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Elites and Citizens in European Integration

TANAKA, Toshiro

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1. Introduction

The Preamble of the Treaty for European Union (TEU) declares that “Resolved to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity”. Article A (now Article 1) of the TEU wrote that “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen”. These words have also being repeated in the Treaty of Lisbon. It is very important that the founding fathers of the EEC/EU had not thought of an ever closer union among the states of Europe nor an alliance of states in Europe.

However, European integration has been led by a small numbers of political elites. Max Haller wrote a book, *European Integration as Elite Process: The Failure of a Dream*.²¹⁾ and Prof. Giandomenico Majone writes in his most recent work that “A politically integrated Europe. A

continent finally united in spite of its diversity and of the internecine wars of the past, was—and continues to be—an elitist project”²⁾. The prime aims of this article are to analyze the roles of the elites and the relations between elites and citizens in European integration in historical perspectives.

2. The Age of the ECSC

The elitist character of European integration had been from its beginning. The originator and the planner of European integration was Jean Monnet. With small group of people such as Pierre Uri, Etienne Hirsch, Jacques Gascuel and Prof. Paul Reuter, he had secretly planned the idea in Monnet’s office on rue de Martignac in Paris, which had been made public by French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman on May 9 1950 in Salon de l’Horloge at Foreign Office at the Quai d’Orsay. Monnet believed that “secrecy and speed were essential, that surprise would permit an appeal over the heads of governments to European citizens anxious for some positive step towards integration. He was determined that the plan would not be the result of compromise between political groups or sectarian interests, but would be presented in exactly the form in which it had been conceived”³⁾. With a strong political support of Robert Schuman, the idea was put into practice as the ‘Schuman Declaration’ and later became ‘the European Coal and Steel Community (EC-SC)’.

Monnet explained the background of his idea. He wrote in his Memoirs that “I realized that neither this organization (OEEC), nor the parliamentary meetings in Strasbourg (Council of Europe) that resulted from the Hague Congress (May 1948) would ever give concrete expression to European unity”⁴⁾. “National sovereignty would have to be tackled more boldly and on a narrower front”⁵⁾. So, Monnet had chosen coal and steel industries and had begun with a ‘sector integration’ as Ernst Haas and neo-functionalists named later.

In order to realize the Schuman Declaration, the International Con-

ference was convened in Paris from June 20 1950 with the representatives from the Six countries, namely France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux. Monnet, representing France, acted as a chair, but “it was clear that the most of the participants were not yet prepared to give up the guarantees they now enjoyed, even if the High Authority were hedged about with the most elaborate democratic safeguards⁶⁾. Finally, Treaty instituting the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris Treaty) was signed on 18 April 1951, with the High Authority, the Common Assembly, the Special Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice and the Consultative Committee.

The most unique invention as far as institutions were concerned was the High Authority, with strong power over coal and steel, run by nine Commissioners including Jean Monnet as a Presidency. Prof. François Duchêne, Monnet’s associate, later wrote that “Monnet personal prestige with the men of power, from Adenauer to Eisenhower and Dulles, gave the High Authority considerable political presence⁷⁾. Monnet’s regime had strong personality, and as usual in such cases, the advantages were bought at a cost⁸⁾. Monnet had been criticized that “he was far too involved in the politics of Europe...and far too little involved in coal and steel⁹⁾. But for Monnet, coal and steel had been only instruments rather than the goal of European integration itself.

Monnet was “a technocratic minimalist on the Assembly. But once in Luxembourg, he realized the High Authority and the Assembly were natural allies¹⁰⁾. Relations were much stickier with the Council of Ministers representing the governments and the Consultative Committee, only advisory but dominated by industry¹¹⁾.

According to Prof. Duchêne, “Monnet’s networks were an ‘elites’ phenomenon. It is hard to see how another would have worked. The populist tactic had been tried in the Council of Europe. The result had been virtually nil. Unfortunately, neither the motor nor brake on European integration was public opinion. In the founder countries of Communities, the popular attitude was then, and always tended to be, more permissive than that of governments. To pursue integration was not,

therefore to go behind the back of public opinion”¹²). “The debate over the Schuman Plan hardly affected the French people. In September 1952, 28% of the French population had not even heard of the pool (of sovereignty over coal and steel). As late as January 1954, only 45% had any definite idea whether it was a good or bad institution, and 26% had still not heard of it”¹³). “Although there was a general feeling that closer integration of Europe was desirable, public opinion was not mobilized for or against specific features of the Plan. While the European Defense Community was to stir nation-wide debate, the Schuman Plan was treated by the general public with only a vague, uninformed benevolence”¹⁴).

European integration has never developed in liner way. There have been many ups and downs in these sixty years. Although the European Coal and Steel Community successfully established “non-war community” and made war between France and Germany impossible as the Schuman Declaration had aimed for¹⁵), the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community was rejected by the French National Assembly on August 30 1954. Monnet thought that “although I was very disappointed, I did not believe that the French National Assembly’s rejection of EDC marked the end of Europe... We had underestimated the strength of the nationalist current. We now needed time to build more solidly”¹⁶).

Then, Monnet had announced to resign the Presidency of the High Authority and eventually established the Action Committee for the United States of Europe to preach the need for more integration without formal office but through dialogues with political and trades union leaders but not with industrialist. Prof. Duchêne explained: “Monnet never held elected office and was never a minister in any regular government. No comparable European leader has depended so heavily on his personal qualities and so little on institutional backing. In these circumstances, he was bound on trade on private networks of contacts. He worked mainly behind the scenes with small groups of key decision-makers”¹⁷).

3. The Age of the EEC

As far as “citizens” are concerned, there had been no reference to citizens in the Treaties of Paris nor Rome. Of course, the de facto citizens’ rights have been determined and guaranteed by the provisions of the European Treaties. However, the Treaties only deal with rights in terms of general principles and in specific, mainly economic areas. A second source of citizens’ rights, again in specific areas, has been the rulings of the Court of Justice in the context of its interpretation of the Treaties. These cases have been concerned primarily with the principle of equality between citizens within one Member States, especially for

Figure-1: General Attitude to Community Membership

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	UK ¹⁾	GR	EC ²⁾
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
September 1973											
Good thing	57	42	63	61	56	69	67	63	31	:	56
Neither good nor bad	19	19	22	22	21	15	22	20	22	:	20
Bad thing	5	30	4	5	15	2	3	4	34	:	11
Don't know	19	9	11	12	8	14	8	13	13	:	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
Index ³⁾	2.64	2.13	2.66	2.64	2.45	2.78	2.70	2.68	1.97	:	2.52
1974-1980 (14 surveys)											
Good thing	61	35	60	58	54	73	75	75	35	:	57
Neither good nor bad	20	26	24	27	21	16	15	14	22	:	22
Bad thing	4	29	6	7	19	4	4	4	36	:	13
Don't know	15	10	10	8	6	7	6	7	7	:	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	:	100
Index ³⁾	2.67	2.07	2.60	2.55	2.37	2.74	2.76	2.76	1.99	:	2.45
April 1981 and October 1981 (combined)											
Good thing	52	30	53	51	48	71	77	75	26	40	51
Neither good nor bad	26	30	27	33	27	20	17	15	25	26	26
Bad thing	5	30	8	9	20	5	4	5	45	21	16
Don't know	17	10	12	7	5	4	2	5	4	13	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³⁾	2.56	2.01	2.52	2.46	2.29	2.69	2.74	2.74	1.81	2.21	2.38
April 1983											
Good thing	62	35	61	53	45	70	72	77	28	42	53
Neither good nor bad	19	30	26	30	28	18	18	15	29	29	25
Bad thing	3	24	5	7	20	4	5	4	36	12	13
Don't know	16	11	8	10	7	8	5	4	7	17	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Index ³⁾	2.70	2.12	2.60	2.51	2.27	2.71	2.71	2.75	1.91	2.35	2.45

1) United Kingdom, excluding Northern Ireland in 1973 and 1974.

2) Weighted average

3) “Good thing” = 3, “neither good nor bad” = 1.

“Don't knows” excluded.

Source: *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Community*, No. 19. June 1983, Table 31, pp. 92-93

minority groups”¹⁸). ‘Persons’ appear in the European Treaties, such as free movement of goods, peoples... (Articles 3-c, 3-d) were meant ‘workers’. Europeans had to wait till the middle of 1980’s to enlarge application of the free movements of persons in addition to workers and their families.

Although it was only in 1973 that *Eurobarometer* had become the source of public opinion polls regularly, general public had been supporting European integration. The first result of the survey had been reproduced in *Eurobarometer* No. 19. As the Figure 1 above indicated that 56% of respondents thought that Community membership was a good thing for his/her countries and only 11% thought it was a bad thing for his/her countries. Only in the United Kingdom, more people thought Community membership was a bad thing for his/her countries in September 1973. As the Figure-1 shows, fourteen surveys had been conducted between 1974 and 1981 and 57% thought it was a good thing and 13% thought it was a bad thing on average except the UK where 36% thought it was a bad thing and 35% thought it was a good thing. Similar tendency continued and in April 1983, 53% thought it was a good thing and 13% thought it was a bad thing on average of ten Member States except the UK where still 36% thought it was a bad thing and only 28% thought it was a good thing.

4. Citizens and Citizenship of the European Union

The word ‘citizens’ had first appeared in the Declaration of the EC Summit at Paris in December 1974. “It agreed to establish a working group to examine the conditions to confer social rights to the ‘citizens’ of the Member States as a member of the Community”¹⁹).

Then, the European Parliament adopted the Draft Treaty establishing the Union on 14 February 1984 with strong initiative by Altiero Spinelli and his ‘Crocodile Group’. Article 3 (Citizenship of the Union) of the Draft Treaty suggested that “The citizens of the Member States shall *ipso facto* (by the fact itself) be citizens of the Union. Citizenship of

the Union shall be dependent upon citizenship of a Member State; it may not be independently acquired or forfeited. Citizens of the Union shall take part in the political life of the Union in the forms laid down by this Treaty...”²⁰⁾ .

But, this unique and imaginative Draft Treaty itself proved to be an abortive attempt, because the European Parliament did not have legal power without the support of the Council. It remained only as a declaration without legal binding force. However, it helped the French Presidency to take initiative to convene a ‘Committee for A People’s Europe’ (‘Adonnino Committee’, named after its chairperson, Pietro Adonnino) in parallel with an ‘Ad Hoc Committee for Institutional Affairs’ (‘Dooge Committee’, named after its chairperson, James Dooge) at the Fontainebleau European Council in June 1984.

‘Adonnino Committee’ had produced its Interim Report in March 1985 to Brussels Summit and a Full Report in June 1985 to Milan Summit. Among many recommendations of two reports were the simplification of border crossing formalities, rights of residence, mutual recognition of diplomas and professional qualifications, more use to be made of European Passport as well as the European Flag and the European Anthem²¹⁾ .

Some of the recommendations were incorporated into the Single European Act, signed on 17 February by 9 Member States and 28 February 1986 by 3 Member States and the internal boarder controls had been abolished by the Schengen Agreement, signed on 14 June 1985 by 5 Member States and the Schengen Convention, signed in June 1990.

But the major breakthrough has been the Treaty on European Union (TEU: Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7 February 1992, by 12 Member States). The TEU Title II Article G established the ‘Citizenship of the Union’ for the first time. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union²²⁾ .

(1) The right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (EC Article 8a, now Article 8).

(2) The rights to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections

and the EP elections in the Member States (EC Article 8b, now Article 19).

(3) The protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member States in the territory of a third country in which the Member States of which he is a national is not represented (EC Article 8c, now Article 20).

(4) The rights to the petition the EP and apply to the Ombudsman (EC Article 8d, now Articles 21).

Additional condition had been added with the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed on 2 October 1997) stating that “Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not to replace national citizenship”²³. This was the one of the compromises to tame the Danes at Birmingham and Edinburgh European Councils after the Danes had rejected the TEU by the referendum in June 1992 as will be explained later in details.

5. Democratic Deficits

The European Union has often been criticized recently as it has “democratic deficits”.

Originally, the ‘Assembly’ had been designed to deliver advisory opinions. After changing its name to ‘European Parliament’, the European Parliament has been increasing its powers with a series of the amendments of the Treaties as follows:

- (1) Amend and/or propose amendments to the budget.
- (2) Approve the nomination of the President of the Commission, and then the President and the other members of the Commission as a body.
- (3) Give assent to the new Member States and the appropriate provisions.
- (4) Approve or give amendments to the act through consultation procedure, cooperation procedure and co-decisional procedure.
- (5) Appoint an Ombudsman and receive petitions from any citizen.
- (6) Request the European Commission to be heard and ask questions and reply orally and in writing.


- (7) Discuss the Annual Report by the Commission.
- (8) Vote on the motion of censure on the activities of the Commission.

From the beginning (in EEC Treaty), the members of the European Parliament can be elected by direct universal suffrage by the citizens of the Member States. But, the members had been sent from national parliaments with so-called 'dual seats'.

After long and reluctant attitudes of the Member States, the introduction of the direct elections of the members of the European Parliament was finally accepted by Paris European Summit in December 1974 and the first direct election was introduced in June 1979.

The fact that the members had been elected by universal suffrage by the citizens offered the legitimacy to the European Parliament to increase its power and the European Parliament has been the largest gainer

Figure-2: The Turnout at the EP Direct Elections



Source: The turnout at European elections (1979-2009), taken from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/turnout_en.html

of power and competence among European institutions through the series of the amendments of the basic Treaties.

It is however very ironical to see the turnout of the European Par-

liament elections constantly declined from 61.99% in 1979 with nine Member States to 43% in 2009 with twenty seven Member States as Figure-2 shows.

The following Figure-3 shows how the citizens of the European Union thought one's country membership of the European Union a good thing or bad thing between 1995 to 2009. Although there had been ups and downs of the support, the majority of the respondents had been in favour of his/her countries being a member of the European Union. The latest survey in January/February 2009 shows that 52% of the respondents had answered that it has been a good thing for his/her country being a member of the European Union and only 16% thought that it was a bad thing.

In comparison with Autumn 2008, the latest survey has not show any sign of decline of support to the European Union in general even after experiencing severe financial and economic crisis and blows after the so-called 'Lehman-shock' in September 2008.

The Figure-4 shows difference among the Member States. The support jumped fourteen points up in Cyprus and five points up in Slovakia and eight points dropped in Bulgaria and seven points in Poland. Bulgaria and Poland are not the members of Euro.

The following Figure-5 shows that the majority of people thought that their countries had on balance benefited from being a member of the European Union. By looking into each Member States with Figure-6, it is very interesting to find that it is Irish, who had refused to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon by its first referendum in June 2008, came to the top of the table (80%) thought that they have benefited being a member of the European Union in January/February 2009.

Those Member States severely hit by the "Lehman Shock" (Bulgaria, Latvia, Hungary and the UK) have shown lower support, although the majority of people tend to feel benefits from being the Member States of the EU in the beginning of 2009.

"Around two-thirds of citizens in Estonia (67%), Slovakia (66%), the Netherlands (65%), Cyprus (64%) express trust in the EU. A tendency

Figure-3: General Attitudes the EU Membership.



































Figure-4: The General Attitudes for the EU Membership by the Member States (Autumn 2008 to Jan/Feb 2009).

QA6a Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is...? A good thing

		Autumn 2008 (EB70)	Jan.-Feb 2009 (EB71.1)	Evolution (% points)
	EU27	53%	52%	-1
	CY	40%	54%	+14
	SK	62%	67%	+5
	IT	40%	44%	+4
	BE	65%	68%	+3
	FR	49%	52%	+3
	LU	71%	74%	+3
	DK	64%	66%	+2
	ES	62%	64%	+2
	HU	31%	33%	+2
	FI	48%	50%	+2
	MT	46%	48%	+2
	AT	39%	41%	+2
	IE	67%	68%	+1
	RO	66%	67%	+1
	LT	55%	55%	0
	EL	45%	44%	-1
	SE	59%	58%	-1
	CZ	46%	44%	-2
	EE	61%	59%	-2
	NL	80%	78%	-2
	PT	50%	48%	-2
	SI	59%	57%	-2
	UK	32%	29%	-3
	LV	27%	23%	-4
	DE	64%	60%	-4
	PL	65%	58%	-7
	BG	48%	40%	-8
	HR	23%	29%	+6
	MK	62%	64%	+2
	TR	42%	39%	-3

Source: *Special Eurobarometer* No. 308, July 2009. p. 88.

Figure-5: Feel benefits from being the Member of the EU (Autumn 1994-Jan/Feb 2009)

SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER 308,p.90.

THE EUROPEANS IN 2009





Figure-6: Feel benefits as being the Member of the EU by Member States (Jan/Feb 2009)




Source: *Special Eurobarometer* No. 308, July 2009, p. 91.

Figure-7: Trust on the European Union (Jan/Feb 2009)

Question: QA9.3 I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.

Option: The European Union



Source: Special Eurobarometer No. 308, July 2009, p. 95.

to distrust the EU is the majority sentiment in the UK (59%, 25% trust) and Latvia (49%, 35% trust), with opinions divided in Austria (45% each) and Italy (41% trust and 42% distrust)²⁴ .

“The evolution since autumn 2008 shows a numbers of significant shifts in opinion at national level. Trust improved in five countries (+7 points in Luxembourg, +6 in Finland, +5 in Cyprus, +3 in Germany and Austria. Significant falls in levels pf trust are recorded in Latvia (-9), Bulgaria (-7), Ireland (-6), Poland and Malta (-5 each) and Slovakia (-4)”²⁵ .

6. The Splits between Elites and Citizens on European Integration

(1) The Referendums in Denmark on the Treaty on the European Union.

The referendum on Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) in Denmark was held on 2 June 1992. The turnout was 83.1% and the result was ‘Yes’ 49.3% and ‘No’ 50.7% and the narrow majority of voters in Demark rejected the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. It was the first revolt by the citizens of the Member States on European issue and gave so-called ‘Hamlet shock’ to whole Europe.

With the special arrangements for opt-outs for the Danes decided at the European Councils in Birmingham and Edinburgh, the Danish Government went for the second referendum on 18 May 1993. The turnout was 86.5%, slightly higher than the first. The result was ‘Yes’ 56.2% and ‘No’ 43.8%. Thus Denmark was able to ratify the Maastricht Treaty, and the Treaty came in force on 1 November 1993 and finally the European Union was established.

(2) The Referendums in Ireland on the Treaty of Nice

After the Maastricht Treaty had been amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed on 2 October 1997 and came into force on 1 May 1999), the Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 February 2001. This time the citizens’ revolt occurred in Ireland. The Irish Government put the Trea-

ty of Nice on the referendum on 7 June 2001. The turnout was 34.8%, much lower compared with the Danes. The result was 'Yes' 46.1% and 'No' 53.9% and the Treaty of Nice was rejected. With similar kind of arrangements by the European Council to the Irish, the Irish Government went for the second referendum on 19 October 2003 after the massive publicities by the Government. The turnout was 48.5%, slightly better than the first, and the result was 'Yes' 62.9% and 'No' 37.1%. Thus, the Treaty of Nice came in force on 1 February 2003.

Such revolts of citizens have occurred against the background that the more the competence of the EC/EU extended, the issues of democratic control and popular participation became more important.

There are many reasons in behind:

1) Weaker power of the European Parliament.

2) Less involvement of the national parliaments of the Member States in the EU decision-making process. The national parliaments can only able to influence the decisions of the European Union in the following ways and cases:

a) Control through their national governments,

b) The national parliaments only can act in the cases of 'Directives' and usually by-passed in the cases of 'Regulations' and 'Decisions',

c) Able to give assent only to important decisions, which being written in the Treaty with 'being ratified by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements' such as the amendment of the Treaty and the accession of a new Member State.

3) The citizens in the Member States can not vote to elect leaders at European level including the President and the Commissioners of European Commission.

(3) The Referendums in France and the Netherlands on the Treaty on Constitution for Europe

But the largest blows to the elites by the citizens came from the Member States of the 'Original Six', founding Members.

The Treaty on Constitution for Europe (European Constitutional

Treaty) was put on referendum in France on 29 May 2005. The turnout was 69.7% and the result was 'Yes' 46.1% and 'No' 54.9%.

According to the survey of *Flash Eurobarometer* No. 171²⁶), "the two main reasons given for voting 'Yes' were based on the essential need to pursue European construction. 39% of citizens who voted in favour of the Constitution declared spontaneously that they did so because they consider that the Constitution is essential in order to pursue the European construction and 16% voted 'Yes' because they had always been in favour of the European integration. The next highest scores concerned strengthening the role of France within the European Union (12%) and strengthening the European Union vis-à-vis the United States (11%)"²⁷).

On the contrary, "the social concerns were at the heart of the 'No' votes in France. The reasons why people voted 'No' are more numerous and were based chiefly on national and/or social themes which took precedence over European considerations. 'No' voters gave the reasons for their vote the fact that in their opinion the Constitution would have negative effects on the employment situation in France/relocation of French enterprises/loss of jobs (31%) and the economic situation in France was too weak/there was too much unemployment in France (26%). The other reasons such as the fact that economically speaking, the draft was too liberal (19%), opposed the President of the Republic/national Government/certain political parties (18%) as well as not enough social Europe (16%) and was too complex (12%)"²⁸).

Three days later, on 1 June, the referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty was held in the Netherlands. The turnout was 62.8% and the result was 'Yes' 38.5% and 'No' 61.5%. It had been a landslide victory for 'No' camp.

However, "the primary motivation of the 'Yes' voters' in the Netherlands was the fact that they consider that the Constitution was essential in order to pursue the European construction (24%). In addition, 13% mentioned that it strengthened the feeling of a European identity and 13% mentioned that it strengthened the role of the Netherlands within

the Union/in the World (13%). A motivation that also received a significant citation rate was the fact that the Constitution was essential for the smooth running of European Institutions (12%)”²⁹⁾ .

On the other hand, “the reasons for ‘No’ vote in the Netherlands were very diverse. Nevertheless, it appeared that it was the lack of information, which could be considered as the main reason for voting against the Constitution, with 32% of all ‘No’ voters indicating this reason. The second most mentioned reason was the loss of national sovereignty (cited by 19% of the ‘No’ voters), followed by opposition to the national government or certain political parties (14%) and by the reference to the ‘cost Europe’ has for Dutch tax-payers (13% indicated that they were motivated by the fact that Europe was too expensive)”³⁰⁾ .

In order to salvage the European Constitutional Treaty, the Brussels European Council on 16 and 17 June 2005 issued the Declaration on the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe as follows: “We have noted the out come of the referendums in France and the Netherlands. We consider that these results do not call for into question citizens’ attachment to the construction of Europe. Citizens have nevertheless expressed concerns and worries which need to be taken into account. Hence the need for us to reflect together on this situation³¹⁾ ”. This ‘period of reflection’ had been extended for nearly two years and finally the Heads of States or Government of Member States of the European Union decided to renounce and reset the European Constitutional Treaty by the Berlin Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome on 25 March 2007³²⁾ . Although eighteen Member States out of twenty seven Member States had already ratified the European Constitutional Treaty including with two referendums in Spain and Luxembourg and with another two referendums in addition to the accession Treaties in Bulgaria and Romania, European leaders decided to renounce European Constitutional Treaty and to adopt the ‘Reform Treaty’ with strong leadership of the Chancellor Angela Merkel and German Presidency. Then Portugal, Presidency of the latter half of 2007, officially convened the Intergov-

ernmental Conference on 22 July and successfully concluded the Treaty of Lisbon on 13 December 2007. All Member States, except Ireland, decided to go through ratification procedures of Lisbon Treaty by national parliaments rather than by referendums.

(4) The Referendums in Ireland on the Treaty of Lisbon

Ireland was the only Member State had put Lisbon Treaty on referendum because she has to go for a compulsory referendum since she had amended her Constitution after the Single European Act had been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Ireland in 1987.

The referendum on Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland was held on 12 June 2008. The turnout was 53.1%, higher than the two previous referendums on the Treaty of Nice in 2002 and 2003. The result was 'Yes' 46.6% and 'No' 53.4%.

"A majority of respondents who voted 'Yes' said they felt that this was in Ireland's best interest (32% of reasons mentioned). The other reasons were some way behind, but most of them were variations on the theme—i.e. the advantages the EU has provided and had provided to Ireland. A large group of respondents voted 'yes' because Ireland had received a great deal of benefit from the EU (19%). Other grounds for voting 'Yes' (each representing 9% of all answers), were that the Lisbon Treaty would keep Ireland fully engaged in Europe and that it would help the Irish economy"³³).

On the other hand, "the 'No' voters' responses were diverse and numerous in Ireland. A lack of information about 'Lisbon' (because I do not know enough about the Treaty and would not want to vote for something I am not familiar with) was the main reason for voting against Treaty (22% of the reasons mentioned), followed by the desire to protect Irish identity (12%). Besides these two main rationales, 'no' voters gave a number of other explanations: these include a general lack of trust in politicians; a wish to safeguard Irish neutrality in security and defence matters; the desire to maintain an Irish Commissioner in every Commission; the need to protect Irish tax system (in each case, 6 % of the rea-

sons mentioned) as well as interpreting their vote as a vote against a 'unified Europe' (5%)"³⁴ .

The Irish Department of Foreign Affairs asked Millward Brown IMS to conduct research on the result of the Lisbon Treaty referendum on 12 June 2008. A national opinion poll of 2,101 adults aged 18+ (a randomly selected 2,000 respondents, aged 18 and over, were interviewed by telephone, in the case of Flash Eurobarometer cited above). All respondents were on the electoral register and all were Irish citizens i.e. eligible to vote. The poll was conducted between 24th July and 31st July 2008³⁵ . The result showed that the main reason for abstaining in this referendum was lack of understanding/knowledge (46%) and the main reason cited for voting 'No' was 'lack of knowledge/information/understanding' at 42% and there can be no doubt that this emerged as the prime reason for people voting 'No'.

Based on their research, Millward Brown IMS advised Irish Department Foreign Affairs that "Getting people more engaged in the affairs will be challenging. Very simple, clear and easily accessible information will be required. Documents with any dense, difficult text are unlikely to generate much enthusiasm. Any publication aimed at communicating how the EU operates and how Ireland benefits from the EU membership, should focus on the following:

1) Very simple and plain language, jargon do be avoided e.g. qualified majority voting.

2) Use of lots visuals, maps, images e.g. a visual history of the EU.

3) Simplified explanation of how decisions are made in the EU and how Ireland's voice is represented in those decisions.

4) Highlight changes that have been implemented that have specifically benefited Irish people e.g. investment in roads, legislative changes, education and work programmes.

5) Highlight clearly how Ireland's economy has benefited from EU membership to date e.g. destination of Ireland's exports pre and post EU membership.

6) Highlight EU advances made in the protection of human rights

and workers rights.

7) Highlight how the EU is working to protect the environment and responding the challenge of climate changes.

8) Highlight how Irish people can have their say in Europe and influence how the EU develops e.g. contracting local TDs (EU policies are part of national policies), MEPs, NGOs who advise the EU on policy (e.g. consumer associations, environmental groups) and contacting the European Commission directly”³⁶).

On the political front, Brian Cowen, the Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister), had been fighting hard to get concessions for Ireland to hold a second referendum by the end of 2009. Brussels European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008 had already agreed that the Commission shall continue to include one national of each Member State³⁷) and Brussels European Council on 18 and 19 June 2009 agreed the concerns of the Irish people, relating to taxation policy, the right to life, education and family, and Ireland’s traditional policy of military neutrality, a number of social issues including workers’ rights with three Annexes with legal guarantee³⁸). In return, Cowen agreed to re-run referendum on the Lisbon Treaty and eventually October 2 has been fixed to hold referendum.

Taking the advices, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs has put up softer home page adverting information with figures in animation on the Lisbon Treaty. “How have Ireland’s concerns been met?”: “The Government, after discussions with all EU Member States, has ensued that when the Irish people vote on the Lisbon Treaty later this year, it will come with additional legal guarantees and assurances to address their main concerns. It has now been confirmed by the EU that:

Ireland, and all other Member States, will keep a Commissioner

Ireland will remain in control of its own tax rates

Irish neutrality will not be affected—no conscription, no defence alliances

Ireland retains control of sensitive ethical issues such as abortion

Workers’ rights and public services are valued and protected in Ireland and across the EU”³⁹)

Then the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty was held on 2 October 2009. By that time, all remaining twenty six Member States, except Poland and Czech Republic, have completed their ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The turnout of the second referendum was 58.0% and the result was 'Yes' 67.1% and 'No' 32.9%. The Irish voters have overwhelmingly approved the Lisbon Treaty and reversed a narrow 'No' vote in the first referendum last year. Ireland had been called 'Celtic Tiger' with rapid growth in her economy since she had entered the European Communities in 1973. It had been 'a success story' for Ireland and for the EC/EU. With the worst financial and economic crisis and the bust of the bubbles in Ireland since September 2008 and grim prospect for her future economy, the Irish voters were unwilling to risk further turmoil with another 'No' vote and have changed their mind to support Lisbon Treaty.

7. Conclusion

Thus the Lisbon Treaty could finally come into effect after eight years since European leaders launched a process to make the European Union 'more democratic, more transparent and more efficient'. The last remaining hurdles have been the signatures of the two Presidents of Poland and Czech Republic holding ratification procedures in each country to see the result of the second referendum in Ireland although the national parliaments of both countries had already approved the ratification bills.

Then Polish President, Lech Kaczynski signed the ratification instrument on 10 October 2009 in the presence of the Presidents of European Council, European Commission and European Parliament⁴⁰). So it is in hand of Mr. Václav Klaus, President of Czech Republic, to complete the ratification procedures.

But, this is not the end of the story. The European Union has not yet shown its final figure, 'finalité', both in terms of its geographical boundary and her competence. The accession negotiations are still go-

ing on and several countries including Iceland have applied for the membership of the European Union. Moreover, it is still difficult to think the Treaty of Lisbon is the final destination. So further quest by the elites will continue and citizens have to express their opinions through the elections of the European Parliament and referendums.

P. S.: President Klaus signed the ratification instrument on 3 November and Lisbon Treaty finally came in force on 1 December 2009.

- 1) Max Haller, *European Integration as Elite Process: The Failure of a Dream?*, New York and London, Routledge, 2008.
- 2) Giandomenico Majone. *Europe as the Would-be World Power: The EU at Fifty*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 22.
- 3) F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe: 1945–1967*, Revised and Expanded Edition, London/Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 83–84.
- 4) Jean Monnet, translated by Richard Mayne, *Memoirs*, London, Collins, 1978, p. 273.
- 5) *Ibid.*, p. 274.
- 6) *Ibid.*, p. 325.
- 7) François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence*, New York/London, W. W. Norton, 1994. p. 239.
- 8) *Ibid.*, p. 239.
- 9) *Ibid.*, p. 239.
- 10) *Ibid.*, p. 240.
- 11) *Ibid.*, p. 241.
- 12) François Duchêne, “Jean Monnet’s Methods” in Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett eds., *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity*, London, Macmillan, 1991. p.196.
- 13) Polls by the Institut Français d’Opinion Publique, cited in F. Roy Willis, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
- 14) F. Roy Willis, *ibid.*, p. 98.
- 15) For details, see Toshiro Tanaka, “Peace and Reconciliation between France and Germany after the Second World War”, *Journal of Political Science and Sociology* (The 21 Century COE Centre for Civil Society with Comparative

Perspective, Keio University), No. 2, 2004. pp.1-11.

- 16) Jean Monnet, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
- 17) François Duchêne, in D. Brinkley and C. Hackett eds., *op. cit.*, p. 184.
- 18) 'Citizens' Rights', in David Phinnemore and Lee McGowan eds., *A Dictionary of the European Union*, 3rd edition, London/New York, Routledge, pp.54-55.
- 19) Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira, "Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky" in Allan Rosas and Esko Antola eds., *A Citizens' Europe: In Search of A New Order*, London, Sage, 1995, p. 58.
- 20) Francesco Capotorti, Meinhard Hilf, Francis G. Jacobs and Jean-Paul Jacqué eds., *The European Union Treaty: Commentary on the Draft adopted by the European Parliament on 14 February 1984*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 36.
- 21) Cf. 'Committee For A People's Europe', David Phinnemore and Lee McGowan eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63.
- 22) Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Community, *Treaty on European Union*, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992, EC Article 8 1. para 2 (now EC Article 17).
- 23) European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts*, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997, EC Article 7d (now EC Article 17).
- 24) *Special Eurobarometer* No. 308, "The Europeans in 2009": Fieldwork: January 2009-February 2009, Publication: July 2009, p. 95.
- 25) *Ibid.*, p. 96.
- 26) *Flash Eurobarometer* No. 171, "The European Constitution: Post-Referendum in France": Fieldwork: 30 & 31 May 2005, Publication: June 2005.
- 27) *Ibid.*, p.13.
- 28) *Ibid.*, p.15.
- 29) *Flash Eurobarometer* No. 172, "The European Constitution: Post-Referendum in the Netherlands": Fieldwork: 02/04 June 2005, Publication: June 2005, p. 13.
- 30) *Ibid.*, p.15.
- 31) Declaration by the Heads of States or Government of the Member States of the European Union on the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Con-

stitution for Europe–European Council, 16 and 17 June 2005, The Luxembourg Presidency of the European Council of the European Union 2005, taken from <http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/conseil/2005/06/17conseur-dec/index.html>.

- 32) ‘Our History reminds us that we must protect this for the good of future generations. For that reason we must always renew the political shape of Europe in keeping with the times. That is why today, 50 years after the signing of the Treaties of Rome, we are united in our aim of placing the European Union on a renewed common basis before the European Parliament elections in 2009’, Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome, taken from http://europa.eu/50/doc/berlin_declaration_en.pdf.
- 33) *Flash Eurobarometer* No. 245, “The Post-referendum in Ireland”: Fieldwork: 13–15 June 2008, Publication: July 2008, p. 18.
- 34) *Ibid.*, pp.18–19.
- 35) Millward Brown IMS, “Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum Research Findings, September 2008”, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland, <http://www.lisbontreaty.ie>.
- 36) *Ibid.*, 11. EU Communications.
- 37) Council of European Union, Brussels European Council 11 and 12 December 2008, Presidency Conclusions, 17271/1/08, Rev 1, CONCL 5, Brussels, 13 February 2009 (OR. fr), p. 2.
- 38) Council of European Union, Brussels European Council 18/19 June 2009, Presidency Conclusions, 11225/09, CONCL 2, Brussels, 19 June 2009, pp. 2–3. For details see Annex 1–3, pp. 17–19.
- 39) Department of Foreign Affairs, “The Lisbon Treaty 2009, Who’s got a question? How have Ireland’s concerns been met?”, taken from <http://www.lisbontreaty.ie/>
- 40) Swedish Presidency of the European Union, ‘A step closer to the Lisbon Treaty’, taken from <http://www.se2009.eu/en/>