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Embodied Experience and Personhood: Towards a Cultural Study of Logic and Sensibility (Implications from Trance States)

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I. Introduction: Anthropological Understanding in the Age of Neuroscience

This paper concerns the topic of rethinking cultural models to deal with culturally patterned aspects of mind and psyche in situated practices in socio-cultural settings. How do mind and psyche work when a person is having apparently dissociated experiences? What has become of mind and psyche (or, from an other point of view, reason and emotion) in relation to the possessed person's fluctuating or split self during trance or possession? While trembling around his/her shoulders with accelerated breezing, do his/her bodily states affect brain activities and the maintenance of self-perception? How is such a culturally meaningful experiential state related to his/her embodied processes of dissociation? By reintroducing the anthropological model concerning selfhood or personhood from a new angle,¹ I here argue that cultural selfhood/personhood partly constitutes a systemic whole in which bodily states, neural structures, and socio-culturally shared processes of constructing meaning through experience are working together to sustain an order of this systemic whole. Furthermore, I will suggest that anthropological research on illness and emotions can become increasingly relevant, directly or indirectly, to the more intelligible understanding of the situated processes of people's mind and psyche as the locus of simultaneous opera-

tions of logic and sensibility, and accordingly reason and emotion. Cultural and medical anthropological scrutiny on the state of continuous flows of consciousness with punctuated altered states of mind/psyche — as appear in ritually induced possessions, or in disruptive hallucinations of others' voices in mental illness experiences — will reveal the inadequacies of the research framework that separates logic and sensibility or reason and emotion in favor of the former as the reliable and purified condition of the mind/psyche. The paper is largely theoretically oriented but partial references to ethnographic data concerning possession and dissociation will be made in a preliminary way. Such unusual states of the altered consciousness reveal the interaction between logic and sensibility, cognition/emotion as well as their accompanying bodily and neural aspects. It will be argued that all of these aspects are integrated to function as a systemic whole, which is constituted through the mediation of cultural selfhood/personhood.

Logic/sensibility and reason/emotion have been analytically separated and dichotomized within the human sciences that have followed a Kantian perspective. Sociology and anthropology have been closely related to the same philosophical tradition since their early days, and the same line of thought had been emphasized, above all, in the model of unilineal evolution; it had also echoed in the structural-functional paradigm of the mainstream social anthropology through Neo-Kantian and Durkheimian motives that placed the collective social in the locus of reason for the social scientific study of human relations. Up until 1930, the anthropological concern with the so-called primitive mind had been oriented towards the differences in understanding and reasoning between mythical and scientific realities, but even later on under the growing orthodoxy of cultural relativism, the underlining tone kept this key dichotomy.³ Due to recent developments of the brain sciences, which, since the introduction of fMRI, have launched stimulatingly into the new perspective of mind research, these philosophical ideas have been increasingly questioned, via a series of studies such as those by A.R. Damasio³; reason and emotion, respectively, are considered to be corresponding to key-points of neural networks or partially localizable circuits of blood streams inside the human brain, and work together simultaneously. Very frequently reason seems to be channeled by emotion; pure reason as represented to be the most separated from emotion may actually be apt to cause, without emotion-laden orientations, faulty judgments. So, the di-

chotomous framework, which had a tendency to sharply contrast rationality with irrationality, has now become more overtly problematic; actually, the established epistemological assumptions, which depended on the supposed priority of reason as abstracted entity, have no more remained effective against, and have not been able to catch up with, the lightning speed of advances in neurobiology.

At a certain level, the new trend of trying to understand reason in its interaction with emotion turns out to be compatible with the anthropological critique against the modernist standpoint concerning Western epistemological categories such as rational/irrational, myth/science, reason/emotion, and other binary dualisms that ultimately crystallize in that of mind/body (“Descartes’ error of separation,” to use Damasio’s famous phrase). Within this transient scope for the necessity for innovative interdisciplinary research possibilities, shared academic goals are set against the recent trend of emerging multidisciplinary. As a result, focusing on the description of the ambiguous zones between logic and sensibility, anthropological endeavors now can go together with those of neuroscience mediated by what may be called “cultural neuroscience.” In contrast to the former, “cultural neuroscience” focuses upon the influence of culture on the development of the neural system (especially up until early childhood) and on the articulation of the meaning of emotional experience (especially associated with prefrontal cortical level processes).

At another level, anthropology’s concern with practical cultural knowledge at work has provided a safe, relativist haven, as it were, for just engaging in criticism against every kind of universalistic orientation as well as generalized theoretical frameworks that aim to capture the culture-bounded nature of human action, intention, thought, and feelings at the level of a meta-cultural theory. In short, the majority of anthropologists are not yet prepared for seriously analyzing the neuro-developmental dimensions of cultural learning and the acquisition of cultural patterning; for instance, anthropological theories of emotion have been articulated between universalist and relativist/constructionist approaches, both of which, however, lack the scope of the recent developments in cultural neuroscience. Nevertheless, there has been a new trend within the anthropological disciplines — we will call it the “neural turn” — that tries to bridge a certain range of mini-paradigms of anthropology and neuroscience. Moreover, an updated version of

cognitive anthropology and the biocultural approach in medical anthropology, along with recent interpretive trends, illustrate how anthropological researchers — although still in small number — have tried to relate to recent developments and findings in the brain sciences.⁴ This line of endeavor turns out to be unexpectedly influential in the light of the growing variety of mini-paradigms in neuroscience. The scope of compatibility between neuroscience and the other extreme of interpretive anthropology may not continue to remain effective in the long run against the ongoing expansion of brain science, but attempts to find relation between so apparently different disciplines *at this stage* by strategically ignoring apparent discrepancies between mini-paradigms will be of growing interest.

Given these presently growing possibilities for cross-fertilization, I would like to encourage cultural neuroscientists to focus on the constitutive role of cultural selfhood/personhood in the maintenance of multiple selves as a means of overcoming the crisis of spilt selves. In order to do so, we need a better understanding of how unusual bodily states, feelings, emotions, cognitive ideas as well as corresponding flows of neural processes become integrated into a systemic whole with the aids of cultural selfhood/personhood.

II. Spirit Possession and the Dissociated Self: Between Logic and Sensibility

The phenomenon of spirit possession has been a constant research topic in cultural and medical anthropology, as well as in religious studies and in cultural/transcultural psychiatry. Although the context of spirit possessions basically rests on a given local culture, anthropologically reported spirit possessions reveal a common baseline in that possessed people are to be occupied by some spirit or spirits as acting and speaking agent(s) who is (are) different from the possessed person as an ordinary everyday actor.⁵ In biomedical psychiatry, this mental phenomenon is considered to be pathological. However, from a phenomenological understanding of the subjective experiencing⁶ that takes place in the mind/psyche of those possessed, it is an experience outside everyday contexts in which a person is possessed by another person or spirit(s). The first episode of possession may be threaten-

ing as it causes disruptions of the self or person in the individual that casts chaotic impacts on the integration of the cognitive and embodied aspect of selfhood. Initially, the possessed spirit imposes on him or her some demanding tasks to integrate his/her split self into an unusual trance state that is only partially compatible with and related to his/her everyday subjective person or self. As found in the processes of being initiated into and becoming shaman, the first period of possession incidents may be shocking to the person *per se* in that her or his ordinary common-sense world is in crisis to be broken down with some unusual perception or awareness of physical-somatic processes, which may lead her or him to an awareness of an illness, something wrong or discrepant concerning one's body, selfhood (personhood), and the surrounding environment along with social relations. However, if successful, that person will be able to ritually-culturally regulate the happenings of possession directly or indirectly with the aids of surrounding fellows and ritual functionaries; the act of trance and the recovering of that person's everyday selfhood will be elicited through ritual operations, and accordingly, that person will be able to handle everyday matters without interruption of unexpected dissociative episodes concerning spirit possession. In this sense, she or he does not find it inconvenient and annoying even if with occasional visits or possessions by external deities/spirits from outside her/his body via ritual operations for inducing to and getting out of trance. As a community of people, they do not treat the possession incidents in one of their members as a sign of madness or unacceptable disturbance. This contradicts sharply with the biomedical psychiatric perspective.⁷

Michael Lambek describes a female spirit medium in Mayotte [the French Departmental Collectivity of Mayotte, located in the northern Mozambique Channel, between Madagascar and Comoros].⁸ A new female spirit with a particular individual name possessed her for the first time whereas she had been possessed by another male spirit. The anthropologist was asked to sponsor that female spirit's initiation *séance*, and he accepted under the condition that that spirit would patiently wait for his next comeback (from Toronto, Canada) despite the fact that he was not sure of when he could return again. In 1985, five years later, he returned and that particular female spirit reappeared on that medium, assuring that she remembered the promise and would be ready to follow the initiation *séance*. The medium's family got consternated as they had forgotten the female spirit who had

not appeared for five years. It was a male spirit who had been active on the medium; the male spirit would take a role of an elderly beloved brother of the possessed, i.e. the female medium, and, upon the anthropologist's return from Canada to Mayotte, the male spirit had assured as a spirit diviner, while the medium was in trance, that the anthropologist and his wife would arrive safely at their village, hence releasing worries at the news about a reported accident of a flight from Toronto (or, to put in a Jungian metaphor, the male spirit may be interpreted to represent the medium's animus aspect, complementarily compensating her overcompensating propensity for acting as a strong woman; she herself subconsciously might have been skeptical of her apparent masculine behavioral pattern that got developed initially in response to some insecure circumstances). Despite the family's apparent reluctance to see the initiation séance, as they thought their mother (i.e. the medium) became middle-aged, and not young enough anymore to endure a demanding initiation, the female spirit in presence on the medium authoritatively persuaded the family to agree to hold the séance. "Two minds" or multiple personality disorders with regards to the selfhood of the medium? However, there is a pattern of interaction between the spirit and the surrounding people, and successful negotiations between them can lead people to focus on the unusual circumstances with which everyday knowledge cannot cope. For instance, the medium's husband, himself also a medium enjoyed the relationship with the male spirit's dissociative visit to his wife. The husband felt, in the same way as his wife felt, that the male spirit, the husband himself, and his wife constitute an almost indispensable triad being united as one whole person. Through these ritual negotiations, we can find the simultaneous workings of logic and sensibility or reason and emotion, as our next example will also show.

Rebecca Seligman describes how the Camdomblé people [in Salvador, Bahia, Northeastern Brazil] recognize and try to construct a Camdomblé way of selfhood through religious and everyday practices.⁹ A member in the group told her that one's everyday self can only take its agency on things related to the body under the head; as for the head, it is to be occupied by and subject to his/her possessed deity/ies who control, lead, and guard her/him. One's guardian spirit(s) is related to some of the Camdomblé pantheon that reflects certain social organizational features of the group. This view goes with their idea -- and bodily condition — of selfhood¹⁰ which is associ-

ated with the disrupting and reintegrating processes between cognitive and physiological states whose disorders are elicited by the initial stage of the possession episodes. Thus, different agencies, different minds — as appeared in one's space of selfhood -- are to be culturally integrated as a newly achieved selfhood which fits in the cultural model of the Candomblé selfhood.

Citing some fragments for the cases of possessions and after-talks and interviews with Ontake *gyoja* who received deities in the altered states of consciousness, a particular *gyoja* recalled in my follow-up interview that it was the moment of his attentive sympathy with a particular aged person who suffered from aches on his body — despite that, the latter came up by car primarily to welcome the comrade group who had climbed up to Mt. Ontake via the steep Kurosawa mountain route and descended down towards Tanokura via Outake route — at that time, the *gyoja* noticed the latter, and his sympathy rose up in his mind as he perceived and then he noticed that his shoulders began to tremble and his consciousness faded away into the possession of Ontake deities. The sympathetic arousal, one type of emotional embodiment, with one of the members, would induce a trance along with a ritual procedure as employed by the group (which was the version of the standard ritual format for traditional Ontake Shinko in Japan), in which an ethical act of healing takes place, as Michael Lambek has shown.¹¹

III. Culturally Constituted Selfhood/Personhood and the Cultural Body

In order to reconsider the intersection between logic and sensibility from cultural and experiential points of view, the concept of agency and mind should be “anchored on” the cultural notion of self as well as of the body. Cultural models that try to explain how the *body is mediated by cultural personhood* are thus indispensable for a better understanding of the simultaneous operations of logic/sensibility and reason/emotion and, furthermore, the ways such interactions are embodied by personal experience and embedded in socio-cultural settings. Moreover, I must add one further note to the issue of the culturally constituted selfhood/personhood: the constitution of cultural selfhood/personhood itself is of processual nature, and it is a cul-

tural device that helps to integrate disruptive experiences bringing forth culturally split “minds” within one’s on-going maintenance of selfhood/personhood. In the case of Ontake *gyoja*, they tried to understand and evaluate variable states of possession both from the perspective of the surrounding assisting ritual functionaries and from that of those in trance (in their afterthoughts primarily, through interactions with other surrounding functionaries) as resulting from hierarchical differences among induced deities. Lower rank deities or animal spirits, as they put it, would cause incompatible sequences of actions including speech acts as well as experiential bodily feelings during trance séance or after. The deities who possess are those spirits who were pioneering religious functionaries to redevelop Mt. Ontake’s religious environment in the 18th and 19th centuries, thus, the ancestral spirits (of really historical figures) who would be closer to their believers than great deities like the god of Mt. Ontake and care the local people with benevolence. Their séances would not always turn out to be successful in ritually regulating the process of trance lest the cooperation and psycho-physiological and bodily coordination between functionaries should fail to sustain successfully including verbal and gestural negotiations (such as magical hand postures) with tuning of mutual breezing rhythm. During the séances even tiny non-verbal behavioral cues at the level of microcultural incidents are critical for inducing successful results.¹²

With regard to those micro-level sequences of non-verbal behavior, Karl Heider found — after reviewing films quite minutely and extensively — that in Indonesian films and TV dramas, actors and actresses give off, when they act to present angry facial expressions, a slightly different facial expression, one part of kinemes (see Birdwhistel) of which is actually contrastingly different from that of the really angry facial expressions. He attributes this contrastive difference as deriving from a strong cultural inhibition of display of real anger on face in Indonesian socio-cultural setting of “acting for dramas and movies”¹³. We may understand this Indonesian example as a demonstration of the cultural mediation of selfhood. In Indonesian selfhood/personhood, cultural propensity for avoiding real or “*kasar*” expression of anger through facial expressions given off towards interactional others has resulted in a new part of selfhood/personhood in which Indonesian cultural ego acts ritually-theatrically by keying and transforming real emotive non-verbal expression (e.g. anger) into non-offensively disguised one which still

can successfully become very similar to the real anger but at the same time be distinguished from what it tries to represent; here, the emphasis is on the semiotic as well as bodily sign of deconstructing the real embodied anger at the closest proximity. This is not only a gesture of semiotic-symbolic message, but also a somatic prelude to the *disembodiment of real anger*. This is the very bodily process that lies and mediates in-between the cultural body and cultural selfhood/personhood.

So, there is a possibility that Indonesian people articulate a new aspect of their cultural selfhood through the above bodily mediating process partly in response to the increasingly widespread national popularity of cinematographic visual media and its technologies; thus, the introduction of new technologies may have significant influence on the cultural body and cultural selfhood. Clifford Geertz once argued on Javanese personhood by comparing it with Balinese and Moroccan personhood.¹⁴ His symbolic and interpretive analysis was so far successful in delineating the important logical/sensible coordinates of *batin/lair* (“inside”/“outside”) and *alus/kasar* (“refined”/“rude”) as found in Javanese personhood; however, what I have discussed as the potential importance of the intersection of cultural body, cultural selfhood, and change of external media associated with technological change should be taken into further consideration for effectively developing the more elaborated anthropological framework of selfhood/personhood.

IV. Discussion

So far, I have outlined the possibility of an anthropological framework of cultural selfhood/personhood in conjunction with the cultural body, and furthermore with a focus on the intersections of cultural change and the transformation of the surrounding media-environment, *especially with the introduction of new technologies*. This is necessary to further explore the issue of cultural variation that emerges at the intersection of logic and sensibility where they operate together rather than against each other (in Japanese, we say, “*Nanto-naku omou*,” sometimes to avoid confrontation, other times to imply that a judgment is intuitively right but cannot be logically articulated: a naive notice that logic works together with sensibility). It is

necessary therefore to construct new anthropological models of the cultural body and cultural selfhood/personhood -- that can ethnographically and phenomenologically situate embodied experience in a cultural space where logic/sensibility and reason/emotion operate together -- and to understand and analyze this situated process.

In this paper, I have referred only briefly to the anthropological discussion on spirit possession; however, the approach elaborated here can also be applied, in order to check experiential and empirical research validity, to other medical anthropological research topics such as cultural variability of schizophrenic symptoms, by focusing on the processes of the patients' attempt to reorganize their cultural selfhood/personhood in relation to their cultural body. On the occasion of my visit to the Bethel house in Urakawa, Hokkaido, self-help groups including a Schizophrenics Anonymous gathering seemed to actively cultivate a new cultural selfhood that seemed to be heavily influenced by their bodily conditions and symptoms. Although there might be some difficulties of drawing analogies between spirit possession and schizophrenic split selves, the anthropological framework presented here will be applicable, at least, explanatorily.¹⁵ And, the research attempt to apply anthropology to further elaborate the issue of culture and subjectivity through the examinations of schizophrenia will also contribute to the extension of patients' autonomous lives.

Finally, the emphasis on cultural relativity of selfhood may be compensated in the future at a higher level of anthropological research; Gregory Bateson's argument on the cybernetic self for the understanding of the logic of (North American) alcoholic self as found in Alcoholics Anonymous will come to a new light.¹⁶

Given the shortage of space, this paper has concerned largely with constructing a new theoretical model of the intersection of cultural self and cultural body. To delineate the working model, ethnographic examples were discussed to some degree, hoping to shed some light on how cultural selves and cultural bodies intersect in unusual states of trance. Such theoretical orientation for effective innovation should be the first step towards the collaboration between the fields of cultural neuroscience, neuroanthropology and transcultural psychiatry, among others. We have to continue our journey further into interdisciplinarity.

Notes

1. Throughout this paper, the psychological notion of ‘self’ and the anthropological concept of ‘person’ are treated interchangeably without further reference to the different academic traditions behind them. This distinction is the topic of a further study. See also footnote 12.

2. Since the rationality debate starting with the focus on witchcraft that involved anthropologists and philosophers during 1960s-70s, the controversy has continued to recur under apparently different rubrics such as “the predicament of culture,” i.e. the cultural critique position of James Clifford. For, if we draw additional lines to current anthropological debates, we will be able to find the shadow of rationality debate. I once dealt with this aspect of rationality debate with reference to anthropological approach to logic and sensibility: Keizo Miyasaka, “(Inter)cultural/Transcultural Lens on Plurality of Logical Cosmological Discourses, Emotions, and the Issues on Sensitivity: Exploratory Cultural and Medical Anthropological Approach,” *CARLS Series of Advanced Study of Logic & Sensibility*, Center for Advanced Research on Logic & Sensibility, 1, Keio Univ. Press, 2008:297-323.

3. His somatic marker hypothesis notes rationality and reason need emotional input. Antonio R. Damasio *Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. Penguin, 1995(1994), *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*. Harcourt, 2003.

4. Reyna, Stephen P. *Connections: Brain, Mind and Culture in a Social Anthropology*. Routledge, 2002, is one of the earlier references to the relevance of socio-cultural anthropology including Geertzian interpretive anthropology to certain aspects of newly arising neuroscience. Amir Raz, a cognitive psychological neuroscientist based on McGill also has been a central figure in doing research on critical neuroscience with a keen attention to cultural correlates in neuroscience through collaborations with cultural and transcultural psychiatrists like Laurence J.Kirmayer, as exemplified in the workshop on *Mind, Brain, and Society*, held on September 12, 2008, McGill University. Han, Shihui & Northoff, Georg “Culture-sensitive neural substrates of human cognition: a transcultural neuroimaging approach.”

(*Nature Reviews Neuroscience* 9, 2008:646-654) deals with the issue on the neural correlates of culturally variable human cognition. Juan F. Dominguez Duque, Robert Turner, E. Douglas Lewis, and Gary Egan's "Neuroanthropology: a humanistic science for the study of the culture—nexus," (*Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience*, August 4, 2009:1-10) advocates "neuroanthropology" as "a combined anthropology/neuroscience field of enquiry," taking after the idea of E. Douglas Lewis, which would be very relevant to the anthropological understanding of culture with its "methodological interdependence of science and humanities." The term "neuroanthropology" was used as early as in 1976 by TenHouten, W.D. ("More on split brain research, culture, and cognition." *Current Anthropology*, 17(3) 1976:503-11.) and in 1979 by D'Aquili EG, et.al (i.e. D'Aquili EG, Laughlin CD, McManus J, (Eds.) *The Spectrum of Ritual: A Biogenetic Structural Analysis* (Columbia University Press, 1979), from which the late leading symbolic anthropologist Victor W. Turner was stimulated and wrote on this biogenic aspect of ritual ("Body, brain, and culture." *Performing arts journal*, 10(2), 1986:26-34). To refer to "biocultural perspective, Hinton, A.L. (Ed.) *Biocultural Approaches to the Emotions* (Cambridge University Press, 1999) shows one of the pioneering attempt. The stimulating anthology on trauma, *Understanding Trauma: Integrating Cultural, Psychological and Biological Perspectives* edited by Kirmayer, L, Lemelson, R., Barad, M. (Cambridge University Press, 2007) also presents an eloquent biocultural framework.

5. I did fieldwork in the Philippines (primarily Roxas, Panay and its neighboring zones in the mid 80s, Kisofukushima in central Japan, partly in Bali, in Yunan Province of China in March of 2001 and 2003, and briefly in Solo near Yok Jakarta of Indonesia, where I encountered trance-induced possession rituals (for instance, in English, see Miyasaka, Keizo "Unusual Gestures in Japanese Folkloristic Ritual Trance and Performances," In M. Rector, I. Poggi, and M. Trigo (Eds.) *Gestures: Meaning and Use*. Universidade Fernando Pessoa, 2003:293-299). In a particular research project on filming the flow of mind/psyche which was accepted as an affiliated research by Kokoro Research Centre of Kyoto University during 2009 March to the present, I also have tried to locate a range of visually recorded possession rituals among anthropological documentary films, and ethnographic films by visit-

ing Royal Anthropological Institute, London [with Susanne Shoemacher in September of 2009], and Referentin für Ethnologie, IWF Wissen und Medien [with Dr. Beate Engelbrecht & Mr. Feinfelt], Göttingen, in March of 2010, as well as my Kyoto colleagues' visual filming scenes on possession séances including mine in order to develop a new concept of filmed sequences of one unit of flow of individual and collective mind/psyche and to investigate the necessary features of filming states of mind/psyche from a new perspective (Poster presentations, Miyasaka, Keizo et al. on "Interdisciplinary studies on mind/psyche through analyses and visual practices as to filming of streams of mind/psyche: focusing primarily on medical anthropological topics in ethnographic films." Annual presentations at Kokoro Research Centre, Kyoto University, Feb.20-21 and Dec.18, 2010). Through these, I here focus on the core aspect of possession rituals as nearly universal in its psychic processes (one type of the altered states of consciousness), though its interpretations vary across cultures.

As to the local variation of the cultural practice of the possession, nowadays, international networks of local shamans and researchers on shamans and related people, have appeared, which has resulted into some momentum to reach an aspect of convergence of locally different interpretations and practices at some level. See of Miyasaka, Keizo, "*Tasha-sei-wo meguru gensetsu-no kouzu: diaspora to globalization- no jidai-no atarashii tashazo-no kyokumen*." "(The schemata of academic discourses on alterity: the important aspect of "cultural others" in this age of increasing globalization and its accompanied diasporic groups), *Mita-shakaigaku*, 7, 2003:25-56.

6. The interpretive and phenomenological approach was introduced in medical anthropology by Arthur Kleinman who read Clifford Geertz, who in turn had got big influences by the Continental thought, especially by Max Weber, by way of one of his advisors, Talcot Persons. However, I would think that the line of thought coming from existential psychiatry of Karl Jaspers and more clinically Medalt Boss would also be quite relevant. This approach offers a methodology to grasp phenomenological experiential dimension that is the base for knowledge as well as varieties of the transcendental knowledge (though there is an element of emphasis on pure reason). However, the critical medical anthropology has attacked this approach as it lacks the interest in the social and the political body. As Byron J. Good argues (*Medicine*,

Rationality and Experience: An Anthropological Perspective. Lewis Henry Morgan Lecture Series, Cambridge University Press, 1994), the redirection of phenomenological/symbolic/interpretive approach via critical medical anthropology is in need for further critical development of medical anthropology.

7. Here in-between cultural and psychiatric approach, we should insert the cultural/transcultural psychiatric perspective on dissociation; Kirmayer, L. J., & Santhanam, R. "The anthropology of hysteria." In P. W. Halligan, C. Bass & J. C. Marshall (Eds.), *Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Hysteria: Clinical and Theoretical Perspectives*. Oxford University Press, 2001:251-270. Also, see Seligman, R. and Kirmayer, L.J. "Dissociative experience and cultural neuroscience: Narrative, metaphor and mechanism." *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry*, 32(1), 2008:31-64.

8. Lambek, Michael "How to Make Up One's Mind: Reason, Passion, and Ethics in Spirit Possession." *University of Toronto Quarterly*, 79(2), spring 2010:107-128. See also, its earlier version delivered under the same title at the conference on *Altered States of Mind*, University of Toronto, March 29, 2008. Lambek, M. & Strathern, A. (Eds.) *Bodies and Persons*. Cambridge, 1998.

9. Seligman, Rebecca. "The unmaking and making of self: Embodied suffering and mind-body healing in Brazilian Candomblé." *Ethos*, 38(3), 2010: 297-320. Also, Csordas, Thomas J. et al (Eds.) *Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture and Self*. Cambridge Univ., 1994.

10. In case of contrasting the psychological concept of self with culturally constructed and embodied idea/feel of the aspect of what "self" tries to designate, we use the word, selfhood. The term is more prone to refer to the underlying cognitive/physiological neural processes regarding one's inner self-concept, whereas the term personhood, following the pioneering argument by M. Mauss, relativizes the psychological concept of personality.

11. In part, I discussed about this matter, in my English article, op. cit. 2003. Incidentally, one Korean Shinban, a ritual functionary, once told me that

deities enter his body through its holes such as nose, or tiny holes of his skin, and then the deities stream via his blood tubes all through his body. Indigenous understandings of the actual experiential bodily process of the inducing steps of deities into one's body vary, but present interesting ethnopsychological interpretations that try to map actual experiential bodily perceptions.

12. The concept of microcultural incidents was first introduced by Ray Birdwhistel as patterned sequences of non-verbal actions that appear for a brief moment in one type of socio-cultural settings. He was influenced by Erving Goffman and Edward T. Hall partly, and produced a film titled *Microcultural Incidents in Ten Zoos* [1969], in which 4 different ethnic families respectively in four different cities, that is, Philadelphia, London, Paris, Rome, New Delhi, Hong Kong, and Tokyo display their non-verbal sequenced actions --its time unit is second rather than minute-- in a supposedly culturally similar setting of "zoo." Psychiatrist Albert E. Sheflen did research together with Birdwhistel and filmed actual psychotherapeutic sessions. His time unit was a span of 15 to 20 minutes, and found quasi-courtship behavioral chains in those psychotherapeutic processes, functioning to establish and maintain rapport relationship between a therapist and a client. Birdwhistel pointed out that those chains of non-verbal behavior, whether observed at the microcultural incidents level or at a larger level, arise, out of 90 % cases, to function to maintain the interactional order of the mutually engaged encounters.

13. Heider, Karl "Negative Emotions in New Guinea and Indonesia: a Visual Anthropological Approach." presented at the conference on *Approach to Anger, Sadness, and the Feeling of "Hitting the Bottom" and their Representation in Visual Images.* August 15, 2010, Kokoro Research Centre, Kyoto University, co-organized by Cultural Anthropology Group, CARLS, Keio University.

14. Geertz, Clifford "From the Native's Point of View." In Basso, Keith H. and Selby, Henry A. (Eds.) *Meaning in Anthropology*, University of New Mexico Press, 1976:221–237. In cultural and psychological anthropology, the research frameworks on cultural self has an interesting line of history,

starting with the seminal work of Marcel Mauss (his concept of “person”) , through Alfred Irving Hallowell (*Culture and Experience*, 1955), and recent arguments in conjunction with cultural psychological research on ethnopsychology and selfhood. See, for instance, Carrithers, M. Collins, S. & Lukes, S. (Eds.) *The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History*. Cambridge University, 1985 [M. Mauss’s “A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person; the Notion of Self.” [transl. by W.D. Halls] is included. White, G. M. & Kirkpatrick, J. (Eds.) *Person, Self, and Experience: Exploring Pacific Ethnopsychologies*. Univ. of California, 1986. Kirmayer, Laurence J. “Sapir’s vision of culture and personality.” *Psychiatry*, 64(1), 2001: 23-30. Kirmayer, L.J. “Psychotherapy and the cultural concept of the person.” *Transcultural Psychiatry*, 44(2), 2007:232-257.

15. Jenkins, J. H. & Barrett, R. J. *Schizophrenia, Culture, and Subjectivity: The Edge of Experience*. (Cambridge Studies in Medical Anthropology) Cambridge University Press, 2003. Stephen, Michele & Suryani, Luh Ketut (“Shamanism, Psychosis and Autonomous Imagination.” *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry*, 24(1), 2000:5-40) argues that an initiatory madness or illness is experienced by only a minority of baliens (Balinese indigenous healers) who are most likely women healers (as found among *blian sesonteng*, *edan* or *takson* who conduct spirit possession, usually illiterate hence different from *balian usada* who learn traditional medicine through *lontars*, the sacred text inscribed on palm leaves in Kawi [old Javanese]). The majority does not experience an initiatory madness by depending on “autonomous imagination” to gain control of a special mode of religious imagination. So, the analogical equation of spirit possession with schizophrenic split selves cannot simply be validated with regard to ethnographic examination.

16. Bateson, Gregory “The Cybernetics of “Self”: A Theory of Alcoholism.” *Psychiatry*, 34(1), 1971:1-18. Miyasaka Keizo “Cultural Perspectives of “Hit-Bottom feeling”: An Anthropological Approach,” and commentary discussion, presented at the conference on *op. cit.* August 15-16, 2010, Kyoto. Bateson considered the logic of alcoholic self would be of North American kind rather than universal. With relevance to his argument on this point, we have to further develop anthropological notion of cultural logic not only with reference to some cultural systems of knowledge [the notion of

partial knowledge], their ambiguous co-existences or conflicting dynamics but also to a recent new horizon of cybernetics.