

Title	Comparative political awareness of Cairo and Lebanese citizens : a report on the 2005 Lebanese and 2007 Egyptian public opinion survey
Sub Title	
Author	富田, 広士 (Tomita, Hiroshi)
Publisher	慶應義塾大学法学研究会
Publication year	2010
Jtitle	法學研究 : 法律・政治・社会 (Journal of law, politics, and sociology). Vol.83, No.6 (2010. 6) ,p.116(85)- 200(1)
JaLC DOI	
Abstract	
Notes	論説
Genre	Journal Article
URL	https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AN00224504-20100628-0116

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Comparative Political Awareness of Cairo and Lebanese Citizens: A Report on the 2005 Lebanese and 2007 Egyptian Public Opinion Surveys*

TOMITA, Hiroshi

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to report in a comprehensive manner the results of a political awareness survey of Cairo citizens the author conducted in 2007. It will also compare the results of that survey with a Lebanese citizens awareness survey conducted by the Keio University 21st Century COE Center for Civil Society with Comparative Perspective in 2005.

There exists a gap between the two surveys discussed herein in terms of their timing and the scale of the region over which their sampling was performed. To wit, the Lebanese survey was conducted in August~September 2005, with sampling done throughout the country, while the Egyptian survey was conducted in September~October 2007

and covered only the so-called Greater Cairo Area, i.e., the governorates of Cairo, Qalyubia and Giza. In particular, the former survey spanned the entire country of Lebanon, including regional cities and agricultural villages, while the latter was limited to the large urban expanse of Cairo. One must take this factor into consideration as an unconformity when comparing the citizens' perceptions of these two countries. In general, it can be noted that people living in cities have a higher level of interest and awareness of politics than those residing in farming villages.

To add to the above, the sampling of the 2005 Lebanese Survey was not conducted proportionally to the ratios of the different religious sects in that country's population. The current ratios of Lebanon's religious sects show the Shiite Muslims to be the most numerous, with a tie between the Sunni Muslims and the Maronite Christians, different sources claiming one or the other to be more numerous (Richards and Waterbury, 2008: 92, Table 4.4). As Table 1 shows, the total sample number in the Lebanese survey was 525, of which Maronites accounted for 165 samples, Sunnis for 157 samples and Shiites for 103 samples. In addition, there were 52 non-Maronite Christian samples and 48 Muslim samples who were neither Sunni nor Shiite. In any case, the number of Shiite samples was too small for their ratio in the population. Overall, the colated results strongly reflected the opinions of the Maronite Christians and the Sunni Muslims.

On the other hand, despite the above-mentioned mismatches, the surveys shared the following elements: neither survey limited itself to any specific theme nor narrowed the scope of its sampling to any particular stratum or sector of society. Both examined a broad cross-section of citizens in general in Middle Eastern countries and attempted to get a comprehensive grasp of their level of political consciousness. In this sense, they may give certain relevance to this comparative analysis of the two citizens' political awareness.

If the significance of the knowledge gained by comparing the political awareness of the citizens of different Middle Eastern countries can

Table 1 Sampling number, by religious sect, in the 2005 Lebanese public opinion survey.

	Sampling number	%
Maronite Christians	165	31.4
Greek Orthodox Christians	27	5.1
Greek Catholic Christians	15	2.9
Armenian Christians	3	0.6
Other Christians	7	1.3
Sunni Muslims	157	29.9
Shiite Muslims	103	19.6
Druze Muslims	8	1.5
Alawite Muslims	3	0.6
Refused to answer	37	7.0
Total	525	100.0

Source : See Demographics: F12 (Religion at Present) attached to the Main Questionnaire and Simple Tally Table: F12 (Tomita, Hiroshi and Kuroda, Yasumasa (March 2006) *Lebanon yoron chosa kekka houkokushyo* (Report on the results of public opinion survey in Lebanon): 26, 48).

be spotlighted, perhaps it will reflect positively on these countries in return. I wish to pursue that possibility in this report.

Part 1 Survey Method and Data from the Public Opinion Survey

1. The public opinion survey in Egypt

In September and October 2007, the author conducted a survey of political awareness of the citizens of the city of Cairo, Egypt.¹⁾ The aim of this survey was to pose questions to people in Egypt similar in content to questions asked in a citizens' awareness survey conducted in Lebanon in August to September 2005 and compare the results of those two surveys. The questionnaire for the 2005 Lebanon survey were composed by the Keio University 21st Century COE Center for Civil Society with Comparative Perspective (21COE-CCC) under the leadership of

Prof. Yoshiaki Kobayashi, entrusting the performance of the survey to Gallup via the Japan Research Center. In August and September 2005 the same questionnaire was used to conduct simultaneous surveys of citizen awareness in Japan, the Philippines, Russia and Lebanon. Analyses of the results were presented in Hiroshi Tomita and Yasumasa Kuroda (March 2006) *Lebanon yoron chosa kekka houkokusho* (Report on the results of public opinion survey in Lebanon) and Yoshiaki Kobayashi *et al.*, eds. (2007) *Shimin Shakai no Hikaku Seijigaku* (Comparative Politics of Civil Societies).²⁾

In Egypt, the author entrusted performance of his survey to the markaz al-ma'lumat wa da'm ittihadh al-qarar (Information and Decision Support Center; IDSC), an affiliate of the Egyptian Cabinet.³⁾ In 2006 the author received funding from Keio Gijuku Academic Development Funds and began preliminary negotiations with the IDSC. At the same time, in conference with research collaborator Yasumasa Kuroda, he drafted a questionnaire based on the above-mentioned 2005 Lebanon survey by the 21COE-CCC. Later, when the author visited Cairo in July 2007, he presented the draft of the questionnaire to the IDSC. Confering with Chairman Magued Osman and several other members of the IDSC, he produced the final questionnaire draft. In the process, the IDSC made a number of requests. As is well known, in order to conduct public opinion surveys in Egypt one needs permission from the Central Agency for Population, Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). Therefore not all of the questions the surveyors wanted to ask have been able to be asked in a way which would completely fulfill their survey designs. The following two requests for revisions were received in July 2007: ① No questions regarding religion were allowed. In the demographics section of our draft questionnaire we had included a question about the respondent's religious beliefs, but had to eliminate it. ② Other than that, we were basically allowed to ask all of the questions we had prepared, but in order to make the intent of each question easier for the average Egyptian to understand, they wanted us to revise the answer selections. In order to fulfill this request we had to rewrite the answer selections

for quite a few of the questions, adding or deleting some of the selections themselves, and include two new questions (Q6, 15). Once we had fulfilled these requests we arrived at the final draft of the questionnaire. It can be seen in Appendix 1: 2007 Egyptian Survey: Questionnaire and Demographics Items.

Let me explain the sampling method used for the 2007 Egyptian Public Opinion Survey. The target sample size was 450 people, but the actual total number of samples was 446. This was not a nationwide survey, but rather a random sampling survey limited to the so-called Greater Cairo Area. This area, in which the survey was conducted, is composed of the following three governorates.⁴⁾

Cairo Governorate: 324 samples
Qalyubia Governorate: 65 samples
Giza Governorate: 57 samples
Total Sample Number: 446 samples

Samples were taken at the following 23 locations.

Helwan: 1 sample
Misr Algadima: 32 samples
Alsyda Zeinab: 38 samples
Alkhalifa & Mokatam: 31 samples
Shoubra: 16 samples
Rod Alfarg: 17 samples
Alsahel: 16 samples
Alwaily: 16 samples
Hadaik Alkoba: 31 samples
Alzeton: 16 samples
Almatarya: 32 samples
Naser City: 15 samples
Misr Algadida: 15 samples
Alnozha: 15 samples
Ein Shams: 15 samples

Mashyat Naser: 17 samples
Shoubra Alkhima-First: 47 samples
Shoubra Alkhima-Second: 17 samples
Tokh: 1 sample
Imbaba: 16 samples
Dokki: 9 samples
Giza: 17 samples
Alomrania: 16 samples
Total Sample Number: 446 samples

The target of the survey was the male and female resident population aged 18 or older. Regarding levels of education or income, we aimed to include all socioeconomic strata of that society, including the low income stratum living in poverty. (Refer to Appendix 1: 2007 Egyptian Survey: Demographics Items. Gender ratio, F2:Age group, F3:Level of education, F7:Household income (monthly earnings).) The survey method was by interview, in which the surveyor visited each household, read the questionnaire to the respondent and entered his or her responses.

2. The results of the survey and utilization of the data in this report

We received the results of the 2007 Cairo survey in December of that year from the IDSC in the form of a SPSS data file, and have preserved them. The IDSC has also stored copies of all of the questionnaires with entered answers on CDs which the author is keeping in his possession.

The Cairo survey is the first public opinion survey of the author's to be conducted in Egypt. Through a series of trials and errors we managed to establish methods of selecting from among many institutions for conducting the survey, drafting of the questions, negotiating with the IDSC on the final version of the questionnaire and other necessary procedures by researchers who had never before performed a public opin-

ion survey in this region. The final version of the questionnaire was, we think, simple in content overall, with consideration given to questions and answer choices that could be understood by all including the impoverished strata, but there are concerns it may have been an oversimplification of the original questionnaire draft. This point will need to be addressed when conducting further surveys on citizens' political awareness, with plenty of consideration given to the best ways to refine the questions.

Another point that must be mentioned as a general impression of this survey's results is that there were a number of errors observed in the tallying of the figures. To give one example, Questions 3 and 4 on the 2007 Egypt Survey were only to be asked of respondents who had answered "Yes" or "Don't know" to Question 2. There were 240 "Yes" or "Don't know" responses to Question 2, but 243 responses to Question 3 and 244 to Question 4 (see Appendix 1). This was probably due to carelessness by the interviewers during the interviews, who are thought to have asked those questions by mistake to some of the respondents who had answered "No" to Question 2. Quite a few other similar cases were seen of minor discrepancies in statistical figures. It is possible that careless mistakes occurred at both the interview and collation stages. One future task when conducting further surveys in Egypt will be to increase the degree of accuracy of the survey, minimizing careless mistakes to the degree possible and improving survey techniques.

The English translation of the questionnaire used in the 2007 Cairo survey (12 demographics items and 33 questions) and the simple tallied results can be viewed at the end of this report in Appendix 1 "The 2007 Egypt Survey: surveyed items and demographics (sample size: 446, simple tallied results are expressed in percentage figures after each answer choice)".

Part 2 of this report introduces the simple tallied results and some cross tabulations for the main items on the 2007 Cairo survey and provides a simple analysis. The reader can refer to Appendix 1 for the original questions and simple tallied results. Part 2 also compares the re-

sults of the Cairo survey with those of the above-mentioned 2005 Lebanese Survey. The questions asked in the Cairo survey were based on the questionnaire used in the Lebanese survey and included three classes of questions, those which were identical to questions in the Lebanon survey, those which had been modified from questions on the Lebanon survey and some which were entirely new. The comparison is based on the former two classes, i.e., we included questions which were not entirely identical to those on the Lebanese survey in the comparison. Appendix 2 at the end of this report, "Excerpt from the 2005 Lebanon Survey: surveyed items and demographics (sample size: 525, simple tallied results are expressed in percentage figures after each answer choice)" shows only the items among the questions and demographics on the Lebanon questionnaire which we have used on the comparison with the Cairo survey.

After that Part 3 takes a closer look at several items from among the Cairo survey questions introduced in Part 2, making cross tabulations with demographics items (F2: age group, F3: level of education, and F7: household income (monthly earnings)) and analyzing them. The cross tabulations used here are given in Part 3.

Part 2 Political Awareness of Cairo and Lebanese Citizens viewed from the Simple Tallied Results

1. The actual state of political participation

To start off with, we need to know what kind of thoughts Cairo's citizens have about participation in politics and what kind of activities they are actually involved in. Let's take a look at the simple collated results. It would also be desirable to have a broader perspective of the level of Egyptians' political awareness among those of other Middle Eastern nations in the form of a comparison with the results of the citizens awareness survey conducted in Lebanon by the Keio University 21st Century COE Center for Civil Society with Comparative Perspective in

August to September 2005. The general form of the questions was the same between these two surveys. However, as can be seen by comparing Appendix 1 "The 2007 Egyptian Survey: surveyed items and demographics" with Appendix 2 "Excerpt from the 2005 Lebanese Survey: surveyed items and demographics," at the back of this report, they were not completely identical, but had differences between some of the questions and also had a few completely different questions added.

(1) Political interest, political speech and degree of freedom of speech

Questions Q1, 2, 3 and 4 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey
(see Appendix1)

Q1, 2 and 3 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

The Egyptians expressed a high degree of interest in politics, with a 70% positive response, reflecting the urban society in and around Cairo. This was higher than the 64% positive response by people in various parts of Lebanon. In response to the question on whether they discussed politics with their friends or relatives, however, a combined 54% of people in Cairo gave positive responses of "Always," "Often" or "Occasionally," while 46% said they did not. By contrast, in Lebanon, 67% answered "Often" or "Occasionally," while only 32% answered "Rarely" or "Never." It is thought that conversations with friends and family are often limited to private matters, and it can be said that in comparison to the Lebanese, fewer even among urban-dwelling Egyptians share their personal inner political concerns with other people.

Regarding a sense of restriction on what they say during political discussions, 42% of the Egyptians surveyed said they felt no sense of restriction regardless of with whom they were talking or that they felt unrestricted when they were talking with certain people, while only a combined 12% said they felt restricted regardless of with whom they were talking or when speaking with many people. In Lebanon, 58% said they felt no sense of restriction, while 32% said they did. It is thought that the reason many more people said they felt restricted in Lebanon is

that even those who had answered that they did not discuss politics in Q2 were subsequently asked in Q3 about their sense of restriction.

(2) Degree of Participation in Local Communal Activities

Questions Q7, 24 and 29 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey

(see Appendix 1)

Q5, 30.1, 30.2, 31.1, 31.2 and 35 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey

(see Appendix 2)

How active are the Egyptian people on a daily basis in local communal activities? When we asked them about local communal activities they considered important for citizens to participate in, we got the following responses, in descending order of frequency: voting in elections (65%), participating in political party activities (34%), participating in activities on the local or governorate level (34%), involvement in projects organized by the local community (31%) and participation in citizens' activities or citizen group activities (24%). When the same question was asked of the Lebanese, they responded: voting in elections (79%), involvement in projects undertaken by the local society (53%), participation in citizens' activities or activities of community organizations (48%), efforts to understand community affairs (44%), participation in political party activities (38%) and participation in local government/administrative activities (29%). There were some differences between the questions asked in each country and a comparison was made despite this, but viewed in general, Lebanon's citizens showed an inclination to consider smaller-scale local communal activities more important than those on a broader-scale governorate or national level. There is also more of a sense of diversity in the fields of activities in which they participate and a will to contribute to society actively. By contrast, in Egypt, this survey found less eagerness among the citizens to involve themselves in solving problems in the community where they reside than was seen among the Lebanese. In particular, 11% responded that there were no local communal activities in which they thought citizens ought to participate, and another 6% said they

didn't know—much larger figures than in Lebanon. There is a need, however, to elucidate exactly how Egypt's citizens are actually involved in the local community near where they live, and this will require follow-up survey research, using other methods in addition to public opinion surveys.

There may be a large connection between this point and citizens' sense of belonging to a community, which was asked about in Q24, to which 71% replied the Arab Republic of Egypt as compared to a mere 14% responded the governorate or district (municipal administrative district) in which they resided. Responses to a similar question on local identity among Lebanese citizens (Q30.1), indicated that more felt a sense of belonging to the city, town or village where they resided (37%) than to the Republic of Lebanon (35%). In all, 49% felt identity with the region (governorate) where they lived, inclusive of those who answered their city, town or village, indicating that nearly one half of Lebanon's citizens feel a stronger sense of identity on a local level than on a national level. However, when they were cross-tabulated with the main three religious sects, Maronite Catholic showed a strikingly high sense of identity with their municipality (46%), while both Sunni and Shiite Muslims showed a stronger sense of identity with Lebanese state than with their municipality.⁵⁾

Moreover, only 29% of the Egyptians were participating actually and currently, either regularly or not regularly, in local charitable activities (e.g., providing local aid to poor families, visiting children's hospitals, visiting sick patients, etc.). This is in fact the most active field for Cairo citizens' communal social activities, with a tiny 2~4% involved in other activities; while in Lebanon, on the other hand, 59% were participating in welfare (charitable) activities, 51% in sports or hobbies, 33% in cultural or educational activities, 29% in town improvement, 18% in environmental or nature preservation and 17% in support of child-rearing, with abundant participation in all fields of citizens' society.

(3) Voting in elections

Citizens of both Egypt and Lebanon chose “voting in elections” most frequently as a political activity of the local community they thought citizens should participate in, as noted above. What, then, is their actual voting performance?

① Voting experience

Questions Q19, 20 and 21 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (see Appendix 1)

When Egypt’s eligible voters (18 years and older) go to cast their ballot, they must bring their election card with them, and to obtain their election card, they must go beforehand to their nearest police station and apply to have it made for them. Seventy-eight percent of the respondents had not had a card made. This figure is close to that of the 72% who responded that they had never voted even once in the national elections or any of the local ones. Any way one looks at it, the truth is 70% or more of Egypt’s citizens have never voted. Low voter turnouts as an ordinary state of affairs may well indicate deep distrust in politics.

Among the respondents who had had voting experience, nearly 80% indicated they “always” or “sometimes” participated. It can be said that of all the respondents, only 22% vote regularly. The overwhelming majority of Egypt’s citizens, it must be noted as a fact, have not regarded the existing elections and their voting as valid procedures to participate in politics at least so far.

When the cross-tabulations are viewed, however, the stronger the respondent’s urge to be involved politically, the more likely he or she was to have voting experience, and this tendency is common to both Egypt and Lebanon. Only 5% of persons who responded to Q5 of the Cairo survey that citizens had no right whatsoever to participate had any experience at voting, but 29% of those who replied that citizens must play a limited role in decision making and 30% of those who replied that citizens must play a large and effective role in decision making had experience. The Lebanon survey obtained the similar results. Twenty per-

cent of the respondents who replied to Q4 that citizens should not participate at all in decision expressed satisfaction with voting in response to Q18; 30% of those who replied that citizens should participate a little in decisions expressed the same satisfaction, and 43% of those who said that citizens should participate actively in decisions expressed likewise.

Question Q8 of the Cairo survey asks respondents whether or not they think citizens can exert an influence on governmental decisions, but the differences in their responses were not reflected in their degree of voting experience. In the Lebanon survey, on the other hand, 30% of the respondents who replied to Q6 that they could do absolutely nothing to influence governmental decisions expressed satisfaction with voting in response to Q18, 54% of those who said they could have a little influence expressed the same satisfaction, and 57% of those who said they could have an influence expressed likewise. In Lebanon, like in Cairo, few citizens thought they could influence governmental decisions, but there were those who did feel greater significance in casting their votes in elections.

②Trust in voting

Question Q18 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (see Appendix 1) Q16, 17 and 18 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

One reason for such dismal turnouts is extremely low levels of trust in the election process among Egypt's citizens. In the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2005, domestic NGOs and groups of judges overseeing these elections reported actual occurrences of various kinds of obstruction, including, in particular, obstruction of voting for independent candidates affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and irregularities in the handling of ballots and ballot boxes. In our survey, when asked about the degree of fairness and orderliness of the voting system, a combined 77% of respondents they thought there was absolutely none, not very much, or some, but insufficient.

In the Lebanese Survey, the people were asked about the signifi-

cance of voting activities and their interest in them and to evaluate the voting system and electoral campaigns overall. Sixty-one percent of respondents said they paid attention to the election campaigns for the parliamentary elections, and 76% either recognized the usefulness of these campaigns or recognized it somewhat. In their general evaluation of the elections, 35% said they felt satisfied in voting. Because Lebanon practices distribution of parliament seats to the different religious sects in the parliamentary elections, the candidates form complicated alliances in each electoral district, and the people cannot vote directly for any particular party or any particular candidate of a party. For this reason, eligible voters ultimately vote for a list of candidates of each electoral alliance, and the winners are selected under a system of proportional representation. For example, the EU election watch group, which oversaw Lebanon's 2005 parliamentary elections, made recommendations for various reforms in its report, including in the complicated way the alliances were set up, in the distribution of seats among the religious sects and in the composition of voting districts. Even given these problems with the elections in Lebanon, it seems the citizens have quite a high degree of trust in the country's election process.

③Parties, candidates and electoral alliances supported or voted for
Question Q23 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (see Appendix 1)
Q20 and 21 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

In Egypt, the National Democratic Party, which is in power, garners the most support, at 27%, followed by the independent candidates (who do not belong to any political party), at 13%. Support for the Muslim Brotherhood's candidates is thought to be reflected in this support for independent candidates. "I wouldn't vote for any candidate" (40%) or "Don't know" (15%) are the answers that were supposed to have been chosen by respondents who have never voted. Cairo's citizens consider "voting in elections" to be the most important chance for citizens to participate in communal activities (Q7), so the fact that in actuality more than half of them never vote reflects Cairo's citizens' current appraisal

of the validity of the nation's politics.

In a cross-tabulation of support for political parties with household income, a breakdown by income levels of the 40% replying that they wouldn't vote for any candidate showed that 58% of the impoverished class, with monthly household incomes of 300 LE (about ¥5000) or less, replied that they wouldn't go to the polls, with the figure ranging from 30~40% among the other income levels, above 300 LE. Support for the National Democratic Party among those with incomes of 300 LE or less was low, at 17%, and increased together with the respondent's level of income. Among those with monthly household incomes of 1000~1500 LE, it was 36%, and among those with 2000~5000 LE, it was 37%. Support for independent candidates among those with incomes of 300 LE or less was low, at 4%, and tended to range from 10~20% among the other income levels. The unaffiliated candidates are thought to include members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

From this we can see that among Cairo's impoverished class, support is low for both the political party in power and anti-government forces and that they have the lowest rate of voting in elections.

By contrast, in Lebanon, where anti-Syrian sentiment was running high following the February 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, 40% of the respondents supported an anti-Syrian alliance and 13% supported a pro-Syrian alliance, such as Amal and Hezbollah, with 22% undecided or unwilling to say. In response to a question on their support in daily life for political parties or organizations, the largest number said they did not support any political party, at 37%, with 15% supporting the Shiite sect-affiliated Hezbollah, 13% supporting the Maronite sect-affiliated Lebanese Forces (who are anti-Syrian), and 11% supporting the Free National Movement, led by Michel Aoun. In Lebanon, rifts along religious lines into Maronite, Shiite and Sunni sects are forming among those supporting different parties or political alliances. In particular, the biggest point of dispute is in how to distance Lebanon from its neighbor, Syria.⁶⁾

(4) Citizen participation in local communities, ideal and actual

Questions Q5 and 6 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (see Appendix 1)

Q4 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

There is a glaring gap between expectations and reality on how much ordinary citizens should participate in decision-making in local society and how much they actually can participate. The IDSC chose of its own will to insert Q6 right after the question asking about the respondents' motivation for political participation. Although 79% of Cairo's citizens say they strongly desire active citizen participation in policy decision-making, 69% complain that in reality absolutely no real steps have been taken to allow them to participate in decisions. In Lebanon, only the first question was asked, i.e., on how much they felt citizens should participate in decision-making. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents desired active participation, while 15% claimed no interest in local decisions, as they were focused on their individual livelihoods (in Egypt, this figure was 2%). This secluded lifestyle may represent one facet of Lebanese citizens' life.

This can thus be read to mean that Cairo's citizens strongly desire participation and that there is a huge gap between the ideal and reality regarding citizen participation.

(5) Citizens' appraisal of the local administration and effectiveness of their use of influence on the local administration

①Influence of the local administration (governorate or municipal administrative districts) on citizens' livelihoods

Questions Q16 and 17 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey

(see Appendix 1)

Q14 and 14.1 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

In Egypt, 54% of respondents thought the local administration had a big influence on their lives, and this figure rises to 80% if those saying there is some influence are included. Fifteen percent said there was no influence at all, rising to 19% when those saying it had little influence were included. However, only 2% of the respondents felt they were be-

ing influenced positively by the local administration in their daily lives, reaching 20% when those saying they were being influenced positively sometimes were included. In contrast, 28% thought they were being influenced negatively, reaching 62% when those saying they were negatively affected under certain circumstances were included.

The majority of Cairo's citizens thought the local administration had a big influence on their daily lives, and more than half of them were aware of a negative effect on their own lives. As (6) tells us next, however, the local administration had a somewhat smaller influence than the central administration did, with regard to both degree of impact and negative influence on their daily lives.

In the Lebanese Survey, 15% claimed a substantial effect, with 47%, inclusive, claiming some degree of effect. Twenty-seven percent said there was no real effect or hardly any effect at all, with 49%, inclusive, saying there was little effect. In Lebanon the local administration also had far less influence on citizens' livelihoods than the central administration did. What was even more impressive, however, was that while 80% of Cairo's citizens replied that they were influenced by the local administration, 49% of Lebanon's citizens thought they were not influenced. In Lebanon, there were more people who said there was no effect than who said there was an effect.

Q14.1 on the Lebanese Survey asked about the degree to which influences from the local administration had improved their daily lives, and was asked only to the 47% who had replied to Q14 that they had been affected.

Additionally, substitutions of answer choices 3 and 4 were made on Q17 of the Egyptian questionnaire, where Lebanese respondents had been asked, "I would be better off if there were no local government," and "My life would not change regardless of whether or not a local government existed." The results showed that 8% thought their daily lives had been improved by the local government, with 42% saying that there had been improvements under certain circumstances. Only 2% chose "I would be better off if there were no local government," and only 3%

chose "My life would not change regardless of whether or not a local government existed." If we read "I would be better off if there were no local government" to indicate a negative impact, only 2% of Lebanon's citizens negatively appraised their local administration.

In these ways, the appraisal of Lebanon's citizens of their own local governance differed markedly from that of Cairo's citizens. It is clear from the results of this survey that in general, the Egyptians are aware of a big impact on their daily lives from their local governments and that most of them are dissatisfied with their policies. Lebanon's citizens, on the other hand, perceive little impact from their local administrations and have few complaints about them. While 20% of the Egyptians evaluated their local administration positively, more than twice as many of the Lebanese did, at 42%.

②Use of influence by individual citizens on their local government

Question Q10 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (see Appendix 1)
Q7 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

Given their dissatisfaction, to what degree are the Egyptian people coming into conflict with their local governments, launching such complaints and requests at their local administrations? This would be a measure of the efficacy of citizens' participation in their local government. In the Cairo Survey, only 6% of the respondents replied that citizens could exert influence on the governorate or district level (municipal administrative district) over policy decisions that were affecting them negatively. Combined with those responding that they could influence it a little, the figure rose to 21%. Fifty-five percent replied that they had no influence whatsoever, and combined with those responding that they could not exert an effective influence, the figure rises to 76% which is slightly lower than the 82% on the central government level. One could say Egypt's citizens face extreme difficulty in exerting political influence at the local level. In Lebanon, by comparison, 29% said they could have an influence, while 69% said they could not.⁷⁾ Thus the Lebanese perceive a slightly higher degree of ability to exert an effective influ-

ence on their local government, but from an overall perspective, it is low in either country.

③ Practical experience in protesting against the local government

Question Q11 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (see Appendix 1)

Q7.3 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

Egyptian respondents who had taken any kind of steps to protest local governmental policies unfavorable to their own interests totaled 13%, with 34% saying they had never taken such steps. Another 46% replied that they could not find any steps that were possible for them to take, before answering whether or not they had taken such actions, therefore they could not take such steps. Thus even when the citizens want to influence the local government on the basis of their own personal opinions and interests, they face a situation in which no effective system exists for that purpose. Meanwhile they had almost the same degree of practical experience in protesting against either Egypt's local governments or the central government(11%).

In Lebanon, 16% had taken action from time to time, while 23% said they had no experience at it whatsoever, so the level of practical experience in Lebanon was slightly higher than in Egypt. Most of the remaining 303 respondents to the Lebanese questionnaire had answered that they could exert no influence against the adoption of unfavorable policies by their local government, so they were not included among those asked the question. Because of this inequality in the way the questions were structured an accurate comparison cannot be made. If we provisionally include these respondents, 54% in the Lebanese survey, who replied that they could exert no influence at all against unfavorable policies of their local government among those with no experience protesting local governmental policies, the total comes to 77%. Similarly, if we include respondents to the Egyptian survey who said there were no suitable means for opposing decisions with those who claimed no experience at protesting, the total comes to 80%, indicating that perceived difficulty by the majority of citizens in exerting an influence on their local gov-

ernment is common to both countries.

(6) Citizens' appraisal of the central government and effectiveness of their use of influence on the central government

① Influence of the central government on citizens' livelihoods

Questions Q12 and 13 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey

(see Appendix 1)

Q12 and 12.1 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

Questions Q12 and Q13 on the Egyptian questionnaire ask about the central government's influence as contrasted with the local governments' influence on citizens' lives, which Q16 and Q17 asked about, as described above. Q12 asked about the extent of influence central government policies had in citizens' daily lives, while Q13 asked if their daily lives had improved on account of the extent of influence of these policies. Sixty percent responded that they felt a big influence from these policies, reaching 82% when people saying they had some degree of influence were included. Fourteen percent said they felt no influence at all, reaching 16% when those saying there was not much influence were included. Q13 was asked of all respondents except those who had answered "they don't affect me at all" to Q12. Only 1%, however, thought the central government was having a positive influence on their daily lives, rising to 15% when those saying it was occasionally positive were included. Those saying they had received a negative impact came to 34%, reaching 65% when those saying it was negative under certain circumstances were included.

From these results we can see that the great majority of Cairo's citizens find the policies of the Egyptian government to have a big impact on their daily lives and the majority of those find it provides no improvement in their daily lives, but rather makes their lives more unpleasant.

In Lebanon, 38% of respondents said their daily lives had been strongly influenced by the central government's activities, reaching 61% when those saying they had been somewhat affected were includ-

ed. Nineteen percent said they were hardly affected at all, reaching 30% when those replying that they were little influenced were included. The difference in perception between the citizens of the two countries was that fewer of the Lebanese, less than half, perceived a “big” impact on their daily lives from the central government than the Egyptians. Moreover, nearly twice as many Lebanese thought there was no effect as Egyptians did. The meaning of this difference in perception between the citizens of these two countries needs further elucidation.

Q12.1 on the Lebanese questionnaire, which asked in what way the central administration affected their daily lives, was asked only to the 69% who had replied to Q12 that they had been affected. In addition, substitutions of answer choices 3 and 4 were made on Q13 of the Egyptian questionnaire, where Lebanese respondents had been asked, “I would be better off if there were no central government,” and “My life would not change regardless whether or not a central government existed.”⁸⁾

The results showed that 8% thought their daily lives had been improved by the central administration, with 41% including those who said that there had been improvement in some cases. Nine percent chose “I would be better off if there were no central government,” 6% chose “My life would not change regardless whether or not a central government existed,” and another 12% chose “Other” for their answer. If we read “I would be better off if there were no central government” to indicate a negative impact, only 9% of Lebanon’s citizens negatively appraised their central government. The fact that relatively many chose “Other” as their response indicates insufficient response choices for the question.

There are big differences between the results of the Lebanese survey and perceptions of Cairo’s citizens. While only 15% of the Egyptians surveyed gave their central administration a positive appraisal, 41% of the Lebanese did, more than twice as many. To the contrary, 65% of Egypt’s citizens gave it a negative appraisal.

Reviewing the above results, one can see that the Egyptians are aware of their lives being impacted directly by the central administra-

tion and that furthermore, they have greater dissatisfaction with the central administration than do the Lebanese.

②General appraisal and degree of satisfaction with the central government

**Questions Q14 and 15 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey
(see Appendix 1)**

Q25 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

Questions Q14 and Q15 regarding the Egyptian administration's governance and performance, directly asked the citizens for their appraisal and degree of satisfaction. In other words, we were able to assess the government's legitimacy, popularity and level of support, just as a cabinet approval rating would in Japan. In public opinion surveys being conducted currently in several Middle Eastern and Arab countries, one would not be assured of approval to ask these questions, but at the very least, we were able to obtain permission for them in the October 2007 survey in Egypt conducted via the IDSC.

Twelve percent of Cairo's citizens appraised the Mubarak Administration's policies as favorable, reaching 40% when those saying it was somewhat favorable were included. By contrast, 34% said they were unfavorable, reaching 57% when those choosing somewhat unfavorable were included. Almost three times as many people felt they were unfavorable than felt they were favorable, and more than half of Cairo's citizens evaluated the current administration negatively to one degree or another.

The IDSC chose of its own will to insert Q15 right after the appraisal question. Cairo's citizens were asked about their degree of satisfaction regarding the current administration's policy implementation, in response to which, 14% said they were satisfied, reaching 46% when those saying they were somewhat satisfied were included. On the other hand, 52% said they were not satisfied. There was no answer selection for those who were somewhat dissatisfied. More than half were dissatisfied, surpassing those who were satisfied to one degree or another.

The Lebanese citizens were asked for a general appraisal of their central government. Fourteen percent rated it as favorable, reaching 34% when those giving it a somewhat positive appraisal were included. Thirty-two percent rated it as unfavorable, reaching 55% when those giving it a somewhat negative appraisal were included. Another 11% did not know or chose not to answer. Lebanon is similar to Egypt in that more than half of its citizens rate the administration negatively to one degree or another. In Lebanon, however, there were fewer with a somewhat positive appraisal, and this is thought to have resulted from more respondents withholding their opinions.⁹⁾

③Use of influence by individual citizens on the central government

Question Q8 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (see Appendix 1)

Q6 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

Questions Q8 and Q9 were asked about the central government in contrast to Q10 and Q11, which were asked about the local governments. As mentioned above, the reality is nearly half of Cairo's citizens complained of difficulty in their lives and they have some degree of dissatisfaction with the administration's policies. Even so, a mere 3% answered that citizens could exercise influence over the decision-making process with regard to policies which they found disadvantageous to their own interests. Combined with those answering that they could exert some degree of influence, the figure reached 15%. Sixty percent replied that they had no influence at all, and combined with those responding that they could not exert an effective influence, the figure rises to 82%. Egypt's citizens perceive that on the national level, citizen participation in policy decision making is not permitted. It would be appropriate to say that Egypt's citizens face extreme difficulty in exercising influence over policies at both the local and national levels.

In Lebanon, by comparison, 7% said they could exercise an influence, reaching 23% when combined with those saying it was somewhat possible, while 67% said they could not exert any influence at all, reaching 75% when those saying they could not really be influential were in-

cluded. The Lebanese citizens, like the Egyptians, consider it impossible for citizens to exert influence over the policy decision-making process at the national level.¹⁰⁾

④ Practical experience in protesting against the central government

Question Q9 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (see Appendix 1)

Q6.3 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

Egyptian respondents who had taken any kind of steps to protest unfavorable central governmental policies totaled 11%, while 31% said they had never taken such steps. Another 52% chose "There are no suitable steps one can take to protest government decisions" as their reply. This is almost exactly the same pattern of responses as to the question about experience in protesting at the local level. It also means that about half of Cairo's citizens in fact feel they lack appropriate steps they can take to oppose decisions by the central government. One wonders if a framework for a system allowing Egypt's citizens to exercise some influence over their government will be achieved in the future.

In Lebanon, 11% had taken action from time to time, while 15% said they had no experience whatsoever at it. The remaining 371 respondents to the Lebanese questionnaire had answered that they could exert no influence against the adoption of unfavorable policies by the central government, so they were not included among those asked the question Q6.3, and because of this inequality in the way the questions were structured, an accurate comparison cannot be made. If we provisionally include the 67% in the Lebanese survey who replied that they could exert no influence at all against unfavorable policies of central government among those with no experience protesting central governmental policies, the total comes to 82%. Likewise, if we include respondents to the Egyptian survey who said there were no suitable means for opposing decisions with those who claimed no experience at protesting, the total comes to 83%, showing the great majority of citizens in both countries either do not protest against the central government or believe they cannot.

2. Perceptions of other countries

In this section, we will use the simple tallies of question Q32 on the Egyptian survey, “In your opinion, to what extent are foreign relations between Egypt and the following countries important?” to identify characteristics and tendencies of perceptions among Egyptians of the relative importance of other countries with regard to their nation’s diplomatic relations. In addition, from the results of question Q33 of the Egyptian survey, “In your opinion, how favorable or hostile (unfavorable) do you think the following countries are toward Egypt?” we will get a grasp of the average citizen’s perceptions of which countries are friendly.

(1) Perceptions of the importance of other countries in national foreign relations

① The 2007 Egyptian Survey

Question Q32 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (see Appendix 1)

First, the Egyptians thought highly of fellow Arab states as important countries. In article ② below on their perceptions of friendly countries, the Egyptians similarly saw the Arab states as being most favorable. Contrasting to their perceptions of favorable countries, however, they made no discrimination among the three groupings of Gulf oil producing countries, Lebanon and Iraq, and other Arab states, giving high ratings to all, ranging from 98% for Saudi Arabia to 86% for Lebanon of combined “extremely important” and “somewhat important” responses.

Second, among countries outside the region, came Japan with 89% and China with 88% of combined “extremely important” and “somewhat important” responses, followed by France with 82%. Among the Western countries, France was seen as most important.

Third were the major countries in the region, with Turkey and Iran receiving 84% and 78%, respectively, of combined “extremely important” and “somewhat important” responses. The former surpasses the latter a little in the Egyptians’ perceptions of both important and favor-

able countries. They were followed by India, though it is not quite in the region, with 77%.

Fourth were countries in the West, with the U.S. and Britain having 64% each and Russia, 59%, of combined “extremely important” and “somewhat important” responses. Britain and Russia were alike in having fewer “extremely important” responses. Perceptions of the U.S., Britain and Russia as favorable countries are low, as explained below. The reason the Western countries were considered important from the standpoint of foreign relations, however, was that many took the attitude that they were important in a sense as major actors in the international politics involving the Middle East. Since the time of the Sadat Administration, the U.S. has provided the most economic support to Egypt.

Fifth was Israel, with 80% considering it unimportant from the standpoint of foreign relations. The common people think that even if foreign relations exist, stronger relations are not desirable.

The above results are an indication of the feelings the average citizens have toward other countries. The political elite can be considered to have different feelings toward other countries. To understand the diplomatic power and actual influence other countries command at the political elite level, one would need to employ a different sampling method in order to measure it. Through that it would be possible to compare the differences and similarities between average citizens and the political elite in their perceptions of foreign countries.

②Comparison to results of the 2005 Lebanese Survey

Question Q43 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

Next, we compare the above results with those of the Lebanese Survey. First, the two Arab states surveyed, Syria and Egypt, were perceived as important countries by 51% and 73%, respectively. The Lebanese Survey looked only at perceptions of these two countries out of all the fellow Arab states. Therefore, it is impossible for us to compare it with the results of the Egyptian survey to guess how important

the Lebanese consider diplomatic relations with other fellow Arab countries. The lower percentage of Lebanese citizens considering Syria important seems to be due to the large sampling numbers allotted to both Maronites and Sunnis, and the fact that these two sects have high anti-Syrian sentiment.

Second, among the nine countries listed in the survey, the highest percentage of respondents, 87%, perceived France as an important country. This was higher than among Cairo's citizens. In a cross-tabulation with the three main religious sects, the figures for Maronites, Sunnis and Shiites were 98%, 82% and 77%, respectively. Considering that it was also highly regarded as a favorable country, as shown below, one sees that even Lebanese citizens who are Muslims have quite strong Francophilic sentiments.¹¹⁾ As Lebanon has experienced colonization by France, one wonders why its citizens have developed relatively strong Francophilic perceptions. We await elucidation of their historical circumstances and factors.

Third, in descending rank among the Western countries, after France, in terms of how important diplomatic relations with them are viewed come the U.S. with 71%, Britain with 66% and Russia with 49%. The Lebanese had lower perceptions of these three countries as favorable than as important countries from a foreign relations perspective. The Lebanese share the same attitude as the Egyptians in perceiving these three countries as diplomatically important.

Fourth, among large countries within the region, came Turkey with 57% viewing it as an important country and Iran with 53%. Just as in the Cairo survey, the Lebanese ranked Turkey higher than Iran, but in terms of absolute values, they ranked both countries lower than the Egyptians did. The reason Iran was ranked so lowly was that in a cross-tabulation with the three major religious sects, 84% of the Maronites ranked it as "unimportant," and this had a strong impact.¹²⁾

Fifth came Israel, with 95% of the Lebanese considering it unimportant from a foreign-relations standpoint. Ninety-six percent perceived Israel as an unfavorable country. In Egypt, though formal diplomatic re-

lations exist with Israel, unlike in Lebanon, anti-Israeli sentiment is deep-rooted among the citizens. It goes without mentioning that Lebanon has been continually on the front lines in military confrontations with Israel, and this would heighten hostile perceptions toward Israel.

(2) Perceptions of favorable countries

① The 2007 Egyptian Survey

Question Q33 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (see Appendix 1)

First, we note that the Egyptians have strong trust in their fellow Arab states. Among those, they have the highest faith in the Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait), which 90% or more perceived as friendly countries. One reason may be that among Egyptian laborers these countries are valued highly for providing important employment opportunities. Following upon these three countries came Jordan, Sudan, Palestine, Libya and Syria, which about 90% regarded as friendly countries. Lebanon and Iraq were ranked a little lower, at about 80%.

Second, it seems that Cairo citizens had a certain affinity toward China and Japan. They were ranked most highly among the major countries outside of the region, at about 75%.

Third, Turkey and Iran followed in terms of favorable perceptions, with 71% and 66%, respectively, considering them friendly states. In both cases, however, there were quite a large number of respondents who considered them neutral countries (cannot say if they are favorable or unfavorable countries), with 25% and 27%, respectively, choosing this option.¹³⁾

Fourth were countries other than Japan and China outside of the region, with India and France being considered friendly nations by close to 60%.

Fifth came the major countries of Europe and America, with 28% viewing Russia as a favorable nation, 47% as neither favorable nor unfavorable (a neutral nation), 15% as unfavorable (hostile) and 11% with reserved opinions. Among the twenty countries listed in the survey,

Russia had the largest number of Cairo citizens responding that they couldn't say if it was a favorable or unfavorable nation or that they didn't know.¹⁴⁾ Regarding Britain, 30% considered it a favorable nation, 39% said neutral, 23% said unfavorable and 8% reserved their opinion. In the case of both Russia and Britain, many respondents said they couldn't say one way or the other about whether they were favorable countries, showing that Egyptians have quite strong distrust toward both Britain and Russia.

Britain colonized Egypt for a long period starting in the 1880s, and after Egypt's revolution, the Nasser Administration relied heavily on the Soviet Union for military, diplomatic and economic support, so the Egyptian people probably have heavy memories of historical burdens from these two countries.

Regarding America, perceptions of it as an unfavorable country dwarf those of it as a favorable one, with 53% considering it an unfavorable (hostile) nation. Combining those who considered it neither favorable nor unfavorable with those who considered it an unfavorable nation brings the figure to 76%. Fluctuations will occur in public opinion surveys depending on when they are performed, but the results here may be taken as a fair representation of the level of anti-American sentiment in Cairo in October 2007. As a reference, the public opinion survey of six Arab countries being conducted continuously by Prof. Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland in the USA shows 76% of respondents to have had unfavorable attitudes toward America in 2006 and 79% in 2008.¹⁵⁾

Following upon the 9.11 incident in 2001, the Bush Administration went to war in Afghanistan, and then in March 2003 it invaded Iraq and thereafter occupied and governed that country. During this time, heightened anti-American sympathy was seen throughout the Muslim region. One needs to consider this background factor throughout the Islamic world to understand the highly unfavorable perceptions among Cairo's citizens toward America, second only to those they hold toward Israel.

Sixth came Israel, toward which feelings on the citizen level in Egypt were extremely negative. Ninety-five percent saw it as a hostile nation.

②Comparison to results of the 2005 Lebanese Survey

Question Q44 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (see Appendix 2)

Comparing the perceptions among Cairo's citizens of favorable states with those of the Lebanese Survey, first, the two Arab countries listed in the latter survey were Syria, which was perceived as favorable by 36%, with 54% considering it unfavorable and 9% abstaining from giving their opinion, and Egypt, which was perceived as favorable by 75%, with 16% seeing it as unfavorable and 9% abstaining from giving their opinion (the Lebanese Survey did not have "unable to say either way" as an answer choice). Only these two countries were included among the surveyed items, so it is not possible to make a full comparison with the Cairo survey. Among Egypt's citizens, however, the degree of trust in their fellow Arab states is generally extremely high, so they would not consider any such country as more unfavorable than favorable the way Lebanese citizens have with Syria.

Regarding Syria, the Maronite sect has strong perceptions of that country as unfavorable, with 84% feeling that way. Among the Sunni sect, 50% saw Syria as unfavorable, but among the Shiite sect, on the contrary, 84% saw it as a favorable country. As a result of the gap in perceptions among the sects, seen overall, it would lead to a majority of Lebanon's citizens perceiving Syria as an unfavorable country.¹⁶⁾ Nonetheless, however, on both the citizen and political elite level, there has been a lively exchange historically between Syria and Lebanon. Their perception of Egypt as a favorable nation is on the same level as Cairo's citizens' perceptions of China and Japan.

Second, with respect to Turkey and Iran, the Lebanese did not have as high an affinity as the Egyptians did toward these two countries. Forty-seven percent perceived Turkey as a favorable nation and 42% as unfavorable, with 11% reserving their opinion. Forty-four percent saw

Iran as a favorable nation and 47% as unfavorable, with 10% reserving their opinion. Regarding Iran, 83% of the Maronites saw it as an unfavorable nation, whereas 61% of the Sunni sect and 90% of the Shiite sect perceived it as favorable, showing perceptions between the Maronite and Shiite sects to be exactly opposite.¹⁷⁾ The sampling numbers among the three sects were not proportional to their actual ratios in the population, so it is thought that unfavorable perceptions among the Lebanese outweigh favorable ones.¹⁸⁾

Third, among the major countries outside the region, France was perceived as a friendly nation by very many Lebanese, 83%. This was higher than among Cairo's citizens. When their perceptions of France as a friendly nation are cross-tabulated with each religious sect, they run extremely high among the Maronites, at 96%, with 81% of the Sunnis and 65% of the Shiites feeling likewise.¹⁹⁾

Fourth, how did the other major countries of Europe and America fare? Half of the Lebanese respondents perceived the U.S. as a friendly nation, with the 50% choosing favorable surpassing the 44% that chose unfavorable. Even if we consider the big impact the timing of a public opinion survey can have on its results, there are clear differences between the Lebanese and the Egyptians, only 19% of whom considered the U.S. a friendly nation. In the case of question Q33 on perceptions of friendly countries in the Egyptian Survey, the answer choice "I cannot say if it is favorable or unfavorable (a neutral country)" was present. Fifty-three percent of the Egyptians considered the U.S. an unfriendly country, but this figure does not include the 23% who said they could not choose either way.

In Lebanon, perception among the religious sects of the U.S. as a friendly nation were 92% among the Maronites, but only 24% and 8% among the Sunnis and Shiites, respectively, showing a big divide between the Christians and the Muslims.²⁰⁾ One reason favorable views of the U.S. reached the 50% level among Lebanon's citizens is to be found in the large number of Maronites in the sample. However, there are also thought to be several other reasons.

One is that despite the protests against America's occupation of Iraq that engulfed the entire Muslim region, the Lebanese Maronites' pro-American sentiments can be seen to have survived. In fact, the timing of the survey in August to September 2005 overlapped with the aftermath of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, when anti-Syrian sentiment was heightened among the Lebanese people, and was backed up with America's initiative to democratize the Middle East. At the end of April in that year, Syria's peace-keeping forces who had been stationed in Lebanon continuously since 1976 were compelled to withdraw from the Beqa'a Heights to Syrian territory. This constituted a big change in the relationship between Lebanon and Syria. In the parliamentary election at the end of May, the anti-Syrian electoral coalition "Rafik Hariri Martyr List" led by Saad Hariri (Sunni Muslim), containing the Lebanese Forces Party, Phalangist Party and other Maronite political parties, won 72 seats in a defeat of the pro-Syrian electoral coalition "Resistance and Development Bloc" consisting of the Shiite political parties, Amal and Hezbollah.²¹⁾ If one considers this political background, it is not difficult to see that at the time of the survey in the summer of 2005, there was heightened pro-American sentiment among the Lebanese people, especially of the Maronite and Sunni sects.

Perception of Russia as a favorable state was 47%, with 40% considering it unfavorable and 13% abstaining from giving their opinion. Forty-three percent saw Britain as a favorable nation, with 47% considering it unfavorable and 10% abstaining. Favorable perceptions of Russia among the Lebanese outnumber those for Britain. Greatly contributing to this was that from a sectarian perspective, the Sunni and Shiite sects had moderately favorable perceptions of Russia, at 46% and 52%, respectively. By contrast, 77% of the Maronites regarded Britain as a friendly country, while only 25% of the Sunnis and 8% of the Shiites did.²²⁾

If we tentatively add half of the respondents who chose "I cannot say if it is favorable or unfavorable (a neutral country)," which was an

option on Q33 of the Egyptian Survey to those who chose “favorable country,” 51% of Cairo’s citizens would perceive Russia as a favorable country and 50% would perceive Britain as a favorable country, higher than the level of favorable perceptions the Lebanese had toward either Russia or Britain.

Fifth came Israel, with 96% of the Lebanese considering it a hostile nation, having the same perception of it as Cairo’s citizens.

3. Regional identity and national awareness

Questions Q24 and 25 of the 2007 Egyptian Survey

(see Appendix 1)

Q19, 30.1, 30.2, 31.1 and 31.2 of the 2005 Lebanese Survey

(see Appendix 2)

The regional unit Cairo’s citizens felt the most personal unity or identity with on a daily basis was the nation of Egypt (71%), followed by the governorate or district (municipal administrative district) in which they resided (14%) and the worldwide Islamic community (13%). Comparing these results to those for the Lebanese citizens, 35% of the latter gave the state of Lebanon as their reply, so it would be no mistake to say that the Egyptians have a stronger sense of their national identity. In Lebanon, 37% chose the city, district, town or village in which they currently resided and 12% chose their governorate, showing that they have a stronger sense of belonging to their local community than to their nation. From the perspective of religious sects, the Maronites came in first, with 46% choosing their city, district, town or village, whereas 40% of the Sunni and 34% of the Shiite chose the state of Lebanon.²³⁾

Thirteen percent of the respondents in Cairo had a strong sense of identity with the Islamic Community (al-Ummah al-Islamiyah), which extended beyond their nation’s borders into a wider global community, while 3% felt strong unity with the Arab Nation (al-Ummah al-‘Arabiyyah). Meanwhile, in Lebanon, identity with the Islamic Community ran low, at only 2%. Instead the Lebanese citizens identified more

strongly with the Arab Nation, 4%, than with the Islamic Community. From the perspective of their religious sects, none of the Maronites felt identity with the Arab Nation. It is better described that the Maronites did not feel primary identity for any regional community extending beyond the Lebanese state at all. By contrast, both the Sunni and Shiite sects felt a stronger sense of identity, by a factor of two or more, for the Arab Nation than for the Islamic Community.²⁴⁾ This in turn signifies that compared to the Egyptian Muslims, the Lebanese Muslims are more oriented toward the Arab Nation than the Islamic Community.

When asked what they took pride in about their own country, quite a large number, 12~15% of citizens in both states replied that they took no pride in any aspect of their country. Thirty-one percent of Cairo's citizens took pride in the peace and stability of their nation, 19% in the upholding of religious principles, 14% in the distinctive characteristics of the country's people (unity, cooperative inclination, consideration for others, etc.) and 10% in Egypt's physical features. Twenty-five percent of Lebanese citizens took pride in the characteristics of the nation's people, 24% in the country's physical features, 10% in its religions and 5% in its mental virtues. It appears that the citizens of both countries shared pride in the characteristics of their nation's people, the scenery/physical features and religions.

The IDSC took the initiative to add "the nation's peace and stability" to the list of answer options on the 2007 Egyptian Survey, and it did not appear on the 2005 Lebanese Survey. The addition of this answer choice made it relatively easier for the Egyptian respondents to express their nationalistic pride. This is thought to be the reason the nation's peace and stability became the top selection. In addition, nearly twice as many Cairo citizens took pride in their religion than did Lebanese citizens. Just as with the above-mentioned sense of identity with the Islamic Community, one senses an inclination among Cairo's citizens to view Islam seriously.

In addition, 0.2% of respondents to the Egyptian survey took pride in their political system and none took pride in their economic system,

and this is thought to be an expression of deep dissatisfaction among Cairo's citizens with the state of political participation and economic difficulties.

One observes an interesting phenomenon when Cairo citizens' Islamic tendencies are cross-tabulated with other results. Such Islamic tendencies were reflected in the simple tallied results of Q24 and 25. In respective cross-tabulations of regional identity (Q24) with regime evaluation (Q14), participation in local communities, ideal and actual (Q5 and 6) and use of influence on the national government (Q8), 77% of the respondents who replied to Q24 of the Cairo survey that they identified themselves with the Islamic Community (al-Ummah al-Islamiyah) most (who themselves constituted 13% of the total number surveyed) had an unfavorable assessment of the national administrative performance. Ninety-one percent of this group thought that ordinary citizens should be involved in decisions in their communities, playing a big, active role. Seventy-three percent answered that in actuality citizens have absolutely no right to participate in community decisions, and 70% said that their efforts would not be influential at all in opposing decisions of the national government. While the Cairo survey tells us that the citizens who view Islam seriously were critical of the central government and had strong motivation for political participation, no such clear inclination is found in the Lebanon survey data.

The Cairo citizens expressing Islamic identity also showed distinctive perceptions of other countries. In cross-tabulations of regional identity (Q24) with the importance of other countries in national foreign relations (Q32) and favorable nations (Q33), 52% of those who identified themselves more with the Islamic Community than the Egyptian state considered the US "extremely important" (though 25% of them perceived it "not important at all"). Forty-eight percent of this group, however, replied that the US was a "very unfavorable country," compared to the total average of 31%. They exhibited the highest level of disregard for the US among all of the groups with various identities, including those identifying themselves with the Arab Republic of Egypt,

among whom 27% felt likewise.

Part 3 Political Awareness of Lebanese and Egyptian Citizens from a Demographics Perspective: Cross-tabulations with Age, Education Level and Household Income

1. Cross-tabulation with age group

Q1. "First, I will ask you about your level of interest in political problems and themes, like the organization of the new cabinet or living conditions in this country, such as unemployment, price levels, wages, etc." cross-tabulated with F2. "Age group" of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (Appendix 1) .

	Considerably interested	Somewhat interested	Not really interested	Not interested at all	Don't know/ unclear	Total
18~29(22.0%)	36.7%	24.5%	12.2%	26.5%	0.0%	100.0%
30~39(20.0%)	50.6%	30.3%	4.5%	14.6%	0.0%	100.0%
40~49(18.8%)	40.5%	25.0%	8.3%	26.2%	0.0%	100.0%
50~59(17.2%)	51.9%	24.1%	5.1%	17.7%	1.3%	100.0%
60 or older (21.5%)	41.7%	26.0%	7.3%	25.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total average	43.9%	26.0%	7.6%	22.2%	0.2%	100.0%

Q1. "Can you please tell me how interested you are in politics?" cross-tabulated with S2. "Age group" [V105] of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (Appendix 2).

	Considerably interested	Somewhat interested	Not really interested	Not interested at all	Don't know	Total
20~29(34.7%)	20.3%	41.2%	24.2%	13.7%	0.5%	100.0%
30~39(27.2%)	30.1%	37.8%	16.8%	15.4%	0.0%	100.0%
40~49(18.7%)	34.7%	31.6%	23.5%	10.2%	0.0%	100.0%
50~65(19.4%)	21.6%	39.2%	20.6%	18.6%	0.0%	100.0%
Total average	25.9%	38.1%	21.3%	14.5%	0.2%	100.0%

Let's consider interest in politics by age group in Cairo and Lebanon. In Cairo, interest in politics is higher in the older age groups, with a 70% overall average. The level of interest was highest in the

30~39-year-old group, at 81%, followed by the 50~59-year-old group, at 76%, and lowest among the 18~29-year-old group, at 61%. The question on political interest in the 2007 Egyptian Survey mentioned political issues, including the organization of a new cabinet and economic problems affecting citizens' lives, such as unemployment, prices and wages. This may be the reason the older age groups, who are undoubtedly sensitive to these kinds of issues, evinced a higher degree of interest in politics.

Generally in Middle Eastern countries, young people aged 20 or below account for up to a third of the total population, and in some instances they constitute nearly 2/5 of the population. Egypt is no exception. Moreover, as the level of health and education among the younger population improves and increases, it becomes a top priority in development policies to provide these young people with employment and income opportunities. Failure to address these issues is often said to cause rising discontent with society among the younger people, motivating them to become involved in political movements. However, the above-mentioned variations in political interest according to age group in Cairo do not seem to support this developmental hypothesis.

In looking at interest in politics by age group in Lebanon, one sees that respondents who answered "interested" account for about 60% of all age groups. There are no big differences in the level of interest among any of the age groups. One clear feature in comparison to Cairo, however, is that except for the 40~49-year-old group, respondents claiming to be "somewhat interested" outnumbered those claiming to be "considerably interested" in politics. Also, respondents answering "not really interested" outnumbered those answering "not interested at all" in all age brackets. This suggests that the Lebanese citizens' interest in politics had gone somewhat "cold."

2. Cross-tabulation with level of education

Q20. "Have you ever voted in elections and referendums?" cross-tabulated with F3. "Education level" of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (Appendix 1).

Comparative Political Awareness of Cairo and Lebanese Citizens

	Yes	No	Don't know/ can't remember	Total
Illiterate (doesn't read or write) (16.8%)	13.3%	86.7%	0.0%	100.0%
Less than primary (reads and writes) (5.2%)	26.1%	73.9%	0.0%	100.0%
Primary (9.2%)	22.0%	75.6%	2.4%	100.0%
Preparatory (8.7%)	25.6%	71.8%	2.6%	100.0%
Secondary or equivalent (includes diplomas) (26.9%)	30.0%	70.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Above intermediate (includes 2-year college/5-year secondary) (6.3%)	25.0%	75.0%	0.0%	100.0%
University education (25.6%)	37.7%	62.3%	0.0%	100.0%
Above university (Masters/Ph.D.) (1.3%)	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total average	27.8%	71.7%	0.4%	100.0%

Q18. "In general how do you regard voting or election campaigns?" (one response only) cross-tabulated with F4. "Education level: What school have you graduated from or are continuing studies at?" [n.f4.1] of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (Appendix 2) .

	I feel satisfied in voting	I sometimes find election campaigns interesting and fun	I sometimes feel annoyed during election campaigns	Sometimes election cam- paigns appear totally ridiculous to me	I feel neither way toward election campaigns	None of the above	Don't know	Total
Middle school (24.6%)	34.1%	19.4%	13.2%	17.1%	12.4%	1.6%	2.3%	100.0%
High school (24.8%)	34.6%	19.2%	13.8%	20.8%	6.2%	1.5%	3.8%	100.0%
Vocational/ technical school (15.2%)	35.0%	16.2%	17.5%	20.0%	8.8%	2.5%	0.0%	100.0%
University, post-graduate school(32.8%)	39.0%	16.3%	17.4%	16.3%	5.8%	2.9%	2.3%	100.0%
Can't answer/ no response (2.7%)	14.3%	0.0%	21.4%	21.4%	14.3%	21.4%	7.1%	100.0%
Total average	35.4%	17.3%	15.6%	18.3%	8.2%	2.7%	2.5%	100.0%

In this cross-tabulation, we look at voting behavior versus education level. From the Cairo survey, one can clearly see that the percentage of people voting increases as their level of education rises. Since the overall average ratio of people with experience voting was 28%, it was

not until they had attained a secondary level education, at which the voting experience ratio was 30%, that respondents who had voted exceeded the total average. Even so, this doesn't change the fact that overall less than 30% of the people in Cairo vote, a low showing.

In the Lebanese survey, there was no actual question on voting experience. Instead, respondents were asked about their general impressions on voting and election campaigning. "I feel satisfied in voting" came in first for each education level, at around 35%. No big differences were seen in their sense of satisfaction with voting based on their level of education. Looking carefully, one finds the greatest degree of satisfaction among those with university or graduate degrees. As for the second, third and fourth-ranked responses, there were upward and downward variations among education levels with regard to their impressions on election campaigns, but no particular trends could be detected.

Among the education levels covered in the Lebanon survey, from preparatory school (junior high) upward, no real differences could be seen in the citizens' general impressions of voting and election campaigns. Perhaps this is the inevitable result of limiting the Lebanese survey to citizens with at least a preparatory school level education, as compared to the Cairo survey, which included all levels of society, even the impoverished.

If we assume that respondents who said they felt satisfied in voting had, in fact, gone out and voted themselves, this would signify that voter turnout percentages in Lebanon were at the very least in the 30~40% range. There are clues that voter turnout ratios in Lebanon are a little higher than in Cairo.

3. Cross-tabulation with income level

Q14. "In general, how do you rate the government's performance?" cross-tabulated with F7. "Household income (monthly earnings)" (LE: Egyptian pound) of the 2007 Egyptian Survey (Appendix 1) .

Comparative Political Awareness of Cairo and Lebanese Citizens

	Favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Unfavorable	Don't know/unclear	Total
100~300LE(5.4%)	16.7%	20.8%	20.8%	33.3%	8.3%	100.0%
300~500LE(16.4%)	9.6%	30.1%	21.9%	34.2%	4.1%	100.0%
500~700LE(27.4%)	10.7%	28.7%	21.3%	36.9%	2.5%	100.0%
700~1000LE(22.6%)	13.9%	28.7%	24.8%	30.7%	2.0%	100.0%
1000~1500LE(15.7%)	14.3%	25.7%	27.1%	31.4%	1.4%	100.0%
1500~2000LE(6.1%)	3.7%	40.7%	22.2%	33.3%	0.0%	100.0%
2000~5000LE(4.3%)	5.3%	21.1%	15.8%	52.6%	5.3%	100.0%
Unstated(2.2%)	20.0%	20.0%	40.0%	20.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Total average	11.7%	28.3%	23.3%	34.1%	2.7%	100.0%

Q25. "How do you regard your overall opinion when you think of the administrations run by the central government?" cross-tabulated with F8.2. "What was the approximate total income last year for all members of your household? Include bonuses and temporary income, before taxes." (LBP: Lebanese pound) [n.f8.2.1] of the 2005 Lebanese Survey (Appendix 2).

	Favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Unfavorable	Don't know/No response	Total
~2 million LBP(4.2%)	13.6%	27.3%	40.9%	18.2%	0.0%	100.0%
2~5 million LBP(6.1%)	6.2%	12.5%	53.1%	15.6%	12.5%	100.0%
5~10 million LBP(13.3%)	10.0%	20.0%	21.4%	38.6%	10.0%	100.0%
10~40 million LBP(47.0%)	13.0%	21.1%	19.0%	32.4%	14.6%	100.0%
40~70 million LBP(11.2%)	15.3%	20.3%	25.4%	32.2%	6.8%	100.0%
70~100 million LBP(3.8%)	15.0%	20.0%	25.0%	35.0%	5.0%	100.0%
100~130 million LBP(2.5%)	7.7%	46.2%	38.5%	7.7%	0.0%	100.0%
130~160 million LBP(1.5%)	12.5%	37.5%	37.5%	12.5%	0.0%	100.0%
160~200 million LBP(0.2%)	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
200 million LBP or more(0.2%)	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Unknown(2.3%)	16.7%	0.0%	33.3%	41.7%	8.3%	100.0%
Unstated(7.6%)	27.5%	12.5%	7.5%	47.5%	5.0%	100.0%
Total average	13.7%	20.4%	23.4%	32.0%	10.5%	100.0%

The cross-tabulation of Q14 with F7 provides a look at Cairo citizens' evaluation of the national government overall by level of household income (monthly earnings). If we assume their annual income is their monthly household income multiplied by twelve and then convert that figure into Japanese yen, their annual incomes spanned 1200~3600 LE (Egyptian pounds), or about ¥20,000~60,000, at the lower end, to 24,000~60,000 LE, or about ¥400,000~1,000,000, at the upper end. Within this range, about 50% were concentrated in two ranges, 6,000~8,400 LE (about ¥100,000~140,000) and 8,400~12,000 LE (about ¥140,000~200,000). Adding the ranges just above and below these, i.e., 3,600~6,000 LE (about ¥60,000~100,000) and 12,000~18,000 LE (about ¥200,000~300,000), covers 82% of the respondents.

In this cross-tabulation, no differences or peculiarities emerged in their evaluation of the administration's governance based on how great or small their income was. Excluding those with the highest income level, 30~40% at each level gave their government an unfavorable rating, with another 20~30% rating it as somewhat unfavorable. At the highest income level, 53% rated it as unfavorable and 16% as somewhat unfavorable, giving the harshest evaluation among the respondents. From the lowest to the highest income levels, more than half of Cairo's citizens share a negative evaluation of the current government.

The cross-tabulation of Q25 with F8.2 gives Lebanese citizens' evaluation of their administration by level of household income (yearly earnings). Converting those figures into Japanese yen, their annual incomes ranged from less than two million LBP (Lebanese pounds), or ¥120,000, at the lower end, to more than 200 million LBP, or ¥12 million, at the upper end. Within this range, 47% fell into the range of 10~40 million LBP (¥600,000~2,400,000), and if the two levels above and below that are added, i.e., 5~10 million LBP (¥300,000~600,000) and 40~70 million LBP (¥2.4~4.2 million), it includes 72% of the respondents. According to World Bank statistics, the per capita gross national income (GNI) for 2007 in Egypt was \$1,580 (about ¥158,000), and in Lebanon it was \$5,770 (about ¥577,000), so there is an income dispar-

ity of a factor of about 3.7 between Lebanon and Egypt. The income distributions in both of the above surveys fit these averages by and large.²⁵⁾

What are the features of this cross-tabulation when we expand the middle income group to 75% by adding the range of 70~100 million LBP (3.8%) to the above-mentioned middle income bracket with 72% of the respondents? This new grouping gave unfavorable ratings to the government in the 30~40% range. Excluding the 10~40 million LBP range, they gave it somewhat unfavorable ratings in the 20~30% range. On the other hand, they gave it favorable ratings in the 10~20% range and somewhat favorable at about 20% across the board. With this reflecting the main body of respondents, more than half of Lebanon's citizens (50~60%) overall gave their government a negative appraisal. In the two income levels below this middle range, unfavorable ratings were down to the 10~20% range, but somewhat unfavorable ratings were up in the 40~50% range. Moreover, in the two high-income levels directly above the four middle levels, the unfavorable ratings were down sharply to about 10%, while the somewhat unfavorable ratings were up to a little under 40%, with somewhat favorable ratings up to the 30~40% level. However, only about 10% gave it a favorable rating (though it must be noted the sample size in each case is small), and this meager ratio was a common feature at practically all the income levels. Therefore, even in Lebanon no clear trends emerged regarding their evaluation of their government based on greater or lesser income. The negative rating of their national government is well established, particularly among the most numerous middle income levels.

Concluding Remarks

The above report compared the political awareness of the citizens of Lebanon and Cairo, using simple-tallied results and cross-tabulated results from public opinion surveys, one conducted in Lebanon and one

in Cairo.

How do citizens in each country participate in their nation's politics? The author was able to summarize the following eight broad characteristics of the citizens' perceptions in Cairo and Lebanon.

- (1) Political interest: Seventy percent of Cairo's citizens and 64% of Lebanon's were interested in politics. In Cairo, however, people with "considerable interest" outnumbered those who were "somewhat interested" in all age groups; while in Lebanon, with the exception of the 40~49-year-old group, those "somewhat interested" outnumbered those "considerably interested." This suggests that Lebanon's citizens have a somewhat "cooler" interest in politics. On the other hand, though, more Lebanese engage in political discussions with their relatives and friends than do Egyptians, which is the first step toward political participation.
- (2) Degree of active participation in local community activities: The Lebanese citizens were observed to have a stronger tendency to view local community activities, such as projects undertaken by their local community, citizens' activities and activities of local organizations, as more important than those at the national level. The Egyptians in this survey, to the contrary, had less enthusiasm than the Lebanese for involving themselves in issues of the community in which they resided.
- (3) Voting behavior in elections: The fact that 70% or more of Egypt's urban citizens have never voted, together with low voter turnouts as a rule in Egypt, suggests that the majority of Egypt's citizens have not thus far, at least, regarded elections as an effective means of political participation. From the Cairo survey, however, we know that the percentage of persons casting ballots increases with their level of education (Part 3, 2. Cross-tabulation with level of education) and the strength of their motivation for political involvement. Cairo's low-income stratum shows the lowest rate of voting in elections. Moreover, its support is low for both the political party in power and candidates with no party affiliation. The Lebanese cit-

izens, on the other hand, have quite a high level of trust in the election process, so one would guess that voter turnouts are a little higher in Lebanon than in Egypt. However, while the Cairo survey included the impoverished class, the Lebanese survey was limited to citizens with preparatory school or higher levels of education, and it is thought that the results may have reflected the effect of this.

- (4) Citizen participation in local communities, ideal and actual: Even though 79% of Cairo's citizens strongly desire more active, involved citizen participation in policy decisions, 69% complain that in reality they are provided absolutely no political rights. In Lebanon, 58% of the citizens want to be actively involved, while 15% are focused on their own lives to the degree that they have no interest in local decisions. The "homebody-ism" has quite a strong impact on Lebanese citizens' perceptions.
- (5) Citizens' assessment of their local government and effectiveness of their influence on local government: From the results of the survey, it could be clearly seen that the Egyptians perceived a big influence on their daily lives from the local government, and more than half of them were dissatisfied with those policies. The Lebanese, on the other hand, felt that they were not influenced very much by their local government, and while inequality between questions on the surveys may have affected this, they appeared to harbor less dissatisfaction with their local governments than the Egyptians. Both countries' citizens shared a perceived difficulty in exerting influence on their local governments. This suggests that even if the citizens wanted to influence their local government based on their personal opinion or interests, there was no effective system for them to accomplish that.
- (6) Citizens' assessment of their national government and effectiveness of their influence on national government: The perceptions of citizens on the local level were repeated even more strongly on the national level. The great majority of Cairo's citizens felt their daily

lives were heavily influenced by policies of the Egyptian government, and more than half of them felt their lives had not been improved by those policies, but rather, made more difficult. The Lebanese citizens, on the other hand, perceived less of an influence from the central government on their daily lives, and there was less dissatisfaction among them over the nature of these effects than there was among Cairo's citizens. Their general assessment of the central government, however, was negative to one degree or another for the majority of citizens in Lebanon just as it was in Cairo. Moreover, the Egyptians thought that citizen participation in policy decision-making processes was not allowed. Similarly, the Lebanese also perceived it impossible for them to exert an influence in the policy decision-making process at the national level.

- (7) Perceptions of other countries at the citizen level: The survey questions on perceptions of other countries covered a number of countries both within the Middle East and outside the region and asked whether the respondents thought ① they were important diplomatically and ② they were friendly countries. The 2007 Cairo survey showed that the Egyptians thought highly of their fellow Arab states. Meanwhile, they saw America as an important country, but 53% perceived it as unfriendly. The 2005 Lebanon survey, on the other hand, differed a little from the Cairo survey in the countries covered, so a thorough comparison cannot be made, but it was clear that Lebanon's citizens did not share the perception of Egypt's citizens toward their fellow Arab states. One factor in the perception among 54% of the Lebanese of Syria as an unfavorable country was there were larger than representative numbers of Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims in the sample, with anti-Syrian sentiments among these sects being high.
- (8) Sense of regional identity and national awareness: Lebanon's citizens felt a somewhat stronger sense of affiliation with their local communities than with their nation. In contrast, 71% of Cairo's citizens felt their strongest sense of identity with their nation, Egypt. In

Egypt's case, 13% of respondents identified most strongly with the Islamic Community. Egyptian citizens who view Islam seriously feel critical, at the same time, of the central government and display a strong urge for political participation.

From the survey on Cairo citizens' political awareness, as noted above, one can see that Cairo's citizens have strong interest in politics but, at the same time, an extremely low sense of effective involvement in politics. The vast majority of Egypt's citizens feel it is virtually impossible for individual citizens to exert any kind of influence over policies and that there are no means of accomplishing that. While the Lebanese have slightly greater awareness of citizen participation, they feel practically the same as the Egyptians in this regard.

*This is the version in which the author revised and expanded the paper of the same title given at the session: Civil Society and Governance in the Middle East, International Joint Symposium of the Keio University Global COE Program: Designing Governance for Civil Society, on November 23rd, 2009.

Endnotes

- 1) Funding support for performing this survey was received from Keio Gijuku Academic Development Funds in FY2006 for the collaborative research project "Citizen Awareness in Egypt: Performance and Analysis of a Public Opinion Survey" (lead researcher: Hiroshi Tomita, Professor of Faculty of Law; collaborating researcher: Yasumasa Kuroda, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Hawaii). The author expresses his gratitude.
- 2) Add to these, Kuroda, Yasumasa (2006) "Civil Society in Lebanon: Its Consociational Democracy and Attitudinal Structure," which analyzed Lebanon's civil society using the results of the 2005 Lebanese Survey.
- 3) The Chairman of the IDSC was statistician, Dr. Magued Osman, formerly a professor at Cairo University. The author was introduced to Dr. Osman by my long friend Dr. Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Cairo University. Concurrently Dr. Al-Sayyid runs an independent private think tank, Partners in Development in Cairo.

- 4) Collaborative researcher Yasumasa Kuroda indicated that because the population of Cairo Governorate was 7,786,640; Qalyubia Governorate, 4,237,003; and Giza Governorate, 6,272,571, assuming a total sample size of 446 persons, the sampling would need to include 190 from Cairo Governorate, 103 from Qalyubia Governorate and 153 from Giza Governorate in order to achieve proportional distribution in accordance with the population ratios. (cf “Data Source”, Kuroda 2008: 4)
- 5) See Tomita, Hiroshi (2007) “Shuyo sanshuha kara miru Lebanon shimin no taigai taido (Lebanese citizens’ attitudes toward foreign countries from the perspective of the three main religious sects),” pp. 140–141. Q30.(1), Q31.(1).
- 6) For more information on this point, see Tomita, Hiroshi (2007) *op. cit.*, pp. 128–132.
- 7) However, the answer choice 3 of Q10 of the Egyptian questionnaire (in Arabic) said, “It would not be an effective (actual) influence,” while on the Lebanese questionnaire (in English), the corresponding answer choice 3 to Q7 read, “I could not really be influential,” so there was a slight difference in meaning.
- 8) The latter answer choice seems to have the meaning of “Under whatever circumstances my own daily life is not influenced by the central government, or not influenced to my knowledge.” Q12.1 of the Lebanese survey was asked only to respondents who had answered to Q12 that their daily lives were influenced by the central government, so the intent of this answer choice is not clear.
- 9) In the Japanese translation of the answer choice to Q25 on the Lebanese questionnaire (in English), “favorable” is “yoi” (good) while “unfavorable” is “yokunai” (not good).
- 10) The difference between the third answer choice for Q8 on the Egyptian questionnaire (in Arabic) and the third choice of Q6 on the Lebanese questionnaire (in English) is the same as in Note 7, above.
- 11) See Tomita, Hiroshi (2007), *op. cit.*, p.142. Q43.(3)
- 12) *Ibid.*, p.143. Q43.(7)
- 13) In this answer choice for Q33, the Arabic word for “neutral country” is used. This, however, does not necessarily mean “neutral” from a diplomatic policy standpoint, but rather seems to have a nuance of “hard to say which it is,” favorable or unfavorable.

- 14) The answer choice for Q33 asking about perceptions of favorable countries uses Arabic words meaning “friendly country” and “hostile country.” In this case, though, “hostile” does not necessarily imply quickness to use military confrontation, but is closer in meaning to “unfavorable” or “unfriendly.”
- 15) Shibley Telhami, “2009 Arab Public Opinion Poll,” “2003–2008 Arab Public Opinion Poll.” Published online at Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development.
- 16) See Tomita, Hiroshi (2007), *op cit*, p.146. Q44.(9)
- 17) *Ibid.* p.145. Q44.(7)
- 18) *Ibid.* p.107–108.
- 19) *Ibid.* p.144. Q44.(3)
- 20) *Ibid.* p.144. Q44.(1)
- 21) *Ibid.* p.130–131.
- 22) *Ibid.* p.144–145. Q44.(4), Q44.(2)
- 23) *Ibid.* p.140. Q30.(1)
- 24) *Ibid.* p.140. Q30.(2)
- 25) World Bank (2008), p.374.

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Telhami, Shibley (2009b) "2003-2008 Arab Public Opinion Poll." *Ibid.*

Appendix 1

2007 Egyptian Survey: Questionnaire and Demographics Items

(Sample size: 446; simple collated results are expressed as percentages after each item)

Demographics

Date of Interview

September 2007	1.6%
October 2007	98.4%

Gender Ratio

Male	50%
Female	50%

Governorate

Cairo	72.6%
Qalyubia	14.6%
Giza	12.8%

Survey Locations

Helwan	0.2%
Misr Algadima	7.2%
Alsya Zeinab	8.5%
Alkhalifa & Mokatam	7.0%

Shoubra	3.6%
Rod Alfarag	3.8%
Alsahel	3.6%
Alwaily	3.6%
Hadaik Alkoba	7.0%
Alzeton	3.6%
Almatarya	7.2%
Naser City	3.4%
Misr Algadida	3.4%
Alnozha	3.4%
Ein Shams	3.4%
Mashyat Naser	3.8%
Shoubra Alkhima-First	10.5%
Shoubra Alkhima-Second	3.8%
Tokh	0.2%
Imbaba	3.6%
Dokki	2.0%
Giza	3.8%
Alomranla	3.6%

F1. Relationship to Head of Household

Self (head of household)	40.6%
Spouse (husband or wife)	36.1%
Child (son or daughter)	15.9%
Step-child (step-son or step-daughter)	1.3%
Grandchild (grandson or granddaughter)	0.2%
Parent (mother or father)	3.1%
Step-parent (step-mother or step-father)	1.1%
Brother or Sister	1.1%
Son-in-law or Daughter-in-law	0.2%

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Other relative	0.2%
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F2. Age Group

18~under 30	22.0%
30~under 40	20.0%
40~under 50	18.8%
50~under 60	17.2%
60 and older	21.5%

F3. Educational Level

Illiterate(doesn't read or write)	16.8%
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Less than primary(reads and writes)	5.2%
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Primary	9.2%
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Preparatory	8.7%
-------------	------

Secondary or equivalent (includes diplomas)	26.9%
---	-------

Above intermediate (includes 2-year college/5-year secondary)	6.3%
---	------

University education	25.6%
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Above university (Masters, Ph.D.)	1.3%
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F4. Work Status

Working	35.9%
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Not working	(64.1%)
-------------	---------

Student	6.7%
---------	------

Searching for employment	3.1%
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Retired	11.4%
---------	-------

Full-time Housekeeper	42.4%
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Unemployed by Choice	0.2%
----------------------	------

Military Service	0.2%
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F5. Job Sector

[Asked only to those who answered “working” to F4.] (N=160/446 people, below are percentages denominated by the entire sample of 446)

Government Sector	15.0%
Public Sector	1.3%
Private Sector	12.3%
Private Business	7.2%

F6. Job Type

[Asked only to those who answered “working” to F4.] (N=161/446 people, replies received from 153 respondents; below are percentages denominated by the entire sample of 446)

Teacher	1.8%
Accountant	4.3%
Lawyer	1.8%
Café Owner	0.9%
Employee	9.0%
Senior Teacher	0.2%
Engineer	1.1%
Pharmacy Owner	0.2%
General Manager	2.0%
Trader	0.7%
Agricultural Technician	0.2%
Microbus Owner	0.2%
School Principal	0.2%
Chauffeur	0.9%
Carpenter	0.4%
Technical Specialist	1.6%
Eyeglass Shop Owner	0.2%
Company Owner	0.4%
Fashion Designer	0.4%
Nurse	0.4%
Artist	0.4%

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Laborer	3.1%
Shop Owner	0.4%
Trainer	0.2%
Marketer	0.7%
Designer	0.2%
Sports Specialist	0.2%
Superintendent	0.7%
Mechanical Engineer	0.2%
Shoemaker	0.2%
Photographer	0.2%
Marketing Representative	0.2%
Commissioned Officer	0.2%

F7. Household Income (monthly, LE = Egyptian pounds)

100 ~ less than 300 LE	5.4%
300 ~ less than 500 LE	16.4%
500 ~ less than 700 LE	27.4%
700 ~ less than 1000 LE	22.6%
1000 ~ less than 1500 LE	15.7%
1500 ~ less than 2000 LE	6.1%
2000 ~ less than 5000 LE	4.3%
No Response	2.2%

F8. Household Appliances Owned (Multiple responses possible)

Household Apartment	55.4%
Automobile	13.9%
Refrigerator	96.9%
Normal Washing Machine	57.2%
Automatic Washing Machine	54.7%
Dish Washer	1.6%
Heater	74.7%
Air Conditioner	12.1%
Deep Freezer	8.5%

Mobile Phone	72.4%
Television	97.3%
Video/DVD Player	11.7%
Personal Computer	27.6%
Satellite Television	42.6%
Electric Fan	0.4%
Semi-automatic Washing Machine	0.2%

Questionnaire

Q1. First, I would like to know how interested are you in political issues and themes, such as the organization of the new ministerial cabinet, or living conditions in Egypt, such as unemployment, price levels and salaries. **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

Considerably interested	43.9%
Somewhat interested	26.0%
Not really interested	7.6%
Not interested at all	22.2%
Don't know/Unclear	0.2%

Q2. Do you discuss these political issues with your friends or relatives?
Only one response allowed.

Yes	53.6% (Proceed to Q3)
No	46.2% (Proceed to Q5)
Don't know	0.2% (Proceed to Q3)

Q3. [Asked of those who had responded "Yes" or "Don't know" to Q2] (N=240/446 people; below, percentages on the left are denominated by 240 persons, and those on the right, by 446-persons. However, there were 243 responses to Q3 and 244 to Q4, so a small degree of error emerged at the time each question was asked.) How often, roughly, do

you discuss political issues? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

Always	25.9%/14.1%
Occasionally	61.7%/33.6%
Rarely	10.7%/5.8%
Don't know	1.6%/0.9%

Q4. [Asked of those who had responded "Yes" or "Don't know" to Q2] (N=240/446 people) When you discuss problems relating to politics or the government with others, do you feel restricted in any way in what you say? Which one of the following statements best describes how you feel? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

I feel restricted no matter whom I speak to.	11.5%/6.3%
I feel restricted when speaking with many people.	10.7%/5.8%
I can discuss these issues with some people without feeling restricted.	21.3%/11.7%
I don't feel restricted regardless of whom I am speaking with.	54.9%/30.0%
Don't Know/Unclear	1.6%/0.9%

Q5. Regardless of their actual livelihood, to what extent do you think ordinary citizens should be involved in decisions in your community? Which one of the following statements best describes or comes closest to your opinion? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

They should participate in decisions, playing a big, active role.	78.7%
They should participate in decisions, playing a limited role.	13.9%
There is no need for them to participate in the decisions if they lead fair personal lives.	1.8%
They do not have the right at all to participate in the decisions.	4.7%

Don't Know/Unclear	0.9%
Other (Specify:.....)	

Q6. In real life, to what extent do you think citizens actually participate in decision-making in your community? **Only one response allowed.**
(Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

They participate actively in the decisions.	2.9%
They participate in the decisions only to a small extent.	21.5%
They do not have the right to participate at all in the decisions.	68.6%
Don't Know/Unclear	6.7%
Other (Specify:.....)	

Q7. In your opinion, in which of the following communal activities do you think citizens should participate? **Multiple responses possible.**
(Read the answer choices to the respondent.) N = 446 people.

Participation in activities on the local or governorate level	33.9%
Participation in political party activities	34.1%
Participation in civic activities and/or activities of civil society organizations	24.2%
Voting in elections	65.0%
Taking an interest in projects currently being carried out in the community	31.2%
None	10.5%
Don't Know/Unclear	5.8%
Other (Specify:.....)	

Q8. Suppose the central government is debating a decision that could be very disadvantageous to you. Suppose that you are expressing your opposition to the proposed decision or taking some kind of action to oppose it. Which of the following statements best describes your situation?

Only one response allowed. (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

My efforts would actually be influential in changing the decision	3.4%
My efforts could be somewhat influential	11.4%
My efforts would not have an effective influence	22.2%
My efforts would not be influential at all	60.1%
Don't Know/Unclear	2.9%

Q9. Have you taken any action/s or measure/s when the central government was debating a decision with potential disadvantageous impact on you personally? Which one of the following statements best describes your situation? **Only one response allowed.**

I always took various actions	2.9%
I took actions from time to time	7.6%
I never took any action whatsoever	30.5%
There are no suitable ways to oppose government decisions	52.0%
Don't remember/Don't Know/Unclear	7.0%
Other (Specify:.....)	

Q10. Suppose the local government (municipal administrative district or governorate level) is debating a decision that could be very disadvantageous to you and that you are expressing your opposition to the proposed decision or taking some kind of action to oppose it. Which of the following statements best describes your situation? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

My efforts would actually be influential in changing the decision	6.1%
My efforts could be somewhat influential	14.6%
My efforts would not have an effective influence	21.5%
My efforts would not be influential at all	54.7%
Don't Know/Unclear	3.1%

Q11. Have you taken any action/s or measure/s when the local government (municipal administrative district or governorate level) was debating a decision with potential disadvantageous impact on you personally? Which one of the following statements best describes your situation?

Only one response allowed.

I always took various actions	3.6%
I took actions from time to time	9.2%
I never took any action whatsoever	34.3%
There are no suitable ways to oppose government decisions	46.0%
Don't remember/Don't Know/Unclear	7.0%
Other (Specify:.....)	

Q12. To what extent do you think the policy decisions or activities of the central government affect your daily life? Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

They have a substantial effect	60.1%(Continue to next question)
They affect me to some degree	22.2%(Continue to next question)
They don't really affect me	2.9%(Continue to next question)
They don't affect me at all	13.5%(Skip to Q14)
Don't Know/Unclear	1.3%(Continue to next question)
Other (Specify:.....)	

(Continue to next question)

Q13. [Asked of all respondents except those who had answered "They don't affect me at all" to Q12] (N=386/446 people; below, percentages on the left are denominated by 386 persons, and those on the right, by 446 persons.) How then do you feel the policy decisions or activities of the central government affect your daily life? Which of the following statements comes closest to your opinion? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

They have improved my daily life	1.0% / 0.9%
They have sometimes improved my daily life	16.3% / 14.1%
They have made my daily life worse in some cases	36.5% / 31.6%
They have made my daily life worse	38.9% / 33.6%
Don't Know/Unclear	7.3% / 6.3%
Other (Specify:.....)	

Q14. What is your overall assessment of the administration run by the central government? Which of the following is closest to your view?
Only one response allowed. (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

Good	11.7%
Somewhat good	28.3%
Not Very good	23.3%
Not good	34.1%
Don't Know/Unclear	2.7%

Q15. So, overall, to what extent are you satisfied or not satisfied with the government's performance? **Only one response allowed.**

Satisfied	13.9%
Somewhat satisfied	32.1%
Not satisfied	51.8%
Don't Know/Unclear	2.2%

Q16. To what extent do you think the policy decisions or activities of the local government (municipal administrative district or governorate level) affect your daily life? Which one of the following comes closest to your opinion? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

They have a substantial effect	53.6%(Continue to next question)
They affect me to some degree	26.7%(Continue to next question)
They don't really affect me	3.6%(Continue to next question)

They don't affect me at all	15.0%(Skip to Q18)
Don't Know/Unclear	1.1%(Continue to next question)
Other (Specify:.....)(Continue to next question)	

Q17. [Asked of all respondents except those who had answered "They don't affect me at all" to Q16] (N=378/446 people; below, percentages on the left are denominated by 378 persons, and those on the right, by 446 persons.) How then do you feel the policy decisions or activities of the local government (municipal administrative district or governorate level) affect your daily life? Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

They have improved my daily life	1.9% / 1.6%
They have sometimes improved my daily life	21.4% / 18.2%
They have made my daily life worse in some cases	39.2% / 33.2%
They have made my daily life worse	33.3% / 28.3%
Don't Know/Unclear	4.2% / 3.6%
Other (Specify:.....)	

Q18. What do you think of voting in Egypt's current elections? Which one of the following statements comes closest to your view? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

I find it being done in a fair and orderly manner.	9.2%
I find it being done more or less in a fair and orderly manner.	15.2%
I find it more or less not being done in a fair and orderly manner.	15.5%
I find it not being done in a fair and orderly manner.	46.4%
Don't Know/Unclear	13.7%

Q19. Do you have an election card? **Only one response allowed.**

Yes	22.0%
No	77.6%
Don't Know	0.4%

Q20. Have you ever voted in elections and referendums? **Only one response allowed.**

Yes	27.8% (Continue to next question)
No	71.7% (Skip to Q22)
Don't Know/Don't Remember	0.4% (Skip to Q22)

Q21. [Asked only to respondents who had answered "Yes" to Q20] (N=123/446 people; below, percentages on the left are denominated by 123 persons, and those on the right, by 446 persons.) How often do you participate in elections? **Only one response allowed.**

I always participate	48.0% / 13.2%
I sometimes participate	32.5% / 9.0%
I rarely participate	19.5% / 5.4%
Don't Know/Don't Remember	

Q22. What types of elections have you voted in before? **Multiple responses allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

A. Presidential elections	14.3%
B. People's assembly/Shura council elections	21.3%
C. Referenda on constitutional amendments	11.0%
D. Local assembly/council elections	7.8%
E. National Democratic(EL Watany El Democracy) Party Elections	0.4%
F. Professional union elections	0.9%
G. Don't Know/Unclear	1.1%
H. Other (Specify:.....)	

Q23. If a People's Assembly election were to take place tomorrow, for a candidate of which political party would you vote? Please select one of

the following. **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

A candidate of El Watany El Democracy	27.1%
A candidate of El Wafd	2.0%
A candidate of El Tagamoa El Watany El Taqaddomy El Wahdawy	0.4%
A candidate of El Ghad	2.0%
A candidate of El Omma	0.2%
A candidate of El Gabha El Democracy	
An independent candidate (candidate with no party affiliation)	13.0%
I wouldn't vote for any candidate	40.1%
Don't Know	14.8%
Declined to answer	
Other (Specify:...Muslim Brotherhood)	0.2%

Q24. Then, to which one of the following communities or regions do you feel you belong? Which of the following really expresses your identity/individuality? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

The Arab Republic of Egypt	71.1%
My Governorate or District (municipal administrative district)	13.7%
The Mediterranean Region	
The Middle East	
The Arab Nation	2.5%
The Islamic Community (al-Ummah al-Islamiyah)	12.6%
North Africa	0.2%
African Continent	
Don't Know	
Other (Specify:.....)	

Q25. In what attributes about Egypt today do you take pride? Which

one of the following do you feel most proud of? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

Egypt's Safety and Stability	30.7%
The Political System/Conditions	0.2%
The Economic System/Conditions	
Egypt's Foreign Relations	2.5%
Social Legislation	0.7%
Distinctive Characteristics of Egypt's People (e.g., unity, cooperative attitude and consideration of others)	14.3%
Observance of Religious Principles	19.1%
Artistic Achievements	0.9%
Scientific or Ideological Achievements	2.5%
Egypt's Physical Attributes	10.1%
I take no pride in any aspect of my country	14.8%
Don't Know/Unclear	2.2%
Other (Specify:...sports activities (1.1%), new building construction (0.4%), ancient Egypt (0.2%), the subways (0.2%))	

Q26. Which of the following media is your basic source of information on the central government's policy decisions and activities? **Multiple responses possible.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

A. Newspapers/Magazines	46.4%
B. TV/Satellite Broadcasts/Radio	90.4%
C. The Internet	2.7%
D. Friends/Relatives/Colleagues at Work	16.1%
E. Public Servants from the Administration	0.4%
F. I don't usually get such information	2.0%
G. Don't Know/Unclear	0.4%
H. Other (Specify:.....)	

Q27. How often do you read newspapers? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

Everyday	23.8% (Continue to next question)
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A few times a week	13.7% (Continue to next question)
Once a week	9.0% (Continue to next question)
On occasion	10.1% (Continue to next question)
I never read them	41.5% (Skip to Q29)
Don't Know/Unclear	0.7% (Continue to next question)
Other (Specify.....)	0.2% (Continue to next question)
No answer recorded	1.1%

Q28. What are the names of the main newspapers that you have read in the past two weeks? **Multiple responses possible.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

A. Al Ahram	32.7%
B. Akhbar Al Youm	33.4%
C. Al Gomhoria	11.2%
D. Al Wafd	2.9%
E. Al Ahrar	0.7%
F. Al Dostour	2.7%
G. Al Masry El Yom	2.9%
H. Al Fagr	0.4%
I. Sowt El Omma	0.7%
J. Don't Know/Unclear	0.4%
K. Other (Specify:...Almesaa (2.7%), 24 Saa (0.7%), Alwatany (0.2%), Alhawadith (0.4%), Alahly (0.4%), Alam Alyoum (0.4%), Alharam Almasaay (0.4%), Rose Alyousef (0.4%), Alwasit (0.2%), Alnabaa (0.2%), Alesboaa (0.4%), Alghad (0.2%))	

Q29. Could you tell me in what kind of activities you currently participate in your community? Also, what is your level of participation in each activity. **Only one response allowed**

1. Charity & Welfare (e.g., community aid to poor families, visiting the orphanages, visiting the ill)

Regularly participate 8.7%

Have participated, although not on regular basis

	20.6%
Have never participated, but want to participate	
	27.4%
Neither have I participated nor do I want to	42.6%
Don't know	0.7%
2. Community development (e.g., meetings on culture, education and academics; support for promoting handicraft, artistic and sports abilities)	
Regularly participate	1.1%
Have participated, although not on regular basis	
	2.9%
Have never participated, but want to participate	
	15.9%
Neither have I participated nor do I want to	78.7%
Don't know	1.3%
3. Culture/Education (e.g., participation in anti-illiteracy programs, training programs for youth and alumni, programs to boost technical skills)	
Regularly participate	0.7%
Have participated, although not on regular basis	
	2.2%
Have never participated, but want to participate	
	16.6%
Neither have I participated nor do I want to	78.7%
Don't know	1.8%
4. Environmental Protection (e.g., participation in tree planting and cleaning along streets and in public squares)	
Regularly participate	1.1%
Have participated, although not on regular basis	
	1.3%
Have never participated, but want to participate	
	20.2%
Neither have I participated nor do I want to	76.2%

- | | |
|---|-------|
| Don't know | 1.3% |
| 5. Human Rights (e.g., human rights groups or women's and children's rights groups) | |
| Regularly participate | 0.7% |
| Have participated, although not on regular basis | 1.8% |
| Have never participated, but want to participate | 19.5% |
| Neither have I participated nor do I want to | 76.7% |
| Don't know | 1.3% |
| 6. Other (Specify: I participate regularly in sports. (0.2%)) | |

Q30. What collective organization are you affiliated with at present?
Multiple responses possible. (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

- | | |
|---|----------------------------------|
| A. Labor union | 2.7% (Continue to next question) |
| B. Commercial organization | 0.9% (Continue to next question) |
| C. Agricultural organization | 0.2% (Continue to next question) |
| D. Social organization or club | 3.4% (Continue to next question) |
| E. Charitable organization | 0.9% (Continue to next question) |
| F. Religious group | 0.7% (Continue to next question) |
| G. Citizens' group such as the Kifaya Movement | 0.2% (Continue to next question) |
| H. Political party | 1.3% (Continue to next question) |
| I. Professional syndicate | 1.1% (Continue to next question) |
| (Although the response choice "professional syndicate" was added at the time of interviewing, we could manage to ask this answer choice of only 158 respondents.) | |
| J. None of the above | 76.5% (Skip to Q32) |
| K. I don't consider affiliation with any group/organization important | 5.8% (Skip to Q32) |
| L. Don't Know/Unclear | 7.6% (Continue to next question) |
| M. Other (Specify:.....) | |

(Continue to next question)

For Q31: Ask respondents as to the organizations they chose from among the list in Q30

Q31. [Asked of all respondents except those choosing answers J or K in Q30] (N=80/446 people; the percentages below are denominated by 446 persons.) Which of the organizations you chose in Q30 do you consider the most important to you? **Only one response allowed.** (Read the answer choices to the respondent.)

Labor union	2.5%
Commercial organization	0.9%
Agricultural organization	0.2%
Social organization or club	3.1%
Charitable organization	0.7%
Religious group	0.7%
Citizens' group such as the Kifaya Movement	
Political party	1.1%
Professional syndicate	1.1%
Don't Know/Unclear	7.6%
Other (Specify:.....)	

Q32. To what extent do you think the diplomatic relations with each of the following countries are important for Egypt? **Only one response allowed.**

	A. Extremely im- portant	B. Somewhat im- portant	C. Not very im- portant	D. Not important at all	E. Don't know
1. US	33.4%	30.9%	10.3%	16.6%	8.7%
2. Russia	16.1%	42.6%	21.5%	7.0%	12.8%
3. Lebanon	46.4%	39.5%	7.6%	2.0%	4.5%
4. UK	17.7%	46.4%	14.8%	9.4%	11.7%
5. Iraq	47.1%	40.8%	7.4%	1.3%	3.4%

6. France	39.9%	41.9%	6.7%	4.3%	7.2%
7. Syria	67.7%	26.5%	2.0%	0.7%	3.1%
8. Iran	41.3%	37.0%	13.2%	1.3%	7.2%
9. Israel	5.2%	7.2%	6.3%	74.0%	7.4%
10. Turkey	40.4%	43.9%	11.0%	0.7%	4.0%
11. Libya	65.2%	29.4%	2.7%	0.4%	2.2%
12. Palestine	66.8%	27.6%	3.1%	0.4%	2.0%
13. Saudi Arabia	89.0%	8.5%	0.9%		1.6%
14. UAE	86.8%	10.5%	0.7%		2.0%
15. Jordan	73.1%	22.9%	1.8%		2.2%
16. Kuwait	78.9%	15.9%	2.7%	0.2%	2.2%
17. Sudan	61.4%	28.3%	6.5%	0.7%	3.1%
18. Japan	52.2%	37.0%	5.8%	1.1%	3.8%
19. China	50.9%	37.0%	6.7%	1.6%	3.8%
20. India	32.5%	44.6%	15.2%	2.7%	4.9%

Q33. In your opinion, how favorable or hostile (unfavorable) toward Egypt is each of the following countries that I will list for you? **Only one response allowed**

	A. Favorable country	B. Somewhat favorable country	C. Neutral country (can't tell either way)	D. Somewhat hostile (unfavorable) country	E. Hostile (unfavorable) country	F. Don't know
1. US	4.3%	14.8%	23.1%	22.4%	30.7%	4.7%
2. Russia	3.6%	24.2%	46.9%	10.3%	4.3%	10.8%
3. Lebanon	43.0%	38.3%	16.1%	0.4%	0.2%	1.8%
4. UK	4.9%	25.3%	38.6%	13.2%	10.1%	7.8%
5. Iraq	37.4%	42.6%	15.5%	2.0%	0.2%	2.2%
6. France	19.3%	39.9%	27.6%	4.7%	3.1%	5.4%
7. Syria	57.8%	31.4%	8.3%	0.2%		2.2%
8. Iran	29.8%	35.7%	27.1%	2.7%	0.4%	4.3%
9. Israel	0.2%	0.2%	2.9%	9.4%	85.2%	2.0%

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10. Turkey	29.4%	41.3%	24.7%	1.1%	0.4%	3.1%
11. Libya	54.7%	35.2%	8.1%	0.2%	0.2%	1.6%
12. Palestine	62.8%	28.0%	7.6%	0.2%		1.3%
13. Saudi Arabia	84.1%	10.5%	3.8%	0.2%		1.3%
14. UAE	82.1%	12.3%	4.3%			1.3%
15. Jordan	66.4%	24.4%	7.8%			1.3%
16. Kuwait	71.5%	19.5%	7.4%	0.2%		1.3%
17. Sudan	60.3%	26.9%	10.5%			2.2%
18. Japan	33.9%	41.3%	20.0%	0.7%	1.1%	3.1%
19. China	32.1%	43.7%	19.1%	0.9%	1.1%	3.1%
20. India	24.4%	38.3%	28.7%	3.4%	1.6%	3.6%

Appendix 2

“Excerpt from the 2005 Lebanon Survey: questionnaire and demographics (sample size: 525, simple tallied results are expressed in percentage figures after each answer choice)”

SOCIAL AWARENESS STUDY

Opinion Poll Survey in Lebanon, August–September 2005, conducted by the Keio University 21st Century Center of Excellence program: Dynamics of Civil Society in a Multi–Cultural World

Main questionnaire

Ask all respondents

Q1. First, can you please tell me how interested you are in politics. Are you...? (Accept one response only) (read/show list)

- | | |
|----------------------------|-------|
| 1. Considerably interested | 25.9% |
| 2. Somewhat interested | 38.1% |
| 3. Not really interested | 21.3% |

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 4. Not interested at all | 14.5% |
| 9. Don't know (Do not read/show) | 0.2% |

Q2. Do you discuss politics when you get together with friends or relatives? (**Accept one response only**) (**Do not read/show list**)

(If "yes") Do you discuss politics with your friends often or occasionally?

(If "no.") Do you mean that you rarely discuss politics or that you never do?

- | | |
|-----------------|-------|
| 1. Often | 25.3% |
| 2. Occasionally | 41.5% |
| 3. Rarely | 21.7% |
| 4. Never | 10.7% |
| 9. Don't know | 0.8% |

Q3. When you discuss problems relating to politics or the government with others, do you feel restricted in any way in what you say? Which one of the following statements best describes your situation? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|--|-------|
| 1. I feel restricted no matter whom I speak to. | 10.9% |
| 2. I feel restricted when speaking with many people. | 20.6% |
| 3. I can discuss these issues with some people without feeling restricted. | 27.4% |
| 4. I don't feel restricted regardless of whom I am speaking with. | 31.0% |
| 9. Don't know (Do not read/show) | 10.1% |

Q4. To what extent do you think citizens should be involved in decisions in your community? Which one of the following statements best describes or comes closest to your opinion? (**Accept one response**)

only) (Read/show list)

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 1. They should participate actively in the decisions. | 58.3% |
| 2. They should participate in the decisions only to a small extent. | 22.1% |
| 3. There is no particular need for them to participate in the decisions if they lead fair personal lives. | 15.0% |
| 4. They should not participate at all in the decisions. | 3.8% |
| 5. Other (please specify:) | 0.4% |
| 9. Don't know (Do not read/show) | 0.4% |

Q5. In what kind of communal activities do you think citizens should participate? Which of the following statements describes your opinion? Any others...? (**Accept multiple responses**) (**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|--|-------|
| 1. Participate in local government/administration | 28.8% |
| 2. Participate in political party activities | 37.7% |
| 3. Participate in civic activities and/or organizations involved in local problems | 47.6% |
| 4. Try to understand community affairs | 44.2% |
| 5. Vote in elections | 79.4% |
| 6. Take an interest in projects that are being carried out in the community | 53.0% |
| 7. None of the above | 3.0% |
| 9. Don't know (Do not read/show) | 1.5% |

Q6. Suppose the central government is debating a decision that could be very disadvantageous to you. Do you think that you could do anything to influence this debate or decision? Or do you think that there is nothing you could do? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 1. I could be influential | 6.7% |
| 2. I could be somewhat influential | 16.2% |
| 3. I could not really be influential | 8.4% |
| 4. I could not be influential at all (Skip to Q7) | 66.9% |
| 9. Don't know (Do not read/show) (Skip to Q7) | 1.9% |

Ask of respondents who answered codes 1-3 in Q6

Q6_1. Specifically what could you do to influence the debate? What actions do you think you could take or what methods do you think you could use? Which of the following statements describes your opinion? Any others...? (**Accept multiple responses**) (**Read/show list**)

1. Form a group or organization
2. Ask friends and acquaintances to write letters of protest or to sign a petition
3. Take action through a political party
4. Take action through an organization (labor union, industry cooperative, religious organization) to which I belong
5. Make direct contact with a politician/politicians or the mass media
6. Write a letter to a politician/politicians
7. Call to see the leaders or those in positions of influence in all sectors of society
8. Make direct contact with a government official/bureaucrat
9. Consult a lawyer
10. Appeal to the court
11. Take some kind of direct action
12. Just protest/complain
13. Other (please specify:)
18. Do nothing (**Skip to Q7**)
19. Don't know (**Do not read/show**) (**Skip to Q7**)

Ask Q6__3 of respondents who selected any item from 1 to 13 in Q6__1.

Q6__3[N = 154/525]

Have you actually taken any action/s or measure/s when the central government is debating a decision with potential for disadvantageous impact? Which one of the following statements best describes your situation? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|---|-------------|
| 1. I have taken such actions from time to time | 37.7%/11.0% |
| 2. I have taken no action whatsoever | 52.6%/15.4% |
| 3. Other (please specify:) | 0.6%/0.2% |
| 4. I don't remember (Do not read/show) | 7.8%/2.3% |
| 9. Don't know (Do not read/show) | 1.3%/0.4% |

Ask all respondents

Q7. Suppose the local government (governorate level) is debating a decision that could be very disadvantageous to you. Do you think that you could do anything to influence this debate or decision? Or do you think that there is nothing you could do? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 1. I could be influential | 9.0% |
| 2. I could be somewhat influential | 20.2% |
| 3. I could not really be influential | 14.7% |
| 4. I could not be influential at all (Skip to Q8) | 54.1% |
| 9. Don't know (Do not read/show) (Skip to Q8) | 2.1% |

Ask of respondents who answered codes 1-3 in Q7

Q7__1. Specifically what could you do to influence the debate? What actions do you think you could take or what methods do you think you could use? Which of the following statements describes your opinion? Any others...? (**Accept multiple responses**)

(Read/show list)

1. Form a group or organization
2. Ask friends and acquaintances to write letters of protest or to sign a petition
3. Take action through a political party
4. Take action through an organization (labor union, industry cooperative, religious organization) to which I belong
5. Make direct contact with a politician/politicians or the mass media
6. Write a letter to a politician/politicians
7. Call to see the leaders of or those in positions of influence in all sectors of society (various fields)
8. Make direct contact with a government official/bureaucrat
9. Consult a lawyer
10. Appeal to the court
11. Take some kind of direct (vehement) action
12. Just protest/complain
13. Other (please specify:)
18. Do nothing (**Skip to Q8**)
19. Don't know (**Do not read/show**) (**Skip to Q8**)

Ask Q7__3 of respondents who selected any item from 1 to 13 in Q7__1.

Q7__3[N=222/525]

Have you actually taken action/s or measure/s when the local government (governorate level) is debating a decision with potential for disadvantageous impact? Which one of the following statements best describes your situation? (**Accept one response only**) (**Do not read/show list**)

- | | |
|--|-------------|
| 1. I have taken such actions from time to time | 36.9%/15.6% |
|--|-------------|

2. I have taken no action whatsoever	54.5%/23.0%
3. Other (please specify:)	1.8%/0.8%
4. I don't remember (Do not read/show)	4.5%/1.9%
9. Don't know (Do not read/show)	2.3%/1.0%

Ask all respondents

Q12. To what extent do you think the activities of the central government affect your daily life? Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

1. They substantially affect me	37.7%
2. They affect me to some degree	31.2%
3. They don't really affect me (Skip to Q13)	10.9%
4. They hardly affect me at all (Skip to Q13)	18.9%
5. Other (please specify:) (Skip to Q13)	0.2%
9. Don't know (Do not read/show) (Skip to Q13)	1.1%

Ask of respondents who selected Code 1 or 2 in Q12.

Q12__1[N=362/525]

How then do you feel the activities of the central government affect your daily life? Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

1. They improve my daily life	12.2%/8.4%
2. They improve my daily life in some cases	47.8%/33.0%
3. I'd be better off if there were no central government	13.0%/9.0%
4. My life wouldn't change regardless of whether or not a central government existed	8.0%/5.5%
5. Other (please specify:)	18.0%/12.4%
9. Don't know (Do not read/show)	1.1%/0.8%

Ask all respondents

Q14. To what extent do you think the activities of local government (governorate level) affect your daily life? Which one of the following comes closest to your opinion? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|--|-------|
| 1. They substantially affect me | 15.4% |
| 2. They affect me to some degree | 31.8% |
| 3. They don't really affect me (Skip to Q25) | 22.5% |
| 4. They hardly affect me at all (Skip to Q25) | 26.9% |
| 5. Other (please specify:) (Skip to Q25) | 0.4% |
| 9. Don't know (Do not read/show) (Skip to Q25) | 3.0% |

Ask of respondents who selected Code 1 or 2 in Q14.

Q14__1[N=248/525]

How then do you feel the activities of local government (governorate level) affect your daily life? Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|--|-------------|
| 1. They improve my daily life | 16.5%/7.8% |
| 2. They improve my daily life in some cases | 72.2%/34.1% |
| 3. I'd be better off if there were no local government (governorate level) | 3.6%/1.7% |
| 4. My life wouldn't change regardless of whether or not a local government (governorate level) existed | 6.5%/3.0% |
| 5. Other (please specify:) | 0.8%/0.4% |
| 9. Don't know (Do not read/show) | 0.4%/0.2% |

Ask all respondents

Q16. How much attention do you pay to the parliamentary election campaigns? Which one of the following statements is closest to your situation? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

1. I pay a considerable amount of attention to the election races.	32.2%
2. I pay some attention to the election races.	28.4%
3. I pay very little attention to the election races.	18.3%
4. I hardly pay any attention at all to the election races.	20.8%
9. Don't know (Do not read/show)	0.4%

Q17. The following two statements are opinions about election campaigns. Which one of the following is closest to your opinion? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

Opinions

A. Election campaigns are necessary for the general public to judge candidates or issues.
B. Election campaigns are not reliable and in fact the country would be better off without them.

1. Close to A	52.8%
2. Closer to A than to B	22.9%
3. Closer to B than to A	9.5%
4. Close to B	13.9%
9. Don't know (Do not read/show)	1.0%

Q18. In general, how do you regard voting or election campaigns? Which one of the following statements comes closest to your view? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

1. I feel satisfied in voting.	35.4%
2. I sometimes find election campaigns interesting and fun.	17.3%
3. I sometimes feel annoyed during election campaigns.	15.6%
4. Sometimes election campaigns appear totally ridiculous to me.	18.3%

- | | |
|--|------|
| 5. I have never found election campaigns interesting or fun, nor have they ever caused me to feel annoyed, nor have I ever disdained them. | 8.2% |
| 6. None of the above | 2.7% |
| 9. Don't know (Do not read/show) | 2.5% |

Q19. In what things about Lebanon today do you take pride? Which one of the following do you feel most proud of? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|--|-------|
| 1. The political system | 2.5% |
| 2. Social legislation | 2.7% |
| 3. The country's status in international affairs | 1.7% |
| 4. The economic system | 0.4% |
| 5. Distinctive characteristics of the people | 24.6% |
| 6. Mental virtues | 5.0% |
| 7. Religion | 9.7% |
| 8. Artistic achievement | 4.4% |
| 9. Scientific achievement | 4.8% |
| 10. Physical features of the country | 24.2% |
| 17. Other (please specify:) | 4.4% |
| 18. I don't take pride in any aspect of my country | 12.2% |
| 19. Don't know (Do not read/show) | 3.6% |

Q20. <For Lebanon>

If a parliamentary election were to take place tomorrow, would you vote for a pro-Syrian electoral alliance, or anti-Syrian electoral alliance? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|-------|
| 1. Pro-Syrian electoral alliance | 12.8% |
| 2. Anti-Syrian electoral alliance | 39.8% |
| 3. Other electoral alliance | 2.5% |
| 4. Independents | 5.9% |

25. Other political parties (Please specify:)	8.4%
26. An independent candidate (candidate with no party affiliation)	4.8%
27. Undecided	12.6%
28. Don't want to say (Do not read/show)	9.3%
29. Don't know (Do not read/show)	4.0%

Q21. What party or political organization do you usually support?
Again, please select one of the following. (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

1. Amal	2.7%
2. al-Baath(pro-Syrian)	1.0%
3. Hezbollah(Party of God)	14.9%
4. Al-Katae'b(Phalangist Party)	2.1%
5. Parti Communiste Libanais(Lebanese Communist Party)	1.0%
6. Parti National Liberal(Al-Wataniyin al-Ahrar)	0.2%
7. Parti Socialiste Nationaliste Syrien	1.3%
8. Parti Socialiste Progressiste(At-Takadumi al-Ishteraki)	1.1%
9. Free National Movement	11.4%
10. Lebanese Forces	13.3%
27. Other political party (please specify:)	11.0%
28. Don't support any political party	37.1%
29. Don't know (Do not read/show)	2.9%

Q25. What is your overall opinion when you think of the administration run by the central government? Which of the following is closest to your view? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

1. Favorable	13.7%
2. Somewhat favorable	20.4%
3. Somewhat unfavorable	23.4%
4. Unfavorable	32.0%

9. Don't know (**Do not read/show**) 10.5%

Q30__1. With which one of the following areas do you feel you identify yourself most? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 1. Municipality where you currently live | 36.6% |
| 2. Region where you currently live | 12.4% |
| 3. Lebanon | 35.0% |
| 6. Regional communities surrounding Lebanon (Lebanon only: go to Q30__2) | 8.4% |
| 17. The world | 6.5% |
| 19. Don't know (Do not read/show) | 1.1% |

Lebanon only and ask of respondents who selected Code 6 in Q30__1

Q30__2[N=44/525]

Then, with which one of the following specific regional communities do you identify yourself? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|--|------------|
| 1. The Greater Syrian Region (Bilad al-Sham) | 20.5%/1.7% |
| 2. The Mediterranean Region | 2.3%/0.2% |
| 3. The Arab Nation | 50.0%/4.2% |
| 5. The Islamic Community (al-Ummah al-Islamiyah) | 22.7%/1.9% |
| 8. Other (please specify:) | 4.5%/0.4% |

Ask all respondents

Q31__1. With which one of the following areas do you feel you identify yourself next? (**Accept one response only**) (**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 1. City/town where I currently live | 5.5% |
| 2. Region/governorate/district where I currently live | 23.8% |

- | | |
|---|-------|
| 3. Lebanon | 23.0% |
| 6. Regional communities surrounding Lebanon (Lebanon only: go to Q31__2) | 9.0% |
| 17. The world | 9.7% |
| 18. I don't identify myself with more than one area | 14.5% |
| 19. Don't know (Do not read/show) | 14.5% |

Lebanon only and ask of respondents who selected Code 6 in Q31__1

Q31__2[N=47/525]

Then, with which one of the following specific regional communities do you identify yourself? (**Accept one response only**)
(**Read/show list**)

- | | |
|--|------------|
| 1. The Greater Syrian Region (Bilad al-Sham) | 31.9%/2.9% |
| 2. The Mediterranean Region | 12.8%/1.1% |
| 3. The Arab Nation | 21.3%/1.9% |
| 4. The Middle East | 8.5%/0.8% |
| 5. The Islamic Community (al-Ummah al-Islamiyah) | 12.8%/1.1% |
| 8. Other (please specify:) | 8.5%/0.8% |
| 9. Don't know (Do not read/show) | 4.3%/0.4% |

Q35. In what kinds of activities do you currently participate? Please tell me your level of participation for each of the following activities. (**Accept one response only for each activity**)
(**Read/show list**)

	Regularly participate	Have participated, although not on a regular basis	Have never participated, but want to participate	Neither have I participated, nor want to participate	Don't know (Do not read/show)
1. Welfare	13.7%	45.5%	22.7%	12.8%	5.3%
2. Town development	5.3%	23.2%	35.0%	24.2%	12.2%

3. Culture/education	10.9%	22.5%	35.0%	23.6%	8.0%
4. Sports/hobbies	19.4%	32.0%	25.5%	16.4%	6.7%
5. Environmental/nature protection	3.2%	14.9%	48.0%	26.5%	7.4%
6. Regional security	0.8%	4.8%	34.9%	51.2%	8.4%
7. Human rights	1.9%	6.1%	55.8%	29.1%	7.0%
8. International exchanges	0.4%	1.9%	33.9%	47.8%	16.0%
9. Child rearing support	4.0%	12.6%	56.2%	20.6%	6.7%
10. Other (please specify:)	1.1%	0.2%	0.6%	0.8%	97.3%

Q43 To what extent do you think the relations with each of the following countries are important for Lebanon in the Middle East? (Accept one response only for each country) (Read/show list)

	Extremely important	Somewhat important	Somewhat unimportant	Not important at all	Don't know (Do not read/show)
1. US	41.9%	28.8%	11.6%	15.6%	2.1%
2. UK	29.3%	37.0%	13.5%	15.4%	4.8%
3. France	61.9%	25.1%	7.0%	4.6%	1.3%
4. Russia	17.0%	32.2%	20.8%	23.8%	6.3%
5. Egypt	32.2%	40.8%	13.0%	9.9%	4.4%
6. Turkey	17.0%	40.0%	16.2%	20.2%	6.7%
7. Iran	22.3%	20.4%	18.7%	32.8%	5.9%
8. Israel	0.8%	1.9%	5.5%	89.0%	2.9%
9. Syria	28.4%	22.1%	9.7%	33.7%	6.1%
10. Other (please specify:)	1.0%	1.1%	0.0%	0.4%	97.5%

Q44. Then, to what extent do you think each of the following countries is favorable to Lebanon? (Accept one response only for each country) (Read/show list)

Comparative Political Awareness of Cairo and Lebanese Citizens

	Extremely favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Not favorable at all	Don't know (Do not read/show)
1. US	30.5%	19.8%	14.1%	29.5%	6.1%
2. UK	17.7%	25.1%	19.2%	28.0%	9.9%
3. France	54.5%	28.0%	6.9%	7.2%	3.4%
4. Russia	8.4%	38.9%	20.2%	20.0%	12.6%
5. Egypt	20.8%	54.1%	9.3%	6.9%	9.0%
6. Turkey	8.4%	38.5%	22.1%	20.2%	10.9%
7. Iran	20.4%	23.4%	16.0%	30.7%	9.5%
8. Israel	0.2%	0.4%	4.4%	91.8%	3.2%
9. Syria	19.2%	17.1%	14.5%	39.8%	9.3%
10. Other (please specify:)	1.3%	0.6%	0.0%	0.2%	97.9%

Demographics

S2. Age group

20–29 (34.7%)

30–39 (27.2%)

40–49 (18.7%)

50–65 (19.4%)

F4. Education level: What school have you graduated from or are you continuing studies at?

Middle school (24.6%)

High school (24.8%)

Vocational/technical school (15.2%)

University, post-graduate school (32.8%)

Can't answer/no response (2.7%)

F8_2. Household income: What was the approximate total income last year for all members of your household? Include bonuses and temporary income, before taxes. (LBP: Lebanese pound)

~2 million LBP (4.2%)

2~5 million LBP (6.1%)
5~10 million LBP (13.3%)
10~40 million LBP (47.0%)
40~70 million LBP (11.2%)
70~100 million LBP (3.8%)
100~130 million LBP (2.5%)
130~160 million LBP (1.5%)
160~200 million LBP (0.2%)
200 million LBP or more (0.2%)
Unknown (2.3%)
Unstated (7.6%)