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17

(Inter)cultural/Transcultural Lens on Plurality of Logical Cosmological Discourses, Emotions, and the Issues on Sensitivity: Exploratory Cultural and Medical Anthropological Approach

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I. Introduction

1. FooTooKit or Transfer of Magical Meme-complex?

Were Michael Owen, John Terry, or Wayne Rooney attacked during their game by some invisible force? On the occasion of the 2006 FIFA World Cup, there was a media coverage on African voodoo witch doctors who had reportedly protected their Togo team from evil spirits. The report also revealed that one voodoo sorcerer demonstrated his supernatural ability on opposing English players by simply inserting three needles into the feet of the voodoo dolls that symbolized the opposing English players. Did he really attack the famous English players through his supernatural force? Was that why they did not play so well?

Nowadays, some of the German football fans seem to be fond of using a similar sort of magical practice along with the idea of attacking opponents. “The FooTooKit” is their favorite item for praying. It is a “voodoo doll for football” made in Germany. English fans also followed this practice. In order to guarantee

England's victory, they would fasten the opponent's national flag onto the FooTooKit and stab the doll's feet with needles and pins, especially in times of unfavourable scopes of the game.

These people are not necessarily a hooligan type of over-excited fans, but they would follow the practice in a hope to secure their favorite team's victory. However, there's a speculation that this FooTooKit will intentionally not work against German players since it's made in Germany.

Science-minded persons would say that football fans think of irrational things somewhat rationally. The inference on this German trap follows some sort of logical understanding concerning the perspectives and intentions of their opponent, but apart from it, basically irrational urges prevail around magical ideas. Contamination of rational and irrational ideas and emotions! Is this phenomenon the evidence of a contagious expansion of magical thought from Africa to Germany and England? Or is this a deterioration of logical reasoning amongst people living in the land of modern science? (Why would modern individualistic Europeans be affected by "pre-modern" magical ideas?) Perhaps it is an evidence for the power of interactive exercise of Dawkinsonian memetic transfer, or for the diffusion of cultural meme-complexes designating magical ideas into non-magical ones of the West. (Power is embedded in the diffusion process of propagating from one population to another and on consequent patterning interactions of memes and meme-complexes in the cultural meme pool, given the mechanism of natural selection of cultural memes according to the criteria of efficacy and repeated availability in adaptational "mindscape.") Or, after all, do humans remain with the same brain set since the latest period of Pleistocene? (Our brain ceased to evolve for the period of roughly the end of Pleistocene or at the latest since the period of agricultural revolution replacing hunters and gatherers economy in human socio-cultural evolution. Therefore, the rudimental stratum of mind follows imaginative religious-magical thinking – perhaps one way partly related to some versions of Metta Blanco's biologic¹, or the other way partly related to imaginative processes of idea construction coupled or de-coupled by hyperactive detections programs that have been relevant to the cognitive science-oriented anthropological approach to religion² – while it is suppressed and controlled by higher-order mono-logical linear reason. This may be explained by future brain science and evolutionary psychology of logic and sensitivity as well as evolutionary psychiatry and anthropological cognitive

archeology.)

Many questions would arise by examining simple and ordinary phenomena. For example, the feeling of embarrassment or perplexity is triggered when an individual is about to throw away an old amulet. Perhaps the amulet was a gift from her/his grandparents. Is it acceptable or even safe to throw away the amulet as garbage? (After all, superstition is superstition. It cannot affect reason, but it will probably affect emotion.) What is a meaning of praying with the FooTooKit for football fans? Is it a serious pray or a mere play? (Perhaps, the main axis of “modern humans’ mind” is logical reason, and it controls irrational emotions by shifting the context from the religious to the playful, i.e. transforming “ritual” into “play.” This may differentiate a certain type of sensitivity which differs from the traditional magical type of sensitivity. Both sensitivities include unconsciously triggered intuitive base- or root-sensibilities³ upon which some sort of thinking processes for rationalization work in patterned ways, consequently resulting in particular modes of higher-order sensibilities which we can also call sensitivity.)

2. Ambiguities in the Analytical Concepts

There would be multiple ways of questing more and more, which partly derive from unsolved ambiguities embedded in difficulties of clear delineations of analytical concepts: In addition to the wide-spread definition of magic and miracle we may need to add “marvels” to indicate unexpected perceptions of unusual non-natural incidents. By doing so, we may better delineate three

¹ Rayner, E. *Unconscious Logic: An Introduction to Matte Blanco’s Bi-Logic and Its Uses*. Routledge, 1995. This theory refers to the unconsciousness following Sigmund Freud’s interpretation of dreams via formal logic of Bertrand Russell and Alfred N. Whitehead and accordingly is related to the ideas of Claude Levi-Strauss, Gregory Bateson and others. It is interesting to note that the emotional, the unconscious can be scrutinized by formal logic. This is partly because the unconscious thinking process consists in classificatory activities. Anthropological studies on primitive classification partly got to this point in a certain sense.

² McCauly, Robert, & Lawson, E. Thomas. *Bringing Ritual to Mind*. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

³ Boyer, Pascal. *Religion explained: The evolutionary origins of religious thought*. Basic Books, 2001.

experiential domains and understand intersections of technically operative magic or religiously high-toned miracles with marvels⁴. Or, the concept of magic itself may have been narrowly defined, in the case of classical anthropological studies on witchcraft, magic and oracles. (The expansion of sort of “magical” practices has been observed in the areas of urban sectors where a small number of African elite people win the games of economic expansion including speculations and capitalistic investments in African contemporary stock markets. The same is true of proliferation of witchcraft and sorcery in the case of small African towns permeated by local articulations of global capitalism that have caused accelerated economic stratification among kin-oriented groups of local people. Propagation of magic in a rapidly changing Africa may not simply be interpreted by the idea that the same variants of classical magical practices have been revived some way or another, not to say of the formulae, but in terms of unchanged magical sensibilities and sensitivities adapted to transnational globalization/re-localization processes. Perhaps the traditional magical sensibility was rooted in a certain type of customary cultural recipes for ordinary life that survived for thousands of years and it would be these customary cultural latent patterning rules that have spelt out the modern version of new magical sensitivity by transforming its deep structural aspects, one after another, into the surface structure adjusting to socio-cultural glocal environments of our time. Classical “magic” was one type of the surface structure in the colonial period that prevailed among non-western geographical areas, partly as locally appropriated variable reactions and repercussions to the Western colonial administration.)

The ambiguities of the concept of logic are also a big issue, at least from anthropological points of view: We refer here to the relevant issues concerning anthropological ideas on the possibilities of plural thinking and the modes of thought, each containing some aspect of logical inference. The Azande of Sudan, following E.E. Evans-Pritchard, got aware of natural causes and effects when they fell down by accident at some stamp of a jungle tree, but they would be quite frustrated at wondering why it did happen “at this time, at this place, and all at once to me among others” who has been a very cautious jungle

⁴ Shanfelt, R. “Magic, miracle, and marvels in anthropology.” *Ethnos*, 69(3): 317-340.2004.

walker. They inevitably would suspect someone's witchcraft⁵. The plurality of reasoning, the one based on natural observation that may have some potentiality to be converged on scientific reasoning and the other on social attribution of contingency of supernaturally operating evil human wills that are generated in the midst of conflictive social relations. A witchcraft type of cosmology with this plurality of reasoning, coupled namely with the cosmological idea on social cause of natural accidental phenomena, is typical

⁵ Evans-Pritchard, E.E. *Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic among the Azande*. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1937. Apart from the possible bias coming from his colonialist orientation and apart from the rhetorical bias coming from the video-camera eye working style of his descriptive writing (see Clifford Geertz. *Works and Lives: the anthropologist as author*. Stanford University Press, 1988) and even further apart from the certain defect coming from under-differentiation of the observer's interpretation and that of the natives', this book still stands as the first achievement of what medical anthropology is about, in that there would be plural ways of reasoning in the face of misfortunes and crises in health, each of which would have each owns system and technology of questioning on validity, such as that of the Zande poison oracles and the choice or survival of which way of reasoning consists not exclusively in purely empirical-logical findings of fallacy and falsification of the system – as contingent factors convey occasional successes of the system's interpretation canceling off its previous failure. The efficacy issue is important to sustain the system. Again, contingent factors give the Zande system a certain range of probable efficacy (see Allan Young). Evans-Prichard's argument on witchcraft and science was taken into the philosophical debate on rationality, joined by the pluralist Peter Winch [In: Bryan Wilson.(Ed.) *Rationality*. Basil Blackwell, (1958)1970], and Popperian anthropological social philosopher, I.C. Jarvie [Concept and Society. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972. "Understanding and explanation in society and social anthropology." In Dallmayr. F. & McCarthy, T. (Ed.) *Understanding and Social Inquiry*. University of Notre Dame Press, 1977]. Charles Taylor [Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Cambridge University Press, 1985] also discussed elaborately along the line of Jarvie. Winch put emphasis on the closed self-validating nature of cultural idioms and concepts by which the Azande describe the problematic situations, whereas the latter refers to the possibility of empirical testing against what the Azande question, and via this empirical testing the Azande might be persuaded that their way of thinking is false. Both represent the two extremes of the argument on what is science and what is unscientific. However, as Ludwick Fleck postulated that even scientists depend on their own system and technology of finding scientific facts; empirical science also bases its foundation on its historically grounded epistemological environment and constitutes factual findings as resulting from a "harmony of illusions." (see: Allan Young. *The Harmony of Illusions*. 1995). Today, we are led to remain swung between the versioned up relativistic position along the hermeneutic line of Peter Winch and that of the extreme rationalistic position.

of the societies with no hierarchical social authorities combined strong group boundaries, from the structural-functional view ⁶.

Similarly, the concept of sensitivity is unclear. It may range from the Kantian concept, which stands close to a sensual screening process, i.e. judgment by sensual sensitivity, to that of the French Annales School or that of the Kyoto School, both assuming some sort of accumulation of cognitive cultural knowledge and sensory-motor learning that form the features of sensitivity with acquired skills at some sorts of quick intuitive judgment.

⁶ Douglas, M. *Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology*. Vintage Books, 1970. Also, Douglas, M. (Ed). *Essays in the Sociology of Perception*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. Mary Douglas developed, as an extension of her Durkheimian kind of social anthropology, the Group-Grid theory after Basil Bernstein's concepts of restricted code and elaborated code in order to detect the correlations between the types of symbolic cosmologies and the four quadrant typologies of group-grid axes as applied to individual societal features. It is interesting to note: what societal features does the international ubiquitous scientific community have, if we follow the line of Mary Douglas's social analysis? The scientists' value system itself constitutes one type of symbolic cosmology, at least from anthropological points of view – nowadays, we witness a rising interest in anthropology of science and technology. The scientists' cosmology, standing besides the elaborate code of cognition, is conspicuously different from other types of cosmologies such as the one closely associated with witchcraft. I assume, the scientists' society falls into the low grid-low group quadrant, but we find also the Mubti pygmy type of hunters and gatherers societies in this quadrant, following the group-grid analysis. The Mubti people would be very different in important aspects of values and thoughts from those of the scientific community, although they are free from the idea of witchcraft as compared to their neighboring Bantu speaking people. Accordingly, we need to introduce a new axis to those of Mary Douglas's schemata. By so doing, we may be able to compensate the defect inherent in her typological theory on which typologies will fluctuate according to which set of societies at large you compare with each other. If we think of such a case as that of the Ecuadorian Waorani in the Amazon forests who seem to reveal the correlation of strong individualism and sorcery practices, we may also have to modify her typological analysis. The problematic analytical distinction between witchcraft and sorcery taking after the Zande emic distinction and practice will come back here in a new disguise. (The Waorani, according to Clayton Robarchek & Carole Roberchek [“Waorani grief and the witch-killer's rage: worldview, emotion, and anthropological explanation. *Ethos*. Vol.33(2), 2005:206-230.] believe in revenging sorceries with their cosmological idea of individual autonomy and the power of human agency over exploitability over the forests or nature. Due to rage submerged with grief, they commit homicide both within their group units and without, which is analyzed to be related to onsets of their rage and grief to the perceived incidents that their individual autonomy gets nullified and insulted by others including sorcerers' evil wills.)

Intuition, in this case, would be at a higher order articulated by complex situated learning than that of what cognitive science-oriented cultural anthropology deems to be, i.e. the unconscious order at which intuitive sensibilities work, so to speak, instinctively prior to thinking or reflection processes (see footnote^{2,3}). Here, intuitive sensibilities are located at a lower level and are different from the higher order sensitivity, although the conceptual differences between sensitivity and sensibility again remain unclear. Following the line of enquiries for higher order sensitivity associated with intuitive sensibilities, one may think of magical sensitivity that can include some cognitive processing and judgment based partly on rational logical thinking (although this may not be equated with “pure” logical thinking).

Furthermore, logic/reason and sensitivity/emotion have been put in an oppositional contrast, thus designating to delineate somewhat mutually exclusive aspects of the human mind. However, leaving the brain/neuroscience approach aside, there has also been a minority of thinkers such as Gregory Bateson who put emphasis on the interconnectedness and complementarity of reason/intellect and emotion/affect; the latter as represented by “tears” is an intellectual thing as Pascal once put it. In particular, following Bateson, the self-contained concept of modern ubiquitous ideal selfhood is the very basis of scientific enquiry for human mind as it is cast on an idealistic abstract plane that is set to be free of situated and positioned socio-cultural contexts. This idea of selfhood, as equated with “individual mind,” would be misleading if we take into consideration that the individual mind could be part of the whole “mind” beyond his/her physical body, immanently embodied over the cybernetic circuits of the interrelated loops of information’s transformational flows, in the world of *creatura* rather than that of *pleroma*, between human agencies and their situated surrounding environment⁷. *Creatura*, the world of networking for a transformational flow of information, which can be called the world of cybernetic mind, is supported on the one hand by its infrastructures for the source of energy such as humans’ metabolic/physiological body in support of transmitting informational impulses through sparking neurons and vibratory muscle-movements. On the other hand, *creatura* only concerns the

⁷ Gregory Bateson. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. Ballantyne Books, 1972. ditto. *Mind and Nature - A Necessary Unity*. Bantam Books, 1980.

ordering of differences that has nothing to do with the world of *pleroma* as being characterized in terms of energy and governed by the law of physics. Emotions are embedded in the *creatura* as well as partly in the *pleroma* of individual bodies. Emotions concern situated socio-cultural interrelationships of the participants in encounters, mainly in face to face, but even in virtual ones, which should be studied under the rubric of *ethnomy* in combination with the perspective of *ethology*⁸. In this light, sensibilities, as well as sensitivity, also have this nature of interrelatedness. At this point, anthropological research on logic and sensitivity should take this relational approach in mind.

3. The Significant Complementary Position of the Cultural Anthropological Exploratory Approach

In this paper written for our annual report on what our anthropology team – one of the two teams in the Philosophy-Cultural Anthropology group of the global COE CARLS projects – has achieved, I would like to avoid getting into the problem of ambiguities of the analytical concepts, which require quite a large space with at least several ramifications of big arguments. Instead, let us remain more positively with the ambiguous analytical key-conceptual terms, with the recognition that the ambiguities may allow us to foster creative rooms for developing new ideas for future fruitful research.

At any rate, our cultural anthropological research now follows exploratory lines of enquiries, as our cultural anthropological enquiry has just started anew

⁸ Emotions feedback their evaluations to neural information flows, and hence like some governor in an engine can positively support the neural information processing or negatively suppress that processing. Humans also can reflexively perceive or grasp this nuanced aspect of emotions. However, in the theory of *autopoiesis*, which Bateson found promising to further articulate his kind of search for the nature of mind, emotions cannot constitute some *autopoietic* system, whereas “*noema*,” i.e. mental thinking unit manifesting in mind, runs its *autopoietic* circulations coupled with corporeal and social systems. Emotions in this theory are by-products of some patterns of fluctuating cycles of muscle-motor reactive movements accompanied by circulatory flows of the *autopoietic* systems that are coupled with each other. The field of *autopoiesis* as a revolutionary epigone of cybernetics aims at constructing a space onto which we can deal with *autopoietic* self-regulatory movements of information without referring to psycho-physiological processes. Hideo Kawamoto. *Autopoiesis: The Third Generation System*. Seido-sha, 1995.

in this academic year without the prior involvement in the 21 century COE project for the integrated research on the mind. So, in the exploratory sense, we would think that there is a certain advantage for strategically unquestioned or ambiguous methodological juxtapositions. This may initially sound eclectic and opportunistic as it contains ad hoc adoptions of different methodologies regardless of their origins ranging from positivist or structuralist, interpretive or post-interpretive, essentialist or post-structuralist/deconstructionist, cultural critique or comparative consciousness-oriented anthropology.

The role of cultural anthropological research on logic and sensitivity lies in its complementary relevance to philosophical and mathematical logic, cognitive science-oriented psychology and aesthetics as well as evolutionary, comparative, developmental, neuro-physiological animal psychology. Thus, with a consciousness of the latent backgrounds as well as with one of the theoretical maps concerning structurally oppositional articulations of each disciplinary paradigm or mini-paradigm, it would be strategically meaningful if our cultural anthropological field approach conspicuously stands apart from experimental sciences as well as from logical philosophy. For, on the basis of meaningful complementary multi-vocality of the approaches, a wider range of different angles and disciplinary scholarships would be pieced together to form mutually stimulating complementary circuits. During this sort of complementary interactions, our cultural anthropological approach may give some concrete examples for desirable empirical research in the scope of unexpected creative findings, as I propose later in a minimal way. Given this complementary role, it is also of some use for other scientific researchers if cultural anthropological approaches include historical/comparative examination on social epistemological backgrounds of the ongoing academic interests and the newly rising relevant research disciplines, including brain-neuro-science, on the human mind with a particular focus on logic and sensitivity. This has been eloquently shown in the case of Allan Young's paper on the social brain, which was delivered at one of our international symposia⁹. He pointed out the close kinship of the mind-brain-neuro model permeated in contemporary

⁹ The international symposium was held on July 29, 2007 at the Keio University as part of the anthropology team's GCOE project. Dr. Allan Young's paper was titled as "Changing Perspectives on Mind, Brain, and Empathy: Implications for Understanding the Intersection of Reason and Emotion."

evolutionary brain-neuroscience, i.e. the social brain model, with that of the later 19th century Jacksonian model. This so far unnoticed regression has been brought about since the introduction of the functional MRI, as it has enabled brain researchers to overview the activating loci and networks of the human brain in terms of the brain imaged observable fluctuation of blood stream in the neural-brain networks. His social epistemological findings, apart from the academic significance per se, will invite reflexive reconsiderations on the Jacksonian model on the side of contemporary brain-neuroscience researchers, which would result in reflexive re-articulations of the latter's theory and consequent research.

Given the loose assumptions of the exploratory attempt as featured above, I would like to cast light on anthropological perspectives for the studies on logic and sensitivity and cultivate a tentative line of theoretical framework by which certain clusters of anthropological topics would be re-contextualized under the rubric of an anthropological approach to socio-cultural foundations and conditions of human reason/logic and emotions/sensitivity with emphasis on interactive aspects of mutual embodiment. By using this tentative framework, I will briefly sketch what our cultural anthropology team has attempted to achieve for this academic year of 2007.

II. Anthropological Approach to Rationality and Emotions

1. Primitive Classifications: From Sociological Reductionism to a Bio-socio-cultural Approach

In the contemporary anthropological scholarship, the dual focus on logic and sensitivity as one segment of a salient research topic has seldom been discussed. Both have been more or less separately dealt with. Therefore, I would like to outline the main points in our exploratory approach, in a first step on logic and in a second step on sensitivity.

As for the focus on logic, what comes to our minds in anthropological scholarship concerns rationality/irrationality or primitive classification/scientific classification. For this scrutiny, the mainstream socio-cultural anthropology has been based on a social cognitivism/constructivist/constructionist paradigm,

putting emphasis on socio-cultural emic constructions of classificatory categories. One of its roots was Emile Durkheim who tried to clarify, with his nephew Marcel Mauss, the social origin of human classification so that they could cast a critical light on the Kantonian assumption of a priori nature of categories.¹⁰ Thus, sometimes, Durkheim's perspective, with regards to "Primitive Classification," is referred to as Neo-Kantonian. Australian aboriginal societies may have acquired classificatory faculty, as applied to natural surroundings, originally through socially based urges to classify their own members according to socially necessary principles for organizing group unity via social structural oppositions. Accordingly, logic itself was considered to be rooted not in human natural faculty per se as a purely abstract logic, but in organizational social practices based on primitive classifications and its hierarchical orderings. Social logic was the prototype for abstract logic.

The anthropological research on the system of classification continued to focus, after Durkheim and Mauss, on folk classification of animals, plants, kin members and symbolic classifications as often associated with social structural patterns and corresponding cosmologies. The system of dual classification, initially cultivated by Robert Hertz as well as Dutch anthropologists under the rubric of "right and left" oppositional dual classification, was found in many small-scale societies, which were then called primitive societies. This system tended to be found in those societies that revealed oppositional social organizational groupings as Lévi-Strauss would detect there the elementary structure of kinship, i.e. social structural groupings that would secure long-term chains of positive reciprocity between the oppositional groups in terms of marriage chances, complementary goods, and ritual greeting words for phatic communion. However, among those societies in which social groupings and their solidarity ties seem to be renewed and reconstituted through regular and crisis rituals, structural oppositional principles of social organization seem to be obscured with no salient correlation with the appearance of some type of dually segmented symbolic classification. Nevertheless, the social cognitivist approach has turned out to be at least partially useful for pointing out a certain measure of correlations between the

¹⁰ Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss [translated from the French and edited with an introduction by Rodney Needham]. *Primitive Classification*. Cohen & West, 1969.

features of socio-cultural classification and social organizational classification. To anchor this topic on the research on logic, we need to further introduce pragmatics of the socio-cultural classification, rather than its syntax or its semantics that were largely targeted in the precedent studies.

Apart from my supplementary points as to the lack of pragmatics, the Durkheimian position has prevailed in socio-cultural anthropology, hence excluding psychological explanation. Thus, on one extreme, to further Durkheim's social perspective, the notion of logic cannot be based on universally assumed human faculty or intelligence to be grounded in humans' brain. Rodney Needham, however, critically summarized discussions over certain shortcomings of what was postulated in "Primitive Classification." With a British sensitivity for empirically oriented scrutiny, which, as for him, was situated within the anthropological socio-centric approach, Needham pointed to the possibly necessary role of the genetic-neurophysiological aspect of human classificatory faculty even in "Primitive Classification" and referred to the visual-experiential differentiating process in the initial formation of visual perceptive categories as found in the case of those people who got eyesight by successful medical operations and brought a measure of perceptive light into their previous blind state. The strong Durkheimian version invites questions from empirical or experiential, or even developmental enquiries regarding a variable threshold of the imposition of socio-cultural conditioning over human psychological faculty.

This is especially the case in criticism deriving from the newly expanded evolutionary psychological paradigm as well as from the evolutionary social sciences. These have developed since the 1980s with the efforts for trying to overcome the problematic shortcomings of what sociobiology assumed and have articulated discussions on current backlashes regarding the mind-brain-culture debate. In this regard, Steven Pinker's criticism is relevant¹¹. He goes much further than Rodney Needham and criticizes Alfred Kroeber's idea of culture, in that the latter's superorganic mind was one extreme culmination of

¹¹ Steven Pinker. *Blank State: The Modern Denial of Human Nature*. New York: Viking, 2002. See also, Allan Young. "Evolutionary narratives about mental disorders." *Anthropological Medicine*, Vol.0, No.2, 2003:239-253.

the idea of the blank state of human mind, i.e. that of the greater malleable mind entertained by the cultural relativist school of the mainstream American anthropology of the 1920s and '30s and its overwhelming influential exercise over these two generations. The human mind has been considered by these anthropologists to be a "blank state" on which personal experience continues to write to fill. Pinker traces its cognate view in Emile Durkheim's analytical concept of collective representation. To Pinker, the concept reveals a singular disguised version of the blank view of human nature.

Accordingly, Pinker criticizes the Durkheimian model, the standard social science model. It neglected the mind-brain part of the complex interacting whole between biology, psychology, the social institution and culture in human experience. Consequently, what Durkheim achieved in establishing the concept of collective representation is actually the following: He just considered it as the output of the social, the social fact, deriving from the collective social mind mechanisms and tried to find out the origin of the representational output within the reference to the structure of interrelated social facts. In short, the strong version of sociological reductionism concerning "the primitive" has after all been based on the classical dichotomy of the primitive and the civilized. The dichotomy itself got socially constructed around the 1850s and '60s in the case of Great Britain according to the people's experience that witnessed, during their life time, the sharp contrast in-between the rapidly industrialized urban landscape and that of the seemingly unchanging backwardness of the traditional country areas.¹² Derived from the dichotomy and its ethnographic analogy as applied to the time ordering of the then differently comparable societies, the Durkheimian approach can hardly take into account more advanced evolutionary views and consequently those recent views that focus on the intricate interactions between biological, psychological, social and cultural determinants. Evolutionary social sciences have impressive potentials for breaking through the dead end of individually enclosed disciplinary paradigms. We find, however, discrepancies in methodologies, research emphases and underlying assumptions among the two representative streams in the field: one stream being the evolutionary psychology focusing on

¹² George W. Stocking, Jr. *Victorian Anthropology*. Free Press, 1987.

specialized cognitive modules through laboratory studies. It aims at uncovering the psychological mechanisms of the mind that underpin human behavior and the selective forces which operated to attain those mechanisms. The other stream, that is, that of human behavioral ecology, focuses on the application of animal behavioral ecology to human populations on the basis of naturalistic field observations and field-oriented tests of hypotheses, such as those in anthropological archeology. This approach adopts fitness-maximization game theory models, which concern humans' optimal conditional strategies for trading off contradiction among various types of first-level advantages recurring around survival and reproductive success.¹³ Finally, we also take caution of the problematic nature of reductionistic stance of evolutionary psychology as Steven Rose criticizes in his "Escaping evolutionary psychology."¹⁴

In the above regard, our exploratory anthropological approach tries to base itself within the differential perspectives of bio-cultural approaches to human behavior, values, and emotions, while retaining the strong version of the effect of culture on neurological aspects of human mind as exemplified by Clifford Geertz: As he argues, the assumption that "the mental dispositions of man are genetically prior to culture and that his actual capabilities present the amplification or extension of these pre-existent dispositions by cultural means is incorrect."¹⁵ Laurence J. Kirmayer elaborates his version of a bio-cultural approach in his recent studies that also keeps the above Geertzian point.¹⁶

Anthropological studies on classificatory systems as found among small-scale societies need some intermediate framework to be combined to the issues on logical reasoning or, to put it more precisely, on-going interactive situated syllogistic discourses in dynamics of thinking and feeling, apart from the facet of neuroscience. We go on, without clarifying this intermediate part, however,

¹³ Smith E.A. Borgerhoff Mulder, M. & Hill, K. "Controversies in the evolutionary social sciences: a guide for the perplexed." *Trends in Ecology & Evolution*, Vol. 16, no.3, 2001:128-134.

¹⁴ In: H. Rose and S. Rose [eds.] *Alas, Poor Darwin*. Harmony Books, 2000:299-320.

¹⁵ Clifford Geertz. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Basic Books, 1973: p.82.

¹⁶ Laurence J. Kirmayer, Robert Lemelson, Mark Barad(Ed.) *Understanding trauma: integrating biological, clinical, and cultural perspectives*. Cambridge University Press, 2007.

to issues and academic debates on rationality in socio-cultural anthropology that are also relevant to our exploratory research on logic.

2. The Problem of Rationality in Anthropology

For a brief overview over issues and academic debates on rationality in socio-cultural anthropology, we will start with the assassination of Captain Cook.

In the 1990s, there were a series of controversial arguments between Marshall Sahlins and Gananath Obeyesekere, which elicited a wider attention among anthropologists¹⁷. The latter accused the former of his projection of mystification of Captain Cook onto 18th century Hawaiians: an indigenous socio-cultural mythological recognition that culminated in their assassination of the captain. The people deemed him as representing the figure of divinity. Allegedly, Sahlins took a relativistic position with a big bias of neglecting the communalities in neurophysiological processing of thinking. Whether Hawaiians or Europeans, this would be the case, and despite this fact, Sahlins unilaterally imputed irrationality onto Hawaiians of the time on the basis of his European-centered ethnocentric standpoint. Sahlins in turn redressed the attack with his counter-argument that he could have hardly been affected by what Obeyesekere considered to be the European ethnocentrism. Instead,

¹⁷ Obeyesekere, *The Apotheosis of Captain Cook: European mythmaking in the Pacific*. Princeton University Press, 1992. Sahlins, M. D. *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the early history of the Sandwich islands kingdom*. University of Michigan Press., 1981. ditto. *Island of History*. University of Chicago Press, 1985. ditto. *How "natives" think: About Captain Cook, for example*. University of Chicago Press, 1995. Ian Hacking. *Aloha, aloha*. *London Review of Books*. September, 1995. Jarvie, I. C. *Review of How "natives" think, by Marshall Sahlins*. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 28 (4): 567-79. Clifford Geertz. *Culture war*. *New York Review of Books* November 30, 1995b: 4-6. ditto. Available light:.. *Anthropological reflections on philosophical topics*. Princeton University Press, 2000c. Robert Borofsky. "Cook, Lono, Obeyesekere, and Sahlins." *Current Anthropology* 38 (2), 1997:255-65. Keizo Miyasaka. "Tasha wo meguru gaku-teki gensetsu-no kouzu.no: diaspora to globalization-no jidai-no atarashii tasha-zou-no kyokumen." in *Japanese [The new aspect of otherness in the age of diaspora and globalization: paradigmatic positions of socio-cultural theories articulated on the social position and the representation of others]*, *Mita-shakaigaku*, (7), 2002:25-56.

he insisted that Hawaiians in the late 18th century had a different type of rationality on the basis of which they were led to kill the captain upon his unexpected return despite the fact that they once had celebrated his departure. Sahlins criticized Obeyesekere on the very same ground as that of the latter's accusation against him: Obeyesekere substantially had the European-centered view of rationality with which he tended to project psychological universal processes onto the locus where it is inappropriate, where close scrutiny on socio-cultural construction becomes much more relevant to getting at cosmologies of different rationalities. The business of cultural anthropology lies in this relativistic interpretive search. Sahlins questioned Obeyesekere's disposition as being away from culturally localized Hawaiian knowledge, its rationality and sensibility that prevailed during the latter half of the 18th century. This was essentially the revived and nuanced battle between the neo-Marxist structural-semiotic approach and the psychoanalytically oriented interpretive approach. The controversy got twisted, however, against the circumstances that Obeyesekere was a non-western Sinhalese anthropologist much influenced by a British colonial higher education, whereas Sahlins was a European-American. Sahlins' criticism sounded as if it was put on the plane of anthropological scholarship, but it might convey a meta-communicative comment, one that is not politically correct, as it touches the delicate issue on a negative aspect of colonial educational conditioning that might have worked on Obeyesekere's intellectual upbringing.

The first debate on rationality in anthropology concerned Evans-Pritchard's question on witchcraft [see footnote⁵]. In face of unscientific reasoning on the basis of supra-sensible qualities as found among the Azande, he was partly influenced by the idea of Lucian Levi-Bruhl's pre-logic mode of thinking upon his attempt of understanding the mode of reasoning in terms of witchcraft. The Azande read cause and effect between contingent metonymic incidents with reference to supra-sensible mangu, which was apparently irrational by the European standard of scientific logical thinking. Nevertheless, Evans-Pritchard got to the pluralist idea of different modes of reasoning. Following the hermeneutical relativistic line of the debate as represented by Peter Winch who opposed Popperian Jarvie's positivistic postulation on irrationality, we can incorporate Allan Young's formulation. If so, we can understand witchcraft among the *Azande* as the *Zande* system of reasoning for witchcraft detection with its technology of testing. Their system of reasoning constitutes its own

logic and rationality.

Robin Horton's idea of the different modes of thought partly developed as a paradigm-oriented approach to this plurality of reasoning along the line of Evans-Pritchard.¹⁸ However, Horton's approach is, if anything tacitly based on the framework of irrationality/rationality that is associated with the idea of African modes of thought as lacking the features of scientific reasoning.

Then, what is inherently different between that type of reasoning and the enlightened scientific logical reasoning? What would happen if these two modes of reasoning meet each other in intercultural circumstances and further in globally rearticulated mutual exchanges and influences with some apparent aspect of hybridization?

With regards to the first question, cognitive anthropology of human reasoning becomes relevant. According to James F. Hamill who scrutinized this problem from the paradigm of linguistics-oriented cognitive anthropology, logical assumptions in discourses of different cultural and linguistic backgrounds commonly meet the criteria of internal coherency. However, with respect to propositional reasoning, they differ from culture to culture.¹⁹ Thus, propositional calculus as most pronounced by A.N. Whitehead and B. Russell for scientific reasoning cannot become the basis of a universally coherent discourse structure. However, a variety of ethno-logics, as analyzed via cross-cultural data on linguistic categorical classification test and interviewing as to its reasoning, are found to follow a syllogistic discourse structure, i.e. the pattern of valid and invalid syllogisms remains the same from language to language. Ethno-logics adopt their conceptual world according to actively and socially embedded functional-pragmatic contexts through which people of each cultural background other than that of the West find concrete efficacy in dealing with repeatedly faced routinely socio-cultural technical and ideational tasks.

Following the cultural relativistic kindred spirit, Hamill criticizes the Eurocentric appraisal of the Aristotelian logic as a version of colonial

¹⁸ Robin Horton. *Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West: Essays on Magic, Religion, and Science*. Cambridge University, 1993.

¹⁹ James F. Hamill. *Ethno-logic: The Anthropology of Human Reasoning*. University of Chicago Press, 1990.

hegemonial position. The soundness of his general orientation apart, his scheme as to the equation of Aristotelian logic with the base of European folk logic seems to reveal the following short-comings. First, it may be too general to think only of the overall continuity of Aristotelian logic since the classical Greek period. We need something more detailed in anthropology of logic in human history as well as some sort of Paleo-philosophy in the scope of human evolution. That would be reconstructed in terms of evolutionary cognitive archeology. Perhaps, we have to distinguish the medieval European logic from Aristotelian logic per se, and modern logic is also to be distinguished from the medieval European one. The former would be mounted as a result of disembedded abstraction from the latter that had occurred since Galileo Galilei onward, as Edmund Husserl once set a phrase for this, i.e. the Galilean mathematicalization of nature, and hence the newly attained abstract propositional reasoning constituted the logic propelling a special kind of reason well suitable for industrial revolution. We also would think that even in the classical Greek period differentiated speciation of discourses on *sophia* would have occurred. Earlier Greek ethno-logic might have lost its position at least among Greek intellectuals, as the social life of Greek polis had culminated to such a degree that Greek city dwellers developed their cosmology of the civilized as opposed to the uncivilized, the way of life for those *Βάρβαροι* who spelt non-sense voices like birds. The meaning of logos, once more incorporated with pathos and psyche got separated to pronounce the rational aspect of reasoning while psyche became more emotionalized.²⁰

Furthermore, if we think of the ancient Indian, ancient Chinese, and ancient Arabic mathematical thoughts, we may reach the idea of alternative modes of mathematical logic that were reached via different contextualizations of concrete strategies to arriving in solutions. Seemingly, a very abstract logic has its roots in some sort of culturally selected strategies for solving problems on the basis of differently constructed metaphorical equations between apparently formal structure and base-line metaphors, the latter of which are

²⁰ Keneth Gergen "Psychological discourse in historical context: an introduction." In C.F. Graumann and K.J. Gergen (Eds.) *Historical Dimensions of Psychological Discourse*. Cambridge University Press, 1996: 1-13.

taken from everyday concrete symbolic-material concrete indexes and are construed as connotatively signified. Again, we reach here the plurality even within the different organization of logical thinking whose concrete situated strategies might develop different ways of abstraction to disembedded logical space.

Besides these points above, for my second criticism, Hamill seemed not to refer to the possibility of a co-existence or epidemiological distribution of the plural modes of reasoning within any socio-cultural demographic group. Basil Bernstein or the late Pierre Bourdieu talked about the distinction between the restricted code and the elaborate code, the latter having a cultural capital for refined distinction of taste backed up with high culture of socially constructed sophisticated sensibilities. The former's mode of reasoning would be akin to some version of ethno-logic. The colonial dichotomy not only divides the civilized and the primitive but also social classes in the same demographic population. Hamill only paid attention to the aspect of mental entity projected upon a linguistic conceptual world, hence neglecting the interrelationship between social aspects and the mode of reasoning.

Furthermore, if we take up a certain kind of interactionist approach following Gregory Batson, as I will mention later, the same person, even great minds of sophisticated science, would fluctuate between different modes of reasoning depending on interactional circumstances as well as on the intricate interactional vibratory moves between on-going psychological mutual processes and logical dimensions of reasoning. Because of uncertainty embedded in interactional circumstances, we humans sometimes fail to attain a sophisticated scientific reasoning by losing momentum for the elaboration of abstract reason towards a disembedded ideal thinking space. We humans even tend to play with these vibratory moves towards deterioration of logical types, which sometimes succeeds in eliciting laughter. We ourselves live on this epidemiological distribution pattern of rational reason and somewhat illogical confusions. Particularly, when it comes to being related to social dimensions, our mode of reasoning would become involved in and coupled with social ritual and rhetorical euphemistic camouflage, which blocks ostensible manifestation of abstract logical judgment.

The above final point is of crucial importance to anthropological studies on situated logical reasoning within socio-cultural communicational contexts. We will come back to this point in our final discussion.

3. The Split Between the Rational and the Irrational

With regards to the historical incident of the assassination of Captain Cook, one would be recalled of Rene Girard's postulation of ritual killing as being prior to myth-making.²¹ To Girard, the victim to be killed at first became a vulnerable target of the violence, while a problematic situation would develop to form a symbolically threatening imposition that would unfold a great risk and danger from the perspective of the general populace. Their intuitive sensibilities would get triggered to fear possible misfortunes, and the people would reflect upon intrusions of symbolically evil interferences which would eventually cause severe destabilization of social order. Giving a death penalty to the scapegoat, people would transform the symbolic meaning of the victim from the profane to the sacred, thus alienating mythological space in religious imagination from their mundane pragmatic experiential domain. To Girard, this is the formulae for inventing the mythological. The original Christian religious idea warned believers to stay away from this scapegoat formulae in interpreting Jesus' crucifixion. However, medieval Christian Europe in the crises of the plague practiced witch-hunting type of scapegoat finding, which might be one of the cognitively-emotionally charged endeavours to interpret uncanny situations and transform malignant ingredients of unstably, and unexpectedly unfolded imaginative realities. People got horrified by momentous unfolding of instability of socio-cultural order where existing norms could not operate, some liminal zombie-like limbo where conflicting frames of realities appeared to compete and contradict.

Previous studies have tended to emphasize the divide between the rational and the irrational, the latter of which jumps up in times of critical chaotic circumstances, that is, pretty much unusual incidents. The extraordinary incidents of misfortunes trigger irrational socio-cultural processes that are

²¹ Rene Girard. *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*. [Translated by Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer], Stanford University Press, 1987. ditto. *The Scapegoat*. [Translated by Yvonne Freccero]. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. ditto. *To Double Business Bound: essays on literature, mimesis, and anthropology*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

also molded by structural-semiotic grammar of communicational discourses, such as those that following mythological symbolization, or those that following Turnerian social dramaturgical processes. Pragmatically motivated imaginative cogito fails to capture and adjust ephemeral realities, and then, embodied afflictions with emotional drives come up, and rational pragmatic gives way to irrationalities.

However, on the basis of our situated anthropological approach to everyday communicational and bodily discursive encounters, we may be able to detect a micro-level of break-downs of socio-cultural order that are not necessarily exceptional. Chaotic facets of everyday ephemeral imaginatively constituted realities appear from time to time, especially in this age of globalization and newly introduced high-technologies that remold and reconstitute the existing mode of our embodiment to the surrounding world. In this light, the divide between rationality and irrationality may appear a one-sided cognitive map which has resulted from our limited perspective on the basis of the uppermost ideal space for disembodied and dis-situated reason that allows us only to look down on the inchoate ephemeral phase of the lived world of socio-cultural encounters. The modern constitution of calculable time and space developed this type of abstract reason.

Thus, it is necessary to suspend or loosen the idea of this divide, so that we can do empirical or experiential research on on-going encounters without heavy reference to the dichotomy of rationality/irrationality. More important stances can be prepared through the view that both are actually the dual facets that intersect actual situated human experience. Dan Sperber elaborates his kind of positivistic approach by means of the relevance theory by suspending the attribution of symbolic references and meanings to imaginative/material systems of meaning²²: Following the line of language as action, he successfully presents, by digging one step of logical typing up within performative discourses, an alternative theory that replaces the questions of symbolically organized systems of referential meanings for the analysis of cognitive relevance contextually interpreted by communicators with relevance to linguistically focused cognitive environment.

²² Dan Sperber. *Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach*. Basic Blackwell, 1996.

Furthermore, our exploratory anthropological approach also includes an ethnological participant observation that focuses on non-verbal communicational encounters, with the context of which we refocus on the intersubjective and even hegemonial interrelationship between the observed and the observer. At this point, Sperber's kind of rigorsm[MM12] turns out to lose more creative questions that stick to on-going ephemeral multi-faceted encounters.

4. Anthropology of Emotions

Having rearticulated since the decline of psychological anthropology in the 1960s, perspectives in anthropology of emotions have differentiated around the two extremes: one focuses on bodily emotions or feelings, and the other mainly pays attention to cultural meaning of emotions, which is constituted by socio-culturally processed discourses.²³ Both approaches criticize each other, although the social constructionist view of emotions as being socio-culturally and intersubjectively constituted seems to prevail, especially after the interpretive and deconstructionist turn of anthropology.

John Leavitt persuasively tries to overcome this divide of feeling/meaning concerning the basis of emotions, by examining the neglected latent communalities between the two poles, as well as contriving methods to reconstruct affective resonances and ethnographic styles of conveying feeling-tones.²⁴ This integrative dual view shares the base-line with a certain version of a bio-cultural approach, which we would like to pronounce.

Again, this integrative perspective, to overcome the divide, prepares the general features of our exploratory anthropological approach as described above, which pays close attention to the interacting whole of reasoning and emotionalizing that arises dynamics of dialogic encounters with intersections of multiple facets of socio-culturally constructive intersubjective processes of meaning/feeling and imaginative cogito that builds frames of reference for a given inchoate incident. Furthermore, a clinically oriented approach to

²³ Catherine A. Lutz. The anthropology of emotions. *Annual reviews of anthropology*, 15, 1986:405-436.

²⁴ John Leavitt . Meaning and feeling in the anthropology of emotions. *American ethnologists*, 22(3):1996:514-539.

emotions within particular contexts of clinician-patient or client negotiating interrelationships is of particular importance. It can focus on the interacting whole of the on-going human encounters from the situated perspectives that also takes into consideration a momentum of aspects of shared emotional experience occurring beyond asymmetrical hegemonial encounters. Our exploratory anthropological approach to emotions thus includes the above integrative framework as applied to understanding clinical encounters (or attempts to constitute clinical interrelationships) as symbolically prepared unique space for restructuring negotiations by emotions for mutual transaction and on those traumatic ones conveyed from outside the clinical space — the space, we call, transcultural space, is to be projected on clinical encounters closely, carefully, and dynamically knitted in intercultural/multi-cultural or ethnopsychiatric consultation processes. The importance of clinical encounters concerns the next emphasis on contemporary medical anthropology.

5. The Importance of Contemporary Medical Anthropology

One important aspect of anthropology of emotions consists in its close relevance to medical anthropology. The latter field naturally concerns human suffering that has much to do with affliction imposed on human pathos. Besides this, due to the rapid development of advanced medicine and its related medical technologies, new forms of emotional sufferings have come to appear corresponding to the changes in the idea of the body and selfhood as well as those in clinical and therapeutic settings. Accordingly, contemporary medical anthropology has been the strong locus of anthropological frontier cast on new horizons for advanced endeavours. Furthermore, this field requires critical rethinking of clinical-ethical considerations inserted in mutual interactions between the people in action as well as those between the observed/ the observer. Thus, this field has been, at least in its pioneering endeavours of enquiries, the locus of accommodating all the contemporary critical awareness ranging from phenomenological/ interpretive, deconstruction, postcolonial, as well as glocal diasporaic reflexive consciousness and further social epistemological enquiries on newly rising neuroscience that have been the resources of critical theoretical and practical innovations. It is the field of medical anthropology that can deal with the interacting wholes of different systems of reasoning as well as those of constitutive emotions in terms of not

only the approach to medical pluralism but also of globally rearticulated mutual exchanges and influences with some apparent aspect of hybridization. The latter is particularly relevant to the core research theme in contemporary socio-cultural anthropology. In this light, medical anthropology can prepare the multi-faceted dialogic dynamics of relational cultural processes which unfold not only intercultural but also trans-cultural space of mutual engaging across barriers of misunderstanding. It can prepare creative (inter) cultural/transcultural lens on plurality of logical cosmological discourses, emotions, and the issues on sensitivity.

Just to mention one example of creative findings in recent medical anthropological pursuits, Karen Nakamura reported part of his fieldwork in the reputed Bethel House located in Urakawa, Hokkaido, and revealed the multi-faceted function, feeling, and meaning of a schizophrenic sort of paranoia and fantasy as initiated by an external visitor from outside during the interactions with the regular members of the ex-mental patient community.²⁵ It was a paranoiac imagination that a UFO was waiting, and that apparently deviated not only from a regular common-sense reality but also from ex-patients' intersubjectively shared experiential realities at the initial processes of interaction. Nevertheless, there developed some room for transforming this sort of schizophrenic narrative into some functionally pragmatic concerns as well as some sort of joking fun-narrative with fictitious playful keying. Through these multi-faceted referential modes of communication, participants could form their communal kind of collective social memories by the way of dealing with episodic paranoia. This medical anthropological study reveals a certain kind of phase of *communitas* articulated around everyday interaction between ex-mental patients, staff and volunteers, that can situate patients' seemingly pathological singular experiences as a meaningful medium of mutual communicative acts. This is uniquely related to some aspects of Japanese socio-cultural characteristics, perhaps also to those of peripheral areas of Japan, in that the Bethel House type of mateship among ex-patients and medical staff cannot be attained within the socio-cultural milieu of the

²⁵ Karen Nakamura. "Crazy in Japan: Schizophrenia, traumas of memory and community story telling in rural Japan." Paper presented on January 23, 2008 at the research seminar organized by cultural anthropology group, CARLS, Keio University.

institutional contexts of the U.S. mental hospitals and their related institutions or psychiatric homes. Like in the case of the “Imu” play ritual as found in Ainu groups, we recognize, there is a play frame that converts singular acts and experiences into playful ones, hence converting the nature of the interrelationships in the group with the ethos of *communitas*. Logic and sensitivity must have different operating modes in playful phases of human interactions. The research parallels our exploratory anthropological framework of situated ethnographic observation and hence successfully presents unique findings so that we can rethink the necessity for reexamining insanity of ephemeral subjective experience with reference to logic and sensitivity issues. In this regard, we organize in this academic year a conference on a dialogue between scholars of medical anthropology, transcultural psychiatry, and religious studies with a special focus of schizophrenia and culture represented by the contributions of Ellen Corin of the Douglas Institute of the McGill University in Canada.

III. Re-contextualization

In this final section, I would like just to add one phrase of my concluding remark to what I so far have described in the above..

The characteristic feature of the anthropological approach lies in its focus on socio-cultural interactional encounters, either within a cultural group, such as healing sessions, or in intercultural encounters such as markets in multiple ethnicities, diasporaic immigrations, therapeutic sessions with regards to medical pluralism, or the like. People’s worldview, their tacit assumptions of daily life are seldom readily available to them for conscious reflection. They are rather implicit in thought and action. The worldview must be scrutinized from a certain kind of effective anthropological observation of people’s actions, that is, from the people’s responses in various situations, from their voiced attitudes and values, from religious and ethnomedical beliefs and practices, from censorious gossip, and so on. They are engaged in situated mutual interactions, in which they think and feel in response to each other. Situated logic interacts with situated emotions and sensitivities in complex ways. Whether they can successfully continue to communicate or not, within the range of allowable misunderstandings and ambiguities, depends on the on-

going situated processes in socio-cultural historical interactive circumstances.

As a part of our cultural and medical anthropological approach is closely related to the Batesonian framework, we can analyze the actual on-going processes via the following two factors: The factor of disembedded logic of the logical typing has to operate together with the factor of embedded and situated psychological processes, the totality of which gives rise to a variety of human communication that swings on situated ethnomical and cognitive relationality among interacting participants. The interactive phase of the two factors may sometimes cause confusions resulting from the mistake of the levels of logical typing behind the loop of exchanged messages, which may elicit either embarrassment or laughter. The Russelian type of pure abstract logic collapses as situated pragmatic logic that appears in various forms of logical ambiguities. Within this framework of dynamic analysis, we can recontextualize the research on emotional breakdown with relevance to people's engagement in interaction ritual, which may cast a suggesting light on

²⁶ Because of the rapid installation of internet communication systems, coupled with the globalization of information flows, peoples' self-contained order concerning localized socio-cultural complexes of reality frameworks have been partly broken, and people are now projected onto a newer fluctuating and moving space where they have begun to form a different kind of consciousness, a different imagined virtual community that is unstable and changing its boundaries depending on variable contexts of (virtual and partly disembodied) interactions. If we take a look at special internet boards where people participate by means of electric paring or mutual writing, we may notice that there are at times bitchy messages and aggressive identifications of bad message writers, and we witness different sorts of scapegoating rituals among the internet board writing communities. In Japan, we can observe in network communities, such as "2 channel," bitchy beatings from time to time. People may have a good sense of courtesy under the circumstances of the actual face-to-face communication, but it is the same people who beat each other and try to find a scapegoat among them in order to construct some orderly settings inside the internet communities. In this type of electric communicational settings, our emotional drives get charged and fall into the state of mobs, so to speak, cast in the unpredictable incidents of something like the medieval plague era, and tend to be induced to the imaginative pseudo-magical-religious modes of thought. Similar phenomena have been observed in African modern cities where magic and witchcraft have now prospered in proportion to the overwhelming appearance of sharp differences between the fewer successful winners of economic and material wealth, and those majorities who appear as losers due to the systemic diffusion of the world-wide late-capitalism and globalism.

rethinking the research issues on logic and sensitivity under the rubric of ritual communication and interactionally situated factors of its failure.

On the basis of the exploratory cultural and medical anthropological approach above, we would like to re-contextualize the precedent available studies so that we can prepare a[MM19] creative (inter) cultural/transcultural lens on plurality of logical cosmological discourses, emotions, and the issues on sensitivity. There are a series of recontextualizable anthropological research topics; the research focus on emotional suffering that conflicts with logical understanding, face and selfhood; the focus on bricolage sorts of emotional reasoning that differ from logical reason when faced with crisis, experiential aspects of break-downed retreat or withdrawal from regular types of interactions; the issue on culturally variable therapies for depression; the focus on critical examination on evolutionary theories and researches on human sympathy and so on. . Under the recontextualization of these research topics, newly emerging socio-cultural modes of interactions due to technological innovations also become relevant.²⁶

Concerned with these topics, we try to overcome the various types of the divide that are imposed on logic/reason and sensitivity/emotions. For this, we need to retain in our exploratory anthropological approach the situated nature of on-going socio-cultural interactions where logic/reason and sensitivity/emotions situate and intersect in a spectrum of bio-cultural nature. At any rate, the point lies in the interactive whole of the situated human encounters, and our cultural and medical anthropological approach concerns this whole through observational scrutiny on socio-culturally and historically situated local mutual interactions.