Title	英文抄録
Sub Title	
Author	
Publisher	慶應義塾経済学会
Publication year	1971
Jtitle	三田学会雑誌 (Keio journal of economics). Vol.64, No.11 (1971. 11) ,p.1- 5
JaLC DOI	
Abstract	
Notes	限界革命百年記念特集
Genre	
URL	https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AN00234610-19711101-0074

The Methodology of the Austrian School Economics

by Kenzo Kiga

In spite of the controversy on the nature of study method and economic law, carried between the Austrian School and the Historical School, the ruling academic body in economics in Germany then, having come to a compromise after all, this event proved a contribution for the clarification of the logical nature of economic law.

According to Carl Menger, there are two kinds of theoretical law in economics: 1, the exact laws set mainly by the deductive reasoning, and 2, the realistic empirical laws set by the inductive reasoning. The knowledge obtained by these two kinds of reasoning, which enables us to search the general causational relationship or the mutually interdependent relationship, differs in its objective from the historical knowledge which aims at explaining the individual particular nature of economic phenomena. The exact laws, however, closely watch and examine the relationships that will occur of necessity either causationally or interdependently. On the other hand, the realistic, empirical laws aim at indicating the regularity of the general, common phenomena.

It was the former, that is, the exact laws, the importance of which was stressed by Menger and his successors such as Böhn-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser. As they are to be formulated by abstracting or isolating the realities, they themselves are not the realities, still they are the knowledge that are necessary and indispensable in order to understand realities. These laws can be applied regardless of time and place so long as the involved basic and general factors function effectively, that is, they never fail to give precise truths, if no error is committed in the process of inference.

The exact laws often get criticized for their unfitness to be applied for the understanding of social or historical phenomena, as they are restricted by the conditions of time and place. An exact theory which disregards such conditions is considered unsuitable.

The criticism of this sort, however, comes from the inadequate comprehension of the logical nature of law which never overlooks social conditions; the exact law is always based on the assumption of a certain social condition in which the most basic and general factors function effetively. For example, the essentials for the execution of an exchange, that is, the human knowledge and the facilities necessary for exchange are the socially admitted assumptions for the exact law of exchange. Thus it is natural that an exact law obtains its absolute sway only in the society where those assumptions are granted.

Here is another criticism of exact law. It says that the so-called exact law is unworthy of such a title by itself, if the theoretical truth it may convery is not empirically tested through some actual phenomena, as it should.

This criticism, however, fails too to grasp the logical nature of the exact law. An exact law is abstruct in itself and comes into being on the basis of some genetic fact. It is meaningless, therefore, to test it empirically.

An empirical testing is required only when it is necessary to confirm the rightness of a hypothesis empirically or statistically. When a hypothesis is a mere surmise or some unknown matter which is not based on positive fact, it may gain its validity for itself on being tested factually or empirically.

Bähm-Bawerk published the essay; Power or Economic Law? (Macht order Economisches Gesetz?) in 1914, repudiating the unjust interpretation of the marginal utility Theory of the Austrian School. His idea was that the economic law never works against social power, as it rather helps to elucidate how social power works. This is indeed the effective and practical answer, the auther believes, in rectifying the erroneously set criticisms presented above.

The Basic Problems of Menger's Theory of Goods

by Kyuzo Asobe

This essay aims at elucidating Carl Menger's theory of goods. His theory of goods is presented in the 1st and the 2nd Chapters of the *Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre,* 1st edition, 1871. This essay, however, is supplemented with the later development of his thought in the second edition, 1923.

The Menger's theory of goods makes the basis and premise for his theory of value and price. It is essential, therefore, that we are well acquainted with his theory of goods, if we should ever want to understand his theory of value and price.

While explaining Menger's theory of goods, the writer often refers to his theory of value, and other theories presented in the *Grundsätze,* intending to show what an important place the Menger's theory of goods takes in the general scheme of his thought.

In the first place, the writer takes up Menger's four prerequisites for a thing to be a good: (1) human want, (2) the utility of good, (3) the recognition of the relationship between (1) and

(2) and (4) the command of thing, and clarifies their relations to his theory of value and the general system of his thought, especially in relation to the importance of his theory of want, and the distinction between use value and utility. Also, he calls attention here to Menger's very assumption of the existence of command objects.

Menger then leaves off the theory of goods and discusses the economic good.

What turns a good to be an economic good is that the existing disposable amount of good is smaller than the human requirements. Needless to say, the general rule of goods can be applied to the economic goods too. Only an economic good is capable of acquring the character of value. Thus the existence of a certain amount of command good itself was taken for granted by him, taking no trouble to explain their process of production either analytically or retrospectively. More than that, he assumed the existence of the human relations behind the relation between man and good, and that between a good and another, because he was rather slavish to the *Versachlichung* peculiar to the commodity production.

Now, we shall examine the Menger's concept of economy in relation to his theory of goods. He looked upon production and labour as merely technical moment which in itself is outside the science of economics. He thought that the error of the Classical School was in attaching too much importance to production and labour. Also, he admitted no independent significance for distribution. According to his idea of the order of goods, the distribution phenomena are the price phenomena of the goods of higher order and their services. Consumption was put outside the realm of economics proper.

Thus exchange, that is, circulation, remained as the basic subject matter for economics, although that was the characteristic feature of the vulgar political economy prevalent since the time of Say and Malthus.

The motive which is considered to have caused Menger to formulate his theory of goods was his criticism of the labour theory of value and the production cost theory of value of the Classical School.

Because of this stand by him, we notice, along with the previously mentioned distinction between the use value and utility, the denial of the common thing as the foundation for the exchange of economic goods, the germ for the Zurechnungstheorie in the theory of the order of goods, and the existence of the ökonomische trinitarische Formel. Further, it is important to take note of the Menger's support for the capitalistic social institution in the theory of property, as a part of his theory of goods.

The Role of Demand in the Determination of Prices

by Masao Fukuoka

The significance of the marginal revolution lies in the fact that it created an analytical tool of more general applicability than that of classical economics, introducing the marginal concepts, turning towards the micro theorizing of the maximizing behavior, and putting a greater emphasis on the demand factor in the theory of price determination. A landmark of this generalizing process was of course the Walrasian general equilibrium economics, according to which the Commodity prices are determined by "everything", including all influences of taste, technology and initial endowments.

Though this culmination is certainly unsurpassed in its all-inclusive character, the conclusion that everything depends on everything is somewhat uninformative. Once we succeeded in providing the minimal conditions to assure certain basic properties of an equilibrium system such as the existence and stability of equilibria, it would be desirable to generate various "special" general equilibrium systems which make some of the workings of the price determination process more "visible". One such special case is that in which the equilibrium prices are determined by technological data alone, and thus are invariant under changes of consumer's taste. This case is already known as the "non-substitution theorem", due to the works by Samuelson and Georgescu-Roegen in 1949.

In this paper we shall examine the polar opposite case to this one, and investigate under what conditions the equilibrium prices are determined by taste-preference data alone. As such a model, we shall first treat the one where all commodities are "perfect substitute" in consumption. Next we shall also analyze a model in which all commodities are produced under the condition of "perfect joint production." Finally we shall appraise the role of demand in the price determination process in general.

Walras and Pareto

by Tamotsu Matsuura

This paper is focussed on one of the problems concerning the history of economics in the School of Lausanne, i. e. the theoretical relations between Walras and Pareto. The fundamental question at issue is: was Pareto only one of the epigones of Walras' general theory of economic equilibrium? I want to examine this problem through the biographical study of their correspondence.

Most historians of economic thought have considered that Pareto was one of the greatest exponents of Walras' theoretical system as his successor in the University of Lausanne. But it seems to me that such an interpretation is not correct.

Rather, I could say that Pareto endeavoured to overcome the Walrasian theoretical system and to create his own new one. I believe that only from this standpoint we can understand the true Paretian theory.

Pareto constructed the new system of social science, which was able to make a positive analysis on the decision-making process of economic policies, making use of pure economic theory: he paved the way to evolve the basis of our science from the general system of 'economic equilibrium' to the one of 'social equilibrium'.

編　集　後　記

1871年にカール・メンガーの『国民経済学原理』とウィリアム・スタンレー・ジェヴォンズの『経済学の理論』が，そして，1874，77年にレオン・ワルラスの『純粋経済学要論』が刊行されたのを機縁に，経済学史上，「限界革命」と称せられる思想の転換が起ったことは，周知のところである。今年はちょうどメンガー，ジェヴォンズの上記の書物が刊行されてから百年目にあたるので，これを記念して国際的にいくつかの学会がひらかれている。

その第1は6月17日から19日にわたってウィーン大学で開かれたメンガーの『原理』に関するシンポジウム，第2は8月23日から27日にかけてイタリー，コモ湖畔のベラジオで開かれた「経済学における限界革命」と題する学会であり，さらに第3はマンチェスター大学で9月14日から17日まで開催された経済思想史会議で，その第3日がジェヴォンズの記念にあてられた。

日本でも明治学院大学で11月13・14日の両日にわたって開かれた経済学史学会第35回大会がこれを記念して，その第1日のプログラムを共通課題「近代経済学百年の意義」にあてた。

このような動向とならんで，本塾経済学会も本誌の本号を「限界革命百年記念特集」として刊行することとした。上に記した三つの国際的学会に出席された松浦保助教授が遠くミラノから寄稿されたことをとくに感謝する。また経済学会主催の「限界革命百年記念講演会」が去る11月11日に三田西校舎527番教室で開催され，富田重夫教授による開会の辞につづいて，気賀健三経済学部長および私たちの三つの講演がおこなわれ，盛会であった。

いまからちょうど四年前に経済学会が『資本論』刊行百年を記念して同じような企画を実行したことが想起される。「限界革命」の意義，とくにその歴史的および理論的必然性はまだ十分に明確にされていないといえるであろう。私たちの今回の企画がこのような点の解明にすこしでも役立てば幸とするところである。

遊部久蔵　福岡正夫

© 三田学会雑誌　第64巻　第11号

昭和46年（1971）11月1日　発行　定価200円　〒12円

編集兼発行人　慶應義塾経済学会　代表者　遊部久蔵
郵便番号 108
東京都港区三田2丁目 15—45
電話 03—453—4511
振替口座番号 東京 44056

購読料　1ヶ年 2400円，6ヶ月 1200円（送料共）

発売所　慶應通信
（購読料を添えてお申込み下さい）
郵便番号 108
東京都港区三田2丁目 19—30
電話 03—451—3584
振替口座番号 東京 155497

印刷・製本　図書印刷株式会社