Thesis Abstract

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Title of Thesis:

The Limits of Institutional Reform in China: Analysis of Patterns of Managers' Career Mobility between Business Entities and Party-State Institutions

Title of the Thesis in Japanese:

中国における制度改革の限界-企業と党・国家組織との間における経営者の転職の様相に関する分析

The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine how the Chinese party-state has (dis-)integrated itself with business entities in the course of the opening-up reform. It analyses the patterns of career mobility of management from 33 strategically important companies in China, holding that managers create *informal networks* between business entities and party-state institutions when transferring between them. Analysis is based on four author-compiled datasets, which include career backgrounds of managers, incumbent in 1992, 2000, 2005, and 2010 (468 positions in total). Analysis approaches the research problem from the perspective of historical institutionalism and, using social network analysis as its main tool (*Cytoscape* software), sets two *research questions*: (1) how did institutional reform affect informal networks? and (2) what facilitated their emergence and persistence?

Analysis finds that at different points in time informal networks of a very limited number of companies extended to the central government institutions beyond their industry and to local governments. Specifically, some companies had links to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, the main institution in charge of China's large state-owned enterprises. Analysis shows that this pattern of informal networks is a result of a longer-term, path-dependent development. It is a display of continuous multiple formal institutional adjustment intertwining with the existing previously established institutions. These findings defy the implicit assumption of regime resilience argument, which suggests that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime is capable of foreseeing and controlling the future development of its newly established or adjusted institutions. This argument may hold true over a relatively short period of time. However, the result of a long-term multiple institutional adjustments may be difficult to anticipate. As this study shows, perfect adaptation is limited since old institutions and earlier policy decisions persist, moreover, a particular pattern of informal networks emerges. Eventually, this could undermine regime stability - institutional adaptation notwithstanding, the existing rigid pattern of networks may constrain regime's capacity to implement necessary policies. In this way, this study makes a theoretical contribution to the literature on regime stability in China, mainly the argument on authoritarian resilience.

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Empirically, this study reveals the model of governance the regime has attempted to create over the last two decades to effectively manage the economy. The patterns of managers' career mobility demonstrate how the CCP has gradually strengthened its role in information gathering and policy making, while the state has been left with administering it.

Methodologically, this research tests a relatively new set of tools in China studies, which could be further utilized to conceptualize elite politics in China and analyze large sets of data in the field.

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| Keywords: | manager | career | mobility, | network | analysis, | regime | adaptation, | institutional | reform, |
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