria. In short the treaties symbolized a national humiliation for the Chinese. The Indies government understood this historical background well, and yet, as Vandenbosch observes in his article on Indies Chinese, it had "prohibited flying the flag at half mast on these days on the ground that it could not permit within its territory any act which would constitute an offence to Japan, a power with which it is on friendly relations."¹⁹⁾ The Indies government had prioritized deferring to Japan's sensibilities over those of its Chinese residents', and warned that all kinds of Chinese actions that could affect Japan's dignity should be avoided.

In 1932 and 1933 large-scale anti-Japan demonstrations and boycotts of Japanese goods took place. Similar anti-Japan movement occurred in other colonies in Southeast Asia. The trigger was the establishment of the Manchuria puppet state by the Japanese government in September 1932. The Indies Chinese press zealously reported on this development and even campaigned for anti-Japanese actions. Their acts naturally displeased the Indies government, and thus the very first *persbreidel* to be issued in the Indies was applied to *Warta Warna* in Semarang. The rationale was that its anti-Japanese articles had caused in-

security of public order. But the last big blow came in late 1937 after the Sino-Japanese war broke out. As the war escalated, the Indies Chinese press published even more aggressive anti-Japanese articles. In response the Indies government issued *persbreidel* against those newspapers one after another.

Japan's aggressive moves in Asia also took a cultural turn.²⁰⁾ Starting in the early 1930s, Japan made a move to penetrate the print culture of the region by circulating its political propaganda. To do this, Japan started building its own print houses and subsidizing Indonesian newspapers. These activities pushed the Indies government to take steps to counter Japan's cultural penetration.

Bureau for East Asian Affairs

The growing presence of Japan in Asia and in the Indies in particular required the Indies government to reorganize its administrative institutions, and in 1932 a major administrative reorganization took place. The two Bureaus for Chinese Affairs and for Japanese Affairs were merged into a new one, the Bureau for Chinese and East Asian Affairs (*Dienst der Chineesche Zaken en Oost-Aziatische Aangelegenheden*, hereafter Bureau for East Asian Affairs). The head of this Bureau was H. Mouw, who had been the head of Bureau for Chinese Affairs since 1919. He ran the new bureau until his retirement in 1935, and then A. H. J. Lovink took his position on 25 July 1935. Lovink served as its head until the Bureau was dissolved in 1942 following Japan's occupation of the Indies.

Combining the bureaus of Chinese and Japanese Affairs represented a change of policy. Since 1916, the Bureau for Chinese Affairs had a section for Japanese affairs. Back then, H. Mouw was the head of the bureau, which had two officers for Chinese Affairs, J. A. M. Bruneman and J. Snellen van Vollenhoven, while H. L. Bense was in charge of the Japanese Affairs. In 1921 the independent bureau, Bureau for Japanese Affairs, was organized and a year later it became the Office for Japa-

nese Affairs. Its advisor was P. A. van de Stadt until the office was combined with the Bureau for East Asian Affairs in 1932.

The newly established bureau had to watch over not only activities of the Indies Chinese, but also political and military developments taking place in China and Japan. Nevertheless, as the name showed, it put more focus on Chinese affairs than those of Japanese. The Chinese division had ten officials. This included five officers of Chinese Affairs: J. Snellen van Vollenhoven, Dr. A. D. A. de Kat Angelino, J. B. de Wilde, A. H. J. Lovink, and L. Kamper. Indonesians were appointed as excisemen with Tjitrotaroenno assuming the position of first exciseman, and Raden Soeria Adi Negara and Soeratman as his subordinates. A Chinese, S. Cho, also known as Tsang Tsui Shih, had been appointed as an officer since 7 January 1922. In 1934 one more officer was added. All officers for Chinese affairs were trained as Sinologists at Leiden University, and hence they all were able to read Chinese language.

Between late 1936 and 1937 under the leadership of Lovink, further administrative restructuring of the Bureau for East Asian Affairs took place as new positions were added. One editor, Dr. L. G. M. Jaquet and four aspirant-controllers, F. J. E. van Gelden, Mr. Th. H. Bot, S. Meijer Jr. and F. P. Thomassen, were appointed. Three aspirant officials were newly stationed in Peking (H. Hagenaar) and Tokyo (G. J. Dissevelt and G. J. Jogejans). S. Cho was now a chief translator for Japanese language, while J. King and Tso Ping Nam took charge in Chinese language translations. With these changes, the size of the staff at the Bureau for East Asian Affairs had doubled to twenty officials.²¹⁾

High officials working for the Bureau for Chinese Affairs tended to have lengthier terms of service in the colonial administration, when compared with officials in other administrative positions. For instance, J. Snellen van Vollenhoven served as adviser in the Indies for twenty-three years, his last post being that of Deputy Adviser on East Asian Affairs to the Government at Batavia before returning to Holland in 1933. H. Mouw also worked for twenty-three years from 1912, and was eventually in charge of the Bureau from 1916 until his retirement in

1935. In the capacity of advisor for the Bureau Mouw travelled widely in China, Japan, Indo-China, Siam and the Straits Settlements, and built an international intelligence network between the imperial powers.²²⁾

The Bureau for East Asian Affairs was responsible for gathering information on the political activities of Indies Chinese as well as China's political development and Japan's actions in Asia. In the 1930s the bureau spent more time than ever on Japan's affairs, because the latter directly affected China's development and evoked strong reactions from Indies Chinese. The bureau regularly sent confidential reports on those issues, but the additional information it also provided to help make sense of newspaper reports became worthwhile reading for colonial officials as well.

Among other issues, Japan's aggressive approach to Indonesian nationalists, intellectuals, and journalists caught the bureau's attention. Development in the year 1933 was particularly notable as Japan invited two prominent intellectuals — Mohamad Hatta and Parada Harahap — to visit Japan. According to a Dutch confidential report, Hatta visited Japan for a month in April 1933.²³⁾ The report cited Japanese newspapers in Osaka and Kobe, which described him as “the young Gandhi of Java” (*de jonge Gandhi van Java*). These newspapers detailed Hatta's life, the connection between his visit and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, and how his people's self-consciousness would awaken. They reported that Hatta's visit would bring Japan and Indonesia, whose people shared the (Asian) blood, closer together. According to the newspapers, the intention of Hatta's visit was to study Japan's industrial development as a model for the Indies in the development of private industries for its economic independence, which was crucial for its political sovereignty. The Dutch report also described the reaction of the Indies press to Hatta's Japanese visit. The semi-governmental Dutch newspaper, *Java Bode*, made an abridged translation of the English edition of *Osaka Mainichi* (Osaka Daily), and concluded Hatta to be a propagandist but harmless.

A more sobering warning signal for the Dutch came from *Jawa Nip-*

po, the Japanese language newspaper in Java, when it mentioned that Hatta met several influential persons in Japan, one of whom was Rash Behari Bose, the exiled British Indian agitator and leader of the anti-British movement.²⁴⁾ During World War I Bose became one of the leading figures of the Ghadar Conspiracy, which attempted to trigger a mutiny in India in February 1915. The revolution failed and most revolutionaries were captured. But Bose managed to escape British intelligence, obtained a passport for Japan by asking P. N. Tagore, a relative of the famous poet Tagore, and reached Japan in late 1915 by way of Singapore and Hong Kong. In Japan he established a shelter for radical Pan-Asian groups and became a Japanese citizen in 1923, living as a journalist and writer. In 1942 he formed the Indian Independence League in Tokyo and started organizing non-residential Indians in Southeast Asia. Through his activity, he became close friends of Japanese right-wing nationalists and Pan-Asianism leaders, such as Toyama Mitsuru.²⁵⁾

Hatta's other significant meeting took place with Shimonaka Yasaburo, a member of an extremely reactionary nationalist association, *Kodokai* (Imperial Way Society).²⁶⁾ Shimonaka was a well-known leader of labor and peasant movements, the founder of a teachers' union, and founder of a successful publishing company, Heibonsha. But his ideological position changed from leftism to National Socialism in the early 1930s, which also embraced pan-Asianism.²⁷⁾ Pan-Asianism was an ideology formed in the 1930s, promoting a view that under the leadership of Japan, Asian nations would solidify and create a continental identity that would defeat Western imperialism. The Dutch secret report found Hatta's access to Pan-Asianism organizations and leaders troubling because those networks would support nationalist movements in the Indies as well as British India. The worrisome indicator was the anti-British movement being organized by Bose and other Indian exiles in Japan. Since the Japanese government did not suppress such activity, it posed a threat to Western powers. At the same time, the report also found relief in the fact that no Indonesian political exiles had yet sought

refugee status in Japan, and hence no evidence of active Japan-Indonesian associational activity appeared to exist.²⁸⁾

While Hatta met Japanese and Indian political figures, Parada Harahap's trip to Japan focused more on industrial and economic aspects of the country. It appeared that Harahap went to Japan not in the capacity of journalist but as entrepreneur. He was accompanied by seven friends and arrived at Kobe on December 1933.²⁹⁾ He met three members of the executive board of the *Ishihara Sangyo Koshi* (Ishihara Concern), which owned iron ore mines in British Malaya and the Indies and was growing as a trading company in the region.³⁰⁾ In Kobe and Osaka, the Chamber of Commerce, and Governor and Mayor offered dinners for the Harahap group. The Dutch report on Harahap's trip notes that the English edition of *Osaka Mainichi* referred to Harahap as "the king of newspaper in Java" (*Java kranten koning*) and praised the good relationship between Japan and Java.³¹⁾ According to the colonial document, Harahap managed to avoid delivering any official speech during his stay in Japan, despite various requests. The implication was that Japan was eager to develop a relationship with Harahap, who continued to contribute his travel essays to his daily *Bintang Timoer*.³²⁾

Japan's overtures to Hatta and Harahap were not entirely successful. Hatta was arrested in February 1934 due to his political activity along with his connection with Japan's right-wing activists, and then banished to Boven Digoel in January 1935. Harahap went bankrupt in 1935 and was charged with financial felony.³³⁾ But despite these setbacks, by the beginning of the 1930s Japan's cultural activities had begun to take root in the Indies.

Japan's Propaganda, Printing Houses, Print Competition

Since the 1920s, Japan's economic presence in Southeast Asia rapidly grew. Japan's economic interests in the region, especially in the Indies, lied in rich natural resources such as oil and rubber that were considered essential for Japan's economic progress. In the 1930s Japan's

southward expansion became justified by the ideology of Pan-Asianism, mostly led by various rightist organizations that developed close relationships with the Japanese government.³⁴⁾

Japan's aggressive propaganda involved various methods. In the 1930s, the intensification of Japanese "cultural" activities in the Indies, both formal and informal, became a problem with regard to the colonial order and tranquility. Formal cultural activities were carried out by the Japanese consulates in the Indies. The Japanese consulate in Soerabaja, for instance, produced and circulated propaganda documents on Pan-Asianism by the Japanese government, held anti-Chinese lectures, and wrote letters of protest to Dutch authorities against anti-Japanese newspaper articles.³⁵⁾

Informal cultural activities included publishing newspapers in the Malay language, and building and making use of collaborative relationship with Indonesian intellectuals and journalists. The Japanese started to publish Malay newspapers in the late 1930s. Two Japanese-owned newspapers deserve our attention here. In 1937 the daily *Sinar Selatan* (Southern Gleam) began circulation in Semarang with a well-known figure, Tsuda Tsukasa, as a chief editor who was the president as well as editor-in-chief of daily *Astra*. *Sinar Selatan* was considered a semi-official Japanese newspaper and had Taira Isamu as its editor-in-chief, Mohamad Soedradjat as the vice editor-in-chief, and Sjamsoedin also in the editorial board. In late 1938, *Sinar Selatan* discontinued its publication because its core associate Kaneko Keizo had arranged to purchase daily the *Warta Harian* (Daily News) in Batavia.³⁶⁾ The other newspaper, under the guidance of the Japanese consulate, *Tohindo Nippo* (Indies Daily), was launched in Batavia in 1937. Kubo Tatsuji, who owned *Nichiran Shogyo Shimbun* (Japan-Netherlands Commercial Newspaper) since 1934, was committed to the establishment of *Tohindo Nippo* and made it a joint venture.³⁷⁾ Saito Masao, who used to be the editor-in-chief of a Japanese daily *Jawa Nippo*, became the president, while Taniguchi Goro served as the editor-in-chief. Siauw Tjin Hoen or Shio Sei Oen took charge of publishing and the Ogawa Corporation took responsibility of the print-

ing.³⁸⁾

Building up collaborative relationships with Indonesian nationalists and leading journalists was also important for the Japanese in the publishing business. Three approaches were possible in this regard. The first was to build a network among indigenous journalists through a leading indigenous journalist, in this case Saëroen, who as editor-in-chief of *Pemandangan* had a long history of involvement with Indies newspapers and enjoyed a good relationship with leading Indonesian “national” figures such as Dr. Soetomo, Thamrin, Soekardjo, H. A. Salim, and Parada Harahap.³⁹⁾ Kubo and a missionary Kurinoki Tatsuo had access to Saëroen. Through Saëroen’s network, Kubo and Kurinoki became acquainted with leading Indonesian figures and built a sort of collaborative relations to spread Japan’s ideas of pan-Asianism.

The second method for effective propagandizing was to increase the number of pro-Japanese Indonesian periodicals.⁴⁰⁾ Soerabaja in particular had many pro-Japanese periodicals. Among others, *Soeara Oemoem* (Public Voice), *Djawa Timoer* (East Java), *Sipatahoenan*, *Nan Sen* (Soerabaja-based weekly magazine) each had a large circulations and therefore relatively strong influence. *Soeara Oemoem* was led by Dr. Soetomo, while Parada Harahap was deeply involved in the publication of *Djawa Timoer*. After October 1937, Kurinoki who was competent in Malay frequently contributed articles on Japanese propaganda to four newspapers including *Soeara Oemoem*.

The third propaganda measure was to extend Japan’s influence over local newspapers by providing loans, financing, and purchasing advertisements.⁴¹⁾ By financing local newspapers, Japanese agents were able to persuade them to carry pro-Japanese articles. In late 1938 the Japanese tried to purchase *Warta Harian*, a Batavia-based daily.⁴²⁾ *Warta Harian* was considered a neutral newspaper and therefore Japanese agents thought that it would not be difficult for *Warta Harian* to carry pro-Japanese articles from time to time without drawing attentions from the colonial authorities. The agents pursued this plan for more

than a year, had conducted a background research on *Warta Harian*, and obtained information on the number of publication, readers, subscribers and its business situation.

Japanese agents evidently made every effort to propagate Japan's political ideas in the Indies through its cultural policy and were in some sense successful in their mission to penetrate the indigenous journalistic network. The colonial authorities had already recognized these Japanese activities and subsequently begun to collect information on them. As the Japanese cultural activities, which consisted of conducting anti-Chinese and anti-Western campaigns as well as finding and encouraging collaborators among Indonesian journalists and nationalists, intensified in 1938, the Indies government started to exercise *persbreidel* against such Japanese newspapers as *Sinar Selatan* and *Tohindo Nippo*. From the secret colonial documents one is able to see how, when and where Japanese agents operated clandestinely, but it is difficult to identify how colonial authorities obtained this information about them. One possible explanation suggests the presence of Dutch informants among the Indonesian journalists who worked closely with the Japanese. What is clear in any case is that the Dutch eventually tried to counter Japan's moves by imposing business regulations.

Japan's cultural activities were closely intertwined with its economic activities. Among other developments, Japan's penetration of the print business posed a threat to the colonial authorities. In 1934 the Department of Economic Affairs sent a draft of "Business Regulation Ordinance 1934" to the Council of the Netherlands Indies.⁴³⁾ It became an official ordinance in April 1935 (Official Gazette No. 595) and known as the Printing Regulation (*Reglementeering Drukkerij*).⁴⁴⁾ The regulation required all printing houses to obtain government license and permits, which implied that there would be cases in which the application would be rejected. The ordinance, as Article 2 read, was applicable to printers across the Indies.⁴⁵⁾ In effect, the colonial authorities sought to get better control over the social and economic order by imposing stronger regulations on business in the colony, particularly in the printing industry.

As a confidential letter of 1935 from the Director of Department of Economic Affairs, G. H. C. Hart, demonstrated, the new regulation on print business regulations represented an attempt to confine the expansion of Japan's influence in the field.⁴⁶⁾ He even used the word "fear" (*vrees*) regarding the establishment of Japanese printing houses in the Indies. Those Japanese printing houses, Hart continued, potentially could destroy major companies. As he saw it, this danger derived from the fact that no effective regulation controlling the establishment of new publishing companies had existed up until now. For Hart, the new regulations were meant to protect existing printing and publishing companies and by so doing to prevent Japan's influence from penetrating in this field.

In fact as reported by the newspaper *Sin Tit Po*, in 1933 Japan was aggressively trying to establish its printing houses in Semarang.⁴⁷⁾ In the same year, the printing house, "Astra," had already started its business at Gang Pinggir and was now waiting for the permission from the government. Although its request for permission had been once rejected, this time it tried by using the name of the Chinese from Formosa (Taiwan). There was also report of yet another Japanese printer looking for a place to start his business. Semarang was an ideal city for the Japanese, according to *Sin Tit Po*, because the kretek cigarettes factories were located nearby.⁴⁸⁾

The confidential reports from Bureau for East Asian Affairs give more detailed information on the development described in the *Sin Tit Po* news coverage. The Bureau's ninth report issued in 1933 identified the name of a big printing company in Semarang.⁴⁹⁾ The company was a joint venture of the Printer Morikawa in Osaka, the Hamada Printing Press Factory in Tokyo, and Kato & Co. from Kobe. Its capital was f 50,000 and it employed Japanese. The report also indicated that its capital was equivalent to a Dutch newspaper, *Algemeen Handelsblad*, in Semarang. Indies Chinese newspapers such as *Sin Tit Po* and *Sin Po* fiercely protested the new "intruder" (*indringer*), and *Sin Tit Po* threatened to boycott the new Japanese printing company.

In addition to the matter of Japanese printing houses, the Bureau's report also described a rumor, saying that Japanese government was secretly subsidizing Indonesian newspapers. The police apparently had begun its investigation on this allegation. This news became the cover story of *Pewarta Deli* in 22 August 1934,⁵⁰⁾ in which the editor explicitly said that Japan tried to subsidize Indonesian papers in order to disseminate Japan's propaganda. Because of this allegation, the confidential report continued, PID had started its investigation to "open the secret of Indonesian press companies" (*ingin boeka rahsia peroesahaan2 pers Indonesia*) to determine if any companies had received secret money (*fonds rahsia*) from the Japanese government. The article even argued that it was the obligation of PID to investigate Japan's political slogan — Asia for the Asian nation — because of the threat the slogan would pose to the Indies government if it succeeded in gaining the people's sympathy. The editor was certain that Japan subsidized some Indonesian newspapers, so PID needed to find out which newspapers were under Japan's influence.

In order to understand the economic circumstances surrounding printing houses, the Department of Economic Affairs launched an investigation. In March 1935, for the first time ever the Dutch made a list of printing houses (not publishers) operating in the Indies.⁵¹⁾ The list was compiled as the supplement document no. 3 in verbal no. 35 dated 26 March 1935, which is equivalent to the secret mail report no. 204 in the year of 1935. It records 305 printing houses from 74 cities. Among others, 44 printing houses are located in Batavia, followed by 24 in Soerabaja, 21 in Bandoeng, 16 in Soerakarta, 14 in Medan, 10 in Padang and Semarang.

Other than this government-made list several other sources of data on publishers, printing-houses, and bookshops in the Indies also exist. *Handboek voor cultuur- en handels-ondernemingen in Nederlandsch-Indies*, published yearly by J. H. de Bussy in Amsterdam is a useful source.⁵²⁾ As the title clearly shows, this is a list-book on cultural and commercial firms and shops. According to the 1910's edition, there were 72 publish-

ers, printing-houses, and bookshops existed in 24 cities in the Indies. Most of these were located in major cities in Java and owned by Dutch and Eurasians judging from the Dutch-sounding names of their listed owners. Twenty-four years later, the *Handboek*'s 1934 edition shows that the number of publishing related shops jumped from 72 to one 178; the number of cities in which publishing-related business were operating had jumped from 24 to 37, due largely to the economic development that had taken place in Sumatra.⁵³⁾

An even more important piece of information offered in the same mail report is a list titled "General Mutations of Printing Business in the Years of 1933 and 1934."⁵⁴⁾ This is a listing of private printing houses that either began their business or closed down in the years 1933 and 1934. As the listing shows, in the course of two years, some 35 new printing houses started business in the Indies, while 30 printing houses were forced to close down. Once-major printing houses that produced many books and periodicals in the Indies — including the likes of Drukkerij "Minerva" in Bandoeng, Drukkerij "Hoe Saing In Kiok," "Albrecht" and "Bintang Hindia" in Batavia, Drukkerij "Han Po" in Palembang, Drukkerij "Minerva" and "Warna Warta" in Semarang, Drukkerij "Excelsior" in Soekaboemi and Soerabaja — ceased operation in the years 1933 and 1934. In some cases, such as that of Drukkerij "Brotoamiprodjo" in Pamekasan and Drukkerij "Apollo," newer publishing and printer houses were in business for less than two years. Clearly, the print market of the early 1930s was a very competitive scene.

The timing of the Dutch colonial government's survey of Indies printing houses is suggestive. By 1934 the Indonesian nationalist movement had been well confined by the secret police, and almost at the same time many private publishers and printing houses went bankrupt due to the economic depression that had badly hit the Indies from 1932 onwards. Oddly enough, the middle of the 1930s also saw a period when a new trend in the launching of many new printing houses emerged. Obviously, the print media market was perceived to be a good profit-gen-

**Table 1 General Mutations of Printing Business
in the Years of 1933 and 1934**

	Opening business		Closing business	
City	Name	Year	Name	Year
Bandoeng	Sin Ah	1934	Minerva	1933
	Galoenggoeng	1934	Maks v/d Klits	1934
	Soekarja	1934		
Batavia	Paseban	1933	Hoa Siang In Kiok	1933
	Milly	1933	Said Abdullah	1933
	Kwee Tjeng Yan	1933	Artisto	1933
	Gouw Thio Goan	1933	Dunlop	1933
	Lie Ie Tjoeng	1933	Milly	1934
	Elsevier	1934	Albrecht	1934
	Djawa Barat	1934	Plantjin	1934
	Tan Hin Hoo	1934	Bintang Hindia	1934
	Maisin Chemical Factory	1934		
Blitar			Liem Liang Djwan	1934
Cheribon	Affif	1934	Tiong Hoa	1934
Djocjakarta	Fabrieik Negresco	1933	Tan Gwat Bing	1934
	Fadjar	1933	Bob	1934
	Kita	1933		
	Het Boekendepot	1934		
Kediri	Quick	1934		
Makassar	Lie A Liat	1933		
Malang	Mars	1934		
Palembang	Ebeling	1933	Han Po	1933
	Ban Seng Hoat	1933	Ind. Mij. Palembang	1933
Pamekasan	Brotoamiprodjo	1933	Brotoamiprodjo	1933
Parakan	Ong Tiauw Hok	1934		
Pekalongan	Fortuna	1933		
Poerwokerto	Apollo	1933	Apollo	1934
	Logawa	1934		
	Trio	1934		
Salatiga	Three - onderneming Ampel	1933		
Semarang	Astra	1933	Minerva	1933
	Kongsie Djit Po	1933	Warna Warta	1933
	Smeroe	1933	Van Sohijndel	1933
			Pang Khoen Liem	1934
Samarinda	Paramount Press	1934	Kramat	1933
Soekaboemi	Van Moosdijk	1934	Persaudaraan	1933
			Excelsior	1933
Soerabaja	Litera	1934	Helios	1933
			Excelsior	1933
			Reproductie Co.	1933
			Ilustra	1933
			Java Nippo Sha	1934

erating prospect for private enterprises, and in fact the number and variety of periodicals and publications flourished in that period.

Political Implications of Printing Competition

The data in the above survey clearly indicate that the printing business still attracted many newcomers even as some established printing houses were forced to shut down because of the intense competition. It also suggests that the print market was growing and offered some opportunities to make money.

From this data it is possible to begin to understand why the government was moved to undertake its survey of the publishing industry in 1935 — which is to say at a time when the Indonesian nationalist movement had already been virtually contained, rather than years earlier, in the 1920s, when the movement and the printing industry that helped carry it first began to flourish. It is reasonable to assume that the timing of the government's survey was shaped by factors related to the print market, more specifically by the important expansion in the print market that took place in the 1930s. To recall some of the data cited earlier in this chapter, the number of weeklies was 108, increasing by more than 30 publications from the previous year, whereas the number of monthlies was 382, representing the addition of 130 new monthlies to the Indies publishing market. Many private publishers published various kinds of new periodicals and books; many private printing houses tried to slip into the publishing industry to look for profit. And more importantly, by 1935, the Dutch government no longer had a major influence on the print market and thereby could exert almost no control on the market itself.

The next question would then be: Who was competing in the printing market in the latter half of the 1930s? From the table above it appears that indigenous enterprises were entering the competitive printing market during this period. But I have some doubts about this observation. From my experience in examining *IPO* (The Survey of In-

digenous and Malay Chinese Press),⁵⁵⁾ when the Dutch counted the numbers of Malay periodicals, they were looking exclusively at the periodicals' publishers. In other words, they disregarded those businesses involved in printing the publications. I would argue then, that not until the Japanese began to enter printing business in the 1930s did the Dutch government become motivated to document the printing houses of the Indies, which it finally did in its survey of 1935.

If one focuses on the printing houses of the newly published periodicals, it is possible to find some cases in which Chinese printers assisted in printing the periodicals of indigenous publishers. Soerabaja, the second largest publishing center in the Indies, provides some of the most interesting cases, because in the arena of the publishing industry, the Indonesian nationalists and Indies Chinese intellectuals of Soerabaja had worked very closely together since the 1920s. For instance, *Sendjata Indonesia* (Indonesian Weapon), whose editor-in-chief was Marsoedi, a leading nationalistic figure in Soerabaja in the late 1920s, was printed by Sin Jit Po, and *Perasa'an Kita* (Our Opinion), published by Persatoean Ra'jat Indonesia Sedjati, was printed by Nam Yong. Both Sin Jit Po and Nam Yong printing houses were owned by Chinese, as is obvious from their names. As these examples show, in order to understand the dynamic relationship between various ethnic groups in the print market, it is better to pay more attention on the printing houses. And in the case of Java, there was not much competition among private indigenous, Chinese, and Dutch publishers. Rather a primary factor shaping the publishing scene in Soerabaja was a common interest in working together against Balai Poestaka's state-backed project in the market.

By contrast, Sumatra gives us somehow a different story, as indigenous printers in those cities, led by Medan in the 1930s, indigenous printers played dominant roles in the publishing industry. Medan and Padang, led by Adi Negoro with some 40 of the most popular writers, produced many series of *roman pitjisan* (*dime novels*), which were considered and categorized as periodicals. Printing houses such as N. V. Handel Mij. & Electriscbe Drukkerij "Sjarikat Tapanoeli" and Mij.

Sumatrasche Drukkerij contributed to the development of periodicals in the Sumatran scene. It was almost impossible for indigenous people in publishing industry in Sumatra to co-operate with ethnic Chinese publishers and printers, because *roman pitjisan*-related articles sometimes sound anti-Chinese in terms of “proper” Malay language. Writers as well as publishers and printers of *roman pitjisan* were generally Indonesian nationalists, relying on Minangkabau’s local, commercial and school networks.⁵⁶⁾

However, what is interesting in this quick comparison is that private publishers and printers in Java did not literally compete with those in Sumatra as there was limited overlap in terms of their actual print market and reading public. In Java the main competitive target of private publishers was Balai Poestaka, while the so-called Chinese-Malay literature was widely read there; in Sumatra since neither Balai Poestaka or Chinese-Malay literature was overwhelmingly dominant, indigenous publishers and writers ruled the market. The latter were quite nationalistic in orientation, while their readers were deeply influenced by modern Islamic views. That is why leading *roman pitjisan* writers included figures like Hamka, Joesoef Sou’yb, Tamar Djaja, and the like.

Furthermore, some similarities can be pointed out. On both Java and Sumatra, private publishers imagined their market to be limited to the growing print market in the Indies. In this sense, they appeared to have an incipient consciousness about the territoriality of the state. More importantly, one of their main concerns had to do with making money through the print market. Also, the content of the published periodicals was carefully selected. The main focus was on international as well as local news and affairs and the frequent inclusion of detective stories. As a rule, the periodicals tried to avoid commentary on “national” politics, except on the affairs of the People’s Council, which was the only terrain on which the Indies press was allowed to freely report.

In short, under a regime of political repression and apparent social stability, and yet with little institutional censorship, the print market grew drastically in the last fifteen years of Dutch colonial era. At the

same time, the capitalistic oriented publishers, writers, printers, and distributors contributed to the development of some kind of “national” territorial mapping. Although the Indies state failed to install successful institutional censorship in service of its political and security-related priorities during this period, the development and spread of capitalistic ventures contributed to the creation of a feeling of nationalism with particular local flavors as well as, ironically, self-censored publications in the last years of the Dutch period.

- 1) For helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript I thank Benedict Anderson, Elizabeth Chandra, Caroline Hau, Audrey Kahin, Kato Tsuyoshi, Peter Katzenstein, Thomas Pepinsky, and Eric Tagliacozzo.
- 2) This is what *Sin Tit Po* claims in its article, “Sebab Apa “Soeara Oemoem” kena Persberidel?,” *Sin Tit Po*, 29 June 1933.
- 3) “Schema politiek maatregelen, Persbreidel” in Parket van den Procureur-Generaal (R. Verheyen), 19 December 1933, No. 6929/A. P. Geheim aan den Gouverneur-Generaal, in Mr. 1559x/1933; “Uittreksel uit de Nota der Algemeene Secretarie: Schema politieke maatregelen. Persbreidel,” in Mr. 604x/1934.
- 4) C. F. Remer, *Foreign Investment in China* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 185.
- 5) Amry Vandenbosch, “A Problem in Java: The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies,” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 11 (November 1930), pp. 1015–1017.
- 6) Vandenbosch, “A Problem in Java,” p. 1016.
- 7) John S. Furnivall, *The Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939).
- 8) Donald E. Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia 1900–1958* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1961), p. 17.
- 9) Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies: Its Government, Problems and Politics* (2nd ed.) (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1941).
- 10) The series were published from 1939 to 1940, covering, in the publication order, Siam, French Indochina, the Philippines, the Dutch Indies, British Malaya, and relation between Nanyang Chinese and Fukkien/Canton.

- 11) Mantetsu Toua Keizai Chosa-kyoku, *Ranryo Indo niokeru Kakyo* (Tokyo: Mantetsu Toua Keizai Tyosa-kyoku, 1940), pp. 1-2.
- 12) Mantetsu Toua Keizai Chosa-kyoku, *Ranryo Indo niokeru Kakyo*, p. 1.
- 13) Mantetsu Toua Keizai Chosa-kyoku, *Ranryo Indo niokeru Kakyo*, pp. 104-156.
- 14) The book referred to the collective works of a prominent Chinese expert, Fromberg's *Verspreide Geschriften* (The Collective Works of P. H. Fromberg) as a footnote (P. H. Fromberg, *Mr. P. H. Fromberg's Verspreide geschriften*. Leiden: Leidscheu Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1926). It introduced Fromberg as a judge and pro-China expert, and his book as a collection of overseas Chinese grievances.
- 15) Shin'ya Sugiyama and M. Guerrero (eds.), *International Commercial Rivalry in Southeast Asia in the Interwar Period* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1994); Peter Post, "The formation of the pribumi business elite in Indonesia, 1930s-1940s," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, Vol. 152, No. 4 (1996), pp. 609-632. For an overview on the Japanese community in Southeast Asia, see Saya Shiraishi and Takashi Shiraishi, "The Japanese in Colonial Southeast Asia: An Overview," in Saya Shiraishi and Takashi Shiraishi (eds.), *The Japanese in Colonial Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993), pp.1-20.
- 16) "Expansie Japan di Indonesia: Dalem "The People's Tribune" penerbitan No. 4 (Vol. 6) tanggal 16 februari jang laloe kita batja satoe pemendangan sebagai di bawah ini," *Sin Tit Po*, 9 March 1934.
- 17) It is to be noted that on 26 February 1936 military revolt took place in Tokyo (February 26th Incident of 1936). On the day, about 1,500 troops went on a rampage of assassination against the current and former prime ministers and other cabinet members, and even members of the imperial court. But other military units put down the revolt and many coup plotters were executed after secret trials. Despite public dismay over the incident and the discredit it brought to numerous military figures, Japan's civilian leadership capitulated to the army's demands in the hope of ending domestic violence. But the revolt pushed Japan to be more aggressive and the military eventually took over the government control. Defense budgets saw rapid increase, naval construction was expanded (Japan announced that it would no longer accede to the London Naval Treaty,

which restricted Japan's naval construction), and patriotic indoctrination was intensified. In this way Japan moved toward wartime preparation. So it was the Japan's military government that signed the Japan-Dutch trade agreement.

- 18) Howard Dick, "Japan's Economic Expansion in the Netherlands Indies Between the First and Second World Wars," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. XX, No. 2 (1989), pp. 244-272.
- 19) Vandenbosch, "A Problem in Java," p. 1017.
- 20) For a general view of Japan's cultural operations in the Indies, see Ken'ichi Goto, *'Returning to Asia': Japan-Indonesia Relations 1930s-1942* (Tokyo: Ryukei Shyosha, 1997), pp 278-295. Goto rightly maintains that Japan's cultural operations consist of publishing Japanese language newspapers and committing Japanese journalists to Indonesian nationalist movement.
- 21) *Regeerings-Almanak voor Nederlandsch-Indië* (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij), 1895-1942.
- 22) Mr. 321x/1922; 434x/1922; 430x/1931. On February 1931 an international conference on Chinese affairs was held in Singapore where British, Dutch, and French colonial officials on the Chinese affairs as well as Siamese officials discussed on the Chinese matters in Asia. Mr. 430x/1931.
- 23) "Bezoek van Mohamad Hatta aan Japan," Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 6, 1933, in Mr. 711x/1933.
- 24) "Bezoek van Mohamad Hatta aan Japan," Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 6, 1933, in Mr. 711x/1933.
- 25) For a biography of Rash Behari Bose, see Nakajima Takeshi, *Nakamura no Bose: Indo Dokuritsu Undo to Kindai Nihon no Ajia Shugi* (Tokyo: Hakusuisha, 2005).
- 26) "Bezoek van Mohamad Hatta aan Japan," Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 6, 1933, in Mr. 711x/1933.
- 27) For biographical description of Shimonaka Yasaburo, see *Shimonaka Yasaburo Jiten* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1965).
- 28) "Bezoek van Mohamad Hatta aan Japan," Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 6, 1933, in Mr. 711x/1933. For Hatta's understanding of Japan's "return to Asia," see Goto, *'Returning to Asia'*, pp. 307-322.
- 29) "Reis Parada Harahap naar Japan," Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 1, 1934, in Mr. 107x/1934.
- 30) Yasukichi Yasuba, "Hiroichiro Ishihara and the Stable Supply of Iron Ore,"

in Saya Shiraishi and Takashi Shiraishi (eds.), *The Japanese in Colonial Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993), pp. 139–154.

- 31) *Osaka Mainichi*, December 6, 1934, in “Reis Parada Harahap naar Japan,” Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 1, 1934, in Mr. 107x/1934.
- 32) “Reis Parada Harahap naar Japan,” Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken, No. 1, 1934, in Mr. 107x/1934.
- 33) Harahap later was funded by Japan for his newspaper business.
- 34) Along with Japanese economic penetration into Southeast Asia, many Japanese merchants, fishermen, and camera shop owners worked for the Japanese government by collecting socio-economic information. For Japanese southward advancement and spy activities, see Eric Robertson, *The Japanese File: Pre-War Japanese Penetration in Southeast Asia* (Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, 1979); Peter Elphick, *Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far East, 1930–1945* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1997); Tony Matthews, *Shadows Dancing: Japanese Espionage Against the West 1939–1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). As a counter activity, in the 1930s Indies, the Dutch authorities closely watched Japanese espionage activities. See Netherlands Information Bureau, *Ten years of Japanese burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies: Official report of the Netherlands East Indies government on Japanese subversive activities in the archipelago during the last decade* (New York: Netherlands Information Bureau, 1942); Robert D. Haslach, *Nishi No Kaze, Hare: Nederlands-Indische inlichtingendienst contra aggressor Japan* (Utrecht: Van Kampen & Zn. Weesp, 1985).
- 35) Vb. 24–10–39–M 44; Mr. 146x/1940 in Vb. 14–3–40–A 17.
- 36) Mr. 673x/1939.
- 37) *Nichiran Shogyo Shimbun* changed its name to *Tohindo Nippo* in 1937.
- 38) It is not surprising for the fact that “Indonesian” journalists worked for the Japanese press considering relatively “racially” collaborative circumstances in print media industry in the Indies. The Indies society was considered as “racially” distinguished society as Furnivall describes, and yet for journalists it was not unusual to work in print media industry regardless of “racial” lines. On Furnivall's discussion of plural society, see Furnivall, *Netherlands India*. Working relations among journalists in print media industry, see for instance *Sin Po 25 Tahun 1910–1935* (Batavia: Sin

Po, 1935).

- 39) Mr. 11x/1939 in Vb. 20-1-39-F2, 673x/1939 in Vb. 10-7-39-S26.
- 40) Mr. 988x/38, 11x/39 in Vb. 20-1-39-F2.
- 41) Mr. 988x/38 in Vb. 20-1-39-F2.
- 42) Mr. 673x/39; 859x/39 in Vb. 19-9-39-Z37.
- 43) Mr. 204x/1935.
- 44) *Sin Tit Po* provided the Malay translation of the ordinance on its 11 April 1935 issue. "Reglementeering Drukkerij," *Sin Tit Po*, 11 April 1935.
- 45) Mr. 204x/1935.
- 46) De Directeur van Economische Zaken (G. H. C. Hart), "Toepassing van bedrijfsreglementeering op drukkerijen," No. 69/A.Z.I. Geheim, January 30, 1935, in Mr. 204x/1935.
- 47) "Drukkerij Djepang: Sebagai djamoer di moesin oedjan," *Sin Tit Po*, 24 August 1933.
- 48) "Drukkerij Djepang: Sebagai djamoer di moesin oedjan," *Sin Tit Po*, 24 August 1933.
- 49) "Mededeelingen Chineesche Zaken," No. 9, 1933, in Mr. 1110x/1933.
- 50) "Kapitaal Yapan masoek kedalam peroesahaan soerat kabar Indoneia?: Politieke Inlichtingendienst asjik mentjari keterangan berhoebong dengan kekoeatiran itoe," *Pewarta Deli*, 22 August 1934.
- 51) "Overzicht der mutaties in het drukkersbedrijf gedurende de jaren 1933 en 1934" in 204x/35 in Vb. 26-3-35-31 Bijlage: 4.
- 52) Handboek voor cultuur- en handels-ondernemingen in Nederlandsch-Indies (Amsterdam: J.H. de Bussy, yearly).
- 53) But different sources give different numbers. According to *The New Commercial Directory of the Dutch East Indies* published by Nam Tiong Boek Handel in Batavia in 1932, there were 154 booksellers, publishers, and printing-houses in the Indies. *The New Commercial Directory of the Dutch East Indies of 1932* (Batavia: Nam Tiong Boek Handel, 1932). Since the directory mainly focuses on Dutch and Chinese related commercial firms and shops, it lacks the number of Indonesian business activities, and covers only 20 major cities. An address book of companies in the Indies, *Alegemeen Handelsadresboek van Nederlandsch-Oost Indies 1938-1939* published by Nederlandsche Siemens Maatschappij in Batavia/Soerabaia in 1939 shows that there were 57 bookshops/booksellers and 192 printing houses existing in 47 cities. *Alegemeen Handelsadresboek van Nederland-*

sch-Oost Indies 1938-1939 (Batavia/Soerabaia: Nederlandsche Siemens Maatschappij, 1939). 9 cities are listed from Sumatra, 3 from Celebes, two from Borneo, 1 from Sabang, and the other 23 cities are located in Java. Among others, Batavia had 31 printing houses followed by Soerabaja (23), Bandoeng (15), Semarang (12), Medan (11), and Malang (10). Another address book titled *Nieuw Adresboek van Geheel Nederlandsch-Indië* (Batavia: G. Kolff) is also an important source to crosscheck the *Algemeen Handelsadresboek*. Unfortunately the National Archive in Indonesia only has the copy from 1920.

- ⁵⁴⁾ Overzicht der mutaties in het drukkersbedrijf gedurende de jaren 1933 en 1934 from 204x/35 in V 26-3-35-31 Bijlage: 4.
- ⁵⁵⁾ Yamamoto Nobuto, "Colonial Surveillance and "Public Opinion": The Rise and Decline of Balai Poestaka's Press Monitoring," *Keio Journal of Politics*, No. 8, (1995), pp. 71-100.
- ⁵⁶⁾ Yamamoto Nobuto, "Sociology of Roman Pitjisan: Popular Literature in the Late Colonial Indonesia," *Keio Journal of Politics*, No. 14, (2009), pp. 19-39.