Title	英文抄録
Sub Title	
Author	
Publisher	慶應義塾経済学会
Publication year	1969
Jtitle	三田学会雑誌 (Keio journal of economics). Vol.62, No.6 (1969. 6) ,p.1- 6
JaLC DOI	
Abstract	
Notes	
Genre	
URL	https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AN00234610-19690601-0137

合を仮定すれば増大すべき石高は，

$$176740988 \text{ kcal} \times \frac{240508086 \text{ kcal}}{571018521 \text{ kcal}} \div 516 \text{ kcal}$$

＝144201 石となる。

(5) 従って修正反当収量は

$$a = \frac{342521 石（増大された分）+466087石（郡村誌総米石高）}{468376.4反（郡村誌米作付面積）} \times 1.10（隠蔽地を10\%と仮定）\times 1.069（UI）$$

＝1.468 石

同様にして

$b = 1.228$ 石

$c = 1.108$ 石

a, b, c 平均 1.268 石

(6) 修正因子（公式推計と修正推計との比較）は

$$a = \frac{1.468 石（修正反当収量）}{0.995 石（郡村誌反当収量）} = 1.475$$

同様にして

$b = \quad = 1.234$

$c = \quad = 1.113$

平均 1.274

(7) 上の修正因子で全国反当収量を求めれば，

$a = 1.166$ 石（政府統計反当収量）

$\times 1.475 = 1.719$ 石

$b = \quad = 1.438$ 石

$c = \quad = 1.297$ 石

平均 1.484 石

(8) 郡村誌（公式統計）による 0.995 石の反当収量は

以上のように熱量計算を行うと 1.108 石〜1.468 石，平均 1.268 石にインフレートさせる必要があることがわかった。その場合の修正因子を仮りに全国反当収量に適用すれば 政府統計 1.166 石 は 1.297 石〜1.719 石，平均 1.484 石に上方修正される。この数字は ナカムラ氏修正 反当収量平均 1.6 石説よりは 若干低いがある程度近い数値をとっているといえよう。無論，この数値算出には様々な仮定が含まれており仮説的なものに過ぎなく今後のより広範な，かつ精密な研究を期待しなければならないが，ナカムラ氏のこの研究はそれにある程度の見通しを与えたものとして高く評価されるべきであろう。

なお，訳は親切丁寧であり適宜「訳注」が施され読者の理解を一層容易にしているが，第5章第1節の冒頭は訳者によると，「修正指数系列を獲得するためには水稲およびその他の全ての農産物指数とこの2種の農産物の基準年における生産指数とが算定されねばならない」とあるが，ここで指数にあたる語は原文では「value」であり，それぞれ修正価額，生産価額と訳すべきではなかろうか。（東洋経済新報社，昭和43年11月刊，A5，255頁，1200円）

稲 本 洋 哉

訂 正

［62巻4号の飯田鼎氏の「研究ノート」について，筆者から下記の訂正がよせられました。］

4月号，掲稿『「スミスとリスト」の問題と「マルクスとヴェーバー」の問題』のなかで，最末尾の 82 頁のなかの一節「1909年，社会政策学会大会において兄マックスとともにはなばなしい論陣をはったアドルフ・ヴェーバーが，のちに国民社会主義の理論的指導者となり，」[56] は事実誤認につき削除させていただきます。

読者に深くお詫びするとともに，御教示下さった山口大学の中村貞二氏にたいし，厚くお礼申上げます。

Social Policies and Labor Force Policies in the Monopolistic Stage of Capitalism, as seen through their Trade Union Acts

by Kanae Iida

This essay aims at the research and elucidation of the legal measures on the social policies appeared in the monopolistic stage of Japanese capitalism in 1920's and after.

The trade union movement of Japan was led mainly by such pioneer leaders who had been to the United States, as Fusataro Takano and Sen Katayama.

The movement, however, was subjected to a severe oppression in 1910's on account of the so-called "High Treason Case." Under the influence of World War I. of 1914, it regained its strength. By 1920's, it accomplished a fair growth under the leadership of Bunji Suzuki, centering around the Japanese Federation of Labor.

At the same time, the legislative attempt to control over the trade union movement came forward. Already in 1900, the government enacted the Police Law for maintaining Order, a trade unionism oppressive measure. So, it was essential for the effective execution of trade union movement either to realize the abolition of the Police Law for maintaining Order, leading towards the enactment of a real trade union law, or to replace it with a reactionary trade union control law. Or, the unionists may not succeed in either of these.

Needless to say, capitalists took the trade union law as a protective measure for workers, but the working class on their part considered it a tactics to legalize their right for organization, a step toward the establishment of the collective bargaining in labor dispute, in other words, to them it amounted to a social policy.

Whether or not they would succeed in this venture depended on the selfdirecting fighting power of the working class.

In 1920's, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and the Kenseikai Party proposed the three different bills for trade union, but they uniformly aimed at a formal enforcement of trade union legislation, varied as they were in contents, for they had seen in the international conditions following World War I. the urgent necessity of improving the general working conditions, especially they had perceived the International Labor Organization tending toward that way.

On the other hand, the government made no concealing of their intention to cling to the

Police Law for maintaining Order, almost utterly disregarding the desire of the working people. Such being the situation, it was natural that the trade union bill failed to materialize. In the first place, the government and the administrative officials in charge were totally ignorant of the basic rights of workers. Thus the proposed measures supposedly in support of workers' interest were merely an exhibition of bureaucratic formalism, completely losing sight of the process by which the working class had come to claim for trade union.

In other words, the peculiarity of the Japanese social policy is an imitation of the European social policy with no corresponding substance and with no self-directing spirit. The Japanese social policy in the monopoly stage of capitalism, that is, the trade union law of Japan is highly tinged with an controlling phase. It is a compromise between state authorities and capitalist interests. Equipped with a weak structure, the Japanese trade unionism, a sort of social policy, is much cursed by authoritarian power and bureaucratic paternalism.

An Empirical Study on the Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax

——An Application of the Gordon Model on the Analysis of Japanese Corporation Income Tax——

by Seiji Furuta

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the econometric study of the shifting of the corporation income tax in the U.S. made by Robert J. Gordon and to apply his model to the same analysis on the Japanese Corporation income tax (see, Robert J. Gordon: The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax in U.S. Manufacturing, 1925-62, A.E.R. Sept. 1967). It is of interest to find out in his paper that it does present a result opposite to that of Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (K-M) and find that on the average the corporation income tax is not shifted in the short run in U.S. manufacturing.

In fact, the K-M conclusions are radically different from his own. They conclude that in the short run in U.S. manufacturing more than 100 per cent of the burden of the corporation income tax is shifted forward to consumers. The conclusions of Gordon model, however, are that the tax-shifting in manufacturing is not significantly different from zero, i. e., the estimated degrees of tax-shifting are less than 11.5 per cent in the whole manufacturing, while the degrees are less than 11 per cent in the individual industries. The contributions of Gordon's study compared with K-Ms' can be pointed out as follows: (1) the independent variables are derived from an articulated model of the probable profit performance of firms that practice mark-up

pricing behavior, (2) a trial is made to fill up the gap found in the K-M study between the low measures of shifting obtained when an income share measure of profits is used at the dependent variable and the high coefficients of shifting which result when the rate of return on assets is the dependent variable, (3) he includes among his independent variables a measure of the increase since the 1930s in the pressure of demand on capacity. In these respects, it is surely worth while to fit his model to the incidence analysis on the Japanese corporation income tax.

His study of shifting analizis time-series observations of aggregated variables whose values should reflect short run forward shifting. Assuming that the tax liability is not known until the level of profits is fixed, he first describes the determination of profits for a representative firm practicing mark-up pricing in a no-tax world. The final descriptions of the rate of return and income share concepts in the no-tax case are as following:

$$\frac{Z'_t}{K_t} = \alpha_1 \frac{R_t}{h_t K_t} + \alpha_2 \frac{R^*_t}{h_t K_t} + \alpha_3 \frac{\Delta p_t}{p_t} + \alpha_4 \frac{\Delta Q_t}{Q_t} + u'_t$$

$$\frac{Z'_t}{R_t} = \alpha_1 \frac{1}{h_t} + \alpha_2 \frac{R^*_t}{h_t R_t} + \alpha_3 \frac{\Delta p_t}{p_t} + \alpha_4 \frac{\Delta Q_t}{Q_t} + u'_t$$

where Z'_t is cash flow as the difference between gross sales R_t and operating cost, total assets K_t, potential sales by full utilization of productive factors R^*_t, wholesale price index p_t, hybrid real output in constant dollars Q_t, the error term u'_t, and the ratio of material prices (p_t) of the industries concerned to the general price index (p_t^o) h_t.

After constructing his equations, he introduces the corporation income tax rate to them assuming that the representative firm can reduce the impact of any given tax rate on its after-tax profits by shifting the burden of the tax.

The focus of interest in these equations is the comparison of the results of fitting the time-series regression equations for the U.S. and Japanese manufacturings by the same method of nonlinear computation which is believed more efficient than the K-M instrumental technique. The statistical results for both of the manufacturings are presented in the table below:

The Results for U.S. Manufacturing. (t coefficients in 〔 〕)

Dependent Variables	Independent Variables				R_t^2	D-W	Shifting Parameter	Years
$\frac{Z^*}{K_t}$	$\frac{R_t}{h_t K_t}$	$\frac{R^*_t}{h_t K_t}$	$\frac{\Delta p_t}{p_t}$	$\frac{\Delta Q_t}{Q_t}$	v_t			
	.176	—.062	.043	.056	.110	.962	1.63	.110	1935-41 + 1948-59
	〔8.942〕	〔—4.480〕	〔1.541〕	〔3.567〕	〔1.220〕			〔1.220〕	
$\frac{Z^*_t}{R_t}$	$\frac{1}{h_t}$	$\frac{R^*_t}{h_t R_t}$	$\frac{\Delta p_t}{p_t}$	$\frac{\Delta Q_t}{Q_t}$	v_t			
	.179	—.065	.051	.060	.057	.879	2.05	.057	1935-41 + 1948-59
	〔13.123〕	〔—7.175〕	〔2.224〕	〔4.506〕	〔.693〕			〔.693〕	

Dependent Variables	Independent Variables				R̄	D-W	Shifting Parameter	Years
$\frac{Z^*_t}{K_t}$	$\frac{|R_t}{h_t K_t}$	$\frac{R^*_t}{h_t K_t}$	$\frac{\Delta p_t}{p_t}$	$\frac{\Delta Q_t}{Q_t}$	v_t			
	-5.173	2.896	-1.165	1.096	$.986$	$.905$	1.23	$.986$	1929-41 + 1952-63
	$[-7.464]$	$[6.542]$	$[-2.631]$	$[1.446]$				
$\frac{Z^*_t}{K_t}$	$\frac{1}{h_t}$	$\frac{R^*_t}{h_t R_t}$	$\frac{\Delta p_t}{p_t}$	$\frac{\Delta Q_t}{Q_t}$	v_t			
	-3.674	2.000	-1.752	$.544$	$.942$	$.903$	1.02	$.942$	1929-41 + 1952-63
	$[-1.631]$	$[5.632]$	$[-3.539]$	$[.628]$				

As he noted, all coefficients have the expected signs, and all are highly significant except for the price change coefficient in the equation Z^*_t/K_t and the tax shifting parameters for the U.S. manufacturing. On the other hand, for the Japanese manufacturing, all coefficients have the opposite signs except for the $\Delta Q_t/Q_t$, and less than half of them are not highly significant. It is, therefore, not so easy task, as we have expected, to compare the results of the evidence of the tax shifting for the U.S. and Japanese corporation income taxes. But, if we observe the tax-shifting coefficients for the Japanese manufacturing they are very high and are not significantly, different from 100 per cent. Afterall, the Japanese results give a description of tax-shifting behavior contrary to that of the U.S., although the markup theory hypothesized in his model can be also supported here to a substantial degree.

Marxian Theory on Investment (No.2)

by Kiyoko Imura

In the previous article (No. 1), published in the May Issue of this magazine, we attempted to clarify Marxian view concerning how investments are made under the competitive regime of capitalism, and why and in what way the enlargement of investment and production is effected in spite of the limitation of markets conditions.

On the basis of the fundamental points considered in the previous article, Chapter III of this article examines the development of investment and its characteristics under the conditions of

depression. And Chapter IV examines the development and its characteristics of investment under the conditions of prosperity.

Also, in the appendix to Chapters III and IV are discussed and criticized in detail the views of Professor Kozo Uno and his followers who discuss erroneously on the characteristics of the investment made in depression and prosperity.

As can be seen in this work, the various market conditions restraint the ways of capitalist investment, while on the other hand, the ways of capital investment often restraint or alter a market condition. This article and the previous one deal with the former relationship, while the latter relationship is considered by one of my previously published separate works "On the Enlarged Reproduction", *Keizaigaku Nenpo* (*Annual Report of Economics*), No. 12, 1968.

The next subject I am to take up is a comprehensive study of the process of industrial cycle on the basis of a general view of the analysis so far performed.

Investment Activities by Oligopolistic Firms
——Capital Accumulation in the Monopoly Stage of Capitalism——

by Isamu Kitahara

In the past, there has been prevalent the two opposing views concerning the development of productive power and the accumulation of capital by monopoly: one looks upon monopoly as tending toward their retardation, while the other takes monopoly as helpful to promote them.

The author considers, however, that monopoly embraces functionally the two possible aspects: the retardation in production and capital accumulation, and the effectuation of a rapid development of them, giving rise to one of them according as the conditions in which monopoly takes place. It is, therefore, too one-sided a view, if one should conclude monopoly as solely promotive in production and capital accumulation.

The author presented the essay "Technical Progress in the Stages of the Competitive and the Monopoly Capitalism" in the *Keizaigaku Nenpo* (*Annual Report of Economics*) No. 12, 1968, analyzing the characteristics of the technical progress in the monopoly stage of capitalism.

This paper and the one which follows are attempts to clarify the movement laws of monopoly capitalism on the basis of the above mentioned peculiarities of monopoly capitalism.

In this paper are explained the characteristics of the investment activities by oligopolistic firms.

The first part of this paper dwells one the perceived two aspects of investment activities; the prudential phase and the dashing phase.

The second part analyzis the investment activities of oligopolistic firms in the case where the size of industrial demand is fixed, or the industrial demand would not enlarge itself beyond the extent which can be taken care of by possibly enhancing the operating capacity of the existing equipment, and explains that under this sort of condition, no new investment can be made even when some technical improvement is introduced. In other words, this is the case where the prudential phase of investment is powerfully working.

The third part analyzis the investment activities of oligopolistic firms when they will have to enlarge their productive capacity to the extent as an industrial demand requires.

Only at the time when an industrial demand calls for a wide and continuous enlargement of industrial capacity combined with a substantial technical improvement, oligopolistic enterprises abandon their cooperative attitude and dashes into an ever fresh investment.

In the next paper, both the stagnant and the developmental phases of nationwide monopolistic capitalism as a whole will be studied on the discovered patterns of the investment activities by oligopolistic firms described in this paper.