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Abstract

This paper examines how presidentialism influences legislative party system formation by focusing on the Philippines. The country’s post-transition party system is what Ekstein (1975) called a “crucial case”: according to an acknowledged theory, the Philippine’s set of conditions should have led to a two-party system, but multi-party system has continued since the 1986 democratization to present. In this concern the paper examines why the theory does not properly explain the current multi-partyism in Philippines. My analyses of the Philippine case demonstrate that the theory failed to give due attention to three issues: (1) the number of presidential candidates need to be taken as a variable, (2) presidential elections influence the organization of legislative parties by providing preferred party affiliation options for legislative aspirants, and (3) presidential elections affect cross-district variation rather than the number of parties competing at the district level. A comparative implication of this single-country study is that the influence of presidential elections on legislative party system formation may be found at the level of cross-district variation rather than at the
Introduction

How does the presidential form of government influence legislative party system formation? This question has attracted the attention of many scholars in the broader context of inquiry into the influence of institutions on politics. Methodologically, most studies have employed cross-national regression analysis to examine this question. Thus far, we know that there is a significant relationship between presidentialism and the legislative party system. However, insofar as regression analysis does not tell us what lies behind this relationship, our knowledge about precise mechanisms that connect presidentialism with the legislative party system is still inadequate. This paper hopes to fill this gap by elucidating the series of steps between presidential elections and national-level legislative party system formation using the case of the Philippines.

The Philippine case serves a “crucial case,” where the set of conditions makes it a likely case for validating an acknowledged theory, but in reality it does not (Eckstein 1975, Gerring 2001). Comparative theorists posit that under the conditions where (1) presidential and legislative elections use plurality rule, (2) both are held concurrently, and (3) the president is endowed with considerable authority, a national legislative two-party system tends to form. The Philippines have these three conditions, and the party system before the 1972 regime breakdown indeed validates this expectation. However, under the same institutional configuration, a multi-party system has continued from the 1986 democratization until the present.

In this concern, the paper demonstrates why this theoretical formulation does not adequately explain post-Marcos multi-partyism. My analyses illustrate that the theory failed to pay due attention to three steps in connecting presidential elections and national legislative bipartyism. These are: (1) the number of presidential candidates should
be treated as a variable but cannot be assumed to be two, (2) viable presidential candidates influence the organization of parties by creating preferred party affiliation options for legislative candidates, (3) the number of presidential candidates does not influence district-level fragmentation but rather the degree of cross-district variation in the set of legislative parties. These points together suggest a comparative hypothesis that can be tested by a cross-national study in future: the fragmentation of presidential elections influences cross-district variation but not the number of parties at the district level.

The paper is organized as follows. The first section discusses the theory in question and how the case of the Philippines does not fit the theoretical prediction. The second section provides my arguments as to why the theory fails to explain post-Marcos multi-partyism. The third section provides evidence for my argument. The last section concludes.

1. The Theory and the Philippine Case

Presidentialism is a form of government that has the following two basic characteristics. First, the chief executive is popularly elected, and second, the executive’s tenure in office is not dependent on the legislature, and vice versa (Lijphart 1999: 117-118). Presidential government is one of the regime types that is usually contrasted with the parliamentary form of government in which the executive is elected by and dependent on the legislature. At the same time, presidentialism has important intra-regime variations (Shugart and Carey 1992). Scholars have shown that the presidential form of government and the variations within it have impacts on various aspects of politics. These include regime stability (Linz and Valenzuela 1994, Shugart and Carey 1992, Jones 1995), policy-making processes (Weaver and Rockman 1993, Haggard and McCubbins 2001), and legislative coalition (Amorim Neto 1998, Cheibub and Limongi 2002). The number of legislative parties, which is the focus of this paper, is one of the aspects on which presidentialism exerts some influence.
Although it has been suggested that some relationship exists between presidentialism and legislative party system formation (Duverger 1954, Epstein 1967), comparative scholars only recently started to pay serious attention to this issue. Properties of presidentialism found to be important in this connection include the timing of elections, rules governing the election of presidents, and the strength of presidential powers (Jones 1994, Shugart and Carey 1992, Filippov et.al. 1999, Golder and Clark 2003).

In particular, one of the propositions found in this literature states that national legislative bi-partyism tends to form under the following three conditions: (1) both presidential and legislative elections use single member plurality rule; (2) presidential and legislative elections are concurrently held; and (3) the presidency is endowed with considerable authority (Shugart and Carey 1992: 228-229, Cox 1997: 198-190). Under these conditions, the following scenario is expected. Single member plurality rule, according to Duverger’s law, produces two-party (and thus two-candidate) competition due to a “mechanical effect” and a “psychological effect.” The mechanical effect implies that elections using plurality rule tend to have higher disproportionality (the gap between vote shares and seat shares) than proportional representation systems. Under such circumstances large parties are over-represented and small parties under-represented. The psychological effect means that voters eschew wasting their votes and thus shift their votes from the most preferred but hopeless party to the one with some chances of winning. Due to these effects, only the first and the second strongest party can survive, thus it is expected that only two viable parties compete both in presidential and legislative elections. The second and third conditions, namely, the concurrency of electoral timing and the authority of the presidency, are expected to facilitate the alliance between presidential and legislative candidates under the same party label.

According to this theory, the Philippines should have national legislative bi-partyism, since it fulfills all three conditions. First, both
presidential elections and elections to the House of Representatives use a single member plurality formula. From independence in 1946 to the present, the presidential candidate who received the highest number of votes won. As for the House of Representatives, the nation is divided into 100 to 200 single-member districts, depending on the time period, and each district elects one candidate who received the highest number of votes.

Second, presidential elections have always been held concurrently with legislative elections. In the pre-Marcos era, presidents and House members were elected every four years. In the post-Marcos era, presidents are elected every six years, and House members are elected every three years. While mid-term elections have been added under the new cycle, every presidential election is still held concurrently with legislative elections.

Third, the president is endowed with considerable authority. In comparison with other chief executives, the Philippine president is ranked in the category of presidents with “great powers,” largely because of the office’s power of legislative veto and authority over the formation of cabinets (Shugart and Carey 1992: 156). In addition, the Philippine president controls the budget execution process through his or her control over the budget secretary. From the perspective of legislative aspirants, this power makes the president even more powerful because, in practice, the president regulates the legislators’ pork barrel provision (Kasuya 2005).

Given this background, let us see how legislative party systems have formed in the Philippines. Figure 1 presents the names of legislative parties and their vote shares, as well as the effective number of parties or ENP (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) \(^1\) calculated by votes for House of Representatives elections from 1946 to 2001.

Figure 1 shows that during the period before the regime break-

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1) Mathematical expression is: \(\text{ENP} = \frac{1}{\sum v_j^2}\), where \(v_j\) is the vote share of the \(j\)th party.
down, a stable two-party competition between the *Nacionalista* Party (NP) and the Liberal Party (LP) continued, confirming the theory. After the 1986 democratization, however, the figure shows that the party system became fragmented, leaving the effective number of parties (ENP) between 3 and 8. One could argue that the particularly high ENP of the 1987 election (8.7) was a temporary phenomena typical of the post-transition period, and thus not to be taken seriously. Yet this multi-partyism has continued for more than a decade. Thus the
multi-party system in the post-Marcos era should be seen as a structural change rather than as a temporary one.

Given the gap between the theory and the actual outcome, the question I raise is this: why does the post-Marcos party system not meet the theoretical prediction? More specifically, what aspects in the existing theory make the Philippine case unfit to support it?

2. Argument

I argue that the theory in question pays insufficient attention to the three steps in the chain of influence exerted by presidential elections on legislative party system formation, with the result that the theory does not fully account for the post-Marcos party system. By taking up the following three issues, the Philippine case does not appear as an anomaly, but can be given a coherent explanation.

First, while the theory reviewed above treated the number of viable presidential candidates as a given factor, the Philippine case suggests that it needs to be treated as a variable. In other words, it was assumed that the plurality rule for electing presidents lead to only two viable candidates as predicted in Duverger’s law. This assumption may be relevant in probabilistic terms, yet plurality rule is not a sufficient condition to yield bipartisan presidential competition. As I will show in the next section, the number of viable presidential candidates increased in post-Marcos elections, and this pattern has continued for three consecutive elections thus far.2)

2) To be more precise, this point ceases to be a problem in cross-national empirical analyses that encompass presidential regimes using various types of electoral rules, such as run-off elections. The typical research design employed is regression analysis using the effective number of legislative parties as a dependent variable and the effective number of presidential candidates as one of the independent variables (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997, Jones 1999, Golder and Clark 2003).
Second, not only the theory in question but also comparative presidentialism literature in general is unclear about how presidential elections influence the “organization” of legislative parties. Broadly speaking, scholars have discerned two types of influence exerted by presidential elections. One is the coat-tail effect, and the other is the organizational effect (Golder and Clark 2003). The former is relatively well defined. It usually refers to a “direct effect,” which means that “evaluations of the attributes of the presidential candidates” influence voting for congressional candidates (e.g. Calvert and Ferejohn 1983: 407). At the same time, the extent of the coat-tail effect is relatively well studied with empirical data in the case of the U.S. (Calvert and Ferejohn ibid, Thorson and Stambough 1995), as well as in cross-national analyses of presidentialism (Jones 1994, Amorim Neto and Cox 1997, Golder and Clark 2003). In comparative studies, the coat-tail effect is examined by testing whether the temporal proximity between presidential and legislative elections has significant influence on the number of legislative parties.

However, the so-called organizational effect remains unclear in definition, insofar as different conceptions of it are found in the literature. For example, Filippov et.al. (1999: 3) note, in their reasoning about party system fragmentation in transitional presidential democracies, that “parties proliferate to support the presidential aspirations of political elites.” This implies that they conceive of the organizational effect as the creation of new parties by presidential aspirants. Yet it is not clear how legislative candidates are involved, thereby influencing legislative party competition. A different conception of the organizational effect is found in Golder and Clark (2003: 20). They note that “électoral parties organize around presidential candidates” by citing Samuels (2002), who showed that presidentialism encourages parties to focus on vote-seeking strategies rather than policy-seeking or ideology-seeking strategies by, for example, allocating larger party resources to presidential campaigns, thereby marginalizing party organization and reducing the emphasis on ideology. In this regard Golder and Clark
(ibid) conceive the organizational effect as the \textit{realloction} of intra-party resources from legislative to presidential elections.

Moreover, few researchers have provided empirical examinations of the organizational effect. Since most of the existing studies employ cross-national regression analysis, the correlation between the number of presidential candidates and that of legislative parties is speculated to be evidence of the organizational effect.\(^3\) And yet, exactly what goes on behind the correlation is not fully examined.

My single-country study of the Philippines can elucidate which aspects of party organization are influenced by presidential candidates. In the case of the Philippines, as discussed in the next section, presidential elections influence legislative party system formation by providing preferred party affiliation options for legislative candidates. This is similar to the concept Filippov et.al. (ibid) employ, but more specific in that the organizational effect occurs when the affiliation behavior of legislative candidates is influenced.

My case also suggests the condition under which presidential elections produce this type of effect. It occurs under the condition that the president is endowed with considerable authority. As discussed, the Philippine president qualifies as such. In contrast, for example, in the case of Brazil, the parties of presidents are less attractive as options for affiliation than those of viable gubernatorial candidates. As Samuels's (1998) study shows, state governors, not presidents, are more impor-

\(^3\) Golder and Clark (2003) is an exception. They test the organizational effect by examining whether there was \textit{no} statistically significant correlation between (1) the temporal proximity between presidential and legislative elections and (2) the number of national legislative parties, other factors being equal. This research design posits, in other words, that the absence of the coat-tail effect equals the existence of the organizational effect. Yet it is not clear to me why these two have a relationship of substitution. Golder and Clark (ibid: 20) themselves note that they "are not necessarily rival" mechanisms of influence.
tant for providing political resources for legislative candidates. As a consequence, Brazilian legislative candidates prefer to affiliate with the parties of governors in their respective states rather than those of presidential candidates.

Third, most previous studies not only theoretically but also empirically do not distinguish the district-level party system from the national-level aggregate. In general, when accounting for national-level party system formation, one ought to consider two issues. The first is inter-party competition at the district level, and the second is the manner in which district-level party systems are aggregated at the national level. The latter, to put it differently, asks to what extent district-level party systems vary across districts (Cox 1999). Empirical studies usually regressed the number of presidential candidates on the number of legislative parties at national-level as one of the independent variables. As a result, these studies obscure the manner in which presidential elections influence the district-level party system, and/or the cross-district variation of legislative party system formation.

The Philippine case highlights the importance of distinguishing the two levels, and of paying attention to cross-district variation. My case study shows that the increased number of preferred party affiliation options influenced the degree of variation in the cross-district party system, but not in party system fragmentation at the district level. In other words, the effective number of parties at the district level on average has been around two in both periods. Cross-district variation was minimal during the pre-Marcos era: in most districts, the set of NP and LP competed. In post-Marcos elections, along with the increased party affiliation options, district-level party competition came to have a greater variation depending on the region. The increased cross-district variation eventually led to national multi-partyism when aggregated.

In sum, the apparent anomaly of post-Marcos multi-partyism can

4) An exception that has a theoretical discussion is Cox 1997: 190.
be explained by paying attention to three issues that were left unattended in the theory in question. These are (1) treating the number of presidential candidates as a variable, (2) analyzing how and which aspect(s) of party organization the presidential elections influence, and (3) asking how the district-level party system aggregates on the national-level. By incorporating these points, multi-partyism in the post-Marcos Philippines can be explained as follows. In the first place, the number of viable presidential candidates increased. This enlarged the number of preferred affiliation options for legislative candidates, which in turn created a greater variation in the set of parties competing across districts. Consequently, national multi-partyism emerged when district-level votes were aggregated. In the next section, I illustrate empirically the importance of paying attention to these three issues in accounting for multi-partyism in the post-Marcos Philippines.

3. Party System Formation in the Philippines

3.1 Plurality Rule and the Number of Presidential Candidates

Figure 2 reports the vote shares and the names of parties as well as the effective number of candidates in presidential elections from 1946 to 2004.

Figure 2 shows that even under the same plurality rule, the presidential elections came to have more than two viable candidates in the post-transition period. Previous to the democratic breakdown, viable presidential candidates were almost always two, one from the Nacionalista party and the other from the Liberal party. After democratization, the effective number of candidates was between 3 and 5. Although not the focus of this paper, it is worth mentioning why this change came about. In a nutshell, this change is the result of the change in the presidential term limit, whereas the country’s party-voter ties have been constantly weak (Kasuya 2005). In the pre-authoritarian era, the presence of the incumbent candidate facilitated successful entry coordination among presidential aspirants, which reduced the
number of viable candidates to two. In post-Marcos elections, due to the change in the constitutional provision, the incumbent president cannot run. The absence of an incumbent, along with the weak party-voter ties among existing parties, makes it easier for aspirants to enter the race by launching new parties.

Figure 2 also shows that the names of major parties in post-Marcos presidential elections have altered. Most of the new party names, including the Power of the People or Lakas, the Peoples Reform Party (PRP), the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), Democratic Action (Aksyon), the Province First Initiative (ROMDI), are those launched by presidential aspirants shortly (about 3 to 6 months) before they filed
the certificate of candidacy. At the same time, one can notice that these new party names roughly correspond to those shown in legislative elections during the post-Marcos era (see Figure 1). The next two sub-sections will show how this correspondence came about.

5) One notices that the 1949 and 1953 elections had a higher effective number of candidates than other pre-Marcos election years. In these elections, incumbent presidents were in the race, but they were not duly-elected presidents. They were elected as vice presidents and assumed the presidency after the duly-elected presidents had passed away. Thus they had neither a history of having won the office nor the political machines that presidents usually cultivate during their tenure in office. This factor appears to have contributed to the increase in the number of entrants.

6) The figure also shows the discontinuity of party labels between the pre- and post- authoritarian periods. Based on my other work, which compares the Philippines with seven other presidential countries that recently experienced re-democratization, the discontinuity of old party labels in the Philippines seem to be due to a particular historical state of affairs. Specifically, the main reasons are: (1) a relatively long period of authoritarian rule, (2) old party leaders joining regime-supported parties, and (3) the fact that the transition was led by opposition leaders who used non-traditional party labels (Kasuya 2004).

7) For a detailed description of how presidential aspirants launched new parties and why some presidential parties such as PRP, Aksyon, and PROMDI do not have their counterparts in legislative elections, see Kasuya (2005, Chapter 7).
3.2 Preferred Party Affiliation Options

In this sub-section, I demonstrate that viable presidential candidates provide preferred party affiliation options for legislative candidates by analyzing the pattern of party switching. Figure 3 displays the extent of party switching among House incumbents from 1946 to 2001. To calculate the incidence of party switching, I compared legislators’ party affiliation status among those who ran again in the immediately succeeding election. For example, the comparison is between candidate A’s affiliation in the 1946 election and that in the 1949 election, using the 1946 affiliation as the base year affiliation.

Figure 3 indicates that party switching has been a recurring phenomenon in the Philippines during its democratic periods, particularly subsequent to re-democratization. On average, about 40% of incumbent legislators switched their party affiliation from one election to the next during the period from 1946 to 2001. These ratios are comparable to or even higher than those of Brazil, where party switching is known to be rampant. Desposato (1998: 1), for example, notes that about 30%
of Brazilian deputies switched parties between 1986 and 1995.

Given that party switching is a chronic and frequent feature in the Philippines, I analyze the direction of party switching insofar as it reveals the candidates’ preferences over affiliation options. I focus on the behavior of incumbent legislators because they are relatively less constrained than non-incumbents in putting their preferences into practice. In general, we cannot directly infer an actor’s preference from observed behavior because the behavior may be a reflection of a compromise due to some constraints the actor faced rather than his or her preference (Frieden 1999). In the Philippines, incumbent legislators have the upper hand over non-incumbents in receiving a nomination from the party of their choice, even just after switching a party. This situation is created by a nomination practice called “the equity of incumbent principle” that has been shared among most parties in both the pre- and post- Marcos era. This principal refers to the unwritten rule that an incumbent is automatically selected as the official candidate of the party he belongs to, even for those who have switched parties after an election (Kasuya 2005, Chapter 4). With this in mind, studying the party switching behavior of incumbent legislators would reveal the party affiliation preferences shared among legislative candidates in general.

Figure 4 shows the direction of party switching among legislators who switched parties. The manner of counting a switch is the same as that in Figure 3. In Figure 4, shaded areas denote the proportion of those who switched to parties with viable presidential candidates in the next election, and non-shaded areas indicate the ratio of switchers to parties without viable presidential candidates. I also classified the shaded areas into two categories: (1) those who switched to the incumbent president’s party and had a viable presidential election, and (2) those who switched to an opposition party with a viable presidential candidate. “Viable” candidates here refer to those who received more than 10% of the votes.

Figure 4 indicates that the dominant proportion of switching is
towards the parties with viable presidential candidates in the next election, either towards the incumbent president’s party, or toward an opposition party that fielded a viable candidate in the next presidential election. The proportion between the two categories varies depending on the election year. In my other work, regression analyses revealed that when the opposition party’s presidential candidates had good prospects to win in the next election in comparison to the candidate from the incumbent president’s party, it was more likely that legislators would switch to that opposition party (Kasuya 2005 Chapter 5). Overall, Figure 4 suggests that the party affiliation behavior of legislative aspirants is notably influenced by the fact that a party has an electable presidential candidate.

3.3 From the District- to National-Level Party System Formation

This subsection illustrates the importance of paying attention to variation in the set of parties competing across districts. Let us first see how the presidential election influenced district-level party system
formation, and then we will turn to the aggregation of the district-level party system at the national level. Figure 5 compares the effective number of parties at the district level on average (ENP_{AVG}), and the effective number of parties in the national-level aggregate (ENP_{NAT}) in the House elections from 1946 to 2001.

Figure 5 shows that the national-level multi-party system is not the result of district-level fragmentation. During the pre-Marcos period, ENP_{NAT} and ENP_{AVG} were constantly around two, and there is only a small gap between the two. What this means is that during this period, the number of parties competing in each district was around two and the set of parties was almost the same nationwide. This situation held steady because the two viable presidential candidates were always from LP and NP. Subsequent to democratization, Figure 5 shows that there is a widened gap between ENP_{NAT} and ENP_{AVG}. ENP_{AVG} is still around two but ENP_{NAT} is between 3 and 5. These indicate that in post-Marcos elections, the variety of combinations in the set of parties across districts became greater, although the number of parties competing at
the district level remained around two. The increased number of viable presidential candidates in the post-Marcos era caused this situation.

To see this point more clearly, I present two figures in which we can compare how the composition of competing parties at the district level changed between the pre- and post- Marcos periods. I chose the 1965 and 1998 elections as representative elections in each period because they have almost the same effective number of parties on average at the district level, that is, about 2.1. Figure 6 shows the situation of party composition for the 1965 election and Figure 7 for the 1998 election. In each figure, I first prepared a histogram with the percentage distribution of the effective number of parties (ENPi) across districts. Both histograms in Figure 6 and 7 have a mode around the effective number of parties ranging between 1.5 and 2. Then, for this mode, the circle graphs are created to show the composition of actual party names that had the highest and second highest vote shares.

The comparison of the circle graphs in Figures 6 and 7 suggests that the variation in the set of parties running at the district level was greater in the 1998 election than in the 1965 election. In the 1965 election, the set of parties running at the district level was almost uniformly composed of LP and NP. About 95% of districts that had an ENPi between 1.5 and 2 exhibited this combination. As for the 1998 election, the circle graph shows that there was a greater variation. About 70% of all districts had Lakas and LAMMP, 10% had Lakas and LP, 5% had Lakas and Reporma, and another 5% had Lakas and NPC, and the remaining 10% of districts had various other combinations of parties competing. The party names such as Lakas, LAMMP, Reporma, and NPC refer to those launched by presidential candidates to pursue their election bid. The pattern seen in the 1969 election is shared by other elections in the pre-Marcos period, and the increased variation in district-level party composition shown in the 1998 election is similar in other elections of the post-Marcos period.

In sum, the increased number of presidential candidates did not
Figure 6: Combination of Parties in Districts Where ENPi was between 1.5 and 2.0 in the 1965 election

Source: compiled by the author based on COMELEC Report, various years

Figure 7: Combination of Parties in Districts Where ENPi was between 1.5 and 2.0 in the 1998 election

Source: compiled by the author based on Commission on Elections Reports
lead to district-level multi-partyism, but instead resulted in a greater cross-district variation in the set of parties competing at the district level. In the case of the Philippines, this regional variation happened because the support bases of presidential candidates varied region by region, which then made the preferred party different from region to region (Kasuya 2001). The increased variation in the set of parties competing across districts, when aggregated at the national level, brought about the national multi-party system in the post-Marcos era.

Conclusion

This paper analyzed why the post-Marcos Philippine party system did not validate an acknowledged theory despite its institutional configuration, which was supposed to have confirmed it. The theory in question predicts that when presidential and legislative elections both use plurality rule and are concurrently held, and when there is also at the same time a strong presidency, national legislative bi-partyism tends to be produced. The paper illustrated that the Philippine case did not validate the theory because the theory skipped three analytical steps in connecting presidential elections with the number of legislative parties at the national level. First, although the plurality rule of presidential election tend to be associated with two-candidate competition, the number of presidential candidates should be treated as a variable but not as a given condition. Second, not only the theory in question but also most of the studies concerning presidentialism and the legislative party system were not clear about how presidential elections influence the "organization" of legislative parties. This paper demonstrated that viable presidential candidates influence the organization of legislative parties by creating preferred party affiliation options for legislative candidates, particularly when winning the presidency is a big prize. Third, previous studies on this subject mostly neglected the issue of cross-district variation. The case of the Philippines emphasizes the importance of paying attention to this aspect. The paper showed that
multi-partyism in the post-Marcos era did not come about because of multi-party competition at the district level, but was instead the result of increased cross-district variation in the set of parties competing.

The above points make a new hypothesis regarding presidentialism's influence on the legislative party system that in future can be tested with cross-national data. The hypothesis is that fragmentation of presidential elections influences cross-district variation in the legislative party system, but not the number of legislative parties in each district. Previous comparative studies of presidentialism tend to look at the the level of national, aggregate number of legislative parties as a dependent variable. As a consequence, it was unclear at which level—whether at the level of the number of parties in each district or at the level of the aggregation process of district parties across districts—presidential elections exert their influence. In the case of the Philippines, the influence was seen at the level of cross-district variation. Whether this is relevant in a general setting or not can be tested with cross-national data. Such examination will provide a refined understanding of the relationship between presidentialism and legislative party system formation.

Note: This is a revised version of the paper prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2 - 5, 2004.

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8) For the measurement methods for cross-district variation, see Jones and Mainwaring (2003) and Moenius and Kasuya (2004).
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