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Congressional Attitude Towards Japan-U.S. Relationship
2014年度 秋学期
This is a timely and important study of changing US Congressional attitudes toward Japan at a moment when the Abe administration is addressing long overdue economic issues and security challenges. The research demonstrates renewed interest in strengthening and deepening the relationship with Japan among key Congressional members and staff. However, it also underlines the need for Japan to address bilateral trade and basing issues as well as taking steps to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to working with the US in managing broader security concerns in the Asia region, including the North Korean nuclear problem. This research should be read carefully by Japanese government and foreign policy experts as they consider how to manage US-Japan relations.

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Congressional Attitude Towards Japan-U.S. Relationship

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Acknowledgements

This research was mainly conducted in Washington DC when I was working as research assistant intern at Reischauer Center, Johns Hopkins University, SAIS. Through this research, I learned many details about my country’s most important relationship and found the mission that our next generation should engage. After graduating from Keio, I am going to start my career as a Japanese diplomat. The learning and significant findings in this research, will definitely be my “core” as a diplomat.

I want to acknowledge everyone who helped me with this research at SAIS and at the U.S. Congress. Especially, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Jim Foster who is my supervisor at Keio and who fueled my resolve to be a diplomat and who gave me lots of advices and helps to conduct this research. I also want to express my gratitude to Professor Kent E. Calder who is my supervisor at SAIS, Reischauer Center for his help with this research and for his continuous efforts to manage our two countries’ relationship. He reminds me of the importance people-to-people communication and friendship in the world of diplomacy.

Through his studies, I realized how today’s Japan-U.S. partnership has developed, as well as recognized that behind the alliance’s history, there were many people who selflessly gave their time and efforts for the betterment of the relationship. I also have to express my gratitude to the people at Reischauer Center: Mrs. Toshiko Calder, Ambassador Rust Deming, Dr. William L. Brooks, Mr. Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Mr. Junya Hashimoto, Mr. Masahiro Chikushi, Mr. Xuan Wang Mrs. Narae Choi and Ms. Megan Forry. Outside SAIS, many people also kindly helped me a lot for this research. In particular, I want to acknowledge Ms. Komaki Foster, Mr. Chris Nelson, Mr. Frank Januuzi, Dr. John H. Miller, Mr. Ian Rinehart, Mr. Ryan Shaffer, Mr. Keiji Iwatake, Mr. Hideom Kinoshita, Mr. Tsuyoshi Takahashi, Mr. Takuya Matsuda, Mr. Daisuke Minami, Mr. Jeff Ordaniel, Ms. Yumie Sano and all congressional staff members who kindly gave me time for interviews.

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Introduction

2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. After the war, the world entered a long period of bipolarity characterized by the security struggle of two dominating superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union. During such difficult time, the Japan-U.S. alliance stood as the cornerstone of both Tokyo and Washington's security policies in East Asia. Protecting the “Arsenal of Democracy” was the goal. However, the strategic environment changed dramatically when the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended. Indian-American journalist Fareed Zakaria described today’s international system and America’s standing in the world as:

I think the United States continues to have unique advantages—economically, politically, and culturally—and that it can thrive in the decades to come. But the challenges we face are real and the world that we are living in now is a very different one from that of decades past. The challenge is not simply China but rather “the rise of the rest”, a world in which countries in every region are becoming politically stable, economically strong, culturally confident—and as a consequence they are asserting themselves on the global stage... The United States still plays a pivotal role in the world, but it is not what it once was.¹

Of course, no one can predict the future perfectly, but concrete evidences of his assumption have been emerging recently, and a trend is already forming on what is expected to happen to the international strategic environment in the next ten or twenty

years.

Obviously, the U.S. still maintains a considerable stature as a world super-power, but it has manifested its limitations already. On the one hand, Japan and European Union, which are the closest friends of the U.S., have been experiencing prolonged economic stagnation. On the other hand, India, China, Brazil and other emerging powers have dramatically improved their economic situations, particularly in the past twenty years, since the collapse of Soviet Union. Of special significance are India and China, two big countries that have been rapidly bolstering their military capabilities. The military build-up that accompanied economic growth in those countries has resulted in uncertainties in their respective regions. The U.S. itself has been facing considerable economic, political and security challenges of its own. Though the American economic situation has improved since the 2008 financial crisis, there is still significant income inequality between the rich and the poor, and between the Whites, and the Black and Hispanic minorities. Such socio-economic problem is posing a challenge to American politicians, more so to President Obama to bridge the ideological divide between the parties and arrive at a consensus. Obama has been haunted by partisan politics over the years in the U.S. Congress. Moreover, the emergence of the "war on terror" after 9.11 drastically changed the traditional military strategy. The new game-rule under the war on terror forced the U.S. and the world to fight against non-state actors, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, which do not have any uniform, national flag and a defined territory on a map.

Under this new and challenging international strategic and economic environment,

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2 Barack Obama, "Address the nation by President Obama on the Syria Debate (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4e5DccEBTGA)" September 10, 2013. President Obama stated in the nation address that US not world's police, but national serenity at stake in Syria.
is the US-Japan alliance still relevant? Can it still protect the peace and stability of Japan, of the region, and of the world, at large? Almost sixty years ago, in San Francisco, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida wrote his understanding over this treaty. He said, “Those who believe the U.S-Japan security treaty is designed for war fighting are mistaken.” As his this remark indicates, Yoshida and John Foster Dulles, who was an advisor to Secretary of State Dean Acheson and who was one of the prominent “foreign policy establishment”, understood that the top priority for Japan at that time was economic development. In order to accomplish Japanese economic revival and to prevent Japanese remilitarization, this highly asymmetric agreement was crafted. Even though there were some problems and disputes that emerged along the way between the two countries, the agreement and its idea worked very well for almost forty years. However, during late 80s and the 90s, the two countries struggled enormously over disagreements on economic issues such as trade deficits that favored Japan, and security issues, particularly on Japanese role on the Gulf War. Moreover, in the 90s and the 2000s, the U.S. gradually lost its interest to Japan because of the country’s economic stagnation, dubbed by economists as “lost decades,” made worse by political disasters.

Such dramatic changes in the regional, international and in both countries’ strategic environments urged Japan to adopt a new set of foreign policy and security strategy. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is pursuing a new age of diplomacy he calls “proactive contributor to peace” or “proactive pacifism.” In December 2013, the Japanese government’s white paper noted, “as Japan’s security environment becomes ever more severe...it has become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation”. It seems that Japan is now
moving forward to redefine its role in the security field and in its alliance with the U.S. The new strategy is a manifestation that in the next decade or so, Japan would actively seek and examine ways to protect its own national interests, and the peace and stability of the East Asia region. Considering this, Japan has mainly three options (or a combination of them): continuing emphasis on the Japan-US Alliance; adapting to Chinese power; and establishing independent foreign policy. Hence, it is an imperative for Tokyo to examine correctly the U.S. attitudes and perceptions towards Japan and its region.

There is this notion within Japan that the U.S. should be the country’s eternal partner, in our region and in the world. However, as earlier described in this paper, the global strategic environment has changed and the internal political and economic situations in the U.S. have also been altered. Thus, under these circumstances, there is a need to reexamine carefully all feasible future scenarios, and the direction of American foreign policy on East Asia and the World, in order to identify the best diplomatic policy tool for maximizing and protecting Japan’s national interests.

First, this paper describes the current political situation of the American Congress and its expected impact to the overall American foreign policy. Second, it shows how the American Congress, which is one of the most important institutions in the U.S., particularly in the crafting of foreign policy, perceive Japan as a strategic and alliance partner, now and in the years ahead. Finally, this paper attempts to provide policy recommendations for Japanese diplomacy and for embassy activities in Washington to bolster the two countries relationship given that, at this moment, in order to sustain peace and stability, cooperation with the U.S. would be an ideal option for Japan.
The U.S-Japan Relationship in Historical Perspective

The Japan-U.S. relationship as it exists today is a product of several historical factors. The arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853 with his “black ships (Kurohune)” marked the first official contacts of the two countries. Since then, Japan and the U.S. have spent almost 160 years of relationships, mostly as friends, and sometimes as enemies.

During WWII, the relationship of Japan and the U.S. was broken off by diplomatic conflicts and a violent war. However, through the brief period of American occupation, and after the continuous efforts by many people of the two countries, the friendly relationship was restored dramatically, and now stands strong as one of the most important bilateral alliances in the World. This chapter plots the brief history of the two countries’ relationship after WWII.

Right after the WW2 and earlier Cold War period

Right after WWII, the U.S. sought to constrain the potential remilitarization of Japan while simultaneously strengthening the Japanese government and economy as part of a strategy to confront communism in East Asia. The State Department’s George Kennan who played a lead role in the early stages of post occupation planning in 1947-48 believed that a stable Japan, backed by a U.S. security guarantee might induce Moscow to respect its independence. At the same time, the Department of Defense(DOD) also insisted that Japan should be pressed to rearm and that the U.S.

3John H. Miller (2014) "American politics and Cultural Perspectives on Japan" 108
should retain bases in Okinawa and the mainland as a “forward operation platform”\(^4\).

Such agenda during the occupation period could mainly be attributed to the works of two key personalities. One was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who was appointed by the Truman Administration, and the other was Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida who was a key wartime Japanese diplomat. There were some differences in their perspectives regarding Japanese roles and responsibilities in the region. But through negotiations, they reached an agreement acceptable to both sides, now dubbed as the “San Francisco System.”\(^5\)

Prime Minister Yoshida believed that Japan should set economic recovery as the top priority and that there was no room for Japan at that time to protect itself from external threats or to help other countries militarily. Under that premise, PM Yoshida used the Japanese Constitution’s peace clause as much as possible. At first, during the negotiation, Dulles demanded Japan that it immediately establishes a 300,000-man army, but the Yoshida refused the plan.

Yoshida’s initial plan was to allow the Americans to use former Japanese military’s bases and fill up the power vacuums in East Asia as deterrence against the Soviet Union. Hence, for Yoshida the best he could offer was a vague promise of gradual and limited rearmament, which Dulles reluctantly accepted.

At the same time, Dulles recognized the huge political and economic imbalance between Japan and the U.S. Such made him accept Yoshida’s ideas on security issues to some extent, while at the same time, promised to open the American market to

\(^4\) Michael Schaller (1987)“The American Occupation of Japan-the origins of the could war in Asia” 132-33

\(^5\) Kent E. Calder “Securing Security through Prosperity : They San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective” Pacific Review, Volume 17, No.1 March 2004, 135-57
Japanese exporters, all to help in economic recovery. However, such was not a reciprocal policy. Regulations against the entrance of American businesses and goods to the Japanese market remained. For example, Coca-Cola and some other American companies were prohibited from entering the Japanese market. From Washington’s point of view, Japan was seen as a “sheet anchor” of its containment strategy in East Asia. The U.S. provided an indispensable forward opening platform for the projection of the American power in the region. Moreover, the support for Japanese economic recovery would foster stability in the region and would function as the “workshop” of noncommunist Asia. From the Japanese point of view, Japan could be relieved from providing for its own defense and enable the country to concentrate its energies and resources on economic recovery. But the U.S. security guarantee was implicit, not explicit and many Japanese and even some American people, the relationship was seen as the occupation by another name. Thus, on the one hand, it was seen as an incomplete and imperfect system. On the other hand, for Japan, the system was very good for both ensuring its security and prioritizing its economic recovery. And these new security and economic agenda between the two countries were formally institutionalized at the San Francisco Conference in September 1951.

**Latter Cold War Period**

During the cold war, the two countries experienced some hard times. While the Japanese economic recovery was seen as a great success, it became a reason for the U.S. to ask Japan to take a heavier political and military responsibility commensurate to its

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economic weight. But there was a huge perception gap between the two countries. The resulting economic and security frictions brought significant challenges to the alliance.

The first friction was the crisis brought about by the revision and ratification of the first Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty in 1960. During that time, massive protests erupted in Tokyo in opposition to the treaty. That was the largest mass demonstration in Japanese history. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who was one of the suspected war criminals at the Tokyo Tribunal, secured the Diet approval and ratification of the revised security treaty. At that time anti-American sentiments were growing, especially among those with left-leaning political ideologies.

In the U.S. the security treaty crisis was viewed as not only an indicator of growing anti-American sentiments but also the fragility of Japan’s new democracy. During such troubling crisis, the Kennedy Administration appointed Harvard Professor Edwin O. Reischauer as the new ambassador to Japan for shoring up the relationship.

Ambassador Reischauer wrote a paper, “The Broken Dialogue with Japan” for the Foreign Affairs magazine. He said the problem was the alienation of Japanese intellectuals and students, and the widening gap between their thinking and that of the Americans. This demonstrates that as an ambassador, Reischauer had done a huge job in bridging the gap between the Japanese and American peoples, and was instrumental in improving the deteriorated situation between the two countries.

However, the outbreak of the Vietnam War in 1965 resurrected the anti-American sentiments in Japan, breaking the improved trust between the two countries. During that

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8 John H. Miller “American politics and Cultural Perspectives on Japan” 112
9 Edwin O. Reischauer “the broken dialogue with Japan” Foreign Affairs October, 1960
time, pro-American sentiments in Japan declined significantly from 49% in 1964 to 18% in 1973.\textsuperscript{11} This was further exacerbated by the strong anti-Vietnam War movements across the nation. Also, prior to the 1972 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, there was a strong demand from the Japanese public for the Americans to return the islands' sovereignty to Japan. It must be noted that the bases in Okinawa was among the most important strategic locations for the American campaign in Vietnam.

Eventually Ambassador Reischauer, with his own personal opposition to the Vietnam War, left his post in Japan and retired from the US Government, entirely. He also felt responsible for the declining American support in Japan. He viewed his resignation as a means to somehow improve the perception of the Japanese people on America.

Meanwhile, the Vietnam War brought big opportunities to Japan for boosting its economy. The country's relative proximity to the warzone-boosted demand for materials such as clothes, ammunitions and electronic devices, among others.

It also brought considerable anti-Japanese sentiments among the American people. This was mainly because of the perceived unwillingness of Japan to provide military and humanitarian support to the war effort. Japan was viewed in America as simply extracting economic benefits from the war.

Furthermore, Japan's economic ascent also brought economic tensions between Tokyo and Washington. At first, right after WWII, Japanese products were seen as of cheap and poor quality but the high-growth period changed that perception. Japanese products were eventually viewed as topnotch in quality. Consequently, Japan was

\textsuperscript{11} Kent E. Calder (2008) "Pacific Alliance-Reviving U.S.-Japan Relationship" 92-93
perceived as an economic “enemy” of the U.S.\textsuperscript{12}

Another hard time was coming. In 1972, President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato finally concluded the Okinawa Reversion Treaty and it was seen as a good sign of the two countries’ relationship. However, the sudden and surprising visit to China of President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger resulted in a huge perception gap between Japan and the US, dubbed as the “Nixon Shock.” Without any consultation with Japan, the White House broke the status quo in the East Asian region. Japan was concerned that the U.S. would choose China, instead as a partner in the region.

In the field of finance, the significant change in the international monetary regime also brought big changes in the two countries’ relationship. The huge trade deficit unfavorable to the US made it difficult to keep the dollar’s value and the corresponding amount of reserved gold. As a result, Washington decided that the US Dollar be no longer directly convertible to gold. From the early 70s, economic tensions, characterized mainly by trade imbalance, emerged as among the biggest obstacles to the relationship. In 1985, in order to correct the imbalance, Ronald Reagan’s Treasury Secretary James Baker pushed Japan to sign the Plaza Accord, under which Japan agreed to raise the Yen’s value and undertake a domestic stimulus program to boost imports.

However, contrary to Baker’s expectation, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan soared from 50 billion dollars in the mid-1980s to 87 billion dollars in 1987. An article that appeared in the June 28, 1985 issue of the New York Times Sunday Magazine captured the perceived economic threat felt by the Americans from the rise of Japan. The article

\textsuperscript{12} Michael A. Branch "From Hershey Bar to Motor Cars: America’s economic policy toward Japan, 1945-76" 217
was entitled, “The Danger From Japan” and argued that the “economic war” was Japan’s revenge from its WWII defeat.

*After the Cold War and Heisei Period*

By the end of the Cold War period, the Japan-US alliance experienced another shock. On the economic front, the trade friction continued to hound the relationship. On the security front, the Gulf War posed as another major threat to the alliance. Japanese diplomat Kenichiro Sasae, now Ambassador to the U.S. described the chaotic security and political environment in his paper. “...for those judging the success of the Alliance in terms of meeting justifiable American requests at a time of crisis, the Japanese response was a disappointment.”¹³ The only thing Japan could do for the U.S. was to provide diplomatic and financial support. Indeed, Tokyo supported the coalition forces by giving its tacit approval for the allied intervention in behalf of Kuwait and by providing approximately 13 billion USD of direct monetary contribution, short of sending boots on the ground. Despite providing a significant amount in taxpayer’s money, it was still viewed as insufficient by Washington, considering that Japan was dependent on the Gulf Region for meeting 70% of its oil needs.¹⁴ The quick and relatively painless victory of the U.S. and coalition forces was good for the Japan-U.S. relationship. Nevertheless, the negative perception on the Japanese attitude still lingered in the American polity.

By the early 90s the relationship was “adrift”.¹⁵ Also, some observers began questioning openly the direction of the alliance and its ability to meet the security needs

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¹³ Kenichiro Sasae “Rethinking Japan-U.S. Relations” Adelphi Paper 292, 47
¹⁴ METI webpage (http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/about/pamphlet/energy2010html/policy/index2.html)
¹⁵ Yoichi Funabashi “Alliance Adrift” Council on Foreign Relations (1999), 503
of the partners. But shortly after, the Americans began to see their relationship with Japan as an invaluable instrument for containing North Korea, while at the same time, underpinning the U.S. engagement with a rising and unpredictable China.

Both Japan and the U.S. began seeking for ways to repair the alliance relationship and meet the new emerging expectations. As a result of this long discourse, the Nye Report was published in 1995. This report is officially known as the “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region” aimed at stressing the importance of the alliance in the region. This Nye Initiative formed the basis for the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security which was signed by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto at an April 1996 summit meeting. Clinton remarked, “the declaration will deepen U.S. cooperation with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF).”

Clinton and Hashimoto believed that the U.S. and Japan could cooperate together on the basis of common interests rather than during on Cold War premises, opposing common enemies. Thus, this joint Declaration was seen as the new beginning for the relationship comparable to the 1960 revision of the security treaty. In 1997, the Declaration led to the revision of the U.S-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. The Guidelines authorized Japan’s SDF for the first time to provide logistical, intelligence and other kinds of noncombat support to the U.S. forces. Japan’s SDF for the first time to provide the logistical, intelligence and other kinds of noncombat support to the U.S. forces.

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16 Bruce Stokes “Divergent Paths: US-Japan Relations Towards the Twenty-First Century” international affairs 72, no.2 (April 1996), 282-83
What was considered as the golden age of the alliance came when George W. Bush and Junichiro Koizumi assumed the leadership in their respective countries. The Koizumi-Bush relationship was viewed as cordial and friendly which consequently impact the two countries' relationship. In 2001, Koizumi changed Japan's image as a "forgotten player." Suddenly, Japan was at the forefront of Washington's attention. Many pundits and observers perceived Koizumi as an audacious pro-American leader who could bring the relationship to the next level. In other words, Koizumi was seen as the Prime Minister who could transform Japan into becoming the "British of the Far East." All of these could be attributed to his strong support for the Bush administration's "War on Terrorism." Indeed, he was successful in moving pass domestic political bickering and enacted a legislation that allowed for the deployment of SDF to the Iraqi soil. Moreover, his government upgraded the country's Defense "Agency" and turned it into "Ministry" of Defense. Koizumi was able to accomplish those primarily because of his consistently high popularity and support rate for his cabinet. Also, this stable political environment contributed significantly towards fostering a good relationship between the two countries. The Koizumi-Bush era that lasted for almost six years was considered as the golden age of Japan-U.S. relationship. During this period, the US expectation of Japan, particularly on the security aspect had ballooned and the Americans believed Koizumi's security-related plans would be pushed through moving forward. But the successors of Koizumi couldn't meet that expectation. After the Koizumi-era, Japan entered a period characterized by messy politics and

19 See Asia Times article February 24, 2005 (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GB24Dh03.html) This "British of the War East" means partner that would stand shoulder to shoulder with America in regionally and globally military as well as diplomatically.
revolving prime ministers. For six years, from 2006 to 2012, six Prime Minister came into power. The constant change of leadership in Tokyo did not bode well for the US security expectations and plans. By 2009, the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan lost power for the first time since WWII and Yukio Hatoyama from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was elected as Prime Minister. His perceived anti-American foreign policy brought a huge perception gap between the two governments. He ended the SDF’s refueling operation in the Indian Ocean, and pushed for the renegotiation of the Futenma relocation agreement, as well as the review of Japan’s host nation support (Omoiyari-yosan) for American forces in the Pacific. Such series perceived anti-American policies impacted the alliance negatively.

On the economy, the post-Cold War period was a very hard time for Japan. In the 1980s, the relationship faced the challenges of widening trade deficit resulting in trade frictions. But the bursting of the bubble economy marked the beginning of Japan’s prolonged economic stagnation. Consequently, the country lost its luster in Washington as an economic juggernaut. The 20 years of stagnation dubbed by economists as “lost decades” also meant the gradual decrease in the interests of the American public on Japan.

Meanwhile, the new Japan emerged with its “cool Japan” image. Japanese pop-culture attracted many young people from around the world. In particular, Anime and Manga were highly received abroad. But from both security and economic aspect, the past 20 years, was not a favorable era for Japan. By the end of the 1990s, Michael Green, one of the most prominent Japan scholars described the country as a “forgotten player” in American foreign policy, while others coined the terms “Japan passing” and
“Japan sinking.”

Japan-U.S. Relationship and the U.S. Congress

In chapter one, I described the evolution of the relationship between Japan and the U.S. from a historical viewpoint. It demonstrated that the alliance needs to adapt to the ever-changing economic, political and security landscape, and meet new demands. In this chapter, this paper describes the system of the U.S. Congress and its importance in the context of Japan-U.S. relationship.

*Why Congress matters?*

Congress is the center of Washington. In the United States, the President does not have any authority to introduce a bill. Such power belongs to the elected members of the Congress. Each year, nearly ten thousand bills are introduced from both the House and the Senate. In comparison with Japan, the American Congressmen are less likely to vote, following strict party lines. Each member is independent. Representatives and senators hire professional staff members to support in information gathering and in the analysis of critical data. In a way, each legislator's office is functioning like a think tank. Each member of Congress has a huge power and his or her office has the capability to introduce bills and enact laws. Hence, studying congressional attitude towards the Japan-U.S. relationship would be very useful for consider the future.

Meanwhile, the Iraq and Afghanistan fatigue, coupled with the adverse fallout from the global financial crisis of 2008, have made the American people very war-weary and extremely focused on socio-economic issues. Public opinion
polls and the viewpoints of high ranking public officials in the US Congress show that they have become very “selective” towards foreign policy, particularly on intervention in overseas conflicts. For instance, Pew research conducted in October-November, 2013 showed that 80% agreed with the statement “we should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home.” In the US Congress, prominent legislators such as Kentucky Senator Rand Paul who is one of the most influential members of the Tea Party movement announced his isolationist attitude on U.S. foreign policy. As described in the following section, the American Congress is facing a dysfunction, characterized by ideological polarization. Congress is one of the most important foreign policy-making institutions in America. Therefore, it is vital to understand its attitudes toward foreign policy. Such is highly relevant for the direction of the Japan-US alliance.

_Congressional power on foreign policy_

In theory, the President has a relatively bigger power than Congress on matters of foreign policy. But, the US Constitution give Congress certain prerogatives and opportunities to influence presidential decisions. Further, the Departments of State and Defense are also influenced very much by congressional decisions. In this section, this paper takes into account the Okinawa military bases, and their problems as sample cases to assess the power of the U.S. Congress on foreign policy.

In the US, the Departments of State and Defense have the responsibilities to
negotiate problems arising from the Okinawa military base relocation. However, on May 11th, 2011, U.S. Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, John McCain (R-AZ) ranking minority member of that committee, and Jim Webb (D-VA) Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs called on the Department of Defense (DoD) to re-examine plans that restructure U.S. military forces in East Asia. In the statement they argued:

"The projected times are totally unrealistic. The significant estimated cost growth associated with some projects is simply unaffordable in today’s increasingly constrained fiscal environment. Political realities in Okinawa and Guam, as well as the enormous financial burden imposed on Japan by the devastation resulting from the disastrous March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, also must be considered."\(^\text{21}\)

Before this bill was introduced, the two governments had already concluded their negotiations on the terms of the relocation of U.S. military base from Futenma to Henoko. However the three members proposed a new plan:

"Examining the feasibility of moving Marine Corps assets at MCAS Futenma, Okinawa, to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, rather than building an expensive replacement facility at Camp Schwab – while dispersing a part of Air Force..."

assets now at Kadena to Andersen Air Base in Guam and/or other locations in Japan."

But President Barack Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan rejected their plan. On the other hand on June 15, 2011 the three members at the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support argued that:

"To require sound planning and justification before we spend more money for marine corps realignment from Okinawa, Guam and on tour normalization in Korea with regard to Guam our provision would address substantial increases in costs by requiring the commandant of the marine corps to certify his preferred force lay down in the pacific and then require the secretary of defense to provide the congress a master plan for the implementation of the buildup before sending more money this should provide the congress with greater clarity of the scope, schedule and cost of this large and complex undertaking."\(^24\)

And finally in 2012, the National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81), Section 2207 was enacted and prohibited the use of funds for realignment. This new law made it impossible for the US to fund the relocation of the base as previously agreed by the two governments. At present, this discussion is still continuing. On May 26th, 2014, the 2015 Fiscal Defense Authorization Bill was

\(^{22}\) Ibid
\(^{23}\) Foreign Policy article May 27, 2011 "Obama rejects Senator's new Japan plan for US forces" (http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/05/27/obama-rejects-senators-new-japan-plan-for-u-s-forces/?wp_login_redirect=0)
approved. The bill states that the Senate Armed Services Committee decided to extend the ban on the use of U.S. or Japanese funds for facilities on Guam needed to accommodate the arrival of Marine Corps forces from Okinawa until the Defense Department completes a master plan for construction needed to support the buildup. Carl Levin (D-MI) said:

“The bill approved by the committee makes the hard choices necessary to preserve our military readiness and uphold our obligations to our men and women in uniform and their families in a difficult fiscal environment.”

As this case indicates, the influence of Congress as an institution and its members individually is very critical in the foreign policy-making process of the U.S. Despite its large membership (100 senators and 435 representatives), three of its most influential members could drastically change the whole direction of the negotiation over matters as important as the Okinawa military base relocation issue.

**Inside Congressional Committees and subcommittees**

President Woodrow Wilson once said, “It legislates in its committee-rooms; not by the determinations of majorities, but by the resolutions of specially-commissioned minorities; so that it is not far from the truth to say that Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work.”

Wilson’s statement shows that the

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(http://www.treas.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Progr.../ndaa_publaw.pdf)

Committee is the central part of Congress. Every legislation undergoes the committees’ investigations before becoming a law. Committees conduct hearings to analyze and investigate the provisions of every legislation.

There are mainly three kinds of committees: Standing committees, Select committees and Joint committees. Standing committees are the most important of the congressional committees because they are permanently established and are responsible for almost all legislations within certain areas. Select committees are established for a limited time and purpose, mainly for studying particular issues arising at particular times. Joint Committees are served by both senators and representatives. For example, conference committee is one such kind of joint committee that is made up of senators and representatives to resolve differences between the Senate and House versions of the same piece of legislation, before its final passage.

The number of seats of the committees varies from about six to more than fifty and usually the party that holds the majority dominate the the seats, and the ration of Democrat and Republican on a committee corresponds to their ratio in the whole House or Senate. Moreover, the committee chairman who has a big power in the investigation process is elected from the majority party. And as a

27 In Senate there are thirteen major committees: Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry/ Appropriations/ Armed Services/ Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs/ Budget/ Commerce, Science and Transportation/ Energy and Natural Resources/ Environment and Public Works/ Finance/ Foreign Relations/ Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs/ Health, Education, Labor and Pensions/ Judiciary/ and there are three minor committees: Rules and Administration/ Small Business and Entrepreneurship/ Veteran’s Affairs/ and there are four select committees: Aging/ Ethics/ Indian Affairs/ Intelligence. And in House there are three exclusive committees: Appropriations/ Rules/ Ways and Means and there are nine major committees: Agriculture/ Armed Services/ Education and Labor/ Energy and Commerce/ Financial Services/ Foreign Affairs/ Homeland Security/ Judiciary/ Transportation and Infrastructure/ and there are eight non-major committees: Budget/ Oversight and Government Reform/ House Administration/ Natural Resources/ Science and Technology/ Small Business/ Standards of Official Conduct/ Veterans Affairs/ and there are two select committees: Energy Independence and Global Warming/ Intelligence.
subordinate organization, subcommittees also exist. In brief, subcommittees are just a replication of the committee system, one level lower and focused to more specific issues in the head committees’ agenda.

Inside the Congress — Caucus/Congressional Member Organizations (CMO)

Party organizations, Democratic and Republican in the House and Senate, embody the strong ideological cohesion of the American polity. However, today the party’s cohesion has become loose. Congress members, even in the same party, no longer get along with each other as much as it does in a parliamentary system like Japan.

Today, congressional caucuses/CMO are growing as a rival to the parties as sources of policy-making leadership. Caucus/CMO is an “association of members of Congress created to advocate a political ideology or to advance a regional, ethnic or economic interest” and associated by House of Representatives. Now there are 694 informal Caucuses/CMO in Congress and through regular member or staff meetings, typically weekly, monthly, or quarterly, depending on the legislative calendar, Caucus/CMO members exchange information and develop their legislative strategy. Thus, a caucus/CMO does not have any legally binding power, but members share their interest regarding specific issues so cohesiveness is stronger than party affiliations.28

28 CRS report “Congressional Member Organizations: Their Purpose and Activities, History, and Formation” (2013) : (http://www.fas.org/spp/crs/misc/R40683.pdf)
• *Unelected Representatives — Congressional Staff Members*

Today, the U.S. Congress is an institution made up of 539 elected senators and representatives. They have a power and responsibility over all legislative processes in Congress. However, there are another hidden representatives. They are the staff members. They are highly sophisticated, professional policy researchers and some of them hold PhDs. For example, each senator serves two committees and seven subcommittees (on an average) so it is almost impossible for members to become familiar with the details of all the issues and to write bills that they want to introduce. Thus, Congressional staff members’ most important job is providing information or analysis over each policy. Most of time, they write bills on behalf of their bosses.29

In the Hill, there are mainly three kinds of staff members: those serving in committees, those serving the congress members, and those serving the support agencies. Each staff member has a different agenda towards policies and has different kind of functions. Committee staff members tend to be neutral, non-partisan professionals of specific policy or field. They are to assist members of committees, regardless of party-affiliation, Democrats or Republican, in holding hearings and revising bills. Specifically, they collect and analyze

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29 In the book “Unelected Representatives” Michael J. Malbin (1980), the author described staff members importance in Congress as “I was nervous. Fresh from academe, on my first assignment as a journalist, I was in the middle of an article about conference committee that was deadlocked over the use of highway trust fund money for mass transit. I had done all the easy interviews — staffers and lobbyists who filled me in on the issues and players. But sooner or later I knew I would have to interview some elected senators and representatives. The $25 billion authorization bill was the most significant one to come out of the House Public Works Subcommittee on Transportation that year (1973), so it seemed obvious to me that I ought to see the chairman. So there I was, waiting in the office of the late John Klucynski (D-III.) with tape recorder clutched in hand and as I said I was nervous. After all, this interview could be the one to give me the political insights I needed to impress my new editors … I began the interview with what I thought was throwaway question. What makes this issue important, I asked? “This is a tremendously important bill. It involves millions of dollars,” Klucynski began to answer and then paused. “No — billions isn’t it?” he asked, turning to the staff aide. That did it—the balloon was pierced and my case of nerves was missed, even by a newcomer. I was initially shocked, but quickly began realizing that to understand Congress, I had better start paying attention to the role of its staff” P.3 - 4
information, and suggest course of action for the committee members to take into consideration. They do so by preparing studies and committee reports on legislations. Their intelligent contribution to the members would be the foundation of decision making in the committee. Year by year, the importance and presence in Congress of staff members continue to grow, especially in committees. The number of staff members indicate this fact. For example in 1971, there were 729 committee staff members in the House and 711 in the Senate, and in 1995 in the House there were 1,250 staff members and in Senate about 950 staff members. In just nearly 20 years, the number of staff members serving the committees had rapidly expanded.

Meanwhile, personal staff members do legislative related jobs like committees staff members, but at the same time, also do important constituency-related works such as helping their boss win reelection. The number of personal staff in Congress have remained the same from 1970s to today. On average, representatives and senators hire 16 and 36 staff members, respectively. The functions performed by committee staff members make it inevitable that they will have substantial influence on the legislative process.

Staff members of support agencies staff tend to be having very neutral political and nonpartisan attitude. They are not directly involved in the legislative process in Congress. Their primary function is to provide information that is required by the representatives or senators regarding specific policies. For

27 ^b The peak of committee staff members, there were 2024 in House and 1074 in the Senate. But in 1995 keeping with the party’s promise to reduce government spending, the number of staff members cut rapidly.
instance, the agenda of Congressional Research Service (CRS) which is one of the support agencies, is “providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation.”32 There are almost 900 staff members serving all the support agencies of the US Congress.

To sum up, all information used in the policymaking process are passing through congressional staff members. In that regard, they have a huge impact and influence on the policies that come out of Congress.

32 Congressional Research Service home page: http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/
Case Studies and Findings

This chapter analyzes the congressional attitude towards some specific issues regarding Japan-U.S. relationship. Using information derived from direct interviews with congressional staff members and from congressional documents on four key issues, namely, the Japan-US Alliance, the rise of China, Japan-US-Korea trilateral relationship, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), taking into account the security, historical and economic dimensions, this chapter explains the congressional attitude towards Japan-U.S. relationship.33

Case One: Prime Minister Abe’s national security agenda

The January 13th, 2014 edition of the Yomiuri newspaper, one of the biggest dailies in Japan, reported that the favorability rating of PM Abe’s Cabinet reached above 60 percent in opinion polls.34 Under this favorable political background, Abe made Japanese security policy his government’s top priority. Soon after his return as prime minister, he presented several security-related proposals. Among them are the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC), the revision of the 1997 US-Japan Security Guidelines, the reinterpretation of the Constitution to enable the exercise of collective-self-defense, an increase in the defense budget, and even the possibility of ultimately revising the Constitution’s peace clause. Despite his initial

33 Interviews with Congressional staff members and former staff members were conducted from January 2014 to June 2014 in Washington DC by the author.

optimism, Abe’s proposals did not go unopposed. There are those who are still worried of increasing Japan’s overseas involvement, particularly those involving military engagements. So far, many of his proposed security-related reforms have been realized.

US Congress’ Perspectives on Abe and His Policies

Abe’s attempts to implement security-related reforms are, in general, received positively by the US Congress. All incumbent and former staff members interviewed by the author agreed with Abe’s positions. According to one Republican Senate Foreign Policy committee senior staffer:

“His efforts enhance the Japan’s position in the region, strengthen Japan’s capabilities as being very positive…. (and) should not be seen as the U.S. want it pull back from our commitment, we want to enhance our abilities to partner together… Many countries have been shrinking budget especially defense budget that by having partner and that allies working together for sort of poor of resources and technical capabilities to provide a strengthen collective opportunity in the limited constraints.”

And another Republican staff member under the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific House Foreign Affairs Committee remarked:

“We are actually very supportive. One of the problems with alliance lately the relocation of alignment has been a cost. Congress put the restriction on efforts to do this realignment relocating because of those concerns of the cost so we’ve been
pushing Japan for long time take more responsibility for their own self defense so we definitely supportive of that. We think it's time Japan does take more that at low and then become more equal partner rather than relying on the U.S."

Meanwhile, one Congressional Research Service report describe Abe's attitude positively:

"Some of Abe's positions—such as changing the interpretation of Japan's pacifist constitution to allow for Japanese participation in collective self-defense—were largely welcomed by U.S. officials eager to advance military cooperation."

As illustrated in Chapter 1, the U.S. has been constantly giving pressures to Japan to change its posture on security issues. Considering such, the impressions of U.S. congressional staff members and those reflected in the report of the CRS were not surprising. Many staff members interviewed by the author clarified that the U.S. attitude of asking Japan to take heavier military responsibilities in the region does not mean that the U.S. has the intention to pull back from the Asia-Pacific region nor does it mean that Washington would no longer honor its commitment to defend Japan in times of contingencies. When asked about the reasons of the US for asking Japan to change its military position, some staff members mentioned budgetary limitation of the U.S.

Despite their overall positive view on Abe's security policy, some staff members expressed concerns. Some of them worry that the dramatic change in the Japanese security policies would be perceived wrongly by other Asian countries while some elected members of the US Congress expressed apprehensions on Abe himself, that he might be using the issue for his own nationalistic agenda and not really to reflect the actual security needs
of the country and the region. One former Democrat staff member described it quite insightfully. He said:

"Many Americans, we like the package, but we are not sure that we like the wrapping paper... Some of the negative responses that some members of Congress have to the Abe policies has more to do with the wrapping paper, and less to do with the package."

Recent statements from the Prime Minister on historical issues have been seen as a sign of his overly nationalistic vision on some Asian countries and even in the U.S., there are some real concerns over that. Under such situations, Abe's security-related decisions would bring some serious concerns in Asia and in the U.S. Congress, as well. Another former Republican House Foreign Affairs Committee staff member, while in favor of Japan's increased security role, expressed his concerns on historical revisionism.

"[By revising constitution or re-interpreting self collective defense] As the second largest contributor to the UN system, Tokyo should play a more active international role including in UN peacekeeping operations and in collective security with its allies such as the United States... But Tokyo should be aware that pursuit of a more robust military posture, if linked with revisionist history rhetoric, causes consternation in Seoul and provides a wedge for Beijing and Pyongyang to drive between America's two chief East Asian allies"

Case two: Japan and the U.S.-Korea relationship

Despite the deep economic ties between Japan and Korea, these two countries
have always been at odds with each other on many issues. For instance, the December 2013 visit of Abe to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, the Comfort Women issue, the Sea of Japan/East Sea naming controversy and the Takeshima/Dokdo territorial dispute, among others, have been negatively impacting their relationship. Also, until May 2014, there had been no direct meeting between Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye. In essence, both on the political level and among their citizens, their image of each other have been quite negative.

Among the most critical problems in the two countries’ relationship are related to historical issues. Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni and his attempts to revise the Murayama and Kono statements on accepting Japan’s responsibility on its conduct during the Second World War and on the issue of comfort women, respectively, brought huge anti-Japan movements in South Korea. Consequently, Korea’s recent aggressive internal and external political campaigns on those issues also resulted in huge anti-Korea movements in Japan. American scholar and East Asian expert Dennis Harpin described the current situation during a conversation with the author as “the worst I have seen in forty years.”

- On historical issues:

  On May 27, 2013, during a press conference, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga tried to downplay allegations of historical revisionism. He said:

  "I have frequently stated the Government’s view that the Abe Cabinet shares the same recognition as that of previous cabinets and that we should not turn this issue into a political or diplomatic issue. That is the basic view with regard to the
Kono Statement. What I actually stated myself was that based on the fact that a Cabinet decision had been made with regard to this issue, various scholars of history and experts in Japan and overseas are engaged in research on various themes and that it would be a good idea for further consideration to be given from an academic perspective."

Abe government’s attempt to reinvestigate over Comfort Woman issue brought huge protest in Korea. In the U.S. especially in the Congress, the Korean government made a lot of efforts to get favorable opinions through effective agenda-setting activities, including in the constituencies of elected members. As a consequence of continuous and effective lobbying activities, some members of Congress were persuaded to work on this issue with eagerness. Outside of Congress, in New Jersey, California, Virginia and New York, several Comfort Women memorials were erected by local governments due to intense lobbying by the Korean Government and Korean-American communities. The erections of memorials were strongly protested by the Japanese Embassy in Washington. Meanwhile, some staff members interviewed for this research also expressed their concerns over Japan’s attitude towards the comfort women issue. Some of them understood the difficulties and importance of internal politics for Abe over this issue, but generally, they agreed that Japan should admit the facts on existence of sexual slavery of women during the war and should do more to address this issue. To put it simply, the Japanese image over this issue in the US Congress is terribly bad. Abe’s perceived historical revisionist attitude definitely hurt the Japanese image in Congress. Staff

members understood this issue as not only a historical issue but also human rights issue. One former Democrat staff member described it:

"Japan cannot win the argument. Once you were debating on that topic, you've already lost before the debate begins [because this is humanitarian issue]."

And other former Republican staff member who worked for House Foreign Affairs Committee said:

"the number [of women forced into sexual slavery] doesn't matter...the specific details are not so important...just fact itself was bad...Congress is not getting into the details...There is no one in Congress who is gonna defend Japan for what it did. Senator Inoue in 2008 tried to calm things down, but he is no longer around."

Republican Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific House Foreign Affairs Committee staff member said:

"Within some conferences focused issue on Japan and there was an elderly Japanese man and he stoop up and he said “we’ve apologized for everything, we’ve done already we’ve never done it through words, we’ve done it through action isn’t that enough?” The entire room was silent and most people were shaking their heads even American, they were shaking the heads. It’s not they alway say actions means more than words, but in the case dealing with South Korea on this issue, I think it’s not enough. It’s not enough to say you’ve done a enough."
Furthermore, the Korean government’s grassroot activities and Korean American constituencies are also making this issue very complicated. One Democratic staff member who work for House Foreign Committee said:

“I know your [Japanese] difficult position[over comfort woman issue], but...we have Korean-American constituencies. We have to respond to that.”

All these reveal that in the US Congress, the lobbying efforts and outreach activities by the Korean government to the members of Congress are effective and are still continuing. Also, some members of Congress recognized the importance of the comfort women issue because they perceive it as more than just a historical issue between Japan and Korea, but more significantly as a human rights issue, particularly a women’s rights issue. These are popular topics in modern American politics, which the politicians could not just brush aside.

* On security issues:

Considering the troublesome relationship between Japan and Korea, the U.S. has been asking the two countries mend ties. A CRS report said:

“A poor relationship between Seoul and Tokyo jeopardizes U.S. interests by complicating trilateral cooperation on North Korea and other regional challenges.”36

A Republican Senate Foreign Policy committee senior staffer said:

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"[Bad relationship between Japan and Korea] Certainly not good for the U.S. perspective and not good for the U.S. interest either"

As indicated in this CRS’ report, congressional staff members’ opinions are all advocating for a closer cooperation among Japan, Korea and the U.S. on security issues, such as on intelligence-sharing related to the North Korean threat or on military planning and operations. Democratic Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff member said:

“Obviously U.S. and Korea keep well long standing relationship in the [Asia] region…one of the major missing pieces of their regional security kind of an architecture that needs to be resolved is…security partnership between south Korea and Japan…I think that as regards North Korea threat which I think it would be…natural cooperative relationship especially given both those countries partnerships on security issues with the U.S. on intelligence sharing, military issues. It would be so beneficial to all three parties.”

Meanwhile, all staff members took the position that the U.S. should not be involved and should not take sides in dealing with the two countries’ relationship. The only thing the U.S. could is to be a facilitator, for instance, by holding a conference or meeting regarding North Korean issue or other relevant issues.

* On the Sea of Japan/East Sea naming controversy

For centuries, the two countries have used different names on the sea between
Japan and Korea. Japan calls the sea as “Sea of Japan” while Korea calls the sea as “East Sea”. The “Sea of Japan” is widely used by a majority of atlases and is the internationally recognized name for the said body of water. The Koreans argue that the name “Sea of Japan” is a vestige of Japanese imperialism. The Japanese meanwhile argue that cartographers have been using the name, “Sea of Japan” since time immemorial and is not related to its imperial past. This naming disagreement between the two countries is now bringing terribly huge concern to the US Congress. CRS report described this dispute as follows:

“In recent years, the South Korean government, South Korean citizens, and some Korean-Americans appear to have been broadening their appeal to atlas publishers, U.S. federal government institutions and the legislatures of some U.S. states such as Virginia and New York. The South Korean government states that there is a “steady increase” in maps using both names. The Japanese government states that the name Sea of Japan is “overwhelmingly”...[37]

This CRS report does not show the US’ own stance on merits of each argument, but it shows a big concern about the rule of “standard name” as follows:

“In the United States, geographic place name policies for federal government agencies are set forth by the Board on Geographic Names (BGN), pursuant to P.L. 80-242. The BGN’s policy is that “a single conventional name, if one exists, will be chosen as the standard name” for seas and oceans. The BGN decides on what constitutes a “conventional name” by consulting various print and online

geographic references to determine which name is “under widespread and current usage.”

As this CRS report explains, the U.S. should take only one position especially on the names of seas and oceans. Hence, until now, the Sea of Japan is still the recognized name, as it is the most dominantly used in the US. However, gradually some states, for example Virginia and New York have approved bills that would outlaw the purchase of public schools’ textbooks that label the sea as the “Sea of Japan” only and allow the sale of textbooks that use both names. Thus if such trend of using both names expands in the U.S., someday the U.S. government’s Board on Geographic Names will have to decide which name is relevant to use as official name in the U.S. That means the U.S. have to take one side on this issue. This naming controversy would then be a major dispute between the two governments - Japan and Korea, and could drag the U.S.

Case three: Japan and the U.S.-China relationship

China is obviously a global emerging power while the U.S. remains to be the global hegemonic power. Major International Relations Theories argue that a rising power challenging the status-quo, hegemonic power inevitably result in war, as was the case during both WWI and WWII. It is therefore of critical importance to manage the relationship of these two countries carefully as the US-China engagements is the biggest issue and we would define the 21st century.

However, at the present, on how to manage the US-China relationship, the opinions of congressional staff members are divided. Regarding the Senkaku islands dispute, however, they seem to be looking at the same direction.

38 Ibid. 8-9
• The U.S. and China relationship

On November 20, 2013, National Security Adviser Susan Rice gave a comprehensive speech on U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia Pacific region in Georgetown University. In her remarks, she said that:

“When it comes to China, we seek to operationalize a new model of major powers relations. That means managing inevitable competition while forging deeper cooperation on issues where our interests converge—in Asia and beyond.”

Her remarks provoke some serious discussions in Washington D.C. Originally, the new concept, “new model of major power relations” was advocated by Xi Jinping in 2012 during his visit to American capital. Xi said that such relationship would be characterized by “mutual understanding and strategic trust, respect for each other’s core interests, mutually beneficial cooperation, and enhanced cooperation and coordination in international affairs and on global issues.”

Congressional staff members’ attitudes toward the American policy on China are very divided. There are three types of opinions on how to best manage the relationship with China. First, there are those who think that the US should share power with China. Second, there are those who think that it is inevitable to share power with China but such should not happen now, or at least not yet. And third, there

also those who believe the US should not share power with China and instead should focus more traditional alliances in the region and should preparing to contain China’s possible aggressive military activities and efforts to undermine the liberal-democratic order. Democratic Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff member said:

"The question is how did they intend to use [New model of major power relations concept], how will they use it and I think that has yet to be determined...but it is certainly the project for the U.S. and for Japan and for the other partners in the [Asia] region."

Another former Democrat staff member argued:

"I think the U.S. talks about it and some people in Obama administration have expressed their support for the concept. I think what they have in mind is just that the inevitable tension that happens with rising power assuming bigger and bigger share of global power. That tension can be managed and this is new that we do not need to repeat the mistakes of WWI and WWII, we do not need to relive in the Cold War, and the reason is because China’s ambitions are less grand than those of the Soviet Union and less aggressive than those of Hitler and therefore it should be possible to manage the tensions and to avoid the conflict. And I think most Americans, they don’t think of it as G2. They think of it as welcoming China to the club...New form of great power relations so that we can all focus on mutual interests. So the two countries are speaking about similar concept, but not identical. Not quite the same. I think the U.S. needs to be a little more clear [the definition]. Because the Chinese might misunderstand [the meaning of the new
concept] even though in fact the U.S. has no intention to give China a place in Asia. In other words the U.S. should essentially step back and respect China’s core interest including maybe Taiwan... I don’t want Chinese to misunderstand... So I think we need more diplomacy on this topic [to clear the definition of the concept].”

Republican Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific House Foreign Affairs Committee staff member described the concept as follows:

“It’s interesting because I think China has a different meaning of what that phrase means, different than we do. And if the White House doesn’t always communicate with us what’s going on so right now for us it’s pure rhetoric... that’s not something that happens before and if we were really working to developing a cooperative and understanding relationship with China, that may have been decision that they would not may but it’s obvious that China is very difficult work with and you never really know with it’s true tension are so I think there is still a lot learn about what this phrase means, meaning for two countries and our relationship.”

And former Republican House Foreign Affairs committee staff member who is a specialist on Chinese and Korean issues said:

“Beijing’s entry into the international community has failed to produce what was called “a responsible stakeholder.” Economic liberalization and reform, accelerated by China’s joining of the WTO over a decade ago, failed to lead to
political liberalization, as was the case with Taiwan and South Korea. Beijing’s charm offensive of a few years ago in Southeast Asia has been replaced by heated rhetoric and bullying, especially against the Philippines and Vietnam. Young nationalist members of the PLA speak with increasing arrogance and Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” sounds like a desire to re-establish the Qing era of tributary state relationships and the Middle Kingdom as the central focus of political power in Asia. The desire to produce a blue-water navy that can break through the first island chain into the western Pacific and to make the South China Sea a Chinese lake bodes ill for continued peaceful relations in East Asia. The unilateral proclamation last year of an ADIZ in the East China Sea also demonstrates potential hostile intent, as does the insistence on “core interests” and the drive to implement anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) with regards to U.S. naval forces in the Pacific. China is a growing threat and the U.S. and Japan must cooperate even more closely together to meet this challenge. Unless there is a fundamental change in China’s assertive foreign policy and/or political evolution in China, the U.S. cannot join hands together with China in Asia any more than it could join hands with the Soviet Union in Europe during the Cold War. America must stand with its friends in Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Canberra, Manila and Singapore and keep its traditional alliances strong as the US did with the UK during the Cold War”.

- Territorial issue — stand by Japan but some problems

In the US Congress the perception over the Senkaku Island dispute is very much
leaning towards the Japanese position. All staff members interviewed for this research expressed that the U.S. should protect Japan from any military action by China over the Senkaku Islands. However, some staff members took note of the difference in perception among themselves and the elected members of Congress on how to approach China on this issue. Moreover, non-Asian security professional members are not well briefed and most of them are indifferent about this issue. Also, the American public are not familiar with this issue, with many of them arguing that the deep and strong economic relationship of the US and China is paramount in importance to Japan-US Alliance. One senior Republican Senate Foreign Policy Committee staff said:

"We've been very supportive of Japan and reaffirmed our position about supporting Japan and its control over the Senkakus. We did the resolution last year and we reaffirmed those commitments reinforcing the massages that Chinese aggressive behavior are being unacceptable and that the U.S. vested interest on freedom of navigation and free commerce in these particular areas. And we do feel the China's actions are counterproductive even dangerous in terms of potentially threatening to those what we see as universal and right to protect international law for freedom of navigation and commerce and over flight".

A Democratic House Foreign Affairs Committee staff member noted:

"We have the responsibility to Japan because of the alliance... we would support Japan when something happens...”

However, former Democratic staff member described the Senkaku Island
problem a little bit differently:

“Experts in congress on the foreign policy committee, they understand that the U.S. has a commitment in the alliance to the defense of Japan and they understand that the commitment means something, it must be respected in all circumstances. Where the territory is concerned, the commitment of the alliance must be 100%. You can't have a 50% or 60% commitment because it doesn't matter even if this territory might not be so important. If the alliance doesn't count here, where does it count? Experts understand that any effort by China to change the status quo by force has to be resisted.”

While also noting that:

“To be honest, most members of Congress don’t think about this issue very much. Most members of Congress are not very well informed about it. The ones that do, fall into two categories. Some of them who are not very well briefed basically say what's the big deal? Why is this so important? Why would the U.S. ever get in a fight over this? The ones who know the alliance, know the history and studied the region, they say actually we need to have a firm commitment... Although he left the Senate, but people like Jim Webb, he was very outspoken on this issue and he held hearing about it in the Foreign Relations Committee in order to try shine the spot light on this problem. But the number of well briefed staff and well briefed members is fewer. That's the problem. Because until you study the issue then you might not fully understand why the U.S. must remain firm on its commitment to the alliance with respect to the Senkaku”. 
A former Republican House Foreign Affairs committee staff member described the situation as follows:

"However, official positions and public opinion are different. President Obama has not done a good job in leading U.S. public opinion on foreign policy – in contrast to Roosevelt in events leading up to WWII, Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis and Ronald Reagan during the Cold War. If you ask the average American if they were willing to risk military conflict with Beijing over some uninhabited rocks in the East China Sea, they would look at you with disbelief and apprehension. America does not want and is not psychologically prepared for a war with China. The Abe Administration, therefore, should not read President Obama’s commitment as a blank check and should be careful not to overplay Tokyo’s position in the East China Sea.

Case four: TPP

Congressional staff members welcomed the Japanese to join the negotiations. And they understand the difficulties of Japanese internal politics over the TPP. However, they think that in the negotiation, we have to find the way to forward it through some compromises by each country. Some members described the TPP in the context of the rebalance policy. They believed that TPP is important not only for economic benefits but also for establishing and for protecting the norms and rules in the Asian region against China.

Regarding the bill on Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), staff members are casting high doubts on the negotiation’s success in Congress. TPA is a mechanism in
the US that grants additional authority to the President on trade negotiation. If the President would get the authority, the President could negotiate agreements with other countries that would then be submitted to Congress for an up-or-down vote with no amendments. Thus, TPA gives an extraordinary power to the President over trade negotiation. At the same time, TPA is a key element to reach an agreements in the negotiation within Congress. But the midterm election of November 2014 happened such resulted in the expected delay in the passing of the TPA bill. Without TPA, staff members believe that TPP would not progress. Nevertheless, the recent creation of “Japan Caucus” which focus too much on TPP is a big positive movement in Congress. It seems that the caucus would be very useful to facilitate the discussions, not only in the U.S. Congress but also in the negotiation between the US Congress and the Japanese government.

* Brief review of TPP negotiation

TPP was originally launched by four countries (Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore) in 2006 and two years after that, Australia, Peru, the U.S. and Vietnam subsequently joined. However, because of the global financial crisis, the start of the negotiation was delayed for more than a year. Finally, at present, 12 countries are involved in the negotiations and some other countries are seen as prospective parties like Korea. TPP is a new trade framework that is seen as a “comprehensive, next-generation regional agreement that liberalize trade and investment and addresses new and traditional trade issues and 21st century challenges.”\(^4\) TPP participating countries are remarkably diverse with regard to their size and their level of economic development.

\(^4\) Office of the United States Trade Representative, TPP trade minister’s report to leaders, November 12, 2011, www.ustr.gov
TPP negotiation deals with a broad range of subjects from agriculture to intellectual property rights.

In Japan some interest groups, such as the Japan Agricultural Cooperative, expressed serious concerns on the new trade framework. According to an opinion poll conducted in February 2013, approximately 50% of the Japanese people approved joining the TPP negotiation, 24% disapproved and 25% said they don’t know. But finally on March 15, 2013, Prime Minister Abe decided to join the TPP negotiation. In a speech, he stated:

“I firmly believe that creating new rules in the Asia-Pacific region with these countries is not only in Japan’s national interest, but also certain to bring prosperity to the world... The new economic order which will be created with the two major economic powers, Japan and the United States, would not remain the ‘TPP only’ rules. It should serve as a basis for rule-making beyond the TPP in Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and in the larger initiative of Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)”

From that time, Japan officially joined the TPP negotiation. However, there were several obstacles. The biggest one has been related to the difficulties of negotiation, not only between member countries but also inside the U.S. Congress over the passing of the TPA Bill.

After the mid-term election, the Republicans got majority seats in both the Senate and the House. The election results were seen as favorable to the TPP.

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negotiation because, in principle, the Republicans support free trade policy. In January 2015, it seems that the negotiation in Congress over TPA would be accelerated because some influential Republican leaders expressed publicly their clear and strong support for passing the said legislation. For example, Senate Majority leader McConnel (R-Kentucky) said to the reporters on January 7, 2015 that:

"I'm happy the president has now become a born-again free trader. It's high-time....He's only got two years left. We think this is an area we can make progress and you can look for us to act on TPA"\(^{44}\)

On January 15, 2015, Committee on Ways and Means Chairman Paul Ryan expressed his support for TPA in a press release:

"TPA is the essential first step for expanding American exports and helping create new jobs, and one House Republicans are ready to take now..."\(^{45}\)

**US Congress Favorable to Japan's TPP Accession, TPA remains a sticking point**

One Democratic staff member who works for the House Foreign Affairs Committee said:

"I think it would be great if you(Japan) can join, I encourage and I hope your farmers and folks are able to compromise...(But) TPP is not gonna happen any time soon, I firmly believe that we are never gonna get Trade Promotion Authority through in such a short period."

\(^{44}\) The Hill : McConnell says Obama 'born again' on trade agenda (http://thehill.com/policy/finance/228830-mcconnell-says-obama-born-again-on-trade-agenda)

Another former Democrat staff member described the importance of TPP from the point of view of setting and protecting the norms. He said:

"When it comes to the rules, norms, laws, U.S. Japan and Western Europe had done a lot of work for seventy years to try to establish certain norms and even though the norms are still under some development, we don't want to retract. We don't want to destroy the norms to accommodate China. China is the new rising power... we gonna have to make some adjustments. But they don't get to completely rewrite all the rules. Japan and the U.S. should work together to make sure we defend the norms."

All staff members interviewed for this research are favorable towards Japanese participation to the negotiation, not only from an economic point of view but also from a security perspective. Further, most of them referred to TPA as a key whether the negotiation would progress in full or not.

* TPP and the New Japan Caucus in Congress

On March 24th, 2014, Japan Caucus was created in the US Congress. There was a Congressional study group on Japan in Congress, but this is the first caucus covering Japanese related issues. After Japanese-American Senator Daniel Inoue passed away, some newspapers said, the Japanese government had eagerly fostered new generations of Americans in Congress who are interested in Japan-related issues, and that regard, the Japan Caucus is one fruit of those efforts.

The chairmen are Democrat and Republican members of Congress, Joaquin
Castro (D-TX) and Devin Nunes (R-CA). Castro stated in the press release that the purpose of establishing Japan Caucus is to

"Strengthen the relationship between the U.S. and Japan on a range of issues including international economics, national security, and international development. 46

During the conference "Congress and the U.S.-Japan Alliance," hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), featuring the Chairmen of the Japan Caucus, Castro said:

“I think at base, the role of the caucus is to highlight the role of Japan in the American economy, but that folks throughout the congress can appreciate the role that Japan plays in our economy.”

Following Castro’s remarks, Nunes added:

“I would add to that, too, the other caucuses that I’ve been on - it really gives the country, in this case Japan, it gives them a great way to give them access into the congress. So a lot of times, we’ll routinely find ourselves doing this - we have a lot of meetings that we set up with our counterparts from Japan…”

During the conference, the two chairmen stuck to the issue of TPP and TPA. They both mentioned the word “TPP” fourteen times, “TPA” ten times and “Senkaku” once. One former Republican staff member who is working now at the think tank in

Washington D.C. interviewed for this research said:

"New Japan Caucus started with the help of the [Japanese] Foreign Ministry...

My understanding is that originally the idea was to create the TPP caucus by the embassy, but they didn’t realize because the TPP caucus already existed so they formed Japan Caucus, but I met two members and they are quite junior and don’t seem all that interested in Japan...staff are fine, I went and met them with Japanese politicians. They seemed very bored and wanted to get out of there."

Hence, for the time being, the Japan Caucus seems to be going to focus on TPP and TPA mainly as their agenda. Also it is expected that the Caucus would be a place in the Congress to discuss TPP and a venue for members of Congress to advocate the passing of TPA.47

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47 Japanese embassy looked for the student who work for Japan Caucus issues at Embassy’s economical division as an internship Here is the part of content of guideline of the internship which was sent from Japanese embassy to me:

在米大経済政策における唯一インターンの採用については来年6月に派遣の可能な限り早いうちに日米間における米国政策の進展を支援する業務を遂行するチームの一員として活動していただくことになります。指定される業務内容については下記1を、採用条件、勤務条件、採用プロセスについては、下記2をご覧の上、ふるってご応募ください。1指定される業務内容（1）米国コーカスの意義米国コーカスは、米国在日米国 Essen議員（公共）及び米国コーカス議員（民）という、若く将来性のある二人の議員が共同議長を務めています。設立当初から参加議員数は約70名に近く、既に米国議会における最大クラスのコーカスの仲間入りを果たしました。このコーカスは、活動を意味のある活動を行うコーラスで育てていくことは、幅広い米国議会で良好な状態に保つ上で、米国議会に重要な足がかりを得ることになり、きわめて重要です。（2）米国コーカスを支えるための活動このため、今後、米国コーカスにおいては、両共同議長と佐々江大使の定期会合、議員レベルで行う活動、議員補佐のレベルで行う活動、日系企業と議員事務所の提携を設ける為の活動、メンバー及び補佐官の協力その他に参加を呼びかけられてヶ月足らずで参加者数を70名近くにまで増やし議会内で18名に上る多数の議員の参賛を得て設立式を行うことができました。また両共同議長がCSTで講演したり、連休中に訪米した我が国議員の多くが米国コーカスとの交流を行うなど、多くの成果を上げてきており、これは既に本邦においても多数報道されているとおります.
Policy Implications and Recommendations

This chapter deals with policy implications and details several recommendations for the improvement of the Japanese Foreign policy and the activities of the Japanese Embassy in Washington D.C., in order to strengthen its ties with the U.S. Congress. As detailed in chapter two, increasing the awareness and interests of the US Congress on issues important to Japan is crucially important to sustain and develop good and stable relationship between Tokyo and Washington. Moreover, the Japanese government should not be complacent with the current status of its relationship with the US and must explore new opportunities to increase the number of American people with the right awareness, appreciation and interests on Japan-related matters. In particular, the Japanese Government, through its Embassy in Washington, must endeavor to nurture a new generation of Japan specialists in the US, to meet current and future regional and international environments. To attain this agenda, Japan must take some steps actively in Washington through programs such as Veterans' outreach. Indeed, it is high time that both governments re-recognize the importance of Japan-US relationship in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and the world, at large.

• **Prime Minister Abe's security reform**

Prime Minister Abe's security-related reforms, such as the re-interpretation of the country's Pacifist constitution to allow the exercise of collective self-defense, the revision of Japan-US Security Guidelines, and even the dropping of the constitution's
peace clause, among others are received favorably not just in the US Congress but almost in the whole American foreign policy establishment. In Congress, staff members believe that by loosening security constraints on Japan, and making it a “normal” country, it could contribute more to U.S. efforts and to the world. Apparently, they believe that by doing so, Japan could play a more significant role in maintaining the current international order. Such expectation of Japan is further fueled by the belief of some people in Congress who are concerned about the limits of the U.S. defense budget, particularly on how such would impact American military activities in the Asia-Pacific region. People interviewed for this research believe that Japan’s “burden sharing” attempt would be helpful for the U.S. Hence, this paper concludes that Prime Minister Abe should continue his agenda on security reforms with high confidence.

However, at the same time in Congress, staff members are very concerned with his seemingly nationalist posture. His attitude towards historical issues with Korea and China and his visit to the Yasukuni shrine contributed to the perception that he is a nationalist. They worry that such overly nationalistic posture would bring some concerns to neighboring countries. Furthermore, such posture also provides the Chinese with an excuse to pursue their own nationalist agenda, raising tensions in the region generally that the US inevitably has to respond to. Abe’s overly nationalistic attitudes also contributes to the deterioration of its relationship with Korea, another US-treaty ally. For the U.S., it means that American diplomacy in the Pacific would face difficulties. Thus, on the one hand, Japan should minimize its overly nationalistic overtures that bring back memories of the war. On the other hand, it should continue its security reforms by taking an “internationalist” point of view like that during the first
Gulf War. Through proactive security reforms based on the principles of international cooperation, Japan could be a "normal" country without unnecessarily causing worries around its region. By doing so, Japan could contribute more to the U.S. in maintaining stability and could act as a key player in world affairs.

• Relationship with South Korea

All staff members interviewed for this research agreed that Tokyo, Washington and Seoul should cooperate with each other on coping with North Korean nuclear and missile threats through initiatives such as intelligence sharing and military operation planning. As a first step, Japan and South Korea should ratify the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) as soon as possible. Furthermore, trilateral military exercises should be conducted to increase trust, capabilities and interoperability in dealing with North Korea-related contingencies. If the Japan-US-ROK trilateral relationship would work together on North Korea-related issues, such could work as deterrence to Pyongyang. At the same time, such could work as a force to push China to take more responsibility over North Korean matters. After the failure of the six party talks, Beijing became a key player on North Korea nuclear and missile issues. However, it has not been able to take any effective measures.

On another matter, Abe is currently trying to make a tangible progress on the issue of Japanese abductees. In order to attain his agenda, it is critical that the Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral relationship and cooperation move in the same direction.

Meanwhile, on historical matters, it is a hopeless case for Japan to continue to seek the understanding of the US Congress primarily because of constituency problems.
and because of the nature of the problems being more than just a historical interpretation issue but a human rights issue. The number of Korean-Americans is growing in the U.S. and for the elected members of Congress, considering their opinions is important to get their votes during elections. Moreover, many members of the US Congress are not really concerned about the specific details related to the Comfort Women issue. Even those who are fully briefed and are aware of the issue are trying to perceive it as a human rights issue, more than anything else. Therefore, the Abe Administration should abandon his agenda seen as revisionist in the US, as soon as possible. He should instead promote a forward-looking agenda. It would also be helpful for Japan to admit its shortcomings during the war including the suffering of women, deal with them, not from a historical perspective but taking them as human rights issue above all else. It is very unlikely for historical debates to end. But if Japan focuses on the human rights aspect of this issue, everyone could agree that women should never be subjected to sexual exploitation, under any circumstances.

* Relationship with China

First, the Japanese government should take into consideration that even among Congressional foreign policy staff members and specialists, there is no consensus on the foreign policy prescription for dealing with China. This lack of consensus exists not only in the US Congress but also in other government agencies, think-tank communities and even in the White House. Everybody is still discussing the future direction of America's China policy. During his state visit to Japan in April 2014, President Obama announced publicly that the bilateral security treaty applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku
Islands. Aside from Obama, other high-ranking US officials also confirmed the American commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands.

However, it is important for the Japanese government not to read Obama’s statements as a blank check and should be careful not to overplay its position on the East China sea dispute. As detailed in chapter three, the current appetite for American involvement overseas is negative. The American people seem unsupportive of an active US foreign policy. They feel that the U.S. has been fatigued by two big wars after 9/11. The adverse fallout from the economic crisis of 2008 has also increased the isolationist voices in American polity. What is remarkable is the fact that even the Republican Party which has been, for decades, viewed as the national security party, is increasingly populated by Tea Party isolationists who often lack international military experience.

While staff members firmly confirmed the US commitment to the contingency over maritime issues between Japan and China, it should not be taken as a blank check for Japan to overplay its hand. Article V of the security treaty between Japan and the U.S. states:

“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”

Thus, if a contingency occurs over the Senkaku Islands, Congressional approval would be necessary in deploying the U.S. military for engagement in the region. Therefore, the Japanese government should improve its own military capability based
on the principles of international cooperation while bolstering cooperation with the U.S. military. Tokyo should endeavor to build a credible military deterrence capability against China, without unnecessarily agitating historical or territorial issues. Contingency management between the two governments to reduce the risk of misunderstanding and perception gap on possible responses to China must be a priority.

- **TPP negotiation and TPA legislation in the Congress**

  TPP as is widely known, is an essential part of the Obama Administration’s “Rebalance to Asia” policy. It would contribute to member countries’ economic development, while at the same time enhancing economic integration in the region. Its objective to establish high-standard rules is good in terms of providing solutions to many emerging problems, such as intellectual property rights and international dispute settlement mechanisms. Finally, as reaffirmed by many staff members interviewed for this research, TPP, as a next generation trade agreement contribute to the building and bolstering of a rules-based international system.

  Thus, for the Japanese government, it is imperative to join the negotiation and conclude it in terms acceptable to all parties. Moreover, it is obvious that Japan is one of the biggest economies among TPP negotiating countries. It is also widely known that Tokyo is the most important partner of Washington in the Asia-Pacific Region. Hence, Japan should willingly take responsibility to finish the negotiation by taking initiative to move pass its domestic politics. Also, in order to implement the agreement in full, the key lies on whether the TPA legislation would be passed or not in the U.S. Congress.
Since Japan now has its own Caucus in Congress, it has now a venue or a platform through which it could promote the importance of the TPA and the TPP. Through the Japan Caucus, Tokyo could contribute in the swift passing of the TPA bill.

The Japan Caucus in Congress would be good not only for TPP negotiation but also contribute in increasing and maintaining Japanese presence in the U.S. Congress.

* Policy recommendation for Japanese diplomacy in the U.S. Congress

As detailed in Chapter two, the complexity of foreign policymaking process resulting from the growing number of staff members, ideological polarization, widening income inequality, growing budget constraints, absence of a common threat like the Soviet Union and communism, and the growing influence of think-tanks and lobbying firms in Washington all result in a highly divided polity while at the same time making it hard for the American President to push for his own foreign policy doctrine.

Given the current trend, it seems that these complex issues may not be resolved soon. It is therefore expected that there would be considerable uncertainty in the future direction of the U.S. foreign policy.

Considering the contemporary geopolitical and security landscape, the changing priorities of the US, and the evolving foreign policy environment in Washington, it is vital for Japan to maintain and to increase its relevance in American polity. Therefore, there are mainly two urgent areas that Japan should focus on to attain its agenda in Washington. First, Japan should spend more money, time and energy to build both formal and informal people-to-people networks between the U.S. Congress and the Japanese Diet. For instance, both legislatures (the US Congress and the Japanese
Diet) should keep a “hotline” to fix any misunderstanding and reduce possible perception gaps. By doing so, whenever times of difficulties arrive such as in the time of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama when there was a perception gap as mentioned in Chapter one, both governments could address problems more proactively.

As detailed in Chapter one, the existence of formal and informal elite ties between governments is imperative. These were lessons that could be drawn from the period after WW II and during the Cold War era. In those times, the formal and informal elite ties between Japan and the US (e.g. Ambassador Reischauer or Ambassador Mansfield), played important roles in sustaining trust and mutual understanding. It must be noted that Ambassadors Reischauer and Mansfield were Japanese experts who had close ties with both the Hill and the White House. This importance could also be demonstrated by the roles of Senators Walter Mondale and Daniel Inoue, and Representative Tom Foley in improving the Japan-US relationship when it faced challenges after the Cold War. Both Mondale and Foley served as US ambassadors to Japan. At present, it is hard to find such talented and influential persons with close relationship to both the US President and the Congress who are well-briefed on Japan-US issues. It is therefore an urgent issue for Japan to find and nurture next generation legislators and politicians in the U.S. and build friendship and confidence with them. One good example but is entirely funded by private initiative is the Thomas S. Foley Legislative Exchange Program implemented through the Mansfield Foundation, a Washington-based research organization. The program overview and objective states:

“Every year the Mansfield Foundation Thomas S. Foley Legislative Exchange program will seek to organize at least one Foley Exchange, with each exchang
bringing five members of Japan's National Diet to Washington, D.C. to meet with their counterparts in government, representatives of the private sector, and members of the Foundation's Board."\(^48\)

This program is the first program in the history of both countries focusing on legislative exchange. The Japanese government should try to think of ways to expand and deepen this new program. For instance, they could benchmark it on Mansfield Foundation's existing Japan Fellowship Program funded by both governments.

Second, Japan should recognize the importance of "agenda setting" in Washington. Efforts should be made to let Washington politicians and policymakers fully aware of the critical roles that the Japan-U.S. relationship in advancing both countries' interests in the areas of economics, politics, security and culture. Only then can they understand, appreciate and advocate for the Japanese importance in Washington affairs. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter two, the growing number of think-tanks and lobbying firms has made Washington really competitive place for various interests. Such is because each player is trying vigorously through various initiatives to influence government officials such as elected congress members and their policies to favor their cause. For Japan to win favorable policies from the halls of the US Congress, Tokyo needs to think of ways through which it could effectively influence ideas, values and interests of political players. But it could only be done if Japan has a strong presence in the American policymaking process.

As the studies of Kent. E Calder shows, agenda-setting activities in the US

\(^48\) Mansfield Foundation's website: http://mansfieldfdn.org/program/exchanges/thomas-s-foley-legislative-exchange/
Congress now involve foreign lobbies dispatched by foreign governments in an attempt to influence American domestic politics and policy-making process. This has made Washington to be a very international city, and an extremely competitive place for diplomacy and politics. Considering this reality, Japan needs to expand the ways through which it approaches Washington and should not be limited to traditional ways such as using think-tank or lobbying firms. If anything, Tokyo should seek other means to shape agenda in the US Congress. The establishment of the Japan Caucus as a place for agenda setting in the US Congress is a step in the right direction. As detailed in Chapter three, the new Caucus is focusing on TPP and TPA legislative issues, which are really important for Japanese interests.

Thus, the Japanese Embassy in Washington should devote more resources to make the Caucus a relevant and an important center for the discussion of TPP and TPA issues as a first step. The Embassy should find ways to expand and facilitate Japan Caucus’ influence and its level of recognition in the US Congress and in the whole Washington DC. Another possible measure is to make use of American internal interest groups to foster Japanese interest in Washington. In the U.S. there are many internal interest groups, which include human rights, gun control, health care and immigration, among others. If possible, Japan could insert itself to one of those organizations and interest groups, support their cause and draw their interests and backing whenever the need arise. One concrete step to start this process is to reach out to Veterans’ interests group to promote Japan-US security issues. Veterans group is one of the biggest and influential interest groups in the U.S. Currently, there are 88 veterans

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49 If you need more information about Washington and international lobbying activities, see Kent. E Calder “Asia in Washington” (2014)
in the House and 18 in the Senate. Those members served the military during World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo as well as those who served at peacetime. 50 Basically, veterans interest groups exist to protect the economic and social interests of their members. But most of them, through their experiences in working abroad and their time in the military, hold positive regard on the the importance of the overseas security engagements of the U.S. as quintessential for world peace and stability. One report regard their political engagements as having the fundamental aim as follows:

“A National Veterans Strategy is fundamental to a sustainable national defense, namely the recruitment and preservation of a robust, all-volunteer military force. The all-volunteer military must continually attract the interest of diverse and talented Americans—representative of the diversity inherent in American society—to succeed in its security mission (DOD, 2012). The efficacy of programs and supports related to the transition of service members to civilian life, and how those programs are perceived by future volunteers, represents an essential motivation for future military service. Establishing a national strategic planning process for veterans’ issues pays tribute to those who have served and concomitantly signals to future generations that military service will be socially regarded and institutionally supported —for years and decades to come—as our nation’s highest calling and ultimate expression of citizenship.”51


Veterans interest groups seem to be a good platform for Japan to insert itself to the policymaking process and consequently push for the relevance of continued close relationship between Tokyo and Washington. Indeed, it is important for Japan to shape American agenda from the inside to fit its own interests.

The Japan-U.S. relationship's strategic imperatives for both countries' vital interests and for sustaining world peace and stability must be continuously appreciated, amidst the changing environment. The Abe Administration's initiative of trying to take responsibilities in the alliance and in the region, dubbed as "proactive contribution to peace" or "proactive pacifism" would be a great chance for Japan to update its relationship with the US and to maintain its relevance in world affairs. But to do this, concrete steps must be taken. Getting the support of one of the most influential political groups inside and outside Washington would surely deliver a bright future to the Japan-US relationship in the long term.
Congressional Attitude Towards Japan-U.S. Relationship

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