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独占体の国内市場征覇とイギリスの制圧下にある海外市場獲得にかかっていたといえよう。イギリスが自由主義段階において綿工業の順調な拡大によって中間層に安定的収入をもたらしたのとはちがひ、この時期のドイツ重工業はダンピング輸出にうったえざるを得なかった。重工業資本家は、独占利潤に基づく相対的高賃金支給と労務管理の強化によって労働組合の組織拡大を阻止したが、不安定な海外輸出に依存する中小経営者とその従業者、ロシア・アメリカ小麦のヨーロッパ市場への流入によって経営危機にさらされた農民層等の大量の中間層は、重工業の蓄積構造と世界市場編成の変化によって動揺を続けたのである。ドイツ社会主義は、このような中間層によって担われたのも当然といわねばならない。ビスマルクの社会政策は、そのような事態の「解決」を狙って登場したのであり、体系的な社会保険をその根幹とし、国庫財政をその支えとする性格をもつことになったわけである。かくして「大不況期」の中期から末期にかけて登場したドイツ社会政策は、世界資本主義の帝国主義段階における世界市場編成に規定されたドイツ資本主義の対国内労働力政策であり、その意味で帝国主義段階に特有なものといつてよい。従ってドイツ社会政策は、依然として世界資本主義の中心国として海外市場を制圧するイギリス資本主義の世界市場編成をつき崩して蓄積を強行し、国庫財政を「健全化」することができるか否かにかかっていたのであり、そのために海外市場の再分割を正当化する包括的なイデオロギーを伴ったのである。

次に著者のイギリス社会政策がドイツに比べて遅れて現われる(118頁)とか、ドイツの体系的・組織的なものとは異なり、消極的ないし非組織的(前掲、「イギリス賃労働史の研究」, 63頁)とする見解について検討する。この見解のもつ難点は、先の行論からも明らかであろう。イギリスに顕著にみられる「大不況期」の停滞性は決して各部門に一律ではなく、同一部門内においても異なっているのであるが、総じて「大不況期」において、新鋭設備を有する巨大企業と共に、旧来の中小経営も根強く残存したから、熟練工組合と不

熟練工組合(=一般組合)も併存し、前者は景気循環とわりわけ不況に弱い不熟練工組織に比べ、強力であった。その組合資金も豊富で、長期ストライキを打つ基盤を1870年代からもっていたのである。これに対し一般組合は1870年代前半の世界的好況と資本制生産部門の拡大によって登場してきたのであるが、その確立は「大不況」からの脱出を待たねばならなかった。また諸中間層は世界市場の中心国として存在するところからもたらされる諸収入によって安定しており、従って「大不況期」の労働者にとっての問題は主として景気循環過程で生ずる不熟練労働者の賃金・雇用等にあったといえよう。失業問題が深刻化しなかった原因としては1880年代に盛んとなった英帝国圏への移住も忘れることはできない。このようなイギリス労働者の状態も、結局はその独占的地位を次第におびやかされているとはいへ、世界資本主義の中心国として海外市場をいち早く制圧し、「大不況期」のドイツ・アメリカ関税政策に対処し得たイギリス資本主義の蓄積構造に規定されていたのであった。そしてドイツ・アメリカの世界市場再分割戦への参加によってイギリス資本主義を中心とする世界市場編成が、「平和的」な競争関係を維持し得なくなったことを告知する1907年恐慌の前後から、イギリス資本主義は動揺する不熟練工を主対象とした対労働力政策を展開することになる。著者のイギリス社会政策論も、以上の点を踏まえるならば、労働者の社会主義運動の存在を前提としたドイツとの型のちがひをもって律し得ないという批評があたるのではなからうか。もっとも、本書は総じて方法的検討が中心テーマになっているので、今後の著者の全機構的な実証研究が期待される。著者が「国家独占資本主義」の時期まで含めて方法的検討を行なっている点を考えると、トータルな社会政策論・労働問題研究方法の再構築を迫られている我々にとって、本書は重要な問題を提示しているといえよう。(有斐閣, 昭和45年12月刊, A5, 230頁, 1200円)

—1971, 3, 21—

(野口建彦)

Core and Competitive Equilibrium

by Masao Fukuoka

This is a sequel of the four preceding papers which have appeared successively in Keizaigaku Nenpo and this Journal in these few years. These papers are primarily intended as parts of my coming book on General Equilibrium Analysis, and their aim is not so much to present the author's novel contributions as to give a systematic and comprehensive restatement of the present state of the subjects.

This paper treats a standard proof of the Edgeworth Limit Theorem, which has been developed recently by such writers as Scarf, Debreu, Vind, Arrow-Hahn and others.

In order to follow the competitive equilibrium model of the preceding papers, we would consider the economy with countably-many traders, and not cover that with a continuum of traders. However, the analysis is extended to the case with production, and is performed according to the device by Rader and Nikaido.

"The Contradiction between Production and Consumption" and Trade Cycle (2)

by Kiyoko Imura

Chapter I. The Recovering Process.

Chapter II. The Prosperity

(Published in the combined volume of February and March issues of the Magazine, 1971.)

Chapter III. The Outbreak and the Process of Crisis

Section 1. The Accumulation and Maturity of Contradictions in Prosperity.

Paragraph 1. The Basic Mechanism and Process of the Accumulation and Maturity of Contradictions.

Paragraph 2. How to Grasp Contradictions.

Paragraph 3. The Various Factors to Strengthen the Accumulation of Contradictions.

(Published in this issue of the Magazine.)

Paragraph 4. The Role of Credit.

Section 2. The Process of Crisis.

Chapter IV. Depression.

(Expected to be published in the next issue of the Magazine.)

This article (2), mainly in Paragraph 1 and 2, Section 1, Chapter III, will clarify the basic mechanism of why and how crisis occurs.

Paragraph 1 explains the basic mechanism in which contradictions accumulate and by which they grow matured in a developing prosperity. Further, there are explained analytically that an innumerable investments, including some fixed capitals, are made in prosperity; that the department I tends to expand beyond the capacity of the department II that the renewal of fixed capital is made and that it ceases to go on with it after a certain period of intensive investment. Also, there is a tendency for the productive means of the department I to get superfluous in an attempt to meet the expanded demand for reproduction, resulting in the decline of the prospective rate of profit.

Further, on the basis of this lowered prospect for profit, letting the amount of the products in department I to diminish and causing the market for them to be largely narrowed down, there will happen inevitably a rapid shrinkage in the whole scheme of reproduction.

In Paragraph 2 is explained the importance to look upon this turn of event as a necessary outcome of the contradiction between production and consumption in the capitalistic process of production.

In Paragraph 3 are indicated the various conditions which will bring about the above described process. These conditions, however, play merely a supplementary role. Thus the Paragraph 3 serves only as an addition to the principal issue of this work.

A Note on Price Leadership

by Masu Uekusa

Japanese Fair Trade Commission pointed out in 1957 Annual Report that price leadership was observed in the following industries: plate glass; caustic soda; copper; electric wire; aluminum; photographic film; nylon; and main steel products. In 1961 a government commission (Sōgō Seisaku Kenkyukai) counted out plate glass, aluminum, nylon, binylon, paper for newspaper and main steel products as administered price commodities with price leadership. Recently the prices have been pulled up by price leadership in beer, newspaper and some petro-chemical

products. However, it is well known that these many price leaderships have ever not been challenged by FTC and not fully inquired into empirically and theoretically by the students.

Therefore, this paper, first of all, attempts to review the great accumulation of the theoretical and empirical studies with price leadership in the United States and know the nature and substance of price leadership. This review is concentrated on the structure, conduct and performance of the three types of price leadership. The first is the dominant price leadership in partial monopoly which was mainly analysed by A. J. Nichol [22] (the figure in [] indicates the number of Reference pp. 72-74 in this Journal) and K. J. Cohen & R. M. Cyert [8]. The second is the monopolistic barometric price leadership in highly-concentrated and high-barriers-to-entry oligopoly which was investigated and called as 'Price leadership in Lieu of Overt Agreement' by J. W. Markham [19]. The third is the competitive barometric price leadership in moderate-concentrated and moderate-barriers-to-entry oligopoly with competitive fringe which was made clear and called as 'Price-Leadership-plus-Price-Concession-Pattern' by J. S. Bain [3].

In addition to the review of the studies by the travellers along the way in the United States, this paper seeks to point out and analyse some questions which seem to have not been asked by them. The first is that there may be various pricing mechanisms in the intermediate market between partial monopoly and highly concentrated oligopoly. I called this market as 'Gulliver type of oligopoly' in which there are a dominant firm and a few *large* firms, in contrast that there are a dominant firm and a number of *smaller* firms in partial monopoly. I pointed out that there can be the three pricing methods like dominant price leadership, parallelistic price leadership and oligopolistic price competition.

The second is that the method to solve the conflicts in oligopolistic core and between oligopolistic core or partial monopolist and competitive fringe has not been fully analysed. For example, why does competitive fringe have to follow obediently to partial monopolist's price?

The third question is how limit price was formed by price leader.

Although these questions have not been fully solved by me, it seems that these analyses may be the necessary road to develop the theory of price leadership.