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Ancient History within the 'Science of Civilizations': Renewing the Classical Tradition[1)]

Neil McLynn

The classical tradition in the humanities is essentially a teaching tradition. In any given culture, the 'classics' are a canonized body of texts, classified as an authoritative basis for the education of an elite. Different cultures have held different educational priorities, and different voices in these cultures have proposed different criteria for inclusion into the classical canon, but the core notion remains consistent.[2)] The emphasis of this paper will therefore be upon the educational function of the western classical tradition, considered in its most pragmatic aspect: I shall offer some thoughts about how materials from the Greek and Latin classical tradition might usefully be used in the Japanese university (and specifically the Keio University) classroom.

My examples shall be drawn from classical history, rather than literature and philosophy. This is not merely a reflection of my own personal interests and expertise; it is also because of the distinctive place that Greek and Roman history occupy in the western tradition, something which has no direct parallel in their Chinese or Indian counterparts. Works of history were central to the cultural achievement of both Greece and Rome, where the writing of history was not a matter of compiling chronicles, or of otherwise keeping an official record of state events: the historian was instead an independent actor, self-consciously engaged in the examination of the causes of political developments.[3)] As such, the historian was

1) This paper is dedicated to the memory of Sumio Nakagawa, who epitomized all that was most humane in the classical tradition. A Japanese version of this paper, which is based on two lectures for the Chairship lecture series sponsored by Daiwa Securities, is being published by Keio University Press in the volume:『文明のサイエンス――人文・社会科学と古典的教養』(慶應義塾大学編, 2011 年). I am grateful to the editorial committee and to the Press for permission to publish the original here.

2) For a clear presentation of perspective, see G. Highet, *The Classical Tradition: Greek and Roman influences on western literature* (1949, repr. 1957).

3) John Marincola, *Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography* (Cambridge, 1997).

himself a teacher; but he could not count on an obedient classroom. His judgements were necessarily part of a wider debate, and subject to dispute: in the ancient world, history presupposes controversy.

It is for this reasons that the writings of Greek and Roman historians have resonated so powerfully through successive phases of European history, and through the histories of areas which have felt the imprint of European culture. Different authors have spoken with particular force at different periods and places. Livy was the historian of choice for Dante, Francis I and Machiavelli; then Tacitus was discovered, to offer a guide to autocracy (and the art of surviving it) for Renaissance Italy; Herodotus provided inspiration to French ethnographers in eighteenth-century North America; the rebel leaders of the American colonies in the eighteenth-century looked to republican Rome for their models, while the French revolutionaries widened their scope to seek guidance also from classical Athens and Sparta; subsequently, Thucydides would serve as a guide to imperialist, navalist Britain in the nineteenth century.[4] Only with the dramatic shifts of elite (and non-elite) education in the twentieth century did Greece and Rome lose their central place in public discourse.[5]

But there is particular reason to emphasize the educative value of the Greek and Roman historians, because they have never played the same role in Japanese education as they have in the west. Although the study of Greece and Rome arguably enjoyed more prestige than ever before or afterwards in the elite schools and universities of Europe when Yukichi Fukuzawa was seeking models for his reformed syllabus at Keio, the ancient European world never became more than marginal to his educational project. Instead, in the preface to *Bunmeiron no gairyaku* (1875), Fukuzawa invokes the 'long history' of western civilization, stretching 'back to the fall of the Roman empire a thousand years ago.' History, that is, is taken to begin with the *end* of the classical period. Here Fukuzawa was accepting the historical perspectives current in the west during his generation. For

4) T. Hudson-Williams, 'Dante and the Classics,' *Greece and Rome* 20 (1951), 38–42; J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: 2003; 1975); K. C. Schellhase, *Tacitus in Renaissance Political Thought* (Chicago, 1976); J. A. S. Evans, 'Joseph-François Lafitau: A Disciple of Herodotus among the Iroquois', in *The Beginnings of History: Herodotus and the Persian Wars* (Campbellville, Ontario, 2006). M. N. S. Sellers, 'Classical Influences on the Law and Politics of the French Revolution' and 'Classical Influences on the American Founding Fathers,' in *The Classical Tradition*, ed. A. Grafton, G. Most, S. Settis (Harvard, 2010, forthcoming); R. Jenkyns, *The Victorians and Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 1980).

5) Christopher Stray, *Classics Transformed: Schools, Universities, and Society in England, 1830–1960* (Oxford, 1998).

this was the periodization established by one of the key influences on his thought, François Guizot, in the enormously influential *History of Civilization in Europe*, first published in 1828 and in its sixth edition by 1857; a measure of its success in the English-speaking world is that the same year saw the 9th American edition, edited and annotated by C. S. Henry. The popularity of Guizot's work abroad owed much to its championship by John Stuart Mill;[6] the third, definitive, English translation was published in 1846. Guizot deftly put France at the centre of the history of European civilization, by relegating classical Greece and Rome to the margins. The former is consigned to a brief and spectacular period of prehistory, as an example of a people animated by a single principle and unable to sustain this, as Europe was sustained by its variety. No other people, acknowledged Guizot, 'ever ran so brilliant a career in so short a time. But Greece had hardly become glorious, before she appeared worn out: her decline, if not quite so rapid as her rise, was strangely sudden. It seems as if the principle which called Greek civilization into life was exhausted. No other came to invigorate it, or supply its place.'[7] The Romans were excluded on other grounds: theirs was a 'degenerate and perishing civilization', and the important elements which they bequeathed to the creation of modern Europe —the three legacies of municipal self-government, of systematic law, and of the idea of sovereign authority—were incidental byproducts of their culture rather than central elements. Above all, Guizot denied the Romans any claim to the paternity of European civilization. The crucial element needed to fertilize their otherwise sterile legacy was the principle of 'liberty' introduced (according to Guizot) by the Germanic invaders who dismantled the western Roman empire in the fifth century AD.

At one level, Fukuzawa was therefore moving with the spirit of the age in ignoring the ancient world. The early years of Keio coincide almost exactly with the birth-pangs of 'Modern History' as a subject at Oxford University: a combined discipline of 'Law and Modern History' was created in 1853, and a separate school of Modern History (taking as its starting-point 285 AD, the constitutional reorganizations which marked the end of 'classical' Rome) was founded in 1872.[8] There was, however, a crucial difference. In Europe, a classical formation could be presupposed. Originally, Oxford history courses were only available to those who

6) J. S. Mill, review of Guizot's Lectures on European Civilization, *London Review,* II (equivalent to *Westminster Review,* XXXI) (Jan., 1836), 306–336.

7) G. Guizot, *General History of Civilization in Europe* (9th American edition, 1857), 28.

8) R. Soffer, 'Nation, Duty, Character and Confidence: History at Oxford, 1850–1914,' *The Historical Journal* 30 (1987), 77–104.

had already completed a degree in classics; when undergraduates began taking the new subject as their first degree, they had invariably been reared on a diet of classics in their schools. The new humanities thus presupposed the presence of the old. Guizot's apostle Mill, famously, had been subjected to an intensive education in Greek and Latin in very early childhood, and in his *Autobiography* he described his immersion in the classics in entirely positive terms. The central place of Greek and Roman history in his formation should be noted. He recalled his private reading at the age of about eleven: 'History continued to be my strongest predilection, and most of all ancient history. Mitford's Greece I read continually… Roman history, both in my old favourite, Hooke, and in Ferguson, continued to delight me. A book which, in spite of what is called the dryness of its style, I took great pleasure in, was the Ancient Universal History, through the incessant reading of which I had my head full of historical details concerning the obscurest ancient people, while about modern history, except detached passages, such as the Dutch war of independence, I knew and cared comparatively little.'[9] The influence of this early grounding would be fundamental to his intellectual development.[10] Guizot too was a product of a thorough classical education, and did not hesitate to provide the same for his own children. He records his efforts to prevent the study of classics from becoming 'nauseous' to his son Francois, who was 'disgusted' by the old world which they seemed to represent. 'On no account', writes Guizot, 'would I abolish, or even diminish, classical studies — the only ones which in boyhood really strengthen and inform the mind. I approve highly of those few years passed in familiar intercourse with antiquity, for if one knows nothing of it, one is never anything but an upstart in knowledge. Greece and Rome are the good society of the human mind; and in the midst of the decline of every other aristocracy, one must endeavour to keep this one standing. Taken altogether, I consider college life — a life of study and liberty — as intellectually excellent. From it alone are sent forth strong, natural, and refined minds; cultivated and developed to the utmost, yet without any false bias or eccentricity. I am struck more and more by the advantages of a classical.'[11] It is impossible not to be struck by the similarity to the educational goals that Fukuzawa proclaimed in his various works.

But Fukuzawa, although the influence of Guizot on his thinking was deep and ramified, remained unaware of this concern that a detailed study of the ancient

9) J. S. Mill, *Autobiography* (London, 1873), 9–16; quotation from 14.

10) G. Williams, 'The Greek Origins of J.S. Mill's Happiness', *Utilitas* 8 (1996), 5–14.

11) H. de Witt, *Monsieur Guizot in private life: 1787–1874* (tr. M. C. M. Simpson, London, 1880), 137–138.

world should prepare for engagement with the modern.[12] Greece and Rome reached the Keio syllabus only in a severely attenuated form. The medium was the hugely popular children's book first produced in 1837 by the prolific Samuel G. Goodrich, *Peter Parley's Universal History on the Basis of Geography* (Boston, 1837), a copy of which Fukuzawa brought back from the U.S. in 1867.[13] This duly became one of the texts for the English courses which were compulsory at Keio.[14] Although written for children, this work was organized on recognizably 'scientific' nineteenth-century principles, and there are very clear affinities to Guizot's universal history, which had first been published in English the same year. Liberty is again the goal of history, but in Peter Parley's version the climate of North America provides as conducive a climate for its gestation as northern Europe. What is striking for our purposes, however, is that while these northern lands are concentrated in the first volume of the work, the second is reserved for the exotic lands of Africa and Asia—and also the ancient civilizations of southern Europe and their degenerate modern successors. Greece is presented as a land of contrast between a wretchedly decayed present and a glorious past. The modern visitor 'would discover that the people of the present day live in miserable villages or towns, all wearing an aspect of poverty and decay. But you would often meet with the ruins of temples and other buildings … built by the ancient Greeks two or three thousand years ago. These would show you that, though the modern Greeks appear to be a degraded people, yet the former inhabitants of this country were among the most remarkable people that ever lived'.[15] What follows is more fairy story than history. Ancient Rome, meanwhile, is introduced merely as an oppressor which set the stage for the Dark Ages: 'Rome was the most splendid empire that the world has ever seen. But as it crushed other kingdoms beneath its foot, so, in turn, imperial Rome was itself trampled down by the northern nations of Europe. Great ignorance followed this event, and the different nations and tribes of Europe seemed like broken and crushed limbs and members of the great empire, almost without life.'[16] The story of Rome itself is merely a record of crime and folly: 'I shall now proceed to tell you

12) For Guizot's place in Fukuzawa's thought, see 平井一弘, 福澤諭吉『文明論之概略』「第三章」におけるギゾーの大意の「参合」: *Otsuma Review* 29 (1996), 85–96.

13) M. Hane, 'The Sources of English Liberal Concepts in Early Meiji Japan', *Monumenta Nipponica* 24 (1969) 259–272, at 261.

14) Fukuzawa's school regulations for 1868 prescribe an hour of reading Peter Parley's Universal History every day Monday-Saturday, and two three-hour seminars on the text on Tuesday and Friday afternoons: *kisoku* (1868).

15) *Peter Parley's Universal History on the Basis of Geography* (Boston, 1837), 188–189.

16) *Peter Parley's Universal History on the Basis of Geography* (Boston, 1837), 181.

the history of Rome, the most celebrated empire of antiquity. Like the history of all ancient countries, it abounds in tales of battle, bloodshed, injustice and crime. Over such horrid scenes I should be glad to draw a veil; but these things have really happened, and it is the duty of a faithful story-teller to hide nothing which is necessary to give a true picture of what he undertakes to exhibit.'[17] There are few redeeming moments: even the emperor Augustus, whose career is one of the most remarkable exercises in political tightrope-walking that the world has ever seen, is presented in strikingly grudging terms: 'He was afraid to assume the title of king, but called himself emperor, and Augustus Caesar. In addition to several other titles, the senate gave him that of Pater Patriae, or Father of his country. This was merely a piece of flattery. Yet there were now so few good men in Rome, that perhaps Octavius made a better use of his power than any other would have done. His reign from this time was peaceful and quiet, and offers few events that need be recorded in this brief history.'[18] Through Fukuzawa, 'Peter Parley' had an enormous influence on the shaping of the Japanese historical consciousness: the work was translated into Japanese in 1876, to become one of the foundations of historical education.[19] It might be suggested that the low profile of classical history in Japanese historical education—above all, the lack of interest in seeking continuities between the classical and the later periods (with important, and arguably unhelpful, consequences for the conception of 'western history')—is directly related to this circumstance.

It therefore seems entirely appropriate that an attempt to redress the balance should begin at Keio. The argument to be presented in what follows will be that classical history is of especial value for high-level undergraduate education in Japan. I shall base my case around specific examples of exercises which I used in teaching advanced English courses at Keio during my time teaching there (1990–2007); these were given to undergraduates in the Faculty of Law, who had no previous expertise in classical history. The form of the exercises is itself a legacy from the classical past. A central component of ancient education was the art of persuasive speaking, and this was taught largely through debates on set themes drawn from history or (more usually) mythology or sheer imagination: a major development in modern scholarship has been to recreate the education value of exercises which were until recently seen as unrealistic and sterile.[20] But classroom debate, in a

17) *Peter Parley's Universal History on the Basis of Geography* (Boston, 1837), 256.

18) *Peter Parley's Universal History on the Basis of Geography* (Boston, 1837), 291

19) *Palei Bankokushi*, Ministry of Education, Tokyo, 1876 (『巴来万国史』文部省刊, 1876).

20) To cite only one, exceptional, example from a large and expanding bibliography: R. Cribiore,

culture (such as that of modern Japan) where young people are not trained in it, is especially difficult to run: the most difficult challenge is to ensure that audiences remain engaged, and that when voting to decide the outcome, they do this on the merits of the case that has been presented to them, rather than their own beliefs (or other extraneous considerations). The most effective solution which I discovered to this difficulty was suggested to me, appropriately enough, by the Greek historian Herodotus.

Herodotus has a good claim to the title of the founder of the discipline of history; and historians of the present generation are far more sympathetic to his approach to the subject and to his conversational narrative voice than many of their predecessors have been.[21] He remains, however, anything but straightforward, and one of the most intriguing puzzles which he presents for his readers is the 'Persian Debate', where after the assassination of a Persian usurper (in 522 BC), different members of the group of nobles responsible for the deed each proposes a different constitution for the leaderless state: one argues for democracy, one for oligarchy, and one for monarchy. Herodotus sets the scene with a typically firm authorial declaration: 'And now when five days were gone, and the disturbance had settled down, the conspirators met together to consult about the situation of affairs. At this meeting speeches were made, which many Greeks refuse to believe, but they were made nevertheless. Otanes recommended that the management of public affairs should be entrusted to the whole nation. "To me," he said, "it seems advisable, that we should no longer have a single man to rule over us—the rule of one is neither good nor pleasant…"' (*Histories* 3.80). Megabyzus then follows with arguments against Otanes' suggestion that power be handed to 'the people', and argues instead for rule by a narrow circle of aristocrats; Darius finally makes the case for monarchy. Herodotus makes it quite clear at the start of the passage that he expected his audience to be sceptical about the historicity of this debate: and indeed, the idea that there was a serious attempt to suggest a democratic constitution for sixth-century Iran is very difficult to accept. This passage has therefore provided much food for scholarly controversy, with complex arguments about possible sources and about Herodotus' own position and sympathies.[22]

Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt (Princeton, 2001), esp. chapter 8: '*Learning to Fly*: Rhetoric and Imitation' (220–244).

21) For a good overview, see C. Dewald and J. Marincola, *The Cambridge Companion to Herodotus* (Cambridge, 2006).

22) P. T. Brannan, 'Herodotus and History: The Constitutional Debate', *Traditio* 19 (1963), 427–439; J. A. S. Evans, "Notes on the Debate of the Persian Grandees in Herodotus 3.80–82." *Quaderni*

However, for our purposes two points are of principal importance. First, the debate is at one level representative of a type of constitutional discussion which became characteristic of Greek political discourse, and which would eventually provide the basis for the discipline of 'political thought'.[23] Second, and more important, the debate is stage-managed in such a way as to make the outcome inevitable. Otanes the democrat has no opportunity to reply to Megabyzus' criticisms of his position; nobody replies to Darius' speech in favour of monarchy (which does not address the issues raised by Otanes). This framing is blatant, and seems designed to prompt the question, what would have happened if the argument had continued, beyond the constraints of the three formal speeches? And how better to answer such a question than by letting the argument continue, through the medium of a class exercise?

Herodotus this became the direct inspiration for the system of triangular debates which became the mainstay of my Keio teaching (for advanced level English courses, for Law Faculty undergraduates majoring in law and political science) for almost a decade, and which solved the difficulties inherent in the traditional debate format. The Persian Debate provides a ready-made basis for a class simulation, which provides students with the opportunity to reflect upon both the peculiar character of Iranian political history, and also upon some fundamental questions of practical politics.[24] Herodotus presents a decision made by a team of seven noblemen; the class (in the Keio case, this would be of about twenty people) is thus divided as nearly as possible into groups of seven. In each group, one person each takes the role of Otanes, Megabyzus and Darius. Briefing material for the roles can be provided quite easily, digested from Herodotus, to be circulated the week before; a fourth person acts as chair of the group, with the important job of setting the scene for the three non-speaking members of the group, so that they are able to listen constructively and make an informed decision. The simulation arrangement allows scope for class members to apply their dramatic instincts; the chair has the additional responsibility of ensuring that the participants, speakers and audience alike, live up to their responsibilities as noblemen of Persia. The three-way format

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Urbinati di Cultura Classica 7 (1981): 79–84; D. Lateiner *The Historical Method of Herodotus* (Phoenix. Suppl. 23.: Toronto, 1989), 167–186; P. Cartledge, and E. Greenwood, 'Herodotus as a Critic: truth, fiction, polarity' in H. van Wees (ed.), *A Companion to Herodotus* (Leiden 2002), 351–371.

23) For the context, see 1979; R. Thomas, *Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science, and the Art of Persuasion* (Cambridge, 2000), 18. K. A. Raaflaub, 'Herodotus, Political Thought and the Meaning of History', *Arethusa* 20 (1987), 221–248.

24) The Persian Debate was also smuggled into the English paper of the Keio Law Faculty entrance examination 2005: Herodotus is there thinly disguised as 'Harud Datis', and the three protagonists become Otan, Megabyz and Dari.

meanwhile provides two crucial practical advantages. First, the dynamics of the debate are more lively and unpredictable: initial speeches (the most carefully scripted ones) are kept short (and indeed a stipulated maximum length of five, or even three minutes, is helpful), since the speakers gain considerable advantages from conserving their ammunition until the shape of the discussion becomes clear; and the position that seems strongest after the first round is likely to find itself under attack from two sides. The chair is tasked with steering debate, ensuring that each speaker is given a fair amount of exposure. The second advantage with a three-way scenario is that the imbalances which are so often created in debates where one speaker is considerably more able than their opponent, or better prepared, are mitigated. Less confident speakers can operate tactically, agreeing with one of the other two in a combined assault on the third; and (no small consideration in the context of Japanese university teaching) the failure of one speaker to prepare properly does not spoil the occasion for the other two speakers, or for the audience. The triangular format thus helps to maintain motivation among the participants. Absences can be coped with by requiring the chairmen to take the role of any absentees (which helps create useful moral pressure on class members).

Let me offer, then, the materials that were distributed to class members as the preparation for a debate that was organized as the first session of a semester which we spent examining the politics of Iran, from antiquity to the present day. The materials consist of an introductory outline, followed by specific notes for each of the three speakers. These provide a detailed summary of the argument to be made; students have the choice, in making their opening speeches, between clinging closely to this and developing it (and since all class members have access to the notes, they can make a virtue of refusing to be confined by the limits of the paperwork), they are then required to answer the points made by the other two participants.

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Introduction to Iran: The Persian Empire
The 'Persian Debate': Choosing a Government System, 522 BC

The focus of early civilization in the Middle East was the area of Mesopotamia (modern Iraq). The Zagros Mountains at the edge of the vast upland plateau of Iran marked the eastern border of the civilized world; the peoples who lived there were regarded as primitive tribesmen by the successive empires who dominated the fertile valleys. The state of Elam,

at the foot of the Zagros mountains, acted as a bridge between the two worlds, and from c. 2000 BC began steadily to expand its power across Mesopotamia, thanks to its ability to use the military manpower of the highland areas. But meanwhile new tribes were occupying the Iranian highlands, moving in from central Asia—these were the first known Persian-speakers ('Iran' means 'land of the Aryans'—Persian being an 'Aryan,' Indo-European, language). These peoples (the Medes and Persians, among many others) both fought and traded with the Elamites, who were also being squeezed in Mesopotamia by the rising powers of Assyria and Babylon.

Elam, which had been weakening for centuries, collapsed in 600 BC, and was conquered by Babylon. The different peoples of the Iranian plateau were left to themselves. The Medes, a confederation of six powerful tribes in northern Iran and what is now eastern Turkey, were the dominant group, with the 'Persians' (named after the region of Fars, in the south) as one of their subject tribes. However, in c. 550 the Persian leader Cyrus led a revolt against the Medes, which resulted in complete victory; Cyrus then conducted a series of stunningly successful wars which led to the takeover of Lydia (modern western Turkey), the area covered by Afghanistan/Pakistan, and finally Babylon itself (539). Persia was now the centre of a huge empire, which was managed by generous decentralization—subject peoples were allowed effective self-government so long as they continued to contribute to Persia' s wars; steps were also taken to unite the different Persian-speaking peoples into a single national group, partly through the propagation of a 'national' religion, Zoroastrianism, which presented life as a constant conflict between good and evil.

Cyrus was killed in 530, leading yet another invasion (this time in central Asia, modern Uzbekistan); his son Cambyses succeeded him, and (following his father's example of conquest) led a successful invasion of Egypt. However, while Cambyses was still involved in pacifying Egypt, in 522, there was a rebellion in Persia, whose leader claimed to be Cambyses' brother Bardiya (also known as Smerdis, or Gautama) (and who might in fact have been the real Bardiya/Smerdis/Gautama, although most history books accept the propaganda which claimed that he was an imposter, a priest or 'magus' who happened to resemble Bardiya, whom Cambyses had previously had secretly murdered). Before he could return to fight the rebels, Cambyses suddenly died, in mysterious circumstances (hostile propaganda said that he went mad and committed suicide, but again this should not necessarily be believed; it is possible that he was assassinated). Bardiya enjoyed considerable support among the Persians, and by promising to suspend all taxes and military service for a three-year period he also made himself popular among the subject nations; however, a group of seven senior Persian nobles who had been serving in the army with Cambyses decided to eliminate him. They claimed that they had discovered that he was only pretending to be the brother of Cambyses; quite probably some at least of them believed this to be the case.

In a dramatic coup, the seven conspirators managed to assassinate Bardiya inside the royal palace. Immediately there was an outcry across the whole empire, and serious revolts broke

out in Elam, in Babylon and in Persia itself against the 'assassins'. But even before they could take steps to deal with these rebellions, the seven conspirators faced a critical decision. The direct family of Cyrus, who had established the Persian monarchy, had now been wiped out; what form of government should they now establish to replace this?

There followed a debate which marks the first recorded exercise in political science. The original account is given by the Greek historian Herodotus (*Histories* 3.80–82), who sets the scene as follows: 'When the commotion had settled down and five days had passed, those who had stood up against the Magians [that is, Bardiya and his supporters] held a discussion concerning all their affairs; and although the speeches that were spoken sound incredible to some of the Greeks, they were spoken anyhow.' According to Herodotus, three of the conspirators made speeches, each recommending a different sort of government; the others then voted for one of these options. We shall hold a version of this debate, under the chairmanship of Intaphernes, the boldest of the seven, who had lost an eye in the fight to kill Bardiya.

Otanes, the wealthiest nobleman in Persia, whose daughter had married Cambyses and then Bardiya, and who had originally organized the conspiracy, began the discussion, and insisted that the time had come to share power among the Persian people as widely as possible. "It seems good to me that none of us should become monarch, since monarchy is neither pleasant nor good. For you all saw how insolent Cambyses became, and you and have had a share of Bardiya's insolence too. Cyrus was an exceptional man, who could bear the responsibility of monarchy successfully; but it is impossible for ordinary men to handle such enormous power without being corrupted. We need to establish our state on a new footing if we are to maintain the stability of our empire. And we must look to the people of Iran, who share our language and culture, and who have all contributed to the creation of our empire. Let us therefore create a system where each Persian-speaking clan (there are about sixty of these on the Iranian plateau, mostly belonging to the Medes) is actively involved in governing the empire, and receives rewards for doing so; in this way we can create a genuine nation from our people. Each Persian clan should send representatives to a newly-established governing council, the number depending on the clan's size, and each year this council (of about 300 men) should then elect six magistrates who will form the executive for that year. This will ensure that no individual has excessive power; and by distributing access to power among all the Persian tribes we shall be able to mobilize them more effectively to support the empire, and to fight for it".

Announcing this as a measure will immediately win support from among the Persians, and end the rebellion there; the united armies of the Persians shall then be able to impose itself upon the rebel provinces. The provinces shall then be made to pay for their disobedience—and the money we take from them shall be used to develop the more primitive parts of Iran (indeed, the new governing council can vote how to allocate these funds).

The seven conspirators all belong to the same clan of the Achaemenids (the 'royal' clan of Cyrus himself), which was relatively small; this plan would therefore mean that only a few of

them could hope to belong to the ruling council at any one time. However, Otanes insists that for the good of the nation it is important that they should be unselfish.

Megabyzus, who had previously served as governor of Babylon under Cambyses, spoke out against this plan. "I agree entirely with what Otanes said about ending one-man rule, but in respect to his proposal to bring the power to the Persian multitude, he has missed the mark of the best opinion; for nothing is more unintelligent and more insolent than a useless crowd. The Persian clans consist mostly of primitive farmers and shepherds; it is absurd to imagine that they can become the basis for choosing our leaders. We already have leaders, men like us who have served the Persian state all our lives, who are trained in the virtues of Persian nobility: we know how to ride a horse, to shoot a bow, and to tell the truth. So let there indeed be a ruling council, but let it represent what is best about the Persians. There are seven of us, and we have just risked our lives fighting to free Persia from the rebel imposter. So let each of us choose ten men, the finest men whom we know, to serve with us on the ruling council; and let each of the men we choose nominate four more. And in making our choice, moreover, let us follow the noble Persian idea of tolerance. We should not limit our choice to Persians: all of us, in our experience of serving the empire, have met excellent men from our subject peoples. Let them serve on the governing council too: let each of us choose at least one non-Persian among his seven nominees, and let each of these be free to choose non-Persians as well.

"We ourselves should serve for life on the council, and our eldest sons or nearest male heirs should replace us: we have earned that right. The other council members should serve for (say) ten years, and we, or perhaps the council as a whole, should then nominate a replacement—indeed, we might decide to reappoint the same man, if his achievements justify this. The details can be decided later—but this basic framework will give us a government that is stable and strong, and which includes a broad and representative sample of our most talented and reliable men".

Otanes will of course protest that this will produce a government that is narrowly-based and unrepresentative of the Persians as a whole; no matter how honourable our intentions, we shall simply appoint our friends, who will then appoint their friends—the whole nomination system will lead to corruption and favouritism, rather than rewarding the brightest and best of our people. And it will even be possible for cunning foreigners to take over the council, if they use their wealth and sophistication to gain influence over the more naïve Persian members. We must think of our own Persia first.

Third to speak is **Darius**, who had struck the blow that killed Bardiya. He presents the following opinion: "To me, what Megabyzus said in relation to the masses, it seems he spoke correctly, but as for his suggestion about an international oligarchy, this was not correct. For, when the three systems are put forward and we imagine that each is the best of its type —so that we have he best people, the best oligarchy and the best monarch—the monarch is far superior. An oligarchy, such as Megabyzus recommends, is bound to lead to factionalism and corruption: those who are on the council (both Persians and others) will be motivated

by their own political considerations rather than by the good of the empire as a whole, while those aristocrats who are *not* on the council will be resentful, and will be either plotting to get on it, or plotting to undermine it. Oligarchy inevitably breeds unhealthy competition, which leads ultimately to civil war; the best possible result of this is the emergence of a single ruler to dominate the factions.

"But why should we bother with the trauma of civil war? Cyrus established a system where the king was supreme, and where all appointments and all decisions depended upon his will —this system worked perfectly under Cyrus and well enough even under Cambyses (who was not as capable a ruler as his father), and is the only system which can guarantee order in our vast empire, whose people are looking for a father-figure that gives them a sense of security. If the Persian people were more sophisticated I would recommend Otanes' solution; but (as Megabyzus has pointed out) the Persian people are not sophisticated. If our empire was a smoothly functioning bureaucracy I would choose Megabyzus' option; but it is not, and to expect rival members of a ruling council to take objective decisions is absurd. If we give supreme authority to one man, however, that man will have no reason NOT to be objective —for he will not be competing against anyone, but will be free to consider what our empire really needs.

"The next king of Persia should be one of us, for we are all nobles who have earned the right to rule through our bravery. Let us therefore devise a method to select one of our number at random, so that the god Ahura-Mazda becomes responsible for the choice; the other six will have special privileges as the king's special advisers, but must swear to protect and obey him.

"Obviously, we must make sensible arrangements about the succession to the throne. There should be no automatic succession of the king's eldest son, who might be a madman or a criminal; we might perhaps devise a system where the members of our seven families meet every time a king dies, and choose our worthiest members as candidates for another lottery. But such details are not important at this stage: the empire needs a King who can act as a father to all the people, and we should create such a King as soon as possible".

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In addition, a list of websites was provided, to encourage research into the wider context of ancient Persia, and into Herodotus and the debate, and into the three historical characters. Modern electronic resources go far towards remedying the shortcomings of library holdings. But such an arrangement still potentially creates an imbalance: half the class is left with nothing particular to prepare. The solution to this, it seemed to me, was to prescribe *two* symmetrical debates for each class session. The generous time available for classes in the Japanese system (ninety minutes at Keio) can be used to good effect here: forty minutes is a good length for a full debate, including time for feedback afterwards (it is interesting to bring the

whole classroom together, to reflect upon the different results obtained in different groups, and upon the relation between these results and the 'historical' outcome); after this, a matching session can be organized where the three speakers become the audience, and the three members of the audience can be allocated roles in a debate which relates to the first one (the chair remains the same: they therefore have to master both sets of background).

Again, the method can be most easily illustrated by a concrete example. My partner for the 'Persian debate' was once more inspired by Herodotus. The climax of his history is the great Persian invasion of Greece in 480–479 BC, the defeat of which proved so important in providing Greek (and subsequently European) culture with a vindication of its ideology of 'civic freedom' (while also reinforcing the less attractive corollary, the idea of 'barbarian servitude'). Darius had launched an initial attack on Athens in 490 BC which was defeated; his son faced the decision of whether to commit Persian resources to a quest for vengeance. Herodotus provides a dialogue, where ideas for or against the great expedition are presented (7.1–19), put into the mouths of the young commander Mardonius and the old counsellor Artabanus. It does not require much imagination to create an intermediate position, for a limited intervention. The basis for the exercise was therefore the following briefing paper.

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The Empire Strikes Back: Xerxes and the Greeks, 485 BC

Darius was installed as King of Persia in 521 and after restoring order to the empire—twelve separate revolts needed to be crushed—he set about reorganizing it into a more efficient system: administration was improved, the provinces were more closely supervised but were also given more chance to make their complaints known, communications and infrastructure were developed, a uniform currency was introduced and the system of tax collection was improved so that taxes were more fairly distributed, and it was more difficult to evade them. These measures had a dramatic effect on improving the stability of the empire, although they offended some traditionalist Persians as being 'unworthy' of the country's military tradition. Darius, unlike his predecessor, ruled mostly from within Iran: although the empire was further expanded, into India and across Africa, these campaigns were led by his generals. Unfavourable comparisons were made between Darius and Cyrus, the founder of the empire: 'Cyrus was a King; Darius is a tradesman.'

Partly in order to silence such complaints, in c. 514 Darius led one great military campaign

in person, into Europe: he advanced to the Danube and invaded the steppes of Ukraine to attack the Scythians, a nomadic confederation who had invaded Media a hundred years earlier. The campaign was inconclusive, since Darius was unable to force a battle against the nomads (who simply retreated to avoid battle); his army marched for several weeks through the wilderness, suffering from hunger and guerrilla resistance, before he decided to give up the campaign. Darius called it a victory (his forces had marched unopposed through the heart of the Scythian homeland), but for the first time a Persian invasion of a country had not led to its conquest.

This suggestion of Persian weakness encouraged the Greek cities that belonged to the Persian empire (the cities of Ionia, on what is now the west coast of Turkey) to organize a revolt in 499 BC—the 'Ionian revolt'. Persia suppressed this rebellion with its usual ruthless efficiency, and after five years of bitter struggle, by 494, the fighting was over. However, in the early stages of the revolt the Ionians had persuaded a few cities from mainland Greece to send forces to help them—above all Athens, which had recently adopted a democratic government. When Darius learned of this interference, he vowed to punish the Athenains: one story says that he ordered a servant to whisper to him three times a day, after dinner, the words: 'Master, remember the Athenians!' (this might show that he was in danger of forgetting about them, however). In 491 Darius therefore sent messengers to Athens to demand that the city join the Persian empire, by making a formal gesture of submission, and that it punish those citizens who had been responsible for launching the intervention against Persia. When Athens refused, Darius sent two of his top generals with a medium-sized fleet and army to conquer the city and install a new pro-Persian government. Against all expectations (even those of many Athenians), the Athenian army of citizen-soldiers, which consisted in the standard Greek manner as heavily-armoured foot soldiers armed and spears, defeated the Persians, whose army consisted mostly of archers and horsemen, at the battle of Marathon in 490.

It is not clear how significant the battle of Marathon was to Darius. He had many other more serious problems to worry about, above all an invasion of nomads into northern Iran and then a revolt in Egypt. Although he publicly declared that he would take revenge on Athens, he did nothing for three years—and then, in 486, he died.

Darius' son Xerxes became King, and immediately faced further revolts in Egypt and Babylon. After a year of hard fighting, these were finally suppressed, and he could consider the question of what to do about his father's plans to punish Athens, which had been advertised around the empire. Xerxes calls together the royal council, and listens to the opinions of his advisers.

Mardonius, son of Gobryas (one of the 'seven'), who had previously led an expedition into Europe under Darius, urges that Xerxes should lead a full-strength army and crush Greek resistance comprehensively; and Xerxes himself should stay in Greece until the

job was done. The Persian empire is still restless (as is clear from the recent revolts), and people need to be persuaded that the new king has the same authority and capability as his father. The only way to achieve this is by military victory, by adding new territories to the empire. We should therefore assemble a huge army which will include elements from all the provinces of the empire, from India to Egypt (who will act as hostages, to prevent rebellions) and march into Greece—all Greek states which choose to join our empire will be accepted without further punishment, but those who oppose us shall be crushed. And Athens, which has already defied us, shall be burnt to the ground and its inhabitants deported to Iran as slaves.

Anything less than this will be seen as weakness both by the Persian aristocracy and by the subject peoples of the empire. Moreover, Athens has been becoming increasingly arrogant since their minor victory at Marathon, and are taking steps to organize a great coalition of Greek states with the intention of 'liberating' the Greek cities in our own empire, in Ionia. If the Greeks ever succeed in uniting their forces, they will be a considerable threat—but if we eliminate them now, we shall have no serious external threats, and our empire will be stronger than ever. Moreover, by conquering Greece itself we can extend our influence into the rich Greek colonies in the western Mediterranean, in Sicily, Italy and the islands, which have extensive trade networks; by incorporating these networks into our economy, we shall make our people more prosperous and therefore more contented. On the other hand, if we do *not* conquer Greece now, sooner or later a Greek superpower will emerge (possibly Athens, possibly another state), which will mobilize the resources of the whole Greek world against us. In the long term, the Greek world is the only external power which is capable of defeating Persia. We must crush them, before they crush us. To be sure of victory we must also develop our sea-power—or rather, since we do not have a navy in the Mediterranean, we must order our subjects, the Phoenicians and Egyptians, to expand their fleets.

In short, we cannot afford **not** to go ahead with this campaign. And to make sure that it succeeds, we must use the whole resources of our empire; we should send an army overland through Thrace and Macedonia, and at the same time we should send a massive fleet across the Aegean Sea. By making clear that every state that sides with Athens will be crushed, we shall persuade most of the Greek states to join us. The Greek world would be very strong if it was ever united; however, at present the Greeks are divided into many small states. Let us take full advantage of their disunity!

Artabanus, brother of Darius (and so uncle of Xerxes), says that it would be a huge mistake for Xerxes to commit himself to so vast an enterprise; there is no benefit for Persia if we win, but it would be a huge blow to Xerxes' prestige if we lose—and what is more, there is a very good chance that we will lose. The Greek states are small and disunited, as Mardonius says; however, the one certain way to unite them all against us is to mount a huge invasion which will threaten the existence even of those who surrender to us. And if the Greeks do unite, they stand a good chance of defeating even the full might of our army and fleet. We shall be operating a long way from our home bases, and the larger our army, the more difficult it will be to keep it supplied; moreover, the rocky land of Greece is difficult to invade, since there

are several narrow passes where a few brave men would be able to hold back a whole army. The further into Greece our army advances, moreover, the more dangers it will face; Greek guerrillas will be operating in our rear, ambushing our supply trains. The Greeks, who are at least as strong as we are in their naval strength (for even if we do expand our navy, we must still rely on our subject-allies, who are unlikely to take bold initiatives), can just keep retreating; even if we conquer Athens, the population can just retreat to the offshore islands.
The Persian empire has reached its maturity, and it is time to reach a mature decision: we have reached the natural limits of our expansion, and we now need to work to strengthen our hold upon the lands we already own, rather than seeking new and insecure conquests. The recent revolts in Egypt and Babylon are a wake-up call: Xerxes needs to spend time in these provinces, building up contacts with the restless local aristocracies. If the Persian empire remains strong, the Greeks will never be a threat; and by opening up our ports for trade with Greek cities (even Athens!) we shall soon ensure that all the merchants of Greece become our greatest supporters, insisting that their cities should remain at peace with us so that trade can continue. Already Xerxes' father Darius has succeeded in changing the image of the Persian king from a warrior to a wise administrator; it is time for Xerxes to take the next step. He should therefore announce that he has decided to forgive Athenians for their crimes against Persia; he can announce that he has decided that his reign will be one of peace, not war. (If he wants to add mystical authority to his announcement, he can declare that he has received this message from his father in a dream…)

Artabazus son of Pharnaces (a Persian noble who had been Darius' economic minister), argues that both Mardonius and Artabanus are half correct. Artabanus is right that a full-size army might be more of an obstacle than a benefit in attacking Greece; however, he is quite wrong to say that Persia can afford a policy of pacifism. The whole meaning of the empire, for the past seventy years, has been expansion and conquest; if the King announces that he is going to abandon further conquest, the old-fashioned Persian nobles (and especially the families of the 'seven', the companions of Darius) will simply decide that he is unworthy to be king, and will take steps to eliminate him. Xerxes needs to win victories to prove that he is a worthy king, and to prove that the great god Ahura-Mazda truly favours him.
Xerxes therefore needs to win a victory against Athens, but without gambling his prestige. He should therefore send a medium-sized expedition, commanded by one of his generals, just as Darius did in 490. He should learn the lessons from the last expedition. Instead of insisting that the only thing that mattered was the destruction of Athens, he should aim first for some initial goals which are safe and easy, and he should advertise these when they are accomplished. For example, he should aim to conquer one of the small islands in the Aegean sea, such as the strategic island of Naxos, which the Persians had tried to conquer in 500 (and they would have conquered it, too—except that the Persian commander, because of a private quarrel, leaked the plans for the attack to the defenders!), and which they had occupied and ravaged during their voyage towards Athens in 490; and as soon as this has been achieved he can proclaim a 'triumph'. Then, he should use Naxos as his base to send out bribes to other Greek states (especially the other island-states), and should also launch

pirate raids against the coasts of Athens (the Phoenicians and Egyptians in our navy will be allowed to keep whatever they steal in these raids—that should motivate them!). Any Greek state which supports Athens will be threatened with similar punishment. By this combination of diplomacy and violence, Xerxes can show the world that he is as strong as his father, and as clever; and one by one, the Greek states will abandon their ties with Athens, until (after, say, two years of preliminary operations) we can sail there, land an army and destroy Athens —which we can then rebuild as our permanent base in Greece.

Mardonius replies that this will just give the Greeks the chance to repeat their success at Marathon: it will be another limited expedition, too small to achieve the decisive victory which is necessary. What if the Athenians manage to catch the Persian fleet, and destroy it? What if the plan to seize Naxos is leaked, and a Greek fleet is mobilized to defend it? A small defeat could be just as damaging to Xerxes' prestige as a major disaster; he should therefore think big!

Artabanus agrees: and he also points out that this approach is also likely to unite the leading Greeks states into an anti-Persian coalition, since intelligent leaders will realize that the conquest of Athens will be only the first step of a long campaign of conquest and domination. A militaristic approach will destroy us in the end. For the sake of Persia's future, we must therefore take the initiative now, and proclaim our peaceful intentions.

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When used at Keio (with a class of about twenty students, so divided into three groups), these materials provided the basis for two lively discussions, which drew the students into thinking aloud about some fundamental questions of constitutional politics and imperial grand strategy; with the second debate, because the actual outcome of the invasion attempt was known, 'Mardonius' had to invite the audience to look into the 'future', and consider the consequences of an insufficient commitment. A further dimension was added to the feedback session of this debate by discussing the implications, in terms of practical politics, of a split decision or a narrow majority: it could be argued that the failure of Xerxes' expedition owed something to a lack of single-mindedness on the Persian side. But overall it was the level of engagement among the students that was the most conspicuous, and perhaps the most pleasing, aspect of the exercise. It was striking to notice the eagerness with which the votes were awaited, the groans of disappointment that came from the losers, and the gaps of surprise when different tables announced their different verdicts. This in turn reflects something important about the world of classical history: ancient authors were keenly aware of the educative value of their writings, and designed these writings so as to provoke thought about decision-making and its consequences.

It is perhaps paradoxical that a Greek classical historian should provide the foundation for a (Japanese!) undergraduate course on Iranian politics. But not the least important part of the European classical heritage is that it brings us back to the very beginnings of European civilization, when the boundaries, and indeed the very identity, of Europe were still entirely open-ended. Here too there are questions which can very usefully be given to Japanese undergraduates in the form of triangular simulations. The following was devised as the first of a semester-long series of exercises on the creation of modern Europe, and specifically the shaping of the EU; once again, Herodotus was the ultimate inspiration. This time it seemed appropriate to consider the Greek point of view. Herodotus never explains why the Athenians chose to resist Persia; when he wrote, this seemed self-evident. But he leaves enough hints in his History to show that there were real alternatives, and it is salutary to consider how different the course of European history might have been had these been followed. One advantage of studying Europe in a Japanese classroom is that a triumphantly 'European' outcome does not seem an automatically attractive one. The scene is set in the prelude to the first Persian attack on Greece, in the reign of Darius. The decision by the Athenians to resist, and their victory at the battle of Marathon in 490 BC, would set the scene for the great expedition of Xerxes.

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Facing Asia: The Athenian Dilemma, 493 BC

The term 'Europe' was invented by the Ancient Greeks; and it was used simply to provide an opposite for 'Asia'. More specifically, it was used to provide an ideological basis for the opposition by some of the Greek city-states, notably Athens, to the expansionist ambitions of the Persian Empire. A clear distinction emerged during the fifth century BC between the images of 'European freedom' and 'Asian despotism,' and this distinction has had a huge effect on the course of world history ever since, shaping ideas, ambitions and prejudices. But there were other possible outcomes to the encounter between Greeks and Persians; and we shall explore these in our first debate.

The debate is set in Athens, in 493 BC; a small group of men from the Athenian elite are meeting (at a symposium, a private dinner-party) to decide their city's policy in a complicated and delicate international situation. The past twenty years have seen dramatic changes in the city: in 510 the 'tyrant' Hippias, who had inherited control over the city from his father Peisistratus, was expelled in a popular uprising, and an experimental new political system

was introduced—'democracy,' which meant that from now on all political decisions would be made by a vote in the popular assembly, where all adult male citizens could participate, and all were free to speak. In practice (of course) the same few wealthy aristocratic families as before (whose members stood for election to the annual executive office of archon, and therefore joined the council of the Areopagus, a combination of Supreme Court and Upper House) continued to dominate policy-making, but they now had to seek the consensus of their citizens before taking action in the city's name.

The new Athenian democracy was soon involved in conflict with its neighbours—Thebes to the North, and the island of Aegina to the South; also (most threatening of all) there was an attempt to intervene by the dominant military power of Sparta. Athens survived all these clashes, but was then drawn into a grave international conflict. In 500 BC, Persia was the great superpower of the Mediterranean world. The Persian Empire had emerged only two generations previously, but had become a multiethnic, multicultural and highly sophisticated organization which extended from India to Egypt, and also included nearly all of modern Turkey. The peoples of the Persian Empire were subject to tax, and were obliged to provide manpower for military service, but were otherwise left largely free to conduct their own affairs as they pleased—the main restrictions being that they were not allowed an independent foreign policy, and any suspicions of anti-Persian activity would prompt an immediate intervention. There were also significant economic advantages for most peoples in belonging to the Empire, which allowed access to a vast internal market; talented individuals of all races could also rise to positions of wealth of power in the king's service. As the most advanced civilization in the Mediterranean world (having absorbed the cultures of Babylon, Egypt, Assyria and Media), the Persian empire also had a vast cultural impact—all its neighbours (including Athens) were strongly influenced by it in terms of dress, cuisine, lifestyle and sports.

The Persian Empire had absorbed the kingdom of Lydia (Western Turkey) in 546, and in doing so had taken over the Greek cities of Ionia—notably Miletus, Ephesus, and Smyrna—which had been subject to Lydia. For various reasons discontent with Persian rule became strong in these cities, which had at one time been the most advanced and richest of all Greek cities, but had been declining for the previous century. In 499 these cities combined to begin a rebellion against Persian rule (the 'Ionian Revolt'); and their envoy Aristagoras toured the cities of mainland Greece looking for allies. An emotional appeal to the democratic assembly in Athens led to the Athenians voting to join the Ionians, and they sent a small expeditionary force which attacked and burned the Persian regional capital of Sardis.

However, the revolt soon faltered, mainly because of disunity between the different cities (always the Greeks' main problem!); the Athenians soon abandoned the alliance in disgust and returned home, and the Ionians were decisively defeated in 494. The following year Darius, the Persian King, announced his plan to seek vengeance on Athens for its unprovoked attack on his empire, and declared his intention to incorporate the city inside

the Persian Empire. Hippias, the former tyrant of Athens, had now moved to Persia and was lobbying Darius strongly for his help in restoring him to his position in Athens, which he would then rule as a loyal Persian subject. Darius has not yet committed himself to doing this; first, he sends some of his Ionian subjects as informal messengers to Athens, passing on his message to the leading citizens there that their present constitution and basic freedoms shall be respected if they agree to make formal submission to his supreme authority, and if they show their loyalty by punishing those responsible for the attack on Sardis.

This was the situation facing the Athenians when our debate takes place. The people present at the symposium must decide what to do about Darius' message. A debate is due to be held the following morning in the Assembly, and they must decide what message (if any) to bring before the people. There are three speakers at the symposium.

Themistocles son of Neocles, a young man recently elected archon, speaks first. He argues that the freedom of Athens—and of the whole Greek world—is now at stake. To surrender to Persia means (despite Darius' sweet promises) surrendering all the political liberties that the Athenians have fought so hard to obtain; for example, the Persians are likely to insist that the democratic government be replaced by one which they can more easily control. All Athenian citizens took part in the assembly that sent the force which attacked Sardis; so the Persians could use this excuse to punish us all. And the network of spies on which the Persian king depends for his information will extend here too; if we submit to them, it will become impossible to have meetings like this, where as free men we can speak our minds freely. We shall always be nervous of spies, who might report us for any 'Anti-Persian subversion'. It is true that Persia is a huge empire and Athens only a single city; but we must fight. And in order to win we must make sure that we do not fight alone. If we announce immediately that we shall fight to the death to protect our freedom, we can then call upon the other Greek states to join us in a life-and-death struggle to protect the values which are common to us as Greeks—above all, the passionate insistence upon the absolute sovereignty of our individual cities which is shared by all Greek cities, even those whose governments are hostile to any thought of democracy. If Persia takes over Athens, it is inevitable that it will continue to expand until it dominates the whole of Greece.
But the other Greeks will only join us if they see that we mean business—that we are *really* ready to risk everything for this conflict. The only way to ensure this is to remove all ambiguity: we must cut all our trade with Persia, and we must denounce all 'Persian' customs (the fashions and the food fads that are currently popular among our elite) as symbols of 'servility to the barbarians'; we must promote among our citizens that there can be no compromise with the 'evil empire'. It will mean committing our whole nation to a long and hard struggle, but by doing this we shall also achieve positive results—we can energize our people with the need to create a new sense of national identity strong enough to unite the whole of Greece (and even to include the semi-Greek populations on the fringes of our world, the 'Europeans' to the North in Macedonia and beyond) and so to create a force that will counter-balance Asia. One day, this grand European alliance, under Athenian leadership, will

conquer the servile hordes of Asia.
We should therefore go to the Assembly tomorrow, reveal to them the 'monstrous' demands and announce to the people our determination to resist these. If we speak with one voice, the people shall follow us, and we shall light a torch that will burn brightly for eternity.

Hipparchus son of Charmus, archon in 496 and a distant relative of the ex-tyrant Hippias, accuses Themistocles of being hysterical. A policy of extremist opposition to Persia is suicidal for Athens. Even if the city beats off the Persian invasion which is sure to come (and their hopes of doing so are at best a gamble), this will not mean 'victory'; we will be committed to an endless struggle which will only lead to our economic and political bankruptcy. Our tiny country simply cannot afford to remain on a constant war footing; we have neither the manpower nor the money. The idea of a united Greece coming together to fight for 'freedom' is an idle daydream; our neighbours are concerned for their own political advantage, and will not hesitate to stab us in the back if they have a chance.
Instead, we should accept Darius' perfectly reasonable offer while we can. Joining the Persian empire is beneficial to us all—to us, the leaders of Athenian society, and to the ordinary people. Our daily lives will hardly be affected by the surrender of sovereignty; and as Persia's subjects, we shall have the most powerful military force on earth to help protect us. We would no longer need to pay taxes to maintain a fleet, so the taxes we would owe to Persia (which are well known for being moderate) would not involve any hardship. And those of our young men who want to fight will have the chance for adventure and glory (and promotion!) in the Persian army, which values Greek warriors for their toughness and initiative; our traders will have access to the whole Persian empire; our politicians can join the king's council, and have a chance to enjoy real political responsibility, rather than being trapped in the petty arguments of Athens (which is just an overgrown village). And Themistocles is quite wrong (and he knows it!) in claiming that there is an absolute contradiction between our Greek ideas of freedom and Persian ways. By following him, we shall create a breach between Europe and Asia which will take hundreds, maybe thousands, of years to heal.
Above all, by doing a deal now, we can get the most beneficial terms for entry into the empire. The King has no motive for abolishing our fundamental laws (which would only provoke us to revolt); we should not be too upset if we are required to impose restrictions upon our democracy, which has already led us into trouble by the reckless decision to join the revolt against Persia. And we should remember that Athens was in fact prosperous and stable under the one-man rule of Peisistratus; it was only the irrational behaviour of his son Hippias that gave 'tyranny' a bad name. But if we reject the King's demands he will certainly invade, and will insist on restoring the regime of Hippias. So we should take his offer while it is still available.
In the Assembly tomorrow we should therefore announce the king's demand, explain the advantages of submitting, and then simply invite the people to vote upon this, without stirring them up with the illogical emotional 'patriotism' that Themistocles is suggesting. The vote will certainly be 'yes', as long as none of our senior members speaks against the proposal;

and we can then establish a commission to investigate the foolish decision to attack Persia made by the assembly six years ago. By establishing exactly who spoke in favour of the proposal we can impose punishments of exile or fines; this will satisfy the Persians. We can then enter a new era of prosperity, peace, and cultural glory, as the talents of East and West are combined.

Miltiades son of Cimon, an experienced soldier and politician, who was archon in 524 (as an ally of the tyrant Peistratus) and who has just returned from ten years abroad as governor of an Athenian outpost in the Chersonese, where he cooperated with both the Persians and with the leaders of the Ionian Revolt (his friends and enemies have different stories about who he *really* supported), argues for a more sophisticated approach. Themistocles is right in saying that our sovereignty is too precious to throw away; at the same time, Hipparchus is right in saying that Athens lacks the resources for total war against so powerful an enemy. So we must do what we can to protect our sovereignty, while at the same time preserving our resources. We can do this by using diplomacy to negotiate a solution to the crisis—while building up our forces so that we are ready to fight if this becomes necessary.

At the Assembly tomorrow, we should therefore say nothing at all about the King's message. Instead, we should indirectly show our willingness to cooperate with him in the following way. The majority of Athenians (as Hipparchus mentioned) now regret the decision to participate in the Ionian revolt; we should therefore introduce a proposal that the commander of the force which attacked Sardis, a political nobody called Melanthius, should be exiled, which will certainly be accepted.

We should then send a private message to Persia apologizing for the error which led to our involvement in the revolt, and informing them of the action we have taken to show our remorse; this will prove to him our sincerity in wishing to cooperate. At the same time, we should explain that we simply cannot afford to propose to the assembly that we submit to the Persian empire; the citizens of Athens are too passionate about their freedom to surrender their sovereignty, and will certainly rise in revolt if there is an attempt to impose a pro-Persian regime. Darius is a realist—he is running a huge empire, and will almost certainly not want to waste valuable military resources in permanently occupying a remote and isolated province, without natural resources. If we offer to become his junior partners, and act as his local 'policeman' in supervising Greece (making sure, for example, that there is no military support for any future Ionian revolts), this will be enough for him.

We should therefore respectfully request that he sends a formal invitation to the Athenian assembly to join Persia as a subordinate ally, with a permanent treaty of friendship (and an obligation that Athens should consult Persia before initiating war against any of its neighbours); we can be sure that he will agree to this.

And even if he does not, and decides to impose his domination by force, we will have gained some valuable time, which will allow us to build up alliances among the Greek cities without resorting to the ideological excesses of Themistocles. With their help (for even our enemies most certainly will not want to see us become a Persia satellite, which would make us a Persian military base and a potential threat to their own independence) we can probably

defeat the Persians in a single battle; and then we can again open negotiations on the same terms. This will give us a safe future under the Persian umbrella, while preserving our independence.

Hipparchus will say that this approach will not solve our problems. Darius will be unable to accept anything less than formal submission—othewise restless Persian provinces (like the other Ionian cities, and Egypt!) will start demanding similar privileges. Miltiades should follow the logic of his argument through to its conclusion: he agrees that Athens' best prospects for the future lie in association with Persia, so he should agree to the terms which Darius has offered.
Themistocles, on the other hand, will say that Miltiades' argument merely confirms his own argument: that association with Persia is a slippery slope which will lead ultimately to slavery. Miltiades' plan can succeed only if he succeeds in deceiving both the Athenian people and the Persian king. The plan is unlikely to work, and when we do end up fighting (as we will) neither our own citizens nor our fellow-Greeks will trust us enough to fight bravely. We can only protect our sovereignty by making it absolutely clear what we are doing—that we are rejecting, once and for all, the whole culture of 'Asia'.

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To complement this debate (and so provide the other half of the class with an equivalent assignment), it seemed natural to move from Greece to Rome; once again, the challenge was to create a simulation which allowed students to think about the decisions that led to Europe being shaped as it is. One crucial question here is why the Roman empire stopped where it did; why its borders remained, basically, the rivers Rhine and Danube. The consequences of this border have been immense: Germany's place in European history is largely defined by the fact that it was not part of the Roman order. The following represents my attempt (with considerable debts to the historian Tacitus) to help the students to approach this issue.

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The Birth of the 'German Question': Augustus' Dilemma, 10 AD

One of the crucial boundaries within Europe, throughout the last two thousand years, has been the river Rhine: there has been a constant cultural, political and military conflict between the French and the Germans (the EU was first designed with the simple, limited goal of containing this conflict—to make any future war between France and Germany

economically impossible; and although war is indeed unlikely, conflict between the two states is by no means over, as we shall see). But this long conflict is largely artificial: it was the Roman general Julius Caesar who first announced that there was a crucial cultural distinction between the semi-civilized 'Gauls' west of the Rhine and the wild Germans beyond it, but this was simply propaganda, to justify his own decision (forced on him by limited resources) to conquer the Gauls but not the Germans. It now seems clear that at the time there was a spectrum of interrelated peoples across what are now France and Germany, which had much more in common with each other than they had differences. Caesar's influence over late Roman policy-makers helped confirm the decision to make the Rhine the frontier; however, for sixty years the question was left open, and for some time it seemed that Rome would expand further into central Europe. Our first debate this week focuses on a crucial turning-point in this development of Roman policy.

Rome developed from a single, rather primitive city-state into a vast empire thanks to two things—the pragmatic flexibility of its aristocratic elite, which was able to absorb new members from conquered territories into the ruling senate, and the professionalism and discipline of its citizen-armies (every citizen had a duty to fight whenever Rome was at war), which became one of the most effective fighting machines the world has ever seen. Roman aristocrats (the senators) were elected to political office for one-year terms, during which they had the right to lead armies—by invading Rome's neighbours they could win glory for themselves and riches for the Roman state.
However, the transition from city to empire was not easy, and led ultimately both to the political collapse of the republican aristocracy which had governed through the senate (as rival senators started using their control of armies to dominate politics inside Rome), and the economic ruin of the Italian peasantry from which the army had been recruited. After a series of brutal civil wars, a hybrid political system emerged with Augustus Caesar, the great-nephew and political heir of the assassinated dictator Julius Caesar, as 'first citizen', making political decisions with the cooperation of the senate but retaining direct control over an army which now consisted of long-term military professionals, who served for 25 years, and were paid well and were given generous pensions on retirement.

An important question was how this army should be used. There were 28 legions, each of 6,000 men, stationed on the imperial frontiers; in 10 AD most of these were on the Rhine and Danube. These legions were by far the biggest item in the imperial budget—at least 75% of the money raised by Roman taxes was spent on the army. Augustus himself was no soldier; instead he authorized family members and trusted senators to lead campaigns to continue the extension of the empire. A major effort saw the conquest of Illyricum (roughly the area of former Yugoslavia), and the establishment of the Danube as the imperial frontier. The conquest was finished in 6 AD; however, as soon as the Roman tax officials began their work, there was a huge rebellion which was only finally crushed in 9 AD, after three years of bitter fighting. For twenty years from 12 BC to 8 AD, meanwhile, a series of campaigns were organized across the Rhine, into Germany. The country was difficult, with few roads,

few permanent settlements, and many forests and rivers making movement slow and often dangerous. However, by steadily applying pressure on each of the German tribes, by rewarding those which sided with Rome and punishing those who resisted, the Romans gradually spread their authority.

By 8 AD it seemed that the conquest of Germany was completed. For the first time, the Romans built permanent bases inside German territory (in previous years their armies had always returned to Gaul for the winters). The principal German tribes had all surrendered, and many leading Germans had volunteered to join the Roman army, which was the usual first step towards 'Romanization'. However, one of these German leaders, Hermann (Ariminius), was secretly organizing a nationalist conspiracy. Hermann persuaded the Roman governor, Quinctilius Varus, an elderly friend of Augustus with limited military experience, to take his whole army (three legions) into the vast Teutoburg Forest, to investigate a report of some minor trouble. Instead, Varus walked into a carefully arranged ambush, in which he and virtually his whole army (10% of the WHOLE Roman military) were wiped out. This immediately made Hermann a hero among the Germans, and the whole country rose in rebellion against the Romans, murdering any Roman officials they could find.

The news of this defeat came as a huge shock to Rome, and to Augustus (his hair turned white overnight when he received the news). The question now emerged, what Rome should do next. Having taken immediate steps to defend the Rhine frontier, Augustus calls his closest advisers for discussions about the strategy to be followed.

Germanicus Julius Caesar ('Germanicus' for short), the grandson of Augustus' powerful wife Livia (he is the son of her son Drusus, who had won some glorious victories against the Germans and had invaded as far as the river Elbe, but then died in an accident in 9 BC) and already a distinguished commander, urges that the expansionist strategy be continued, and that Germany be fully reconquered. Varus was stupid; he ignored the basic rules of leadership, and allowed his army to walk into a trap. But his defeat does not mean that Germany cannot be conquered. True, the nature of the terrain (all those forests!) and the lack of good roads and cities which can serve as bases will make things difficult. It will take time, and patience, and no doubt it will be expensive (since we will have to build the roads and cities ourselves); but with determination, good leadership, and sufficient commitment, we can be confident that the whole of 'Germania' can be again absorbed into the empire—but this time, we shall do it properly. Military resources are available: the revolt in Illyricum has been suppressed, and we can recruit three more legions to replace those lost with Varus. We must think in terms of fifteen or twenty years of slow, patient advance.
In making our decision we need to think about the long-term future of our empire; we must decide where the most useful frontiers will be. And it will be a fatal mistake to leave the German lands outside the empire. First, it gives us a long and awkward frontier, along the two rivers, the Rhine and the Danube. There are many points here where we can be invaded; by advancing to the River Elbe we can establish a much shorter, more defensible, more

practical frontier.
There is another equally important reason. The forests of Germany are densely populated, but relatively poor in resources. If we do not 'civilize' the country and bring the Germans inside the more advanced economic zone of the empire, where they can find work, we will always be faced with the threat of invasion, since the overpopulated German tribes will be permanently unstable. If we advance the frontier as far as the Elbe, we shall solve this problem completely—for beyond this point, Eastern Europe is empty and underpopulated, and its peoples will put no pressure on our frontiers. By going forward with this advance we will reach the 'natural' borders of civilized Europe, and will have security for centuries to come.

Augustus' chief civilian adviser, **Gaius Sallustius Crispus**, argues that Germanicus is living in the past. Rome does not NEED any more territory; besides, experience has shown that our conquests only work when we invade a region which already has the infrastructure to allow Roman customs (properly planned cities, hot baths, paved roads) to develop. Germany is simply not yet ready to accept our 'civilization'; and that is why Varus was defeated. And there is no good reason to suppose that Germany will *ever* be ready to accept our customs. It was probably a mistake invading Illyricum, which is also underdeveloped; but it is madness to continue to throw our resources into an expansion which we do not need, and which can only bring us trouble.
So we should treat this defeat as a wake-up call. The truth is that the Roman army has become a huge waste of money—for history has shown that we can only conquer areas which are ready to be conquered anyway. Julius Caesar did not really 'conquer' Gaul; he made alliances with those tribes whose rulers felt ready to join Rome. And the chiefs of these tribes, fifty years later, are now senators of Rome. And these Gaulish senators are warning us that their people are desperately unhappy, because for them Roman rule has so far been a negative experience—they pay very high taxes (to pay the salaries of the armies which are 'occupying' their territory) and so far have seen very few benefits in return. And the massive revolt in the newly-conquered provinces of Illyricum has shown how unstable our conquests are, as long as the peoples of the empire think that they are paying us more than they are receiving from us.
We therefore need to rethink our strategy radically. We should give up all thoughts of future expansion, and cut the size of the army by 50%. This will allow us to reduce taxes drastically, which will immediately help make the Gauls and Illyrians recently incorporated into the empire much more satisfied. Since the population of the empire will have more money to spend, the economic level of the provinces will rise immediately, and this will lead to a big increase in 'Romanization', the development of Roman-style cities and lifestyles. We can therefore begin offering citizenship more widely, and our empire can become truly stable and united.
Germanicus is worried about the threat from the Germans. But we do not need to use military power against this threat—indeed, it is a mistake to do so, since this only encourages the Germans to develop their own military power. Instead we should use diplomacy.

The Germans are divided into hundreds of tribes, most of whom hate their neighbours much more than they hate us. Their current unity under Hermann is a very temporary phenomenon, and soon other leaders jealous of Hermann will turn against him. We can encourage this, by using our vastly superior economic resources—by careful use of bribes, we can pay the Germans to attack one another, keeping them weak and disunited.
There is one piece of good news, meanwhile, from the disaster in Germany: we will not need to pay the pensions of the soldiers who died with Varus. So let us concentrate on building up and unifying the empire which we have, so that all subjects of the empire—from the Jews of Judaea to the painted Celts of western Spain—come to share the same culture, and begin to take a positive view of their membership of the Roman Empire.
And if at some point in the future there is a danger of invasion from outside the empire, we can of course build up the strength of the army again. By that time the people of the empire will have felt the benefits of Roman rule—so they will be content to pay extra taxes in order to preserve what they have.

Tiberius Julius Caesar, born Tiberius Claudius Nero (**'Tiberius'**), Augustus' step-son and recently adopted heir, the uncle of Germanicus and a vastly experienced general (he was in charge of the recent suppression of the revolt in Illyricum) , immediately rejects Crispus' position. The army is the only thing holding the Roman empire together; if we reduce the army we shall be inviting all those provinces which are not yet fully stable to revolt. Rome has already expanded too far, as Crispus says, and that is one reason why we cannot afford to relax. We need to keep a large army to guarantee our security; this is more important than any dreams of making our rule popular among the subject peoples. The only security Rome has ever had has come from the army, and we cannot take the risk of lessening this.
The most sensible policy is therefore a compromise between the two that were previously suggested. We should keep our army up to full strength; but we should not use it on any unnecessary invasions of further territory. Instead, we must have a strictly defensive policy. The army should keep it deployed on the Rhine and Danube frontiers, and on the Eastern border of Syria, ready to keep out any barbarian peoples who try to invade us.
Crispus is wrong to say that the army is simply a negative factor. Our soldiers are trained engineers, and we can use them to build roads and public buildings in the provinces, which will make our empire more efficient and also boost the local economy; we can also encourage provincials to serve in the army, where they will learn Roman discipline and Roman values; and when they retire, they will bring these values back to their own people. So the process of 'Romanization' will go on, albeit gradually, without taking the giant risk that Crispus (who is a civilian, and has spent all his life enjoying the comforts of Rome, so he does not know 'reality') is proposing.

Germanicus and Crispus will both say that this policy is futile—it is not worth paying so much for an army if you are not going to use it.

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I offer these materials both as a practical contribution, for other teachers to reproduce and use in the university classroom as they please, but also to begin a discussion about the sort of materials than can most usefully be fed to advanced undergraduates at Japanese universities, to help equip them with the skills that Yukichi Fukuzawa advocated so eloquently, those of self-reliance and the art of communication. For much can be said against a method such as this. It will be argued, no doubt, that the very construction of these exercises involves trapping the students between the devil of over-protection (is too much detailed guidance provided for each position in each debate, so that the timid can avoid the need to think for themselves?) and, for the more confident, the deep blue see of licensing speculation; does the invitation to students to rewrite the past in the classroom risk contaminating the stern discipline of history with wild flights of fancy? Such considerations are serious ones, and although I became wedded to this method during the last six years of my career at Keio (conjuring semester-long series of three-part simulations on a range of topics from Terrorism to the political history of Argentina and Chile) I never completely quelled the inner voices of doubt.

But it is, I believe, an argument worth having out loud. And it might be that Yukichi Fukuzawa would have approved. In describing his 'Educational objectives at Keio', he was unsparing in his denunciation of those academics who 'remained apart from human affairs,' who condemned themselves to being only 'playboys of society'. His primary targets here were the 'inept' Confucian classical scholars who drew so much of his invective, and also the more exclusively academic of those 'who profess to be specialists in the new science of civilization,' those 'who shut themselves up in the small spheres of their own fields and are blind to the world outside.'[25] Modern scholars, increasingly subjected to the demands of a research-based professionalization, do well to reflect upon these strictures. The exercises presented here should be seen as attempts to involve undergraduates in what Fukuzawa called 'human affairs': 'from the noble to the vulgar, big to small, from extremely scholarly subjects to the most trivial incidents of life'.[26] And it is particularly significant, I believe, that such an attempt should be made from a starting-point in the western classical tradition. For this tradition is, in the modern world, too readily liable to retreat from the vigour of undergraduate education to

25) 'Objectives of education at Keio Gijuku', in E. Kiyooka (ed. and tr.), *Fukuzawa Yukichi on Education: selected works* (Tokyo, 1985), 201–206, at 203; original at『続福澤諭吉全集』10, 353–357.
26) Ibid.

the seclusion of the library. The words of Gilbert Highet on this subject provide a fitting conclusion to this paper:

> "It is, then, the fundamental fault of modern classical scholarship that it has cultivated research more than interpretation, that it has been more interested in the acquisition than in the dissemination of knowledge, thatit has denied or disdained the relevance of its work in the contemporary world, and that it has encouraged the public neglect of which it now complains. The scholar has a responsibility to society—not less, but greater, than that of the labourer and business man."[27)]

The exercises that have been presented in this paper are offered as a modest attempt to fulfil this responsibility, and so to contribute to the unceasing business of renewing the classical tradition for the benefit of new generations of students.

27) Highet, *The Classical Tradition*, 499–500.