

Title	An ethnographic study of inter-group social contact in Hong Kong anti-ELAB movement : from double monologue to dialogue
Sub Title	
Author	刘, 小健(Liu, Xiaojian) Kunze, Kai
Publisher	慶應義塾大学大学院メディアデザイン研究科
Publication year	2020
Jtitle	
JaLC DOI	
Abstract	
Notes	修士学位論文. 2020年度メディアデザイン学 第786号
Genre	Thesis or Dissertation
URL	<a href="https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=KO40001001-00002020-0786">https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=KO40001001-00002020-0786</a>

慶應義塾大学学術情報リポジトリ(KOARA)に掲載されているコンテンツの著作権は、それぞれの著作者、学会または出版社/発行者に帰属し、その権利は著作権法によって保護されています。引用にあたっては、著作権法を遵守してご利用ください。

The copyrights of content available on the Keio Associated Repository of Academic resources (KOARA) belong to the respective authors, academic societies, or publishers/issuers, and these rights are protected by the Japanese Copyright Act. When quoting the content, please follow the Japanese copyright act.

Master's Thesis  
Academic Year 2020

An Ethnographic Study of Inter-group Social  
Contact in Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement

— From Double Monologue to Dialogue —



Keio University  
Graduate School of Media Design

Xiaojian Liu

A Master's Thesis  
submitted to Keio University Graduate School of Media Design  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Media Design

Xiaojian Liu

Master's Thesis Advisory Committee:

Professor Kai Kunze	(Main Research Supervisor)
Professor Hiro Kishi	(Sub Research Supervisor)

Master's Thesis Review Committee:

Professor Kai Kunze	(Chair)
Professor Hiro Kishi	(Co-Reviewer)
Professor Akira Kato	(Co-Reviewer)

Abstract of Master's Thesis of Academic Year 2020

An Ethnographic Study of Inter-group Social Contact in  
Hong Kong Anti-ELAB Movement

— From Double Monologue to Dialogue —

Category: Social Sciences

Summary

This paper examined the inter-group social contact during Anti-ELAB movement from 2019 to 2020 in Hong Kong. Following a quantitative approach, I looked at the fragmented social media landscape between Hong Kong and mainland China; determined pluralistic ignorance, the self-other bias for inter-group social contact existing among Hongkongers and mainland Chinese. I argued that there is tension and urge for inter-group dialogue yet been ignored.

I explored the possibility of curating a dialogue via artwork. Following a qualitative approach, I interviewed Hongkongers and mainland Chinese, and found symmetric resonance of the two monologue narratives. I rewrote the transcripts into dialogue scripts, and produced a short film to present the possibility of inter-group dialogue. The film was screened in two art spaces in Hong Kong on December 2019. A survey was handed out to evaluate the effectiveness of the film in encouraging inter-group empathy and willingness for inter-group social contact.

Based on the 3 focus group discussions I facilitated in Hong Kong, I observed an enhanced Hong Kong identity by analyzing the frequency of people using “we” and “I”. This points to potential localism in formation, yet the identity of a Hongkonger is rather exclusive, without recognizing the diverse population of Hong Kong society, which is mostly practiced through the movement languages. Furthermore, I analyzed how Weibo usage is negatively related to the willingness

for inter-group social contact, in particular among other comparable social media platforms.

This thesis looks at the Anti-ELAB protest from the perspective of inter-group social contact, as an archive of one of the social movement in Hong Kong, also around the world. The short film is meant to facilitate smoother inter-group social contact, and is an artistic form of reaction to the deglobalization context worldwide.

Keywords:

Anti-ELAB; Hong Kong; Social Movement; Inter-group Social Contact; Pluralistic Ignorance; Attributional Bias; Short Film; Visual Anthropology; Social Media; Deglobalization.

Keio University Graduate School of Media Design

Xiaojian Liu

# Contents

<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. Motivation . . . . .	1
1.2. Research Question . . . . .	3
1.3. Contributions . . . . .	4
1.4. Thesis Organization . . . . .	4
<b>2 Background</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1. Identity Formation and Social Movements . . . . .	5
2.2. From the Chinese Perspective . . . . .	6
2.3. Umbrella Movement Vs. Anti-ELAB . . . . .	7
<b>3 Why Just Monologues</b>	<b>9</b>
3.1. Study Setup . . . . .	9
3.2. Fragmented Narratives . . . . .	10
3.2.1 Binary Social Media Landscape . . . . .	10
3.3. Pluralistic Ignorance . . . . .	12
3.3.1 Self-Other Attributional Bias . . . . .	12
3.4. To Jump Across the River . . . . .	15
<b>4 From Double Monologues to Dialogue</b>	<b>16</b>
4.1. Semi-structured Interview . . . . .	16
4.1.1 Topic Clustering . . . . .	17
4.1.2 Curating the “Dialogue” Scripts . . . . .	18
4.2. Film Production . . . . .	19
4.2.1 Prototype 1: Self-portrait . . . . .	19
4.2.2 Prototype 2: Merged Faces . . . . .	20

4.2.3	Final Version: Animoji . . . . .	20
4.2.4	Film Information . . . . .	21
4.3.	Screenings and Focus Group Discussion . . . . .	22
4.4.	Revisit Survey . . . . .	23
<b>5</b>	<b>Discussion and Insights</b>	<b>30</b>
5.1.	In Becoming Hongkongers . . . . .	30
5.1.1	“We” and “I” Word Frequency Analysis . . . . .	30
5.1.2	Enhanced Group Identity by Civic Engagement . . . . .	32
5.1.3	Encouraged Altruism by Shared Sufferings . . . . .	33
5.1.4	To a Greater Solidarity . . . . .	34
5.2.	The Dark Side of the Solidarity . . . . .	35
5.2.1	Exclusive Language - “Go back to China” . . . . .	36
5.2.2	Guilt-Driven Slogans - “Our brothers are bleeding” . . . . .	37
5.3.	Fragmented vision in Mainland China . . . . .	37
5.3.1	Reinventing Individuals in Propaganda . . . . .	39
5.3.2	Media Spin in Weibo . . . . .	39
5.3.3	Weibo and Inter-group Social Contact . . . . .	41
5.3.4	Political Fatigue and Self-censorship . . . . .	44
<b>6</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>46</b>
6.1.	Summary . . . . .	46
6.2.	Re-inmagine Social Movements . . . . .	47
6.3.	Limitations . . . . .	48
6.4.	Future work . . . . .	49
	<b>References</b>	<b>51</b>
	<b>Appendices</b>	<b>54</b>

# List of Figures

1.1	The Protest Scene . . . . .	2
1.2	Graffiti on a Street Corner in Wanchai . . . . .	3
2.1	“Categorical Ethnic Identity in Hong Kong” . . . . .	6
4.1	Interview Transcripts Topic Clustering . . . . .	18
4.2	One of the Self-portraits . . . . .	20
4.3	The Merged Faces . . . . .	21
4.4	The Actor A . . . . .	22
4.5	The Actor B . . . . .	23
4.6	Poster of the Screening Events . . . . .	26
4.7	Screening in CCCD Art Space . . . . .	27
4.8	Discussion after Screening in Urban Tribe . . . . .	27
4.9	Discussion after Screening in CCCD Art Space . . . . .	28
4.10	I opened up my mind and shared as much as I wanted to during the discussion. . . . .	28
4.11	I did not or was reluctant to share them in public. . . . .	29
4.12	I want more inter-group empathy and social contact. . . . .	29
5.1	Mean frequencies of interviewees from Hong Kong and mainland China of using “I” and “We”. . . . .	32
5.2	Poster Made for “Martyr in Yellow”. . . . .	38
5.3	The Meme Poster . . . . .	40
5.4	The Meme Made for ”Brother Ah Zhong” by Fan-group. . . . .	42
5.5	Scatter Plot: Weibo Usage and Inter-Group Social Contact . . . . .	43



# List of Tables

3.1	Paired Samples <i>t</i> -test Result: Cross-Region Social Media Usage .	11
3.2	Independent <i>t</i> -test Result: Pluralistic Ignorance among Mainland Chinese Participants . . . . .	13
3.3	Independent <i>t</i> -test Result: Pluralistic Ignorance among Hong Kong Participants . . . . .	13
3.4	Paired Samples <i>t</i> -test Result: Self-other Bias of all Participants .	14
5.1	Group Statistics of "I" and "We" frequency between groups . . .	31
5.2	One-Way ANOVA Test Result of "I" Frequency Between Groups	31
5.3	One-Way ANOVA Test Result of "We" Frequency Between Groups	32
5.4	Linear Regression: Weibo and Inter-Group Social Contact . . . .	43
5.5	Linear Regression: FaceBook+Twitter and Inter-Group Social Contact . . . . .	44

# Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge the support and guidance of my thesis supervisor, Professor Kai Kunze. Here I want to thank Sandra Tai, I am more than happy that we could work on something we believe in, after all these years. I also want to say thanks to our two lovely actresses, CCCD Art Space and Urban Tribe for your support on the film making and screening. Thanks for all the interviewees who accepted my interview request, I know it wasn't an easy choice to make. My deepest gratitude goes to my family. It has been a difficult year in my life, thank you for being the light in the darkness. Mum, you are dazzling when you dance. Dad, we are happy to see you doing more chores. And my brother, I wish all your efforts will pay off in the future.

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1. Motivation

On December 2019, I visited Hong Kong again, it seemed people living in Hong Kong had been used to broken signal lights, train system shut down, fights on the streets, or any other abrupt emergencies in daily life. Everyone found their own rhythm to live under the chaos and turbulence. Hong Kong used to enjoy a reputation of business efficiency, financial prosperity and civilized society around the world, yet what was happening in Hong Kong went beyond many people's imagination. The turbulence this time was caused by the Anti-Extradition Bill movement (Anti-ELAB movement hereafter), started since June of 2019, this social movement grabbed attention worldwide, no one would deny that this is one of the darkest time of Hong Kong history, depressive atmosphere has covered the once peaceful city.

I have been following the news of this movement since June 2019, as I had been living in Hong Kong for years, I am very emotionally attached to the city. At the same time, I was born and raised in mainland China, China is my hometown. That said, I have always been identifying myself as a global citizen, I didn't attach my self-identity with a particular place, and I didn't have to. Although I was in mainland China at that time, far from the main battle field, I still suffered a lot. The suffering not only comes from empathizing with Hongkongers, but also from the antagonistic attitudes on social media between Hongkongers and mainland Chinese. The boundary between the two camps became distinct, yet I belong nowhere. Mainland Chinese would think I am partly from Hong Kong; for



Figure 1.1 The Protest Scene

Hongkongers, I am totally from China. Suddenly, being a global citizen means being homeless.

In fact, I understand both sides. I tried to talk to people around from both sides. and I found a lot of unshared feelings, unspoken words. However, these narratives were barely seen on social media or heard in real life. Besides, many of the topics that people are concerning about were overlapped, as if a dialogue could occur between them, and couldn't it? Many said that they actually wanted a dialogue, yet why did they struggle to do that?

I also noticed that the antagonism between people is not necessarily because people are holding different political stances, but due to a lack of common grounds to have a dialogue. People have been receiving different information, which was distorted across the boundaries, through the different media sources and languages. Mainland Chinese might find that learning the facts by checking news on Weibo, Wechat or any other mainstream media platforms in China is difficult; while same situation is also happening to Hongkongers, who use Facebook, WhatsApp etc. Does the hatred come from the bottom of their hearts, or is it socially constructed? In this social movement, the information asymmetry on social media between mainland China and Hong Kong and how this affected the inter-group



Figure 1.2 Graffiti on a Street Corner in Wanchai

communication was understudied.

I couldn't stop wondering: Why are the narratives fragmented on social media? Why do we struggle to talk to each other? Is there a way to rebuild inter-group social contact? Bearing the above questions in mind, I drafted my research questions in the following. Then I started my field work, which consists of questionnaire surveys, interview, film making and screening, focus group discussions.

## 1.2. Research Question

- Examine differences in social media usage between Hong Kong and mainland China.
- Examine pluralistic ignorance (self-other attributional bias) for inter-group social interactions among Hongkongers and Mainland Chinese.
- Explore means to facilitate inter-group social contact.
- Re-imagine an alternative way of social movements.

### 1.3. Contributions

- This study offered an empirical archive and artwork of Anti-ELAB.
- This study revealed the alternative discourse and presented reflective perspectives in Anti-ELAB.
- This study examined the reasons and possibilities of inter-group social contact between Hongkongers and mainland Chinese.
- The short film contributed to facilitate inter-group social contact in Hong Kong, also as a reaction to the deglobalization context worldwide.

### 1.4. Thesis Organization

- **Chapter 1** discusses the motivation, research questions and applications of this project.
- **Chapter 2** introduces the history and dynamics of social movements in Hong Kong and the liquid nature of the constantly changing binary identities of being “Hongkonger” and “Chinese” in history.
- **Chapter 3** examines the pluralistic ignorance existing among Hongkongers and mainland Chinese, analyzes the reason that people struggle to talk to each other, and the possibility and urge for dialogues.
- **Chapter 4** describes the process of curating the “Double Monologue”: interview, insight, prototype, film production, screening, focus group and revisit survey.
- **Chapter 5** further analyzes the insight from the fieldwork results.
- **Chapter 6** summarizes the previous work, proposes the limitation and future work.

# Chapter 2

## Background

This chapter provides an overall picture of the context of this social movement in both scenes in Hong Kong and mainland China.

### 2.1. Identity Formation and Social Movements


The story did not begin in a sudden. Before we ask why there is an antagonism, we'd better first examine why there is a binary situation of identities between Hong Kong and China.

The identity of “Hongkonger” has been fluid in history. Hong Kong, the former British colony, went through two social movements raised in the 1970s. The movements expressed dissatisfaction of the colonial social political order, and triggered search for Chinese cultural root among the young generation. Millions of students went to the Victoria Park for protests, and it was seen as a heritage of the social movements until now that protests in Hong Kong often gathered around Victoria Park. The movements raised an urge for localism, however, the localism was expressed in patriotic passion towards China. That were regarded as the beginning of localism and identity formation as Hong Kong citizens (Chiu and Lui 2000).

In the year of 1997, Hong Kong, was returned to China in 1997, the Central government has begun handing over what's left of its Bureaucracy to a new body, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and District Council. Deng Xiaoping, the leader of China announced the policy “One country, Two systems” for Hong Kong, where mainland China and Hong Kong remain as one nation but

operate under different political and economic systems (Steinhardt et al. 2018).

According to a longitudinal Public Opinion Program conducted by the University of Hong Kong (HKUPOP 2019), as seen from the figure 2.1, Hong Kong citizens who identify themselves as “Chinese” has declined to 20% after 1997, then constantly mounted until 2008, the Beijing Olympics, yet declined again back to the starting point of 1997 afterwards till now (Ping and Kin-Ming 2014). What is worth to notice is that, 40% of the subjects chose to identify them as mixed identity, being both Hongkonger and Chinese.



(Source: Public Opinion Program, the University of Hong Kong, “Categorical Ethnic Identity - per poll”)

Figure 2.1 “Categorical Ethnic Identity in Hong Kong”

## 2.2. From the Chinese Perspective

The colonial history of Hong Kong has been perceived as a shame for a hundred years. The handover of sovereignty in 1997 has been regarded as the end of the shame. In Chinese discourse, it has been clear from the beginning that only the identity as Chinese is recognized for Hongkongers, and this Chinese identity was once suppressed under colony but became official after the handover. The protest towards colonial government and the localism fostered in Hong Kong was



neglected. The TV series of “Hong Kong Legend” described the two social movements in the 1970s as economic riots, the political elements were hidden. The history of Hong Kong was edited and portrayed in a different way in China (Chiu and Lui 2000).

After 2003, Chinese tourists flushed into Hong Kong, due to the launch of “Individual Visit Scheme” policy for encouraging mainland Chinese traveling to Hong Kong. Hong Kong opened up its door to mainland China to embrace not only tourists, but also students pursuing study in the universities, job seekers, and pregnant women giving birth in hospitals. Several protests were raised because of the conflict of limited local resources taken by the “*outsiders*”.

### 2.3. Umbrella Movement Vs. Anti-ELAB

Umbrella Movement in 2014 has a profound influence on Anti-ELAB. In late November of 2014, during the Umbrella Movement, some militant protesters attempted to break into Hong Kong’s Legislative Council Building. The action raised a large disagreements and internal conflicts among the pro-democrat, meanwhile, it also raised a significant degree of psychological distress among many core participants (Reynolds et al. 2017). However, the wide-spread intense debate among Hong Kong citizens demonstrated that localism has become dominant in Hong Kong identity discourse, through the will of Hongkongers to reclaim unique local cultural identities as different from China, and to fight against the authoritarian governing from Beijing. However, this localism neither shares a specific unified cultural imaginary nor a single operational path (chung Chen and Szeto 2015).

In Anti-ELAB, protesters learned lessons from the Umbrella Movement. Internal conflicts were intentionally avoided this time. Moderate and radical protesters showed a high degree of solidarity. The most frequently used slogans were “*no splitting and no severing of ties*”, addressing the ethics of this movement that splitting will destroy the previous efforts as the failure they had last time. Other popular slogans such as “*brothers climbing mountains, each offering one’s efforts*”, and “*going up and down together*”, were emphasizing the bond among

the protesters. Nonetheless, the Anti-ELAB has achieved a high solidarity in action and did last longer than any other social movements in Hong Kong history (Lee 2199). While the solidarity has been celebrated in Hong Kong and acknowledged worldwide, I think the negative influence of it has been under-examined. The solidarity has been effectively uniting some, yet inevitably excluding some others, which I see could be a potential cause pushing the inter-group dialogue between Hongkongers and mainland Chinese to an unpleasant edge.

# Chapter 3

## Why Just Monologues

*“I visited Hong Kong on September (2019), and went to a rally (part of Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement) at Tamar Square, Admiralty. I wanted to ask a girl for a cigarette, but could not say it to her, I was afraid that she would recognize my Mainland Chinese accent, I was never a shy person, I just could not ask for that cigarette.”*

---

*Excerpt from an interview with a mainland Chinese.*

In this chapter, I tried to understand why people from Hong Kong and mainland China struggle to talk to each other. The harmful factors for inter-group social contact could be practiced via social media, language, etc. Besides, I would like to determine if there is reluctance for inter-group social contact and if it is acknowledged. I started the following study from a quantitative approach, by examining the social media usage and self-other attributional bias for inter-group social interactions.

### 3.1. Study Setup

71 students from the University of Hong Kong and Keio University participated in the study. 30 identify themselves as mainland Chinese; 29 identify themselves as Hongkongers; 8 identify themselves as both Hongkonger and mainland Chinese; 2 are Taiwanese and 1 is Malaysian.

All participants completed a questionnaire asking the following questions, using a 7-point scale, where 0 = *not at all* to 6 = *very much*.

*Imagine you are in a lecture room, sitting beside you there is a Hong Kong student and a Mainland Chinese student.*

- To what extent would you like to talk to the Hong Kong student?
- To what extent would you like to talk to the Mainland Chinese student?
- To what extent do you think the Hong Kong student would like to talk to you?
- To what extent do you think the Mainland Chinese student would like to talk to you?
- To what extent do you use the following social media apps: WeChat, WhatsApp, QQ, Telegram, Weibo, FaceBook, Twitter.

## 3.2. Fragmented Narratives

When I asked people “from where did you know Anti-ELAB” and “from where do you keep learning the news about Anti-ELAB” at the first place, none of the answers differentiated from social media ranging from “WeChat, WhatsApp, QQ, Telegram, Weibo, FaceBook, Twitter.” It is undeniable that our information feeds and public discussion are largely relied on social media. It might be common sense yet still important when we look into the narratives about Anti-ELAB, that people from Hong Kong and mainland China don’t share common social media platforms. The narratives, accordingly were fragmented by the binary social media landscapes.

### 3.2.1 Binary Social Media Landscape

I examined the difference in using social media between Hongkongers and mainland Chinese by analyzing the results from the questionnaires. The interviewees were asked “to what extent do you use the following social media apps: WeChat, WhatsApp, QQ, Telegram, Weibo, FaceBook, Twitter.” and answered from 0 = *not at all* to 6 = *very much*. I grouped “WeChat” and “QQ” as the personal messaging social media commonly used in mainland China; “WhatsApp” and

“Telegram” commonly used in Hong Kong. I grouped “FaceBook” and “Twitter” as the commonly used public social media apps in Hong Kong; and “Weibo” as the commonly used public social media apps in mainland China. Paired samples *t* tests were conducted to compare the difference of Hong Kong and mainland Chinese participants in using personal messaging social media and public social media apps grouped above.

As seen in table3.1, there is an obvious significant difference in using cross-regional personal messaging Social media apps between Hong Kong participants (M= -6.38, SD= 3.44), where  $t = -10$ ,  $p = .00$ ; and mainland Chinese participants (M= 6.63, SD= 3.11) where  $t = 11.67$ ,  $p = .00$ . Similarly, there is a significant difference in using cross-regional public Social media apps between Hong Kong participants (M= 5.31, SD= 2.75), where  $t = 10.39$ ,  $p = .00$ . However, it is interesting to notice that and mainland Chinese participants (M= 6.63, SD= 3.11) almost could have yet failed to reach a significant difference in using “FaceBook + Twitter” and “Weibo” where  $t = -2.01$ ,  $p = .051$ .

Table 3.1 Paired Samples *t*-test Result: Cross-Region Social Media Usage

	ID	Mean	SD.	SE	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	Sig. (2-tailed)
WeChat+QQ -	HK	-6.38	3.44	.64	-10.00	28	.00
WhatsApp+Telegram	MC	6.63	3.11	.57	11.67	29	.00
FaceBook+Twitter -	HK	5.31	2.75	.51	10.39	28	.00
Weibo	MC	-1.07	2.86	.52	-2.01	29	.051

To sum up, Hong Kong and mainland Chinese participants showed a significantly different pattern in using personal messaging apps, mainland Chinese use “WeChat+QQ” more and and Hong Kong participants use “WhatsApp+Telegram” and “FaceBook+Twitter” more. Although the difference of mainland Chinese in using “FaceBook+Twitter” and “Weibo” was not significant under a  $p < .05$  significance level, yet still the gap was far from close. Apparently, the binary social media usage explained that the dialogue is never going to happen as the channel is primarily blocked.

### 3.3. Pluralistic Ignorance

In the quote at the beginning of this chapter, the girl from mainland China failed to make the move to borrow that cigarette from the Hongkonger. What if she did? Would she be rejected, or the Hongkonger was actually happy to lend one? Is there any possibility that it was just the fear in her mind that stopped her from initiating a smooth inter-group talk which could have happened?

Although discrimination in inter-group contact is agreed by an abundance of researches that people tend to avoid inter-group social interactions than in-group interactions (Major et al. 2002), there are intense studies conducted by researchers proved that the discrimination is probably biased and smoother inter-group interactions is wanted (Prentice and Miller 1993).

Pluralistic ignorance describes the discrepancy between public behaviors and private beliefs. People publicly conform social norms while disagree with the norms, and mistakenly think other people's public behaviors reflect their own belief. This attributional bias was first found in the binge drinking behavior among university students. This phenomenon was also well-explored in racial aspect, among America black and white people who fail to realize that their concerns of being rejected to initiate inter-group social interactions also exist in the out-group members.

Pluralistic ignorance for inter-group social contact is rather under-studied in Asian societies, yet meaningful to help us understand the inner problem lying in the antagonism. In confirming the pluralistic ignorance for inter-group social contact among Hongkongers and mainland Chinese, fundamental implications are asserted to call for future actions to initiate inter-group dialogue. The results of the study became my inspirational grounds to create the film afterwards.

#### 3.3.1 Self-Other Attributional Bias

Consistent with previous predictions, pluralistic ignorance was found among

both Hongkongers and mainland Chinese participants. As seen in table 3.2, a significant result from independent  $t$ -test indicates that participants from Hong Kong ( $N=29$ ,  $M=3.72$ ,  $SD=1.73$ ) are more willing to talk to a mainland Chinese than mainland Chinese participants ( $N=30$ ,  $M=2.47$ ,  $SD=1.38$ ) think average Hongkongers are willing to talk to them,  $t(57)=-3.09$ ,  $p = .003$ . As seen from table 3.3, similar yet slightly smaller significant significance of pluralistic ignorance was found among Hong Kong Participants as well. In fact, mainland Chinese participants ( $N=30$ ,  $M=3.87$ ,  $SD=1.81$ ) are more willing to talk to a Hongkonger than Hong Kong participants ( $N=29$ ,  $M=2.83$ ,  $SD=1.77$ ) think average mainland Chinese are willing to talk to them,  $t(57)=2.22$ ,  $p = .03$ .

Table 3.2 Independent  $t$ -test Result: Pluralistic Ignorance among Mainland Chinese Participants

$F$	Sig.	$t$	$df$	Sig. (2-tailed)	Std. Error Difference
1.74	.19	-3.09	57	.003	.41
		-3.08	53.55	.003	.41

Table 3.3 Independent  $t$ -test Result: Pluralistic Ignorance among Hong Kong Participants

$F$	Sig.	$t$	$df$	Sig. (2-tailed)	Std. Error Difference
.95	.34	2.22	57	.03	.47
		2.22	56.99	.03	.47

The results tell us that pluralistic ignorance for inter-group social contact significantly exists among Hong Kong participants and mainland Chinese participants. However, as for the 8 participants who identify themselves as both Hongkongers and mainland Chinese, I ran a paired samples  $t$ -test to check if the self-other bias exists among participants with dual identities. As shown in in table 3.4, no significant difference between willingness to talk to Hongkongers ( $M=3.43$ ,  $SD=2.23$ )

and expected acceptance from Hongkongers ( $M=3.71$ ,  $SD=2.06$ ) was detected among participants who identify themselves as both Hongkongers and mainland Chinese ( $N=7$ ),  $t(6)=.80$ ,  $p=.45$ . Likewise, among participants who identify themselves as both Hongkongers and mainland Chinese ( $N=8$ ), no significant difference was found between willingness to talk to mainland Chinese ( $M=4.63$ ,  $SD=2.00$ ) and expected acceptance from Hongkongers ( $M=4.38$ ,  $SD=1.77$ ),  $t(7)=1.00$ ,  $p=.35$ . These results indicate that participants who have dual identities have less self-other bias than other participants who have single identity. From this indication, I would like to further argue that the inter-group pluralistic ignorance was more related with binary group identity factors.

Furthermore, I checked if the self-other bias exists in-groups. Among participants from Hong Kong ( $N=29$ ), there is no significant difference between their willingness to talk to Hongkongers and their expected acceptance from Hongkongers. Likewise, among participants from mainland China, there is no significant difference between their willingness to talk to mainland Chinese and their expected acceptance from mainland Chinese. No significant self-other bias was found for in-group social contact. These results indicate that, obviously, the participants tend to have a more equal and reasonable estimation of being accepted by in-group members and initiating social contact with them, compared to their estimations over out-group members.

Table 3.4 Paired Samples *t*-test Result: Self-other Bias of all Participants

		Mean	SD.	SE	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	Sig. (2-tailed)
Both	HK bias	.29	.95	.36	-.80	6	.46
	MC bias	.25	.71	.25	1.00	7	.35
HK	In-group bias	.14	.64	.12	1.16	28	.26
	Inter-group bias	.90	1.97	.37	2.45	28	.02
MC	Inter-group bias	1.40	1.50	.27	5.11	29	.00
	In-group bias	.07	1.14	.21	.32	29	.75



### 3.4. To Jump Across the River

From the results above, we can conclude that the public space for discussion was fragmented by binary social media landscape in the first place. In recognizing that, I examined the pluralistic ignorance (self-other attributional bias) for inter-group social contact among all participants. The result indicates that both Hong Kong participants and mainland Chinese participants expected less acceptance from out-group people than their actual willingness in talking to them. However, the pluralistic ignorance failed to be significant when it is tested among participants with dual-identities or under in-group situation. Specifically, the participants with dual identities had more accurate estimation in being accepted talking with either Hongkongers or mainland Chinese than those with single identities; what's more, the pluralistic ignorance wasn't found significantly for in-group social contact, which means both Hongkongers and mainland Chinese participants had more accurate estimation in being accepted talking with their in-group members than out-group members. The bias turns invalid when it comes to participants who partly or fully share the same identity with the people they are facing. That reaffirmed our prediction that the pluralistic ignorance is not a general phenomenon among all, but mediated by group identity factor, that it exists between groups.

Based on the results above, I would like to argue that, although the space for dialogue was split up by binary social media landscape, either in public discussion or personal conversation, despite all the external boundaries and barriers, on the contrary, there is undermined tension and urge for inter-group social contact. The reason behind the fact that people are less likely to talk to out-group members is not that they don't want to, but rather attributional bias, the gap between actual willingness to reach out and false estimation of being accepted. The pluralistic ignorance here is not individually generated, but socially constructed. There are many "could have happened" and "wish it happened", yet the possibilities of happening were structurally suppressed. Having realized that, I see the opportunity to re-curate a more inclusive and holistic discourse space, to build a bridge across the river. Based on this faith, I started a series of actions to enable inter-group empathy and communication, which is described in the following chapter.

# Chapter 4

## From Double Monologues to Dialogue

This chapter describes the four main action items I facilitated for inter-group social contact in Hong Kong, which are Semi-structured Interview, Film Production, Screening and Focus Group Discussion, and Revisit Survey.

### 4.1. Semi-structured Interview

To better understand the cohort in the context of Anti-ELAB, I started my action from a qualitative perspective, I conducted semi-structured interviews from June to December in 2019. The research method contains observation, to find the under-skin problem and unexpected issues, then to design for a better solution. The interviews were conducted through face to face talk, video chat, voice call, as requested by the interviewees. Most of the interviewees (N=20, F=14; M=6) have mixed backgrounds living in both Hong Kong and mainland China, while 9 of them identify themselves as Hongkongers, and 11 of them identify themselves as Chinese.

Before I describe the interview process more specifically, it is interesting to notice that, I started the interview with my friends around, as I have more trust credibility from them so do self-disclosure, then the first bunch of interviewees would introduce their friends to me. Nonetheless, most of them shared their hesitation in participating the interview, concerning the political censorship in China (including interviewees from Hong Kong), and after I guaranteed the anonymity

of the interview, they turned out to be surprisingly talkative. Most of the interviews lasted longer than 1 hour, in which the interviewees voluntarily wish to share more, and the conversations were led by the interviewees in the end. The “unexpected talkativeness” might indicate that, there could be more words and thoughts haven’t been shared in public, the desire to express was suppressed.

After the interviews, I wrote down the transcripts of the 20 hours interview recordings. I split the transcripts into two groups, Mainland China and Hong Kong, based on the interviewees’ identities. They turned out to be two sets of monologues. However, interestingly, I saw potential common grounds that could enable a dialogue among the monologues. I found out that there were many overlaps of the topics covered by the two monologues, there were so many similarities in what they care about. Moreover, both of them showed strong interests and curiosity in the other group, while shared their pityness and hopelessness of lacking that information source. I realized that, in fact, the monologues could have actually been a dialogue, if there were an opportunity for them to talk to each other.

#### 4.1.1 Topic Clustering

I did topic clustering to have a more specific grasp of the overlapped narratives. I grouped the lines of each side touching on the same topics into one category, and calculated the frequency of each category. The result was shown below:

- Nation/Imagined community (20)
- Media sources/Censorship (16)
- Awareness of lack of inter group dialogue (11)
- Family members (7)
- Old/ New social order (6)
- Personal growth (4)

As seen from the figure 4.1, among all 6 common topics, public topics such as nation and media source were mentioned more than private topics such as family and personal growth. Inter-group dialogue were in the middle, with a frequency of 11 times among all.




Figure 4.1 Interview Transcripts Topic Clustering

### 4.1.2 Curating the “Dialogue” Scripts

The common topics became my inspirations of curating the “imagined” dialogue. I re-wrote the double monologue transcripts into dialogue transcripts, to reflect the symmetric resonance of the fragmented narratives, to show the possibility of a dialogue that could have happened. In addition, I sorted out the hidden narratives that were rarely seen on public sphere; more specifically, rather than the mainstream propaganda discourse and political statements that were often seen on social media, I tried to find the narratives from an individual perspective, lines that are reflecting their personal feelings and experiences. Following that criteria, I screened the draft scripts material from the original transcripts.

I created 2 virtual female characters. They talk in turns, one speaks after the other, as if they are having a real conversation. Based on the above criteria, the scripts were mixed, paraphrased, or re-positioned from the original transcripts. The full scripts could be found in the appendices in the end of the paper.

## 4.2. Film Production

In considering the format to present the curated dialogue, I chose film, as compared to other formats, such as plain text or audio, it is the most straightforward way to show a dialogue, and probably a more effective way to provoke empathy. In discovering the visual form of presenting the outcome, several prototypes were experimented.

### 4.2.1 Prototype 1: Self-portrait

The baseline of the visual is to assure the anonymity the interviewees' and the actors' identity. which means I could not show any real voices or faces of them. To keep the interviewees or actors' anonymous is a must, not only because of ethical concerns, but also concerns of unknown political censorship in China, as mentioned by some interviewees. First I tried to let the interviewees to draw self-portrait and briefly describe themselves in a few words, as seen from the figure 4.2. The self portraits would appear as visual information while they speak in the video. This plan did not proceed well out of two main reasons. Firstly, some participants had difficulties or felt uncomfortable with drawing. Secondly, in the figuring process to create a "fake dialogue", the narratives turned out to be impossible to stay in a linear pattern. That is to say, the transcripts from each interviewee were disproportional and shuffled, which made it hard to present the corresponding person one by one in order, as I rewrote the scripts based on the sorted transcripts, merged some pieces, rearranged the order.




Figure 4.2 One of the Self-portraits

### 4.2.2 Prototype 2: Merged Faces

In the second prototype, I tried to merge faces of two girls to create an actor which does not exist, thus to have an actual face but keep an anonymous identity. I merged two girls' faces using After Effect, as seen from figure 4.3. In this way, both anonymity and facial expression were remained. After trying out several face prototypes of merged faces, it seemed these faces may invoke Uncanny Valley effect. Uncanny Valley effect refers to the phenomenon that the more a fake face resembles an actual human being's face, the more eeriness people would feel, which makes them feel difficult to empathize with the character (Mori et al. 1970). This is the opposite of my initial purpose, which is to encourage the audience's empathy towards the actors, therefore they could recognize the possibility of inter-group dialogue.

### 4.2.3 Final Version: Animoji

After a while of confirming the actors, who were supposed to be native Cantonese speakers, I communicated with the actors via FaceTime using Animoji to



Figure 4.3 The Merged Faces

rehearse, as I was in Japan and the actors were in Hong Kong before the actual film shooting date. Animoji was found surprisingly effective in serving both of our goals, to remain anonymous and evoke empathy. Actors with customized Animoji was decided to try out in the first stage of screening, as shown in the following, figure 4.4 shows the look of actor A, and figure 4.5 shows the look of actor B.

#### 4.2.4 Film Information

- Project type: Experimental/Short/New Media
- Filming Location: Hong Kong SAR
- Completion Date: December 5th, 2019

- Language: Chinese (Cantonese)
- Runtime: 21 minutes 59 seconds
- Dimensions: 1920x1080
- Shooting format: Digital, 26mm, f/1.8
- Aspect Ratio: 16:9
- Film Color: Color



Figure 4.4 The Actor A

### 4.3. Screenings and Focus Group Discussion

3 screening sessions were held in Hong Kong. As shown in the event poster (figure 4.6), on December 11th and 15th 2019, the film was screened in CCCD Artspace, as seen from the figure 4.7. On December 14th 2019, it was screened in Urban Tribe, as seen from the figure 4.8. Around 20 audiences attended each session, the total audiences were about 60 people.

3 focus group discussions were facilitated with the audience after screening, which consisted of around 20 people and lasted for 1-2hours each. The first focus





Figure 4.5 The Actor B

group discussion (December 11th 2019) and the third (December 15th 2019) were held in CCCD Art Space, as seen from the figure 4.9. The second focus group was held on December 14th 2019 in Urban Tribe. About the structure of the focus group discussion, first I briefed my motivation of making this film, then encouraged the audience to share any spontaneous personal feelings or thinking evoked by the screening. The findings and insights are discussed in the next chapter.

#### 4.4. Revisit Survey

Online revisit questionnaires were distributed after the screenings to examine whether the screening has stimulated alternative discourse and encouraged tendency towards inter-group empathy and interactions. All participants completed the questionnaire, in a 4-point scale, where 0 =not at all, to 6=very much, following the manner of Likert scale. 14 participants' response were collected (F=8; M=6). 11 of them are in their twenties, 1 in thirties, 2 in their forties. 7 questions in the following were asked in this questionnaire:

- I shared what I thought freely during the discussion.
- I think I could have talked more in the discussion.

- Things I shared in the discussion are something I never said before
- Things I shared in the discussion are something I may not want to share on social media or other public occasions.
- I am more willing to learn about people from different groups after the screening.
- I wish to have more empathy and dialogues among people from different groups after the screening.
- Please feel free to share anything you felt like sharing in the screening session but didn't get a chance to say.

The first two questions examined if the participants opened up their mind and shared as much as they wished to during their discussion, as seen from 4.10. The third and fourth questions examined if the participants shared something that they did not or were reluctant to share in the public sphere, either in daily talk or on social media, as seen in 4.11. The last two questions examined if the screening had a positive influence on the participants for inter-group empathy and contact as shown in figure 4.12.

21% of the participants strongly agree and 50% agree that they shared something that they never shared before and still felt reluctant to share on social media or any other social occasions; 85.7% of the participants agree and 7.1% strongly agree that they could have shared more in the discussion. The results indicate that the film screening had a positive effect on invoking conversation.

21.4% of the participants strongly agree and 50% agree that they shared something they never shared before. 64.3% of the participants strongly agree and 14.3% agree that things they shared in the discussion were something they do not want to share in public occasions. The results indicate that the film screening was effective in digging the suppressed narratives in Anti-ELAB movements, which might help to understand the cohort in-depth and find genuine insights.

57.1% of the participants strongly agree and 42.9% agree that they wish to learn more about different groups after the screening. 50% of the participants strongly agree and 50% agree that they wish to have more inter-group empathy and dialogue. On the one hand, this result is consistent to the predicted tendency and desire for inter-group dialogue previously discussed in Chapter 3. On the other hand, this indicates that the film is very likely effective in encouraging inter-group social contact.

For the last open question “Please feel free to share anything you felt like sharing in the screening session but didn’t get a chance to say”, 5 of the participants expressed their pleasure and thanks that they could learn different voices and alternative perspectives and wish there were more similar events. 2 of the participants thought that the contents could have shown more views from more diverse spectrum of people, for example, they would love to hear more from the pro-establishment (blue party). 1 participant wrote that:

*After the screening, I feel that I’ m more empowered to ask people about their real thoughts about the movements and politics in general. I wouldn’t rush to prove that I’ m on their side or defend my stance. However, I would still want to observe and know the landscape of political stances before speaking.*

**Double Monologue**

**對話 二 短片 放映 SHORT FILM SCREENING**

**Shall we talk**

當代社交對話如何被媒體信息，  
 社交網絡，語言，民族，個人歷史所建構？  
 在這場時代性的社會運動中，  
 作為一個個體是如何去思考，行動，反思自己的？  
 今天我們不討論政治，也不預測未來。  
 我們討論那些沒說出口的話，被壓抑的共情，被誤解的話語，  
 我們如何被這場運動中塑造，和誰的距離近了，和誰又遠了，  
 這種撕裂感使我們渴望對話，真正的對話變得艱難而珍貴。  
 來自不同地域年輕人的匿名表演，是一場對話，也是兩場獨白。

**12.11 Wed. 19:00-20:00** **CCCD Artspace** 九龍石硤尾白田街30號  
 賽馬會創意藝術中心L205-208 D室  
 RoomD, L205-208 Jockey Club Creative Arts Centre, 30 Pak Tin Street

**12.15 Sun. 19:00-20:00**

**12.14 Sat. 19:00-20:00** **Urban Tribe** 旺角彌敦道562號1樓  
 1F, 562 Nathan Road, Mong Kok

Figure 4.6 Poster of the Screening Events




Figure 4.7 Screening in CCCD Art Space



Figure 4.8 Discussion after Screening in Urban Tribe



Figure 4.9 Discussion after Screening in CCCD Art Space



I shared what I thought freely during the discussion

I thought I could have talked more in the discussion.

Figure 4.10 I opened up my mind and shared as much as I wanted to during the discussion.




Figure 4.11 I did not or was reluctant to share them in public.




Figure 4.12 I want more inter-group empathy and social contact.

# Chapter 5

## Discussion and Insights

In this chapter, I would discuss in detail about my findings and elaborate the insights from my field work in Hong Kong, especially from the focus group discussion. In section one, I would discuss the dynamics of identity formation and the solidarity I observed during Anti-ELAB movements. In section two, I would discuss and evaluate the power of language playing a negative role in inter-group social contact. In section three, I would look into how current social media usage pattern and national propaganda that have been shaping people reacting to inter-group social contact.

### 5.1. In Becoming Hongkongers

In the screening, I noticed that some Hongkongers cried after listening to some narratives of monologue. At the same time, some audiences from Hong Kong shared their feedback of feeling “cathartic”, some said “educational”, and many of them said that they wanted to know more about mainland Chinese. Many other interviewees and audiences in the screening expressed that they shared the feeling of being united. Since then I started to wonder, is Hong Kong cultivating sense of collectivism, or even nationalism in Anti-ELAB movement?

#### 5.1.1 “We” and “I” Word Frequency Analysis

In reviewing the focus group discussion, I found that interviewees from Hong Kong tend to use more “we” instead of “I” than interviewees from mainland China.



This might suggest the group identity as Hongkongers has been reinforced. To understand the group identity recognition, a One-way ANOVA test was used to compare the group difference of the frequency of using “I” and “We” in the transcripts. Consistent with the previous prediction, it is found that there is no significant difference of the frequency of using “I” between interviewees from Hong Kong (M=46.44, SD=16.86) and mainland Chinese, (M=45.73, SD=10.15),  $F(1,19) = 0.01$ ,  $p < .05$ . However, there is a significant difference of using “we” between interviewees from Hong Kong (M=11.11, SD=6.41) and interviewees from mainland China (M=2.82, SD=2.48),  $F(1,19) = 15.69$ ,  $p < .05$ .

Table 5.1 Group Statistics of “I” and “We” frequency between groups

Word	Origin	People	Mean	Standard Deviation	Std. Error Mean
I	HK	9	46.44	16.86	5.62
	MC	11	45.73	10.15	3.06
We	HK	9	11.11	6.41	2.14
	MC	11	2.82	2.48	0.75

Table 5.2 One-Way ANOVA Test Result of “I” Frequency Between Groups

Source	SS	df	MS	
Between-treatments	2.55	1	2.55	F = 0.01
Within-treatments	3300.40	18	183.36	
Total	3302.95	19		

This finding was brought up explicitly by an interviewee from Hong Kong. She shared her self-reflection that, she realized a strong sense of group identity is now within her, unexpectedly and unprecedentedly:

*To be honest, in the past we had no idea why mainland Chinese are such patriotic. I don't have this kind of mindset when I grow up. Yet now I somehow understand better. Before, if you said patriotism,*

Table 5.3 One-Way ANOVA Test Result of "We" Frequency Between Groups

Source	SS	df	MS	
Between-treatments	340.42	1	340.42	F = 15.69
Within-treatments	390.53	18	21.70	
Total	730.95	19		

## "I" or "We"?




Figure 5.1 Mean frequencies of interviewees from Hong Kong and mainland China of using "I" and "We".

*I knew there is such a word, but I didn't know what it was talking about. I even didn't understand why some people were willing to die for a country. And I didn't feel like being a Hongkonger or Chinese or anything. I barely thought about it, actually I didn't need to think about it.*

### 5.1.2 Enhanced Group Identity by Civic Engagement

I tried to zoom in, looking for the reason behind the rising collective group iden-

tity. The interviewee from Hong Kong also shared her feeling that the formation of group identity is related to collective efforts of engaging in the movement with the fellows:

*Suddenly, this movement, I see the picture of the city changed. Before, when I walked on a street, I didn't think it has anything to do with me, it was just a space. But now, when I walk on a street, I will realize this is the street that we in a huge crowd walked by, we fought for something, with some slogans, some publications, they are like someone living with me, they said something on this street, I just feel more connected with the place.*

This self-disclosure is consistent with previous studies over the linkage between public civic engagement and formation of group identity. Identity could be enhanced, transformed and renegotiated through “linguistic exchange and social performance” (Cerulo 1997) and then by “civic performance in the public” (Campbell 2005).

### 5.1.3 Encouraged Altruism by Shared Sufferings

Enhanced empathy and altruistic behavior were shared by one of the interviewee from Hong Kong:

*It's like before, when I knew a person died, I would feel sorry for him, but I wouldn't feel heartbroken or cry. Or we all knew the primary and middle school students were under stress, they are in bad mental health condition, but I wouldn't really want to care about them, or do something for them. But now I feel all these, many things feel different for me in a sudden. The space is not just a space, it's a place with memory. Now I feel that we are a unity, some parts of this unity disappeared, forever. I really care, I want to hug them, from the bottom of my heart. Not just out of politeness, this time.*

Reinforced in-group empathy, emotional support and altruistic behaviour during collective suffering have been observed in other societies as well. Collectively experienced suffering such as natural disasters has increased the possibilities to of experiencing similar fate, consequently, significantly increased pro-social behavior was observed after the disaster, this social behavior pattern was referred as “altruism born of suffering” by Staub (Staub 2005) and the self-help group was referred as “altruistic community” by Kaniasty and Norris (Kaniasty and Norris 1995). Not only in natural disaster, in social movements, collective suffering stimulated empathy and altruistic behavior also exists (Vollhardt 2009).

#### 5.1.4 To a Greater Solidarity

To sum up, enhanced group identity of being Hongkongers was found during the Anti-ELAB, by analyzing the frequency of using “I” and “we” among interviewees. While the interviewees talk during the interviews that usually last for 1 hour in a casual context, the interviewees from Hong Kong tend to say “We think” or “We did” no matter in expressing political views or personal feelings. Instead, interviewees from mainland China used less “we” than interviewees from Hong Kong. This result indicates that in thinking and making statements, Hongkongers unconsciously tend to recognize themselves as one of the Hongkongers, where the notion of “oneself” has been weakened, or in other words, expanded into a bigger “us”. This result is a bit different from the common sense that mainland China is famous for its efforts in propagandising collectivism ideology, while Hong Kong has been famous for its individualism ideology. From this result, I argue that the Anti-ELAB has cultivated a sense of collectivism in Hong Kong. One of the reason of the enhanced group identity that I observed from the in-depth interviews is the collective pro-social behaviour. And the pro-social behaviour was encouraged by the shared sufferings.

## 5.2. The Dark Side of the Solidarity

*“A question has been bothering me for a long time, I agree that we shouldn’t split, and I did my best. But what is ‘splitting’? No one defined that. We say ‘brothers climbing mountains, each offering one’s efforts’, at the meanwhile, we also say ‘Our brothers are bleeding, why don’t you strike?’ I was confused, I felt guilty not to strike, am I splitting?”*

---

*Excerpt from an interview with a Hongkonger*

According to a 10 years long-term cohort study following the mental health condition (depression and PTSD symptoms) of 1213 to 1736 adults during 2009 to 2019, about 11.2% of the participants reported depression in 2019, while only 1.9% reported depression during 2009 to 2014, and 6.5% reported depression in 2017 after Umbrella Movement; Prevalence of suspected PTSD in 2019 was estimated to be 12.8%, and 32% of the participants reported signs of PTSD in last few months of 2019 (Ni et al. 2020). It is worth to notice that, this result was independent from age, sex, educational attainment, or household income factors, whereas heavy social media use (more than 2 hours a day) was associated with both.

Some may claim that “Revolution is cruel”. However, researchers who have been studying social movements and mental health conducted a Multi-variable regressions analysis during Hong Kong Umbrella Movement in 2015, and they found a significant correlation between personal and social resource loss with anxiety and depressive symptoms on the psychological health (Hou and Hall 2019). This finding is an inspiring reminder for us to re-examine our old beliefs such as “solidarity is above individual well-being” and “revolution needs bleeding”, where psycho-social resource losses might leads to poor outcomes of social movements.

Although Anti-ELAB movement has a reputation for being uniquely faceless and decentralized, yet it does not necessarily indicate that there is no power hierarchy. The power hierarchy is not practiced in a organizational way yet reproduced in a linguistic way.

In the following section, I would discuss the hierarchical power embodied in the

language reproduction in Anti-ELAB movement, and how it has been excluding people sorted by identity categories instead of political beliefs; and how it has been motivating people by guilt-production propaganda. These are inevitably mental violence that are undergoing on people who have been actively participating in Anti-ELAB movement, and nonetheless are not necessarily helping the social movement to achieve its goal in a greater aspect as they were supposed to.

### 5.2.1 Exclusive Language - “Go back to China”

*“I have been living in Hong Kong for years, I became a Hong Kong resident last year. My Cantonese is native, no one would notice I am from mainland China. I used to be quite active participating in the protest. Once on the street, my friend was yelling at the Hong Kong police, ‘go back to China, you idiot!’ together with other protesters. I couldn’t say that out. My friend realized suddenly somehow, she turned to me and comforted me saying, ‘we are not cursing you, you are one of us, and you have a vote!’. Her words didn’t comfort me much to be honest, I don’t know how to identify my position in the protest, before I was always at the front line, I shared a lot of my thoughts on Facebook, but now I only re-post articles without any comments.”*

---

*Excerpt from an interview*

The rising nationalism in Hong Kong benefited from the binary discourse of polarizing Hong Kong and mainland China, in cultivating anti-China sentiment through radical curse language about China. However, here the term “China” mean not geographical or cultural, it is a hatred vocabulary to swear towards their enemies, while they are not necessarily mainland Chinese, pro-establishment and policemen could also be included in the enemy group. It is rather a dilemma, study showed that participation in radical collective action enhances collective identification, but meanwhile fosters dis-identification with the broader in-group (Becker et al. 2011).

In using violent tactics, social movements were more likely to keep the initial core bases of support, while risk losing the sympathy of less committed citizens, and alienate those with lower support levels, and increase antagonism of those

that are already distant from the movement (Muñoz and Anduiza 2019). The hatred language might decrease the diversity of the movement participants in a broader group level, such as new immigrants and peaceful protesters.

### 5.2.2 Guilt-Driven Slogans - “Our brothers are bleeding”

*“I don’t know if my life now is good or not. Yesterday I told my friends that I miss the days that we went to Karaoke, we were carefree. Now we don’t even have time to take a rest. There are some events to attend after work, always. I still want to go to karaoke now, but I would be guilty.”*

---

*Excerpt from an interview with a Hongkonger*

The guilty-production discourse is suppressing diverse local voices. Guilty was keyword frequently mentioned among the interviewees from Hong Kong. The protest propaganda would heroize those who sacrificed in the movement. A guy who committed suicide was depicted as “martyr in yellow”, as seen from the figure 5.2, his action was explained in a romanticized discourse, and certainly encouraged larger engagement, and also produced guilt of disengagement. Violence in social movements is mainly symbolic: the cultural and emotional effects that it produces are more important than the material damage (Tejerina 2019).

## 5.3. Fragmented vision in Mainland China

*“I saw the news saying Hong Kong young people were fighting violently in the train, but even though they are terrorists, I want to know what they are fighting for. I searched on all media platform I usually use, Weibo, Wechat, and Zhihu, I didn’t find the answer to that question, so I held back and dared not to take a stance, or to say anything about it.”*

---

*Excerpt from an interview with a mainland Chinese*

In comparison to the unprecedented solidarity in Hong Kong, mainland Chinese interviewees shared totally different attitudes and views about collective propaganda and Anti-ELAB. By self-disclosing their personal history and media source,



Figure 5.2 Poster Made for “Martyr in Yellow”.

reflecting on their feelings and experiences, and looking into their imagined future landscape, the interviewees from mainland China presented us another perspective to examine how people from each side have lost common grounds for dialogues.



### 5.3.1 Reinventing Individuals in Propaganda

*“I remember we used to watch the Spring Festival Gala on Chinese New Year’s eve every year. I really enjoyed that, imagine all of the people in the country watch the same TV programme with their family on that special day, in the joy of being connected, living happily together. My mom would ask me, ‘how many Spring Festival Galas have you watched?’, as if it’s a ruler that marks my life, counts my age, yeah, that national and personal. Till now I still miss that feeling, but now I just can’t feel it anymore. It’s sad. I still watch it every year though, I would instantly post sarcastic jokes of the shows on Wechat and Weibo, and check for other funny jokes. I found these jokes much more fun than the show. Actually when I saw the actors performing hard on the stage, I feel like I saw myself from years ago, practicing college admission essay in the classroom.”*

---

*Excerpt from an interview with a mainland Chinese*

Many Chinese shared experiences in dealing with national propaganda discourse and processing the national language. The interviewee from mainland China introspected her personal experience in early years of exposing to national propaganda discourse, and her current experience in deconstructing the emotion about the collective memory embodied in her personal history. She, same as many other Chinese, has to develop her own perception with the national discourse. Admitting the imprint of collective memory on her early years of life, she actively and reflectively reinvented the national propaganda discourse into jokes, which means that collective event is important, but no longer restrictive. The joy of being connected doesn’t have to be shared among the whole nation, but shared among the online community she developed individually upon her own interest. That said, other Chinese may have different relationship patterns responding to the discourse, either close or distant, yet to do that is an inevitable path, and there is no guidebook for that.

### 5.3.2 Media Spin in Weibo

10 of 15 interviewees from mainland China didn't know that the Anti-ELAB movement started since June, "I saw some posts on Weibo and a article talking about it , but it soon got deleted, I didn't get to finish reading that", said one of our interviewees. Most of the interviewees from mainland China got to know this "riots" since August 13th, when the protesters occupied the Hong Kong international airport. Fu Guohao, a journalist of *Global Times* (a pro-Communist Party Chinese newspaper) was beaten up in the crowd of protesters by saying "I support Hong Kong police, you can hit me now." A poster became virus meme on social media, as shown in the figure 5.3, which raised a large patriotic sentiment on social media.

The Great Firewall and censorship mechanism is restricting the political awareness and engagement of Chinese. In the generation of social media and streaming media nowadays, it was argued that, the new media facilitated free flow of information, provided alternative information sources, and thus increased an individual's freedom to information access (Zheng and Wu 2005). However, the seemingly democratic media tools fail to make national propaganda less effective. The mechanism of national propaganda in China never stops evolving along with the evolving media platforms (Esarey and Xiao 2011).



Figure 5.3 The Meme Poster

Ever since then, the censorship taboo was broken, news and articles about the movement flushed in daily media, even *Network News Broadcast*, and the official Weibo account of the Communist Party started to condemn the protesters, and named the protesters as “terrorists”. It is interesting to notice that, during the “silent phase” before August 13th, the Anti-ELAB stayed peaceful. After the turning point of August 13th, when the protesters started to commit violence, the media in mainland China lifted its ban.

The state is learning the language that young people are using in cyber spaces. Another strategic propaganda move which is phenomenally unique in this movement is that, the official Weibo account of the Communist Party was encouraging online “fandom girls”, a colloquial term among China’s online community to describe the fans who devote in mass postings to boost the exposure and reputations of their idols, to defend for their country. China was personified as “Brother Ah Zhong”, made into memes and refined posts flooding into social media, as seen from the figure 5.4. The so called “Fandom Nationalism” is not new, but has been practiced many times in the battle between fan groups (Hailong 2019), but this was the first time that the country actively participated in leading them, to fan the country, as if the country were a super star. It is worth noticing that, “Fandom girls” was never a positive term in the discourse of nationalism, instead, it was depicted as childish and feminine, in opposite to the ideal masculine national image of China (Scott 2019).

### 5.3.3 Weibo and Inter-group Social Contact

Discussed above, I wonder if Weibo usage (as well as comparable public social media platforms such as FaceBook and Twitter) and the tendency for inter-group social contact are related?

Having that question in mind, I looked into the correlation between frequency of using Weibo and openness for inter-group social Contact. By inter-group social contact, I combined the 2 data sets, “willingness to talk to the other group” plus “think the other group would like to talk to you” as indicators. I ran a linear



Figure 5.4 The Meme Made for "Brother Ah Zhong" by Fan-group.

regression analysis to test the co-relational relationship between the 2 factors.

A significant negative linear regression was found between the frequency of using Weibo and openness for inter-group social contact among all participants, as seen in the figure 5.5. We can tell from the linear regression test result shown in table 5.4, that R square = .16,  $F(1, 57) = 10.72$ ,  $p = .00$ , 16% of the negative linear regression could be described by this standardized model:  $-0.58 \text{ Weibo} + 8.22 = \text{Inter-group social contact}$ .

However, when all the participants in the pool were tested separately by 2 groups Hong Kong and mainland China, as seen from table 5.4, the negative regression between inter-group social contact and frequency of using Weibo was not significant among mainland Chinese participants, R square = .09,  $F(1, 28) = 2.61$ ,  $p = .12$ ; while it stayed significant among Hong Kong participants, R square = .36,  $F(1, 27) = 15.07$ ,  $p = .00$ .

Till now we can conclude that the strong negative linear regressional relationship belongs to Hong Kong participants using Weibo. We are close to a statistically significant result but not yet to draw a similar negative linear regres-




Figure 5.5 Scatter Plot: Weibo Usage and Inter-Group Social Contact

sional relationship between mainland Chinese using Weibo. That is, the more Hongkongers use Weibo, the less likely they would prefer inter-group social contact (in talk to mainland Chinese and in estimating mainland Chinese would like to talk to them). However, this negative linear regression is weakened when it is examined among mainland Chinese. The mechanism behind this interesting group difference is unknown, and this result need to be re-examined in a larger and more randomly sampled pool as well. However, based on what we have now,

Table 5.4 Linear Regression: Weibo and Inter-Group Social Contact

ID		R Square	B	SE	Beta	F	Sig.
Hongkonger	(Constant)		8.65	.70			.00
	Weibo	.36	-1.03	.27	-.60	15.07	.00
Mainland Chinese	(Constant)		8.35	1.35			.00
	Weibo	.09	-.50	.31	-.29	2.61	.12

I would like to argue that Weibo is not playing a friendly ambassador between Hongkongers and mainland Chinese. A greater frequency of using Weibo could be a predictor to a less friendly tendency for inter-group social contact.

I also checked if the negative linear regression relationship also exists between FaceBook and Twitter, the comparable public social media platforms commonly used in Hong Kong, and tendency for inter-group contact. As seen from table 5.5, my experiment data failed to reach a significant result, either among Hongkongers where  $R^2 = .05$ ,  $F(1, 27) = 1.52$ ,  $p = .23$ ; or among mainland Chinese, where  $R^2 = .05$ ,  $F(1, 28) = 1.31$ ,  $p = .26$ .

Table 5.5 Linear Regression: FaceBook+Twitter and Inter-Group Social Contact

ID		R Square	B	SE	Beta	F	Sig.
Hongkonger	(Constant)		8.07	1.34			.00
	FB+Twitter	.05	-.25	.20	-.23	1.52	.23
Mainland Chinese	(Constant)		5.57	.85			.00
	FB+Twitter	.05	.23	.20	.21	1.31	.26

### 5.3.4 Political Fatigue and Self-censorship

*“I would hesitate about reading or not reading the news. I have so many other things to do. How should I know the news? And after knowing them, so what? I tend to not read them these days. This is the indifference and ignorance I can afford now, with my resources, my position, my distance, which allowed me not to invest or commit myself. It is ironic, I acknowledge that, if I invest more thoughts into this, I would want to fight against the biased views, yet this fight would not benefit me. My life can continue without this, my future is bright if I work hard, it is.”*

---

*Excerpt from an interview with a mainland Chinese.*

Other factors that are emitting inter-group communications were found and worth to notice are political fatigue and self-censorship.

The fatigue does not come from intense participation in the movement. Instead, it was complained that, the interviewees from mainland China felt tired of following the news on the social platforms they are not used to, reading different languages (usually the news were written in vernacular Cantonese and English), and more importantly, following the news didn't give any positive feedback to them, as said in the quotes above, they were unable to learn about the movement or even reach out for a talk. Engagement would not change anything in their ongoing life (Burton et al. 2016).

Self-censorship has been found as a general factor that the interviewees hesitated to discuss publicly. "I couldn't fall asleep on August 13th night, I posted my thoughts about it on WeChat Timeline, one of my friend texted me, suggesting me better to delete that post, in case of any troubles, actually I don't know what troubles would happen, yet I did so. Thinking about I have no idea who would see that post and what would they think about me, I became afraid", said one of the interviewees. It is argued that, people tend to concern more about privacy and social relations than they do about government surveillance, as most of them think government surveillance is not likely to affect them personally (Warner and Wang 2019).

# Chapter 6

## Conclusions

### 6.1. Summary

In this thesis, I examined why people from Hong Kong and mainland China struggled to talk to each other. In the first place, there is no shared space for a public discussion nor personal contact, as the social media platforms were split into a binary landscape. Apart from the external barriers, pluralistic ignorance, the self-other attributional bias was found under the circumstances of inter-group social contact between Hongkongers and mainland Chinese. The reason that people are less likely to talk to out-group members is not that they don't want to, but due to the gap between actual willingness to reach out and false estimation of being accepted. Therefore, I argue that the fragmented inter-group narratives are not individually created, but socially constructed, via external factors such as social media, and internal bias between groups. The struggling is real, the urge for inter-group communication is also real.

Based on the findings above, I started a series of actions. I facilitated semi-structured interviews with 20 people who reside in different cities around the world, both online and in-person between August and December 2019. At first, I wrote down the transcripts into two monologues, surprising and consistent with my expectation, I found symmetric resonance of many fragmented narratives, so I curated the double monologues into a virtual dialogue. The film was shot, edited and screened in Hong Kong during November to December 2019. In the 3 screening sessions, I facilitated focus group discussion with the audiences. The revisit survey tells that the film screening was effectively encouraging diverse opinions sharing, inter-group empathy and social contact.



During my fieldwork in Hong Kong from September to December 2019, I witnessed some more local social actions and talked to more people onsite from different background and diverse identities. The fieldwork was a fruitful experience to gain more in-depth insights and to explain my research questions. First, I observed an unprecedented solidarity of Hongkongers united under the abrupted social order. I compared the frequency of using “we” and “I” in the transcripts from Hongkongers and mainland Chinese, Hongkongers significantly tended to use more “we” than mainland Chinese did, while there was no significant difference of the 2 groups using “I”. This evidence helped to explain the notion of being a Hongkonger and representing Hongkonger are internalized by Hongkongers. However, the solidarity isn’t as noble as we thought to bring all good deeds. On the contrary, in reviewing the language invented in Anti-ELAB, the power hierarchy is also reproducing itself from language in the seemingly flatly organized Hong Kong protest regime. There are race-exclusive and guilt-provoking languages commonly used in the movement which were obscuring diverse voices and losing its broader group of supporters such as new immigrants from mainland China. As for mainland Chinese, as I examined the asymmetrical media release timing and contents cross-region, Weibo is updating and evolving itself, from top-down censorship and propaganda to bottom-up provoking strategy. Besides, I found a significant negative regression relationship between using Weibo and tendency for inter-group social contact.

Four main factors were identified getting in the way of a smoother inter-group social contact, which are binary social media landscape, pluralistic ignorance, downplay of Hong Kong solidarity and media spin in Weibo.

## 6.2. Re-inmagine Social Movements

From June 2019, Anti-ELAB social movement started and also this study began, till this moment I am writing the thesis, “National Security Law” came into force on July 1st 2020. Although the movement was in a way abrupted by COVID-19 since early 2020 and now “terminated” by National Security Law, which could

impose protesters with severe penalties, e.g. life imprisonment. That have said, the study showed a slice of the alternative voices in Anti-ELAB movement and archived them, I wish this work could provide an alternative perspective to for people to look at Anti-ELAB social movement holistically and reflectively, in comparison with the mainstream media contents or social media fragments.

Besides, this study was never aimed at social movement itself inter-group study. After this, more group could be included in the future. In the current global context, the year of 2020, more protests focusing on racial issues are happening. I believe a smoother inter-group social contact would be an essential and endless topic for us to dig into. Based on the work I have done so far on the case of inter-group social contact in Anti-ELAB movement, I believe this is just a start, and yet here are many possibilities to explore, in creating more comprehensive and inclusive dialogues.

Living in the post-modern era, as described by Zygmunt Bauman, we are walking on moving sand (Bauman 2013). Although we seem to have more access to information, yet lack of trustworthy information resources still put in an uncertain situation to take an clear self-motivated action. The path of democracy seem not to guarantee us a optimistic future, where power hierarchy of nationalism reproduces itself again and again (Bauman and Donskis 2016). It is a more important task than ever, for individuals to be reflective on examining themselves on personal life discourse, being aware of structural violence in disguise of any justified purpose, and cultivate the ability to empathize with people online and offline. In the drastically changing era, we may need to re-imagine the definition and practice of revolution, and reinvent our action for a revolutionary purpose, to catch up for the revolutionary situation. If we don't stop reflecting on our actions, the revolution is always ongoing, it never stopped.

### 6.3. Limitations

I categorized my participants into “Hongkonger”, “mainland Chinese”, and “Both” all long the research. However, this binary definition could not explain the

diverse demographics of the cohorts. Based on origins, experience living abroad, experience travelling to mainland China or Hong Kong etc., there are more identity types that are distinct from the three above, for example, Hongkongers in China or Chinese in Hong Kong. The identity is more like a spectrum and constantly changing and evolving, interfered by many other factors. To look at the issue by categorizing the cohorts into 2 binary groups can be arbitrary.

What's more, the participants who took part in interviews or surveys are mainly my friends or friends' friends, who are mainly current students or alumni from the Universities in Hong Kong. Indeed, they were easier to approach to and gain trust from. However, their background might not be diverse enough to represent the population. They probably share similar education level, socio-economic level, even political stance, without examining the factors, it is questionable to attribute the correlation to the results I had. Meanwhile, the participants in the focus group discussion, came voluntarily by seeing the event poster online. Given the shared interest of this event, the diversity of their background is further degraded.

## 6.4. Future work

In testing pluralistic ignorance and social media using habits, the validity and reliability could be improved by including a broader and more representative crowd in the pool. Not just it could verify the results of this thesis, but also it could conduct inter-section analysis further explore the relationship among all the factors. I would like to further examine the relationship between using Weibo and inter-group social contact, and in comparison with other social media platform and its validity between groups. For example, if the result still tells significant negative linear regression among Hongkongers but not mainland Chinese, it would be meaningful to look into the reason of this group variance.

We could have gained an overall picture of the public opinion of social media from a quantitative analysis on social media contents. For instance, we could better understand the public sentiments changing over time, and difference between Hong Kong and China by examining the words used on cyberspace; we

could examine how Hong Kong and mainland China named one item differently and the frequency of them changing overtime, for example, “riots”, “protest”, or “revolution”? “terrorists”, “protesters”, or “brothers”?

As I mentioned before, the project is a reaction to the deglobalization context. The project is applicable and inclusive to various topics, for example, “Black Lives Matter”, refugee issues, climate change, all of these urgent and immediately emerging issues. There is no doubt that plenty of topics and presentation formats could be explored and experimented.

# References

- Bauman, Zygmunt (2013) *Liquid modernity*: John Wiley & Sons.
- Bauman, Zygmunt and Leonidas Donskis (2016) *Liquid evil*: John Wiley & Sons.
- Becker, Julia C, Nicole Tausch, Russell Spears, and Oliver Christ (2011) “Committed dis (s) identis: Participation in radical collective action fosters disidentification with the broader in-group but enhances political identification,” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, Vol. 37, No. 8, pp. 1104–1116.
- Burton, A Mike, Robin SS Kramer, Kay L Ritchie, and Rob Jenkins (2016) “Identity from variation: Representations of faces derived from multiple instances,” *Cognitive Science*, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 202–223.
- Campbell, Kelly B (2005) “Theorizing the authentic: Identity, engagement, and public space,” *Administration & Society*, Vol. 36, No. 6, pp. 688–705.
- Cerulo, Karen A (1997) “Identity construction: New issues, new directions,” *Annual review of Sociology*, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 385–409.
- chung Chen, Yun and Mirana M. Szeto (2015) “The forgotten road of progressive localism: New Preservation Movement in Hong Kong,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 436–453.
- Chiu, Stephen Wing Kai and Tai Lok Lui (2000) *The dynamics of social movements in Hong Kong: Real and financial linkages and the prospects for currency union*, Vol. 1: Hong Kong University Press.
- Esarey, Ashley and Qiang Xiao (2011) “Digital communication and political change in China,” *International Journal of Communication*, Vol. 5, p. 22.
- Hailong, Liu (2019) *From Cyber-nationalism to Fandom Nationalism: The Case of Diba Expedition in China*: Routledge.

- HKUPOP (2019) “Categorical Ethnic Identity - per poll (27/6/2019),” [https://www.hkpopop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/eidentity/poll/eid\\_poll\\_chart.html](https://www.hkpopop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/eidentity/poll/eid_poll_chart.html), June.
- Hou, Wai Kai and Brian J Hall (2019) “The mental health impact of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong,” *The Lancet Psychiatry*, Vol. 6, No. 12, p. 982.
- Kaniasty, Krzysztof and Fran H Norris (1995) “In search of altruistic community: Patterns of social support mobilization following Hurricane Hugo,” *American Journal of Community Psychology*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 447–477.
- Lee, Francis, “Solidarity in the Anti-Extradition Bill movement in Hong Kong,” *Critical Asian Studies*.
- Major, Brenda, Wendy J Quinton, and Shannon K McCoy (2002) “Antecedents and consequences of attributions to discrimination: Theoretical and empirical advances..”
- Mori, Masahiro et al. (1970) “The uncanny valley,” *Energy*, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 33–35.
- Muñoz, Jordi and Eva Anduiza (2019) “ ‘ If a fight starts, watch the crowd ’ : The effect of violence on popular support for social movements,” *Journal of Peace Research*, p. 0022343318820575.
- Ni, Michael Y, Xiaoxin I Yao, Kathy SM Leung, Cynthia Yau, Candi MC Leung, Phyllis Lun, Francis P Flores, Wing Chung Chang, Benjamin J Cowling, and Gabriel M Leung (2020) “Depression and post-traumatic stress during major social unrest in Hong Kong: a 10-year prospective cohort study,” *The Lancet*, Vol. 395, No. 10220, pp. 273–284.
- Ping, Yew Chiew and Kwong Kin-Ming (2014) “Hong Kong identity on the rise,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 54, No. 6, pp. 1088–1112.
- Prentice, Deborah A and Dale T Miller (1993) “Pluralistic ignorance and alcohol use on campus: some consequences of misperceiving the social norm.,” *Journal of personality and social psychology*, Vol. 64, No. 2, p. 243.

- Reynolds, Katherine J, Emina Subasic, Luisa Batalha, and Benjamin M Jones (2017) “From prejudice to social change: A social identity perspective..”
- Scott, Suzanne (2019) *Fake Geek Girls: Fandom, Gender, and the Convergence Culture Industry*: NYU Press.
- Staub, Ervin (2005) “The roots of goodness: the fulfillment of basic human needs and the development of caring, helping and nonaggression, inclusive caring, moral courage, active bystandership, and altruism born of suffering..”
- Steinhardt, H. Christoph, Linda Chelan Li, and Yihong Jiang (2018) “The Identity Shift in Hong Kong since 1997: Measurement and Explanation,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 27, No. 110, pp. 261–276.
- Tejerina, Benjamín (2019) “Social movements in the political transition: inheritances, singularities, and transformations of social mobilisation in the 1970s,” *Debats. Revista de cultura, poder i societat*, Vol. 3.
- Vollhardt, Johanna Ray (2009) “Altruism born of suffering and prosocial behavior following adverse life events: A review and conceptualization,” *Social Justice Research*, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 53–97.
- Warner, Mark and Victoria Wang (2019) “Self-censorship in social networking sites (SNSs)—privacy concerns, privacy awareness, perceived vulnerability and information management,” *Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society*.
- Zheng, Yongnian and Guoguang Wu (2005) “Information technology, public space, and collective action in China,” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 507–536.

# Appendices



## Shall We Talk - Scripts

Characters :

- Character A: Combined role from 8-10 people who live(d) in mainland China. Some have Hong Kong experiences and some don't. Some have more exposure and understanding about the political climate in Hong Kong than others do.
- Character B: Combined role from 4-6 people who live(d) in Hong Kong. Some participate in the protest and some don't. Some have personal experiences about the current social movement, and some receive second-hand information from media and other sources.
- Character A and Character B: Both have something personal and subtle to say. Both desire for true dialogue.

\*\*\*\*\* begins \*\*\*\*\*

**[我地傾下解：一場雙獨白/對話]**

**[Shall We Talk: a Double Monologue/ Dialogue]**

A:

六月份 ( 2019 年 ) 開始我一直在關注(反送中運動)

I've started following the news (about the Anti-Extradition Law Movement in Hong Kong) since June (2019)

我很想說一些話但沒有發表什麼

I wanted to express my thoughts but I did not

我人在大陸, 這裡一片寂靜

People remain silent here about this movement

我看到 Facebook 那些信息也會憤怒

I would be angry when I read the news on Facebook

但這種距離讓我不知道如何去判斷

But the distance held me back to make a judgment

我就很想和周圍人討論

I really wanted to discuss with people around me

想要真實的對話

I wanted true dialogue, real conversation

但大陸人幾乎沒人知道, 也不敢討論

But nobody here knows what's happening, or dares to talk about it

其實我很想遇到一個知道事情全貌但 pro-beijing 的人

Actually I wanted to meet someone who is pro-beijing AND understands what's happening

很想去了解他是如何思考的

I want to know what they think

但我沒有遇到

But I have not met anyone like that

我九月份去了一趟香港  
I visited Hong Kong in September (2019)

在金鐘添馬廣場  
And went to a rally at Tamar Square, Admiralty

我看到旁邊女生抽煙想藉一根  
I wanted to ask a girl for a cigarette

我鼓起很多次勇氣都沒說出口  
But I could not say it to her

我怕她聽出我粵語的大陸口音  
I was afraid that she would recognize my Mainland Chinese accent

平時我沒這麼聳  
I was never a shy person

可那天就是如何都開不了口  
I just could not ask for that cigarette

我很難過  
I was sad

以前在香港生活沒有這麼強烈的對立的感覺  
Such identity crisis and tension did not exist

感受不到自己身份的存在感  
I did not feel that my identity stood out

有點懷念以前了  
I miss Hong Kong

B:  
我有些朋友會問兩句  
Some of my friends would ask me about the movement

但是他們沒聊太多就會說  
But they would not go too deep

”照顧好自己，希望一切很快就會回到原狀！”  
Before saying “take care, I hope everything will go back to normal.”

我也不記得從哪一次開始  
I remember myself

我跟誰說  
responding to a friend saying

“我們不想要原狀”  
We don't want normal

“我們想要有改變”  
We want something new

如果回到原狀  
If we go back to normal

就是退步了  
That would be going backwards

如果回到原狀  
If we go back to normal

這個社會可能很穩定  
The society might be more stable

大家繼續返工  
People would get back to work

那些不平等還是繼續  
And the inequality goes on

不是我們想要的  
This is not what we want

A:  
在金鐘看到示威者設路障  
I saw that when protestors were blocking roads

所有車輛, 巴士的士私家車全都默默停下沒有人抱怨  
All cars and buses stopped without complaint

這種事情我難以理解  
I couldn't understand what was happening then

他們下車拿開路障就能走了  
The drivers could have removed the blockages and leave

可他們沒有一個人這樣做  
But they did not

就默默在車上等著  
They just waited on the cars

好像示威者接管了社會秩序  
As if social order was taken by protestors

香港是多麼講求效率的城市  
In a city that prioritizes efficiency

突然怎麼了  
What's happening here?

太魔幻了  
This is so surreal

B:  
很多人屬於爸爸媽媽不贊同他們這樣站出來的  
Parents usually do not support their children to be protests

第一個星期一百萬人  
There was 1 million people on the first week

第二個星期兩百萬人  
And two million on the second

中間有年輕人自殺  
There were youths committing suicide

很多這樣的事情  
Things like this

那天晚上政府發了一個聲明  
The government made an **announcement** that night (**after the protest**)

不管你們有多少人  
They said, no matter how many people are on our side

沒有討論的空間  
There is no space for dialogue

這個事情把很多和平的人的憤怒和絕望帶出來了  
This brought anger and desperation from many people

他們不一定贊同暴力  
They may not support violence

但他們可以體諒和理解勇武派的行為  
But they can understand the why fighters fight

A:  
我印象中香港人是非常**文明**的  
I remember Hong Kong people as very **orderly**

怎麼會一下子變成**暴徒**呢  
How have they become **"riots"**?

但我的立場比較溫和  
But I have a soft stance

我覺得與其那麼快下結論  
Instead of making rush judgment

不如去聽聽你不屑於去理解的聲音  
Why not listen to what you're not bothered to listen to?

他們究竟是怎麼想的  
Listen to how they think

B:  
經過這次事情我懂得了一件事  
I have come to understand that  
  
就是只要你與當權者為敵  
You would be perceived as terrorists  
  
就會被當成恐怖份子  
When you're acting against the established regime  
  
我就會明白到他們不一定是所謂的恐怖份子  
I realized that they may not be terrorists  
  
而是誰有權力誰可以定義另外一群人是暴徒  
But they are labelled by those in power

A:  
我在香港最直觀的震撼的是  
I was most shocked  
  
每晚都會聽到大家的呼號  
When I hear people shouting slogans every night  
  
大家從住家裡面喊  
Shouting from their homes  
  
像一個喝彩聲  
Just like a cheer  
  
有人喊上半句  
Someone shouts the first half  
  
別人喊下半句  
And another follows with the second half  
  
他們可能不知道對方是誰  
They may not know who each other are  
  
街上有個姑娘喊得很大聲  
There was a lady shouting aloud

後面一對中年夫妻  
A middle-aged married couple responded to her

對她說我們支持你  
Saying, we support you

但我們老了走不動啦  
But we're too old to go on the streets

我和這個姑娘後來走進同一個樓道上了一班電梯  
I then walked into the same elevator with that lady

我們都沒有講一句話  
We did not talk to each other

可能我沒有喊口號  
Maybe because I did not shout the slogans

就說明了我們不同的狀態和身份  
That meant we were different

這對中年夫妻在路上, 在聽到一瞬間就和這個姑娘產生了這麼密的關心和聯繫  
That married couple immediately formed relationship and connection with this lady who was a stranger on the streets

在我看來是非常神奇的一件事  
For me that was incredible/peculiar?

B:  
在我成長的年代沒有“根”這個東西  
Growing up, there was no such thing as *root*

大家都是“個體”  
Everyone was *individualized*

大家沒有“社區”  
There was no *community*

我住在一個地方  
I don't know everyone



也不一定認識全部的人  
Who lives in the same neighborhood

認識了也不覺得我屬於這個地方  
Even if I know them, I don't feel that I belong here

可能以前我太抽離吧  
Maybe I was too detached from the society

只想到自己  
I only thought about myself

就以前我也不會想到香港有什麼特別的地方  
I wouldn't think that Hong Kong is anything special

不同的區有自己的特色  
That every district has its own character

不會留意這些東西  
I didn't pay attention to these things

可是現在就突然覺得靠近了很多  
But now I feel very close to this city

就你突然覺得沒有那麼孤獨的感覺  
You suddenly feel that you're not lonely anymore

我想住在城市的人或多或少都會有一種孤單的感覺  
I guess city dwellers more or less feel lonely

以前你不會 expect 從一個不認識的人身上得到溫暖  
You wouldn't expect to receive warmth from stranger

或者你可以把這樣的溫暖給一個不認識的人  
Or deliver warmth to a person you don't know

原來這個界線是可以被打破的  
I didn't know that this boundary can be crossed

A:

雖然我可以作為一個見證者

Even though I can be a witness to this movement

跟著記者的鏡頭看到現場

Following the cameras to the site

但是我究竟是個什麼樣的角色呢？

But who am I? What role am I playing here?

我常常在猶疑

I always question myself

這個狀態持續到我回到內地

This question followed me back to Mainland China

聽說了審查有多麼厲害

I heard that censorship was getting more harsh

所以我把社交媒體上所有發表過看法的內容

So I deleted all my political statements

都刪掉了

on the social media

我以為會被查

I thought I would be investigated

但一路都感覺到自己是無名小輩

But seems like I am just a nobody

B:

在網上看

Watching online

到了街上看

Watching on the streets

現場其實有好多微妙的細節

There were actually a lot of subtleties on site

看到警察白天休班的時候像友善的阿叔  
During break time during daytime, police were friendly uncles

晚上裝備的時候又對記者和市民照大光燈  
But with gears at night, they started flashing lights to obstruct reporters and pedestrians

一下很輕鬆  
They were so chill at some point

一下很情緒化  
And became emotional all of a sudden

一下很有人性  
They were so humane at some moment

一下變成政府機器  
And turned into state apparatus suddenly

我會傾向於去搜尋很多「白警」的新聞  
I tend to search for stories about “white cops (innocent police)”

會去看一些警察家屬連線分享的訊息  
I would look for information shared by police' family

我一邊喊著黑警死全家  
I would shout “Bad Cops Die with Family” in the protest

一邊又覺得好難過  
But I would feel sad for saying that

我每天起床都要看五種不同的新聞  
I read five different types of news every morning

先是看我的 Facebook 同溫層、微信、LINE、Telegram、再看一些外媒，我才  
會覺得自己是一個負責任的公民  
First my Facebook's “Echo Chamber (information that reinforces my existing views), WeChat, LINE, Telegram, then some English media. Then I would start feeling like a good citizen.”

做一個負責人的公民好累  
It's tiring to be a responsible citizen

A:  
其實我每次還是會有猶豫究竟是看還是不看  
I would hesitate about reading or not reading the news

因為我還有很多別的要做的事情  
I have so many other things to do

我究竟怎麼了解  
How should I know the news?  
了解了又怎麼樣  
And after knowing them, so what?

我現在有些不看的傾向  
I tend to not read them these days

這是我現在的資源, 位置, 距離  
This is the indifference and ignorance that I can afford now

能去 afford 的冷漠和無知  
With my resources, my position, my distance

決定了我可以不去 invest 不去 commit  
They decided that I don't have to invest or commit myself

這是非常矛盾的點  
This is ironic

我也意識到  
I acknowledge that

如果我投入這個事情想得更深  
If I invest more thoughts into this

因為想得更深就會想去反駁那些單面的看法  
I would want to fight against the biased views

這些對我生活沒有幫助  
This fight would not benefit me

我的生活可以這樣繼續  
My life can continue without this

只要我努力成長的未來是光明的  
My future is bright if I work hard, it is.

B:  
有時候我在 Facebook 上看到內地人跟香港人吵架  
Sometimes when I see Mainlanders arguing with Hong Kongers on Facebook

其實很多誤解在中間  
I see a lot of misunderstandings

可是當我點出對方錯誤的時候  
But if I point out the misunderstanding of one party

怎麼說, 就進一步加劇矛盾  
How to say, this would only make things worse

我覺得大家現在懶於討論  
I feel like people are lazy to have real discussions

看到大陸人就會說他們是三毛五毛  
They would call the Mainlanders *Internet Water Army* (*Internet ghostwriters paid to post online comments with particular content*)

懶得爭辯  
They are lazy to argue

就去笑你, 問你收了多少錢去發這個評論  
They would laugh at you saying, how much are you paid to post this comment?

他們也會笑香港人你們收了多少錢上街  
Similarly, the counterpart would say, how much are you paid to go on the streets?

A:  
大家在網絡上溝通  
When people communicate online

根本不在意用戶名背後是不是一個真實的人  
They don't really care whether there is a real person behind that username

去猜背後是善意還是惡意太累了  
It's too tiring to assess the motive of a person

也有可能是水軍  
Perhaps the *Internet Water Army* is too strong

失掉了對話的耐心  
People lose patience to engage in a conversation

B:  
我沒有想到內地很多人會想成港獨的事情  
I didn't expect that people in Mainland would perceive the movement as related to Hong Kong Independence

其實我覺得一開始的時候完全沒有這個氣氛  
There was no such thing in the very beginning

一百萬人兩百萬人上街的時候都沒有說過這個意思  
No one out of the one million and two million crowd talks about it

六七月的時候大家在連登上很多人也不想把兩個東西(修例和港獨)混為一談  
People were deliberately separating Anti-Extradition-Law with Hong Kong Independence on LIHKG (popular online platform in Hong Kong) in June and July (2019)

是不是中國的一部分啊我想對於大部分香港人其實都不是很在意  
I think the majority of Hong Kong people didn't really care about whether we're part of China

我想他們已經很滿足於本來的狀況了  
I think they were satisfied with the current situation

只要不要把我的東西拿走就很滿意  
As long as what they currently have is not taken away

在早期六七月的時候  
In June and July

有很多新移民也在支持

Many (Mainland Chinese) New Immigrants support the movement

之前之前雨傘運動更像是 identity 決定了我是哪一個 camp

This is different from the Umbrella Movement in 2014, when identity decided which camp you belonged to

可是這一次是很 issue specific 的

This time, it's "issue-specific"

大家有同一個概念我都不管你哪裡來的

Regardless of where you come from, as long as

只要你住在香港關心這裡

You live in Hong Kong, you care for this place

A:

我因為在香港生活過

I lived in Hong Kong

對香港很有感情

So I feel attached to this place

可以理解香港人的立場

I can understand what Hong Kong people think

但很多大陸人完全不了解香港人

Many people from Mainland do not understand Hong Kong people

不懂為什麼香港人會這麼想

They don't get why people think in this way

他了解的就是你香港回歸了

In their mind, Hong Kong is part of China after 1997

主權上屬於中國

It belongs to Chinese national sovereignty

那你就應該說你是中國人

So you should call yourself Chinese

B:

我奶奶我外婆他們都是大陸過來的

My grandmother from both mother's and father's sides are from the Mainland

他們說你本來就是國內過來的

They would say, you're from Mainland

為什麼你就不承認自己中國人

Why don't you admit that you are Chinese?

我沒有跟她吵

I did not argue with her

我覺得再吵傷感情

Arguing would affect our relationship

A:

像是

Terms like

“中國沒有辦法被分割”

“China can't be split”

“國家主權高於一切”

“National sovereignty is above everything”

這些國家語言從小被灌輸在耳朵裡

We hear these national propaganda since we were little.

從小看新聞聯播, 看奧運會, 國慶閱兵, 唱國歌

We watched Network News Broadcast, Beijing Olympics, military parade and sing national songs

這些想像的共同體概念和個人認同綑綁在一起

The concept of imagined communities was attached to personal identities

B:

其實香港人對內地人為什麼會有這種愛國情懷

To be honest, HongKongers don't quite understand why mainland Chinese are such patriotic.



我們也不是很理解  
We have no idea.

我長大的過程中完全沒有這種概念  
I don't have this kind of mindset when I grow up.

現在長大了明白多了  
Yet now I somehow understand better

以前 你跟我說愛國  
Before, if you said patriotism

我知道有這個詞語  
I knew there is such a word

我不知道裡面其實談的是什麼  
But I didn't know what it was talking about.

我以前都不明白為什麼有的人會為了一個國家去死  
I even didn't understand why some people were willing to die for a country.

以前我沒有特別強烈的感覺自己是香港人中國人或是什麼  
And I didn't feel like being a HongKonger or Chinese or anything.

我基本都沒想 也沒需要去想  
I barely thought about it, actually I didn't need to think about it.

突然這次運動  
Suddenly, this movement

你看到整個城市的畫面變得很不一樣  
You see the picture of the city changed.

以前我走過一個街道  
Before, when I walked on a street

我不覺得跟我有關  
I didn't think it has anything to do with me

只是作為空間存在  
It was just a space

現在我走過一條街  
But now, when I walk on a street

我會記起曾經我們很多人在這裡走過一段路  
I will realize this is the street that we in a huge crowd walked by

爭取一些東西  
We fought for something

有一些標語一些海報  
With some slogans, some publications

就好像跟我住在一起的人  
They are like someone living with me

他們在這個街上說著一些東西  
They said something on this street

就好像跟這個地方的聯繫多了很多  
I just feel more connected with the place

就好像以前看到一個人去世  
It's like before, when you knew a person died

你會覺得可惜  
You would feel sorry for him

但不會感到心痛去流淚  
But you wouldn't feel heartbroken or cry.

又或是我們都知道小學生中學生壓力很大  
Or we all knew the primary and middle school students were under stress  
精神健康也不好  
They are in bad mental health condition

可是你不會想去關心他們  
But you wouldn't really want to care about them

為他們做一些事情  
Or do something for them

可是現在會有這個感覺  
But now I feel all these

就好像突然之間很多東西都不同了  
Many things feel different for me in a sudden

那個空間就不是一個空間  
The space is not just a space

是一個有記憶的地方  
It's a place with memory

現在你會覺得大家是一個整體  
Now I feel that we are a unity

這個整體有一個部分就永永遠遠消失了  
Some parts of this unity disappeared, forever

在這次裡面我會覺得不單單是外在的禮貌  
I really care, I want to hug them, from the bottom of my heart

是從內心的真的想去關心他們給一個擁抱他們  
Not just out of politeness, this time.

A:  
我記得小時候看春晚  
I remember we used to watch the Spring Festival Gala on Chinese New Year's  
eve, every year.

我真的很感動  
I really enjoyed that, felt satisfied.

每年都很期待  
I look forward to it every year

全國的人在一個特殊的日子裡和家人一起看一個節目感到連結的快樂  
All of the people in the country would watch the same TV programme with their  
family on that special day, in the joy of being connected

直到現在我也很懷念那種感受  
Till now I still miss that that feeling

雖然現在我得不到了  
But now I can't feel it anymore

但我每年還是會看  
I still watch it every year though

我會在微信微博直播我對每個節目的吐糟  
I would instantly post sarcastic funny comments of each session on Wechat and Weibo, and see what others say.

我發現網友的評論比節目好玩多了  
I found these comments much more fun than the gala.

看到他們在台上努力表演的樣子  
Actually when I saw the actors performing hard on the stage

就像是看到當年在教室裡練習高考作文的自己  
I feel like I saw myself from years ago, practicing college admission essay in the classroom.

B:  
如果我遇到一個內地人  
If I met someone from mainland China

我可能會跟他談  
I may talk to him

但我也會有點防備  
But still I would sort of hold back

因為我不知道他是什麼背景的人  
Because I don't know where does he come from

我覺得我們沒有因為你是內地人的身份我就討厭你  
I think we don't hate you because you are from mainland China.

可能會有的反而是一種恐懼  
On the other hand, it might be a fearful feeling.

你知道現在很多年輕人失蹤  
You know, there are young people missing.

一個我不認識的人我不知道他什麼意圖  
I won't know the intention of a stranger

我擔心有一天這種恐懼會成為我們生活的一部分  
I am worried that someday the fear would be part of our life.

A:  
有時候我也覺得  
Sometimes I think that

香港人現在 fight for 的事情我們已經正在承受了  
The things HongKongers are fighting for, we are already bearing it

但另一方面我覺得有非常神奇的效果  
But on the other hand, I found it amazing

在內地不連外網  
When you are in mainland China without connection to the "outer world"

不看任何非正能量的東西的時候  
You don't read anything not positive

感覺自己生活在安定祥和繁榮幸福的社會裡的  
You feel like living in a peaceful, lovely, prosperous, felicitous society.

我相信很多人就是這麼生活下去的  
I believe many people keep on living like this

他們會讓不符合自己世界觀的人和觀點都排除在自己考慮的範圍以外  
They exclude the people and opinions that are against their ideology out of their mind.

甚至有一些時候我覺得  
Sometimes I even think that

難道這樣不對嗎？  
Isn't it a good thing?

難道大家不想要幸福生活嗎？  
People want to live happily, don't they?

難道我們有削減別人幸福的權力嗎？  
Do we have the right to deprive their happiness?

誰願意、誰可以承擔這個真相？  
Who will and who can bear the truth?

B:  
我也說不上現在的狀態是好還是不好  
I don't know if my life now is good or not.

昨天我就跟朋友說很懷念以前唱 KTV 的日子無憂無慮  
Yesterday I told my friends that I miss the days that we went to Karaoke, we were carefree

現在好像都沒有休息的空間  
Now we don't even have time to take a rest

下班又有什麼活動要去  
There are some events to attend after work, always

現在也想去唱 KTV 但是會有內疚的感覺  
I still want to go to karaoke now, but I would be guilty.

A:  
不會覺得自己好像沒所謂可以不發聲  
I don't think I'm careless or I should stay silent

我能做一些事情  
I know I can do something

這個能可能是非常微小的  
The "something" might mean very insignificant

沒有底氣的  
Without any backup

但這是我的意願  
But this is my willingness

我知道我可以做  
I know I can do it

我也應該去做  
I should do it

而且做了可能真的會有一些改變的  
There might be some tiny changes after doing it

當然我也是一個非常微小普通平凡的人  
But of course I just am very ordinary, insignificant person.

A:  
我媽老是叫我不要關注  
My mom always asks me not to read those stuff

她也不關心這個  
She doesn't care about it

對這個事情沒有想法  
She has no opinions on this issue

我爸能理解香港人為什麼上街  
I think my dad understand why HongKong people went on the streets

但他年紀大了  
But he is old

\*\*\*\*\* end \*\*\*\*\*