Title	Reflexive relationships in aspects of the ideology of the balinese on lombok
Sub Title	
Author	Duff-Cooper, Andrew
Publisher	三田哲學會
Publication year	1988
Jtitle	哲學 No.87 (1988. 12) ,p.219- 255
JaLC DOI	
Abstract	
Notes	
Genre	Journal Article
URL	https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AN00150430-00000087-0219

Reflexive Relationships in Aspects of the Ideology of the Balinese on Lombok

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"The distinctive characteristic of
a traditional society is order".

Coomaraswamy

I. Introduction

The focus of the present brief study written in May 1987 is the ways in which the modes of reflexivity—reflexive, irreflexive, and non-reflexive relations—are evinced by aspects of the ideology of the Balinese in western Lombok.[1]

There are two main reasons for taking up this topic. The first reason is, that to come to as full an understanding of a form of life such as that of the Balinese we should consider it under as many aspects as we can. Balinese life, both on Lombok and on Bali, has not been considered from the point of view of reflexivity before; considering it under this new aspect may enhance understanding of this form of life. Whether it does or not, of course, can only be determined after the consideration has been carried out.

This reason arguably furnishes sufficient grounds for us taking up the matters that are addressed below: understanding one particular form of life, after all, is part of the central core of social

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anthropology, and anything that might contribute to this essential aspect of the subject should not, reasonably, be ignored.

But there is a second reason for taking up the consideration of this topic. This reason is, that in comparativism generally and in the study of Balinese ideology, for instance, in particular, a number of formal relational concepts that includes opposition, analogy, homology, symmetry, asymmetry, transitivity, and alternation and other modes of periodicity have been employed to some effect in elucidating the order that frames various forms of life, including aspects of Balinese life.

The successful employment of these concepts as technical resources has prompted the consideration of aspects of Balinese ideology by way of other concepts that have proved equally useful. "Condensation" has been pressed into service in the consideration of "paradigmatic or exemplary scenes" (e.g., Needham 1985: 67–70) in Balinese ideology (Duff-Cooper: 1988a), while the notion of "broken symmetries", although not pressed perhaps as far as it might have been, has been revealingly employed in the comparison of aspects of Balinese and Japanese ideology (Duff-Cooper: forthcoming-a).

It is not claimed that these notions have the fundamental character of the relations listed earlier, although "condensation" is of course a familiar process (cf., Needham 1985: 69); while symmetries that are manifested in various ways but which are not carried through to perfection (sc. "broken") are common in the natural world (e.g., Morison 1978: *passim*). It cannot, therefore, be claimed either, and certainly not without comparative argument, that these notions are "indexes to constant proclivities of the mind" nor that they have operated as "tacit guides in the fabrication of social systems" (Needham 1983: 123), as can be claimed for the relational concepts listed above. Yet they are evinced by Balinese ideology, as by other ideologies and aspects of the world, and their discovery or contrivance has thrown light on the social facts through which they

have been discovered or contrived. The question now is: Can the same be said of modes of reflexivity?

This question is answered as follows: in section II, the definitions of the modes employed in subsequent sections are set out. In sections III, IV, and V, relationships that appear to evince, respectively, reflexive, irreflexive, and non-reflexive properties are considered; section VI concludes the study with a résumé of the findings of earlier sections and by suggesting some of their implications.

One final introductory point: I have tried as far as possible *not* to work in the direction of any kind of outcome. Of course, the results of the study are limited by the data that are analysed, and in very broad outline they can be inferred from the bases of the study, as in any formal analysis or whenever a conventional train of argument is pursued (cf., Needham 1983: 4). Beyond these circumscriptions, however, I have aimed to let the facts truly speak for themselves so that they shall lead us where they will—even when the path that they take seems not to follow that route which the signposts of formal logic traditionally enjoin us to take.

II. Definitions

The three main modes of reflexivity are: reflexive, irreflexive, and non-reflexive. It is also convenient to distinguish relations that are totally reflexive. A relation that is totally reflexive is one that every individual has to itself. Identity is a totally reflexive relationship and is designated by the phrase "is identical with". A propositional function "*Rab*" designates a totally reflexive relation if and only if: $(a)\, Raa$.

A propositional function "*Rab*" designates a reflexive relation if and only if: $(a)\,(b)\,[Rab \supset (Raa \cdot Rbb)]$. A relation, that is, is reflexive if any particulars which stand in that relation one to another also have that relation to themselves. Simple examples of phrases

that designate a reflexive relationship are as follow: "is the same age as", "is of the same estate (Bal. *varna*, *bangsa*, or *jadma*) as", "has the same colour hair as". It is clear that relationships that are totally reflexive are also reflexive.

A propositional function "*Rab*" also designates an irreflexive relation if but only if: $(a)\sim Raa$. An irreflexive relationship is one that no individual has to itself. The phrases "is north of", "is father of", "is married to" are simple examples of designations of irreflexive relationships.

Finally, relationships that are neither reflexive, nor totally so, nor irreflexive are said to be non-reflexive. Examples of words that designate this mode of reflexivity are "loves" and "hates".

These three modes of reflexivity may be combined variously with other modes of relation. Among these modes are symmetry, asymmetry, and the three modes of transitivity—transitive, intransitive, and non-transitive relations.

Symmetry may be defined by reference to Leibniz's criterion of "indiscernibility" (cf., Duff-Cooper 1985b: 15-16). Two particulars are indiscernible if no matter what objective statement that is made about one particular (a) can also be made about the other particular (b). By this criterion, the relations that obtain between a and b when they are indiscernible are perfectly symmetrical.

Symmetry, like transitivity, can be absolutely defined in formal terms—as $aRb \supset bRa$ and as $(aRb) \cdot (bRc) \supset (aRc)$ respectively—but from this point we do not employ such formal definitions but rely instead on definitions that are verbal. It is not that formal definitions are not in certain analytical contexts useful, as Needham points out (1983: 94); it is simply that for the present purpose the relationships between symmetry and asymmetry and between transitive, intransitive, and non-transitive relationships are better expressed verbally, consonant with the mode of analysis adopted in sections III, IV, and V below.

In Balinese ideology, the only example of perfectly symmetrical relations that is evinced consists of Ida Sang Hyang Sunya, the Void. Perfectly symmetrical relations obtain only where the particulars in question are devoid of content: Sunya is a dualistic unity, the two constituent aspects of which are indiscernible and without content. They are also substitutable one for another.

Substitutability is a criterion that can be invoked to gauge the symmetry or the asymmetry of the relations that obtain between two or more particulars. The greater the number of contexts in which two or more particulars are interchangeable one with another, the greater the symmetry of the relations that obtain between the particulars; and the asymmetry of such relations can be gauged by the converses of these propositions.

Another measure of the symmetry or the degree of asymmetry [which have thus far been established to be four (Duff-Cooper 1987a)] is the standing of two or more particulars relative to a point of reference. The greater the disparity in the standing of the particulars relative to such a point, the greater the asymmetry of the relations that obtain between them (and, of course, the fewer the same objective statements that can be made about the particulars, and the fewer the contexts in which they are interchangeable or substitutable one for another). The less this disparity between the particulars, the greater the symmetry of the relations that obtain between them (or the less the degree of asymmetry).

What is closer to a point of reference is also finer than what is further away from the same point of reference. What is higher is also finer than what is lower. What is highest and finest is also where relations of the greatest symmetry obtain. It should be emphasised, however, that these relations may be represented as obtaining both vertically and horizontally, or in either plane. In the latter case, "high" and other forms of this word are to be understood as referring to the east or the northeast, to the right, or to the centre,

depending upon the context.

Balinese ideology evinces the three modes of transitive, intransitive, and non-transitive relations in various ways. Different modes are evinced by aspects of Balinese life that are divided into the same number of constituent particulars; the same mode is evinced by such aspects that are divided into different numbers of particulars; and one such aspect may evince two modes of, or may both implicate and not implicate, transitivity when viewed from different points of view.

The definitions that were employed in that study (Duff-Cooper: forthcoming-b) and which led to those findings will be employed here also. Transitive relations are designated by, for instance "is north of": suppose that *a* is north of *b*, and that *b* is north of *c*, then it must be the case that the relations that obtain between *a* and *b*, and between *b* and *c*, obtain also between *a* and *c*.

A relation is intranstive if a relation that obtains between *a* and *b* also obtains between *b* and *c* such that it cannot obtain between *a* and *c*. In English usage, for instance, if *a* is mother of *b* and *b* is mother of *c*, *a* cannot be mother of *c*. Here the phrase "is mother of" designates a relationship that is intransitive.

A non-transitive relation, finally, is a relation that is neither transitive nor intransitive; unless it can be shown that a relationship that obtains between one particular and another, and between that second particular and a third, must also obtain between the first and the third particulars, or that it cannot or necessarily does not obtain between the first and the third (transitive and intransitive respectively), the relationship is non-transitive.

III. Reflexive Relationships

Relationships that evince the present mode of reflexivity necessarily also evince the relational property, symmetry. At this point we are

forced to confront one of the knottiest questions in sociology: the necessary asymmetry of social relationships as it is very generally, one might say axiomatically, taken to be.

This vast question can of course only be most skimpily alluded to here: we cannot go into the long history of the idea, nor into many of the more modern formulations that this axiom, so to say, takes in contemporary sociology and social anthropology. I think mention of a number of leading anthropologists' views on the matter, though, will point up what we are here dealing with. The Indianist, Louis Dumont, for instance, writes (e.g., 1980: 6, 20) that people do not just act, but they do so on the basis of values; and that to adopt a value is to introduce hierarchy: "Hierarchy . . . is an inevitable result of the fact that men think and act, that is, of social action". Further, of course, that values are necessarily scalar implies asymmetry. Many critical remarks could be made about this formulation (cf., e.g., Needham 1987a; Duff-Cooper 1987b: 118 n. 13), but let us now turn to an Africanist: David Parkin alludes (1984: 348) to the way in which relationships, even if they manage to attain symmetry, must, necessarily, revert to being asymmetrical within an instant, because relationships involve power and power relations are necessarily asymmetrical. In the same year, Barnes, a Southeast Asianist, suggested (1984: 61), in a more limited formulation, that "it is doubtful that complementary opposites ever permit a perfect equality between the sides". Assuming that Barnes would agree to "equality" being replaced by "symmetry" (cf., e.g., Sahlins 1974: 222), then he appears to subscribe to the views, at least generally, of Dumont and of Parkin. Rivière also cites Dumont approvingly (1972: 366); while Hobart, an expert on the Balinese of Gianyar, central Bali, appears to follow Parkin when he writes, without compunction or qualification, about "the necessary asymmetry of human relationships" (1986: 4).

Only Barnes's formulation, it seems, is truly based upon the em-

pirical: he writes, to justify his assertion cited above, that "a recurrent feature of studies of complementary governance [or diarchy] is the superiority of one form of authority, usually the spiritual or mystical". The other writers whose work is quoted here take it, apparently, as axiomatic that social relationships are defined by the property of asymmetry and that one of their tasks is to elucidate the forms that these inequalities (if they would allow "inequality" for "asymmetry") take and from where they derive.

Not all anthropologists have adopted this position in the various forms that it takes in for instance the works just cited however. Needham, for one, has shown that in the traditional social organization of the Meru of Kenya, neither the Elders, in whose hands were all kinds of juridical, political, and economic decisions, nor the Mugwe, whose function was essentially to bless, an activity that was indispensible to such major events as the constitution of age-sets, marriage, war, and the sentencing of offenders, were or was superior to the other party: "sovereignty was partitioned between them, each party having a distinct role, and neither was sufficient for the governance of Meru society without the other" (Needham 1985: 181); and "it is precisely an intrinsic complementarity, not an unequal evaluation, that is stressed" by Meru ideology (Needham 1980: 57), so that the terms of the dyad "Elders/Mugwe" (political power/mystical authority) were not unequal.

Howell too has shown (e.g., 1985) in connection with the Chewong of Pensinsular Malaysia that that form of life is governed by an ethic of equality, and that "hierarchy" is far subsiduary as a value in Chewong social life.

In Japan, further, it is clear that while many aspects of Japanese life, and particularly aspects of Japanese "exchange", evince asymmetry, in such relationships as that known as *yui*, which is an equal exchange of labour for labour between two parties, symmetry is also evinced (e.g., Duff-Cooper: 1988b). Symmetries are also dis-

cernible in the ideologies of communalities of greater and lesser extension (Duff-Cooper: forthcoming-a); while Hendry, an expert on Japan, suggests (1987: chap. 12) that "equality" is one of the principles that order Japanese life, and has shown (1986: 55) how this principle, and some of the forms that it takes in social life, are instilled into children from a very early age.

These examples could be multiplied by reference to, for instance, the Mon Khmer speaking Temiar, also of Peninsular Malaysia (e.g., Benjamin 1966), the Kauli of the Great Papuan Plateau of the South Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea (e.g., Schieffelin 1976), and the Karimojong of northeast Uganda—as well as to comparative work such as that of, say, Schlegel (1977) which depends upon the existance of "egalitarian" societies, but I think that the point has been made: that not all forms of life are "unequal", nor all the relationships that constitute them necessarily asymmetrical. Apart from suggesting that those anthropologists who have decided, on the basis of theoretical considerations, that social relationships are necessarily asymmetrical are wrong-headed, and apart from demonstrating the deleterious effect that too heavy a reliance on theory can have in the consideration of forms of life, these examples suggest that, when it is claimed that symmetrical relations are discernible in Balinese ideology [as it has been (Duff-Cooper 1987a)], this is not the claimant trying to plough his own furrow (a tendency to which many social anthropologists are prone), but it is a claim that is indeed consonant with the social facts of aspects of Balinese life.

It has already been noted in section II that relations that are perfectly symmetrical obtain between the two aspects that Balinese metaphysics (*sarva-surya*) teaches Ida Sang Hyang Sunya, the Void, evinces. These aspects are, at this level of abstraction, wholly indiscernible; any objective statement that can be made about one aspect can also be made about the other aspect; in this sense, one

aspect is interchangeable for the other in any context whatsoever. It therefore follows, by virtue of the definition of "totally reflexive" adopted, that the relations that obtain between these two aspects, which are identical, exemplify the present mode of reflexivity.

On the face of it, transitivity is not implicated at all by these social facts: modes of this relational concept imply at least a relationship that obtains between two particulars by virtue of the relationship that obtains between one of those particulars and one other. Where, it might be asked, is the necessary third particular in these social facts?

It has already been shown (Duff-Cooper 1986b: 188–189) that the bracelet that young people wear to protect them against sickness, called *kampuh*, and the lead and halter of the ox sacrificed at the temple on the top of Gunung Péngsong on the day Anggara Kliwon Perangbakat, both of which are made by plaiting red, black, and white threads or ropes, emphasise the way in which the duality of the gods Brahma (red) and Visnu (black) is also inextricably a unity [the god (*déva*) Siva (white)].

All such pairs of particulars in Balinese ideology are at once a duality and a unity. The same goes for Sunya: in as much as, for instance, Brahma and Visnu are synthesised in Siva, and as Siva is at once one (Siva) and dual (the opposed pair Brahma and Visnu), so Sunya is at once one, and dual (the two identical aspects). But in the case of Sunya, which is devoid of content, it is as though the sum of the two aspects is equivalent to one of the aspects: $a+a'=a_{va'}$. Viewed in this way, the relations that obtain among the three, Sunya as one and as a duality, are reflexive and transitive: relations of identity ("is the same as") obtain among the three, no matter which combination of the three is isolated for consideration, for, to repeat, the three are identical.

Such perfectly symmetrical relations only obtain when the social facts under consideration are, like the Void, devoid of content, but symmetrical relations are discernible in other aspects of Balinese

ideology, though these relations are not perfectly symmetrical. It is as though the symmetries are broken, by the intrusion of other principles of social order such as "relative age", "sex", and "status", or else by other ideas.

Take, for instance, the two examples of paradigmatic scenes that have been identified in Balinese ideology: the bisexual icon Ardhanārīśvara and the couple Jayaprana and his wife Layon Sari (Duff-Cooper: 1988a). Ardhanārīśvara is constituted of two aspects, a male half (proper right) and a female half (proper left). This icon and its attributes are generally not known about by Balinese people other than Brahmana and Ksatrya priests, Pedanda Siva or Boddha and Pedanda Resi respectively (cf., Duff-Cooper 1985c: 156–157).[2] Ardhanārīśvara exists at a very high level of purity, and, concomitant with this standing in Balinese life, the relations that obtain between the two halves are, by the criterion of indiscernibility, only barely asymmetrical. The same goes for Jayaprana and Layon Sari who were born Sudra, but who became gods, freed from rebirth, through the purity of their lives and deaths. In each case, the aspects of the duality in question are barely discernible; but the difference in each case of the sex of the aspects, and the associations that "male" and "female" have in the Balinese world of material human beings (*madyapada* or *mertyapada*) render the symmetrical relations that under many aspects obtain between the two particulars of each pair imperfectly symmetrical.

The relations that obtain, also, between the female principle (*pradhana*) and the male principle (*purusa*), which together constitute *pradhana purusa*, are similar to those just described.

Both these principles are among the finest aspects of Balinese life, according to Balinese metaphysics, and *pradhana purusa* is one expression of the dichotmous unity, Ida Sang Hyang Vidhi Vasa, that is the basis of Balinese ideology (Duff-Cooper: 1988c). This unity is expressed in Ardhanārīśvara and perhaps less directly in the

couple Jayaprana and Layon Sari. *Pradhana purusa* pervades the world in various guises [as, indeed, does Vidhi, one of the characteristics of which is that it is "everywhere" (*sarvagatah*)]. One of the forms that *pradhana* takes is the blood (*kama bang* or *swanita*) which when united with semen virile (*purusa: kama putih* or *sukla*) form human life. Both are essential to the creation of life and in this sense the relations that obtain between the two are symmetrical. But only rarely is the balance of the two in the person created by such a union equal. In these cases, the *bantong* or *banci*, a transvestite, is created and, consonant with the symmetry of the transvestite's constituents, his standing in Balinese social life is superior to the standing of other people of his own relative age and status. Usually, of course, the union of *pradhana* and *purusa* produces males or females: when *pradhana* predominates, females are produced; when *purusa* does so, males are produced. Here the relations between the two are asymmetrical. The female principle is sometimes superior, at other times the male principle is superior. These relationships are mirrored, so to say, in the relations that obtain between men and women in which the former are superior in matters that concern the public realm, while the latter are superior in matters that concern the domestic. But the male is ultimately superior here, as *purusa* is ultimately superior to *pradhana:* in the essential, generally invisible realm (*niskala*), what is superior is referred to or addressed after what is inferior—hence *pradhana purusa* ("female male") and not "male female" as is appropriate in the material, and generally visible (*sakala*) realm (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1986b: 128–130). This is all to say, of course, that under many aspects (those in which symmetrical relations obtain), the relations that obtain between the male and the female aspects of Ardhanārīśvara, the couple Jayaprana and Layon Sari, and *pradhana purusa*, are reflexive; and that "sex" breaks these symmetries in certain contexts so that these relations become irreflexive and asymmetrical.

The conception of the Balinese "person", at least as it can be constructed from various aspects of Balinese ideology in western Lombok, again manifests symmetries that are broken, in this case by "sex", "relative age", and "status". Balinese people of all four estates expressed the idea to the writer that all Balinese people are the same one as another. Clearly, this statement runs counter to the facts that, for instance, there are Balinese who are male and others who are female, that some are older than others who are younger, and that a Balinese is born into one of the four estates, so that some Balinese are not so pure as others.

An investigation of this claim, however, shows that in many regards—in what goes into creating a person, in his or her relationships with other people, the matters that contribute to his or her character, what is reasonably expected of him or her, and what happens to him or her when death occurs—Balinese people are indeed all the same. That is, to say of two or more Balinese that they are the same one as another is to say that they are the same in the regards outlined above [which are dealt with at length and in detail in the investigation alluded to (Duff-Cooper 1985a)]. In these contexts, the relations that obtain between the people in question are reflexive—as they are, of course, when it is said of one or more Balinese person or people that he or they is or are of the same status as the speaker, when "status" refers to estate.

But differences, naturally, do exist among Balinese people too. These differences have most broadly to do with "relative age", "sex", and "status": where these come into play, the symmetries mentioned are broken, and like most such symmetries discernible in social life become asymmetries. The degrees of asymmetry that will then obtain depend upon the disparity in the relative ages and the statuses of the people concerned, and upon whether they are some of one, some of the other of the two, or the three if a transvestitte is involved, sexes.

The reflexive relations that obtained also become irreflexive: if *a* is of a different estate from *b*, or is of a different sex from *b*, or is older or younger than *b*, then clearly the relationship that obtains between *a* and *b* cannot also obtain between *a* and him- or herself nor between *b* and him- or herself.

Equally, if *a* is the father (*aji/bapa*)[3] or the mother (*biang/mémék*) of *b*, or stands in any other such relation, senior or junior, to *b*,[4] the relationships that obtains between *a* and *b* must be irreflexive. This relation will also be asymmetrical to a greater or lesser degree (see, e.g., Duff-Cooper 1985b: 30; 1987a) relative to, for instance, a particular origin-point [*kawitan* (cf., Duff-Cooper 1985a: 77–78)] that can be selected to accord with the circumstances and the relationship implied by the terms that each uses to address and to refer to the other as obtaining between them.[5]

What, though, of the mode of transitivity, if any, that is combined with these combinations of reflexive and symmetrical and irreflexive and asymmetrical relations? We can deal with this question by considering Ardhanārīśvara, Jayaprana and Layon Sari, and *purusa pradhana* together. In each case, symmetrical, reflexive relations are broken and rendered asymmetrical and irreflexive by the introduction of "sex". In none of these cases does "relative age" figure; nor, of course, does "status", if only because in each case the statuses of the two aspects of each dichotomous unity are so high that differences have long been dissolved, if they ever existed,[6] which in the case of Jayaprana and Layon Sari they did not (both were Sudra).

Each of these cases constitutes a dichotmous unity, it has been said, so that perhaps when symmetrical relations obtain between the two aspects of each, the third entity is, as in the case of the Void, the unity. If this is so, it appears not to be the case that the relations between the three are transitive as argued above for the Void. In the case of Ardhanārīśvara, Balinese stories tell of half-people

who existed independently, as it were, (e.g., Hooykaas 1948; cf., Needham 1980: chap. 1). Ardhanārīśvara, as the synthesis of a half-man and a half-woman, is probably superior to its two constituent aspects, as Siva is superior to Brahma and Visnu. But the relations that obtain between these half-people can be symmetrical: here, then, Ardhanārīśvara is superior to one of its constituent aspects and to the other too, but neither of them is superior to the other. Here, the relationships between the two sides of the icon do not implicate transitivity.

The cases of Jayaprana and Layon Sari and *purusa pradhana* do not implicate transitivity either, but for different reasons. The couple that Jayaprana and Layon Sari compose does not, I think, rank above its constituent aspects in the way that Siva ranks above Brahma and Visnu, nor as Ardhanārīśvara ranks higher than the two half-people that constitute it. It is true that by marriage a man and a woman render themselves socially complete, but the couple that is created by their union does not have an existence apart from its aspects, as do Siva and the bisexual icon. Transitivity cannot, therefore, figure, either when the relations that obtain between Jayaprana and Layon Sari are symmetrical (as they are before "sex" figures).

In the case of *pradhana purusa*, although each takes a different form in the phenomenal world, before "sex" is introduced, the principles are indiscernible. Yet neither is identical with *pradhana purusa*, the name of which, unlike Sunya, the Void, stresses the dual nature of the principles. Nor can either *pradhana* or *purusa*, as the half-person can, have an existence apart from the other. Transitive relations cannot therefore be implicated on both these counts.

When "sex" is introduced, however, the relations that obtain between the three aspects of each dichotomous unity are transitive: the half-woman is inferior to the half-man, the half-man is inferior to the complete icon, so that the half-woman is inferior to the complete icon too; Layon Sari is inferior as a woman to Jayaprana,

and Jayaprana is inferior (only half a social being) to the couple that they constitute, i.e., Jayaprana and Layon Sari together as complete social beings—as human beings a husband with a wife, a wife with a husband; as gods, a *déva* or Bhatara (protector) with his *sakti*. Layon Sari is also, therefore, inferior to the couple. *Pradhana* is inferior to *purusa*, *purusa* is inferior to *pradhana purusa*, and, therefore, *pradhana* to *pradhana purusa*.

Let us, briefly, consider three further examples. Male and female ancestors are not differentiated among the Balinese, except in genealogies; in the temples where they are located they are treated in all ways the same. The relations between them (if it is legitimate to express the matter thus) are symmetrical. They are also reflexive, for clearly if they are in every way the same one as another as sets then they are identical. There is no third particular to which they are linked, though, so that transitivity is not implicated. Most ancestors are reborn, however, five generations after their own. When they are reborn, these souls are housed, as it were, in physical bodies (*sthula sarira*) that are of the same sex as those in which they existed in previous incarnations. The relations among such souls thus become asymmetrical by virtue of the operation of "sex", which renders males superior to females; their statuses may also be such as to add another facet to this asymmetry, if a soul is reborn before the parents whose child it is have been through the rites of marriage (*ngantén*), while others reborn to the same parents or to close relations of the parents are born after the parents to which others are born have been through the rites; and, of course, "relative age" also renders the relations between them asymmetrical—but this is a reversal: those who previously honoured them as gods now have authority over them as grandparents and parents who, when dead, will be honoured by their children and grandchildren as they honoured them before their rebirth. This reversal is, characteristic of Balinese ideology, enantiomorphic (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper

1986a: 211, 211 n. 7).

The second example to be considered is the triads father's father (*kakiang/kakét*), father, and a male or a female subject, and father's mother (*niyang/dadong*), mother, and a male or a female subject. These terms imply relationships that obtain between people of the sex (male or female), relative age (defined generationally), and the status (estate) to whom the terms are applied and a male or a female subject; as for detaching these terms from the set of which they are a part and with which they should normally be considered, these terms imply the relationships that are minimally to be found in any compound, and, as such, may be considered apart from the other terms (as the compound may be considered apart from the village, agglomeration of villages, etc., of which it is a part).

The terms can be made specific by a subject applying, for instance, "my" (*titiangé/tiangé*) to a term, e.g., *kaket tiangé*, my father's father. In these cases, defining the relationships by descent, they are clearly irreflexive: if my father's father is my father's father, neither can be his own father nor can my father's father also be "my" (a subject's) father; the same goes for mother's mother. These relations are therefore irreflexive and intransitive.[7]

If, though, these relationships are considered with reference to the origin-point constituted by the subject's *kumpiang/kumpi* (father's father's father and father's father's mother), father's father and father are interchangeable one for another in contexts that generally concern the duties of the local descent group of which they are a part to such village institutions as the council (*banjar*) and the temple (*pamaksan*) or such occasions as when a Pedanda, the group's Surya, whose *sisia* the group is, holds an important rite: the attendance of either, not both, discharges their obligation to the institution or to their Surya; similarly father and male subject are interchangeable—and the same goes for, *mutatis mutandis*, father's mother and mother and female subjects. But the relations defined by inter-

changeability are not reflexive nor transitive, for these relationships are not necessary, nor do they always obtain, but depend upon circumstances. These relations, therefore, are non-reflexive and non-transitive.

If, however, the relationships are defined by authority, then both the male and the female generations to which the terms are applicable in relation to either a male or a female subject evince relations that are transitive: father's father and father's mother are in this regard superior to mother and father; and father and mother are also superior in this wise to the male and the female subjects. It therefore follows, logically and empirically, that father's father and father's mother are superior to those subjects.

It is not quite so simple to decide whether these relationships exemplify a mode of reflexivity, and, if so, which. Saying that these relationships are reflexive appears to fit the case best: although there are, so to say, chains of authority that have just been described, Balinese people have a duty to live in accordance with local, current conventions (*dêsa kala patra*) and also to live in accordance with general ideas that define what a good Balinese life is like. It is not necessary to go into the details of these duties;[8] it is enough to assert that each person should live so that his life is consonant with the general ideas just mentioned and with local conventions. This involves each Balinese person, sometimes, in decisions—about whether to work hard or not, whether to be honest or deceitful, whether to be mean and avaricious or generous and not self-regarding materially, whether to get drunk or be abstemious, whether to be hot-blooded and quick to anger or to be temperate and balanced, for instance. A person's propensity for these contrasted attitudes to life are determined at his or her birth by the configuration of the three qualities (*triguna*) that he or she is born with, the estate into which the person is born, and other matters such as the conduct of his or her parents during the child's gestation in the mother's belly,

the day when the child is born, and the name that is given to the child. These matters are gone into at length elsewhere (Duff-Cooper 1985a); what is important here is, that a person can, or should be able to, discipline himself so that his life—his thoughts, words, and actions—are in harmony one with another and with what is finest in Balinese life. It is in this sense that each Balinese person also has authority over him- or herself. The authority of the father's father, the father, the father's mother, and the mother alluded to earlier is also supposed to ensure that the lives of those over whom they exercise authority are good lives, i.e., that their words, thoughts, and actions are in harmony one with another and with those of others, and with what is finest in Balinese life. These relations of authority appear to be reflexive, therefore, in at least the senses described.

Defining the relationships in terms of sentiment, it is usually but not always the case that the relationships of father's father and father (his son) are "negative" (e.g., cool and distant), as are the relationships between father and male and female subjects; but the sentimental relationships between father's father and his son's son(s) and daughter(s) are "positive" (e.g., warm and close). These relations are thus non-transitive. The question, Which mode of reflexivity do these relationships evince?, is hard to answer. Any answer must also answer the questions: Are the father's father's and the father's attitudes to themselves "negative"? Are the father's father's and the male and female subjects' attitudes to themselves "positive"? But there are two major difficulties in the way of answering these questions: that of identifying emotions in other, exotic forms of life (e.g., Needham 1981: chap. 3); and that of finding out whether the attitudes that are evinced by the parties to these relationships are akin to the attitudes that the parties each have in relation to themselves—if, of course, the Balinese would even understand questions that attempted to elicit such information, for it

is far from obvious that conception such as "self-love" or "self-hate", upon which the questions rely, and their concomitant attitudes, as they are understood to be by Western psychiatric and less professional ideas, are intelligible to people who live, ideologically, in different worlds.[9]

Similar questions arise in connection with the relationships defined by sentiment that obtain between father's mother and mother and father's wife (mother) and between mother and male and female subjects. These are generally more positive than negative. Formally, these relationships tend to evince transitive relations: father's mother's sentimental attitudes to male and female subjects are generally positive. But as for reflexivity: Do father's mother, father's wife (mother), and male and female subjects each have "positive" attitudes to themselves?

In any case, it should be said that these comments about relationships defined by sentiment are matters of rather fine judgement, not of, so to say, bare social fact. A different judgement would probably procure different findings as to the modes of transitivity and reflexivity involved here. Add to this uncertainty the difficulties mentioned already, and the small amount of comparative data that are to hand on indigenous classifications of the emotions, and it must be recognised that much more research needs to be conducted into these areas of social life before conclusions that are at all definite can be hoped for. Still, these paragraphs will perhaps serve to alert attention to a most important gap in our knowledge of the Balinese, both on Bali and on Lombok.

The last example to be considered in the present section are the relations that obtain between two people (*a* and *b*) of the same estate, and between them and *c*, a third Balinese person of undetermined status.

If *a* and *b* are of the same estate, or status, and if Brahmana or Ksatrya not having become Pedanda, and being either both married

or unmarried, and also if they are of the same sex, and the same relative age (understood generationally), then the relations that obtain between them are symmetrical: the language that they use to address and to refer to one another will be of the same degree of fineness or coarseness (see n. 3), the clothes they wear will be broadly similar (e.g., Duff-Cooper 1984b), and their contributions to the form of Balinese life of which they are aspects will broadly be the same. The particulars of these matters well show even though only in broad outline that these relations are reflexive. The relations of *a* and *b* relative to *c*, however, even if of the same sex and relative age as *a* and *b*, are non-reflexive and non-transitive: it cannot be said that the relations that obtain between *a* and *b* also obtain between *a* and *c* and between *b* and *c* such that *a*, *b*, and *c* each also has that relation to him- or herself or cannot do so; nor can it be said that, for instance, *a* is related to *b*, and that *b* is related to *c*, such that *a* must be or cannot be related to *c* as *a* is related to *b*. These implicate an empirical question that cannot be decided formally: Is *c* of the same status as *a* and *b*?

If *a* and *b* are of the same status, however, and of the same relative age, but of different sexes, then the relations that obtain between *a* and *b* are asymmetrical, though which is pre-eminent cannot be decided formally: whichever is male is ultimately the pre-eminent party to the relationship. The relations that obtain between *a* and *b*, though, are reflexive by virtue of their status and relative age, but irreflexive by virtue of "sex". Which modes of reflexivity and transitivity the relationships of *a* and *b* and *c* evince are, again, empirical questions, the answers to which will depend here upon the status and the sex of *c*. If *a* and *c* are both male, say, and *b* is female, and if *a*, *b*, and *c* are all of the same estate, then the relations that obtain between *a* and *b* are also those that obtain between *b* and *c*: they are asymmetrical, they are intransitive—because the relations that obtain between *a* and *b* and between *b* and *c* cannot

obtain also between *a* and *c*—and they are irreflexive by virtue of the different sex of *c* (although they are reflexive, as concerns *a* and *c*, by virtue of their sex being the same).

If *a* and *b*, finally, are of the same status and of the same sex, but of different relative ages, then these relations are symmetrical and reflexive by virtue of "status" and "sex", but asymmetrical and irreflexive by virtue of their different relative ages. Whether the relations that obtain between *a*, *b*, and *c* are reflexive, irreflexive, or non-reflexive and which mode of transitivity they evince, are empirical questions, the answers to which depend upon the sex, the status, and the relative age of *c*.

In all these cases, as in the first mentioned aspect of this final example, the symmetry or the asymmetry and the mode of reflexivity that are evinced by the relations that obtain between *a* and *b* and between them and *c*, are reflected in the demeanour, the language, the dress, and the "sacred duty" (*dharma*) of the parties to the relationships. The same, of course, goes for the relations that obtain between *a* and *b*, and between *a*, *b*, and *c*, when they are of the same sex (but of different relative ages and status); when they are of the same relative age and of the same sex, but of different statuses, however, this latter fact tends to take precedence over the reflexivity of the relationships defined by sex and relative age; though these days young people adopt Indonesian as a way of avoiding the different kinds of language ("levels") that among older Balinese people of the same sex and relative age but of different statuses can mark the asymmetry and the irreflexivity of the relations that obtain between them by virtue of the difference in status—an asymmetry which is the greater, of course, the greater the disparity in the status of the parties, and which is greater still when the sexes of the parties are different and coterminous with the differences in status (i.e., higher status and male; lower status and female).

IV. Irreflexive Relationships

The four Balinese estates, Brahmana, Ksatrya, Vesia, and Sudra, may be considered, in line with Balinese ideology, as consisting of a number of dyads of greater and greater extension (e.g., Duff-Cooper 1985c: 163); the relation of opposition obtains within these dyads, such that Brahmana is opposed to Ksatrya; Brahmana and Ksatrya are opposed to Vesia; Brahmana, Ksatrya, and Vesia are opposed to Sudra; and Brahmana, Ksatrya, Vesia, and Sudra are opposed to all other human beings.

The four estates may also be considered in a sequence that is, so to say, lineal rather than dyadic. Beginning, correctly in Balinese terms, with the finest estate, the sequence is as above: Brahmana, Ksatrya, Vesia, Sudra. The relationships defined by purity that obtain among the four estates are asymmetrical: Brahmana is superior to Ksatrya to the first degree of asymmetry, to Vesia, to the second degree of asymmetry, and to Sudra, to the third degree of asymmetry; Ksatrya is superior to Vesia to the first degree of asymmetry and to Sudra, to the second degree; Vesia are superior to Sudra to the first degree of asymmetry. Seen in this way, the relations that obtain between Brahmana and Ksatrya, and between Ksatrya and Vesia, and Vesia and Sudra are intransitive: they do not also obtain between Brahmana and Vesia and Sudra, nor between Ksatrya and Sudra.

Taking "opposition" in a very abstract and accomodating sense, however, the relationships that obtain among the four estates are transitive: Brahmana is superior to Ksatrya, Ksatrya is superior to Vesia and Sudra, so that Brahmana is superior also to Vesia and Sudra; Ksatrya is superior to Vesia, Vesia to Sudra, so that Ksatrya are also superior to Sudra.

It is also the case, of course, that the relations that obtain among

the four estates can not also obtain in relation to each of the four estates themselves: an estate cannot be either inferior or superior to itself. These relations are thus irreflexive.

The next examples to be considered are such phrases as "is spouse (*kurén*) of", "is father of", "is mother of". In each case a particular may be related to a number of other particulars: one male may be the spouse of up to four women by Indonesian law and of as many women as he can afford to support in traditional Balinese ideology (*krama*; Ind. *adat istiadat*); and he may of course be the father of more than one child. A women may be a co-wife and she may of course have more than one child. In each of these and in analagous cases, the multiplication of the relationships does not affect the facts that in Balinese ideology (as in English) these phrases designate relationships that are asymmetrical and irreflexive. Nor, of course, do they implicate transitive relationships, because the relationships are not mediated, i.e., there is no third (or subsequent) particular to which the first (spouse, father, or mother) can be related. Even when such a particular is supplied, the phrase "is father of", as "is mother of", is not transitive: if *a* is father or mother of *b*, and *b* is father or mother of *c*, *a* cannot also be the father or the mother of *c* in Balinese ideology at least.

In the case of "is spouse of", *a* may have four or more wives (if male) or may have one husband (if female). Even when more particulars are provided, though, these relationships implicate no mode of transitivity: the relationships are closed, and can obtain only between two particulars, even when one of those particulars (e.g., *a*'s wives) may be several.

On the other hand, in Balinese ideology, the phrase "is ancestor of" designates an asymmetrical, reflexive relationship when *a* refers to the eighth ascending generation that a subject (*b*) can identify (by the term *kelépék*) or when *a** refers to the fourth ascending generation (*klambiung/kumpi*) that a subject *b* can identify (see n. 7).

But the phrase "is an ancestor of" designates an irreflexive relationship otherwise. Considered in the sequence a is the ancestor of a^*, and a^* is the ancestor of b, further, these relationships are transitive: a is the ancestor of b; but this result is hardly more than expectable, given that a, a^*, and b, though not materially, are at one one with another.

V. Non-Reflexive Relationships

As a residual category into which relationships that are neither reflexive nor irreflexive, nor totally so, fall, non-reflexive relationships may in principle be combined with relationships that evince symmetry or asymmetry and one of the three modes of transitivity. In the event, only two of the six possible combinations are evinced by Balinese ideology; four of the possible combinations—non-reflexive relations that are symmetrical and transitive, such relations that are symmetrical and intransitive and relations that are asymmetrical and intransitive—are not exemplified by this form of life.

Of the two remaining possibilities, one—non-reflexive relationships that are symmetrical and non-transitive—can be discerned in social facts; the remaining possible combination—non-reflexive relationships that are asymmetrical and non-transitive—is exemplified by a hypothetical case that is, though, wholly possible in Balinese life and is not, like a patrilateral prescriptive system (e.g., Fortune 1933), for instance, only a formal possibility.

First, relationships that are non-reflexive, symmetrical, and non-transitive: imagine three brothers, a, b, and c, all unmarried and all resident in the compound of their father's younger brother. The three brothers, of whom a is the eldest, c, the youngest, son, are all between about 18 and 21 years old. As can be inferred from them residing in their uncle's compound, their father and mother have no compound of their own, and live in every way from hand

to mouth. They have four other children: one, a sister to *a*, *b*, and *c*, who is older than them and contributes to the household of their father and mother in cash and in other important ways. The three other children are all boys, of under 15 years old. *a*, *b*, and *c*, like their father and the other members of this "family [but see Duff-Cooper (1985e.: 230)] are proud, without being arrogant, strong-willed, very hard-working, but also great pleasure lovers. The three are all of marrying age; each is employed by a different villager who is wealthy (though their employers deny this, saying that they hold the rights in land that are registered in their names, and their other real and personal property, as trustees for the time being on behalf of their successors). *a* has no relationship with *b*, except one that involves *a* ignoring *b*, and *b*, *a*. They never speak or behave as brothers otherwise, working and relaxing together. *b*, also, behaves in this way towards *c*, who reciprocates. These relationships are clearly non-reflexive: *a*, *b*, or *c* may also hate himself or may not do so (but see sec. IV, above). The relations that obtain between *a* and *b* and between *b* and *c* are symmetrical: *a* and *b* hate each other (or appear to do so; "hate" is used as shorthand here), and so do *b* and *c*, though in spite of repeated enquiries I could not discover what had happened to break the relationships that *a* and *b* and *b* and *c* would normally have had one with another, and which they had with their sister and other brothers. The relationship that obtained between *a* and *c* was turbulent: at times they fought (though not physically, though one, usually *c*, at times threatened the other with violence), at other times, they appeared to be on reasonably good terms. Clearly the relationships that obtained between *a* and *b* and between *b* and *c* depended upon circumstances; they were not necessary, nor were they impossible: they are thus non-transitive.

Next, imagine that a male *a* "loves" a woman, *b*, who loves another man, *c*.[10] *c* loves neither *a* nor *b*. The parties may or may

not each love him- or herself; the relationships are thus non-reflexive. *a* may or may not also love *c*. So long as the matter remains undecided, all the relations that obtain here are asymmetrical. If it turns out that *a* does love *c* as well as *b*, then the relations of *b* and *a* relative to *c* are symmetrical and, empirically, transitive; formally, they remain non-transitive. If it turns out that *a* does not love *c*, the relations remain asymmetrical and, empirically, they are intransitive, though formally they remain non-transitive. In either case, the relations that obtain between *a* and *b* and between *b* and *c* respectively one to another remain asymmetrical, though it is a question which can not be decided here which is the pre-eminent particular of each pair. I think, though, that the party who is loved in each pair, and not the party that loves, would be considered the superior by most Balinese people.

VI. Concluding Remarks

In his book about transitivity, Needham remarks (1987b: 191) that "it is unlikely that the range of relationships composing a social system should be all in the same mode". The present study again (cf., Duff-Cooper: forthcoming-b) bears out Needham's assessment of the matter.

That is to say, Balinese ideology evinces the three modes of reflexivity: totally reflexive and reflexive relationships, irreflexive relationships, and non-reflexive relationships are all discernible in the aspects of Balinese life considered above.

The totally reflexive relationship also evinces the properties of perfect symmetry and the transitive mode of transitivity. Reflexive relations may be combined, however, with symmetrical relations that do not implicate a mode of transitivity, and with asymmetrical relations that evince both transitive and intransitive properties. Irreflexive relationships also evince asymmetry which may be combined

either with the property transitive or intransitive. Non-reflexive relationships evince symmetrical relations that are non-transitive and symmetrical relations that are formally non-transitive, but which seem empirically to be intransitive. In some cases, the mode of reflexivity cannot be decided.

For convenience, these combinations of a mode of reflexivity with one of the modes of transitivity, or not as may be the case with reflexive, symmetrical relations, and with the property of symmetry or asymmetry are listed in the Table.

Reflexivity	Transitivity	Symmetry/Asymmetry
Totally reflexive	Transitive	Perfectly symmetrical
Reflexive	None	Symmetrical
Reflexive	Transitive	Asymmetrical
Reflexive	Intransitive	Asymmetrical
Irreflexive	Transitive	Asymmetrical
Irreflexive	Intransitive	Asymmetrical
Non-reflexive	Non-transitive	Symmetrical
Non-reflexive	Non-transitive or Intransitive	Symmetrical

TABLE: Combinations of Mode of Reflexivity, Mode of Transitivity, and Symmetrical or Asymmetrical Relations.

It is not claimed that the combinations tabulated here are the only such combinations that are discernible in Balinese ideology; only that no other combinations are evinced by the aspects considered. It may be, for instance, that examples of non-reflexive relations that are also symmetrical and transitive or intransitive, or that are asymmetrical and transitive or intransitive, are apparent to other students of forms of Balinese life; the present writer has been unable to discover or to contrive any (cf., above). On the other hand, it is unlikely, perhaps, that an irreflexive relationship could be discovered that evinced symmetry: asymmetrical relations are generally taken

to entail the presence of the irreflexive mode of reflexivity. The corollary of this entailment would appear to be that symmetrical relations entail the reflexive mode of reflexivity. Yet the present study suggests that asymmetrical relations may also be combined with this mode of reflexivity.

This suggestion might seem to some to be an unlikely, if not illogical, conclusion that deserves no further consideration; but it has also been discovered that what, in English, is an example of an irreflexive relationship—"is an ancestor of"—may in Balinese ideology, under certain circumstances, exemplify a reflexive relationship. That this is possible is clearly bound up with the Balinese conception of the person (see n. 7); and the fact may well have implications for a finer appreciation of Balinese conceptions of duration, which appear to imply, at least, "the perennial and worldwide idea of the mystical co-presence of past, present and future" (Willis 1986: 251). But the Balinese concept of the person does not involve "a concept of human beings as consisting of relatively defined multiple selves ...", a concept that Willis at the same place suggests is implicated by the idea of a past, present, and future that are in some regards contemporaneous. The Balinese conception of the person, rather, exemplifies an idea that is discernible, I dare say, in all aspects of Balinese ideology: essentially, that the one is also many (*how* many depending upon the context), and that the many are all one (*which* one, again depending upon the context, at least initially).

This idea is exemplified by certain people who can be, and have been attested by witnesses to have been, in two places at the same time and perhaps by people who are at times visible and at other times invisible, by the social fact that a Balinese person can be at once a god and a material human being living on earth (cf., n. 7), and ultimately by every thing in the universe being an aspect of—deriving from, being pervaded by, and being contained in—Ida Sang Hyang Vidhi.

Willis also suggests (1986: 245, 246) that "the striking image of the Contemporary Ancestor [was] dear to the nineteenth century evolutionist anthropology", that "social evolutionism, though officially assumed to have been superseded in most anthropology courses taught in Western universities still persists in scholarly discourse", while "even the Contemporary Ancestor, in his full-blown Victorian epiphany, is frequently to be encountered in both anthropological and journalistic writings.... For most of us today, reared on cultural relativism and the nominal equality of all socio-cultural arrangements, [latter-day evolutionists such as Marvin] Harris must himself [for instance] count as a contemporary ancestor". But if the idea of the "contemporary ancestor," an expression [Willis suggests (1986: 251)] of the idea of the mystical co-presence of the past, the present, and the future, involves a conception of human beings as "consisting of relatively defined multiple selves, rather than the substantive, concrete and theoretically unique Self or Person of Western ideology", one might expect the Victorian evolutionists, such writers as Harris, and indeed Willis, and other like him, who appears to find the notion of the contemporary ancestor useful, to subscribe also to the former conception of the Self. But there is no evidence that I know of to suggest that Victorian evolutionists did so, and it is unlikely in the extreme that Harris and Willis (and others who subscribe to the "contemporary ancestor" idea) do so. This, also, suggests that this idea, and the idea of which it is an expression, is not necessarily correlated with this notion of human beings that consist of relatively defined multiple selves.

Of course, the Victorian evolutionists generally considered *humankind* to have various facets, consisting of peoples at various stages of development along a continuum, the ends of which were located among such peoples as the Australians (the most primitive end, but also more or less primitive socially one from another) and their own forms of life [the most advanced, but thought to evince, at least up

until about 1907 (e.g., Duff-Cooper 1986d: 191–193, 198), survivals from earlier stages]; and as Willis points out (1986: 251), Harris also appears to subscribe to a view that approximates this discredited one that employs a scalar evaluation of forms of life which relies upon a notion ("survival") that is circular. But this view is not the same as viewing the Self or the Person as consisting of relatively defined multiple selves.

But this tension, if that is what it is,[11] in Willis's exposition cannot be followed up here; though, of course, one can only concur (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1984b) when he writes (1986: 252) that he sees no reason why a domain of experience such as matters as these that are generally labelled "metaphysical" should not be amenable to scientific investigation. They are, of course—but that must wait upon another occasion.

The findings of the present study, anyway, have two main implications for the prosecution of social anthropology. Neither implication is new, but both can not too often be repeated. The first is, that the point of view adopted by an analyst of social facts can alter the properties that are discernible in the social facts under examination. This is clearly of the utmost importance for social anthropology (and indeed for any discipline outside the experimental and the exact sciences). It means that in social anthropology neither a major ethnography nor even a more minor anthropological study such as the present essay can fully be understood until the point of view that was adopted by the writer, and to which his study responds, is apprehended. That this task is a difficult one, and one that is perhaps intrinsically more difficult than the apprehension of what a study sets out to convey substantively, does not, of course, mean that it should not be undertaken; to the contrary: for the comparativist, especially, who perforce must rely upon the work of others in his or her own work, logically, it must be.

The second implication is equally important, at least to whose who,

like the present writer, consider that the employment of relational concepts in social anthropological analysis is one way that is open to the comparativist by which he or she can escape the limitations that natural languages and their verbal concepts place upon analysis, and especially upon comparative analysis, where the meanings of ordinary language concepts, be they the concepts of ordinary English or Japanese or whatever, and the associations that they have with other such concepts, can fatally distort the social facts being compared and therefore vitiate the analysis (e.g., Duff-Cooper 1987b: 118 n. 16). One is tempted to rely upon the logicians, perhaps, in defining the relational concepts that are employed in analysis. But the present study as earlier studies by the present writer and more notably by others such as Needham (cf., e.g., Duff-Cooper 1986c: 194), shows that even the work of logicians cannot be relied upon axiomatically.

This is perhaps hardly more than could have been expected, given that even logicians work within a tradition that is cultural and hence historical. But it is a matter that should perhaps be kept at the front of the mind, to warn against the blandishments of the work of those who, explicitly or more usually implicitly, often claim for their work an absolute character that for some can prove a fatal lure in these days of relativism and uncertainty.

Less generally, the focus of the present study upon modes of reflexivity has given us the opportunity to consider bodies of social facts—some that have been studied before under other aspects, some that have not—from a new point of view. This is to go more deeply into Balinese ideology, which some may think (as the present writer thinks) an undertaking that is valuable in itself: "The skeptical perturbations of comparativism are", after all, as Needham writes (1985: 43), "self-sufficient moral acts which in being conceived accomplish their proper nature".

It cannot yet be said whether this consideration will prove to be

profitable in future studies of Balinese life, though the present writer's experience leads him to think that it will probably do so, in ways that are not now foreseen and that will depend upon future concerns. What, of course, it has done is, first, to suggests that the logic of relations as it is generally considered to be by their professional students may not accomodate the thought of other, exotic, forms of life; and, second, it has pointed up the lessons alluded to. These lessons in themselves, if taken to heart, render the present investigation worthwhile too; anything else that might derive from it in later studies may be counted a bonus.

NOTES

1 The data upon which the present essay is based in the main were collected during the course of about 21 months field research in 1979/81 in Pagutan. western Lombok, Indonesia. This work was funded by the Social Science Research Council of Great Britain (now defunct), and by awards from the Emslie Horniman Anthropological Scholarship Fund of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and from the Philip Bagby Fund, University of Oxford. The writer is much obliged to these bodies for supporting his work. In the present study, unless it is specified or is otherwise made clear, "Balinese" refers to the Balinese of western Lombok; "ideology" refers to ideas and values in social action, not to the delusions of or to deceptions perpetrated upon social classes however defined. On Balinese ideology, see Duff-Cooper (1983) and the studies listed in the References to *idem* (1986a) under the present writer's name. Thanks are due to Suzuki Takao (Professor of the Sociology of Language, Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, Keio University) for reading and commenting on this study in draft and on many other counts. Any errors naturally remain the responsibility of the writer.

2 Brahmanaa nd Ksatrya are the two senior estates (*varna*) of the Balinese. These estates, which are related as elder is related to younger, were charged with attending to the mystical and jural powers to which the Balinese were traditionally subject.

3 Balinese consists of words of varying degrees of fineness and coarseness

(cf., Kersten 1984: 17–28). When words are given in this way, the first word is the fine (*alus*) form, the second word, the coarse (*kasar*) form.

4 On the Balinese terminology of relationship, see, e.g., Duff-Cooper (1984a).

5 On "*kawitan*", see, e.g., Duff-Cooper (1985a: 77–78).

6 On the levelling of differences, see, e.g., Duff-Cooper (1985b: 20–21; forthcoming-b: n. 28).

7 On the other hand, the relationships designated by the phrases "is father's father's father's father of" and "is father's father's mother of" (Bal. *kelab*) may designate a relationship that is reflexive: a subject "is reincarnated in the fifth generation from his [or her] own, according to villagers, so that any Ego . . . is always both a reincarnation of the highest (eighth) generation, with reincarnations, as it were, in the fourth ascending and descending generations. Human beings may at the same time be both gods and may be reincarnated" (Duff-Cooper 1984a: 487; cf., *idem* 1985a: 81; 1986c: 191–192). On the matter of the contemporary ancestor, see, e.g., Sahlins (1981: 13) and Willis (1986: *passim*). The English phrase "is a contemporary of" designates a reflexive relation, of course, "is an ancestor of", an irreflexive relation.

8 See Duff-Cooper (1983: esp. chap. VII) for a full account of them.

9 Suryani, a Balinese, lists (1984: 108 Table IX) a number of "dimensions of personality" that she investigated in a study of *bebainan* attacks—an illness or a disorder of the spirit (Ind. *sakit jiwa*) that is thought to be brought on by a malignant spirit called the *bebai*—among the inhabitants of the *Puri* Klungkung on Bali that seem perfectly intelligible, and that one could readily label "positive" or "negative"; but their very similarity to English descriptions of emotional states (if that is what they are) makes one suspicious that the "dimensions" listed do not perhaps go very far in truly identifying aspects of the Balinese classification of the emotions.

10 On Balinese conceptions of "love", see, e.g., Duff-Cooper (1985d: 410).

11 It may be that Willis considers the evolutionists' schemas about humankind and the view of Harris that he cites (1986: 246) as analogues of of the idea that the Person or Self consists of multiple relatively defined selves. If he does so (and it would, I judge, be an appropriate and interesting analogy to draw), though, he does not say so.

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