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Abstract	"Development" has become a catchword for the recently developing countries of the world. But their efforts to development does not often produce the awaited results. Reasons are varied. This paper attempts at explainig it through a special and belimited point of view : the legacies of colonial nexus. History bears weight. In explaining any society we need to consider its history too, because history can shed light toward understanding its mode. Today if we look at the history of these countries, we find, almost all of them had undergone a nightmare of colonial exploitation. A great majority of them have gained independence in last two or three decades only. Their morals, values and codes of behaviour were shattered under long colonial rule where efforts were made to only partly change these societies. Motivations for such change were varied-ranging from benevolent goodwill, expansion of western ideas, to downright ex-ploitation. Thus a distorted or shattered society of uneven social change was created. Polarization became prominent. It is in this situation that most of the third word countries today are struggling for a leap forward to development. But their shattered condition do not give them the necessary momentum to a rapid development. The essay tries to give light to this aspect of development, although it is understood that the question is more complicated and needs examination from various other standpoints. Still we need to consider the experience of colonial subjugation with more weight and try to find means for coping with resultant hinderences.
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Colonial Legacies and Development

*Syed Maqbool Murtuza**

“Development” has become a catchword for the recently developing countries of the world. But their efforts to development does not often produce the awaited results. Reasons are varied. This paper attempts at explainig it through a special and belimited point of view: the legacies of colonial nexus. History bears weight. In explaining any society we need to consider its history too, because history can shed light toward understanding its mode.

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PROLOGUE

“Look at the globe of, say, 1914. This.....was the jingo world, the Imperial Age. See how the European burst his borders, sprawled out over the Americans, gobbled a continent in Australia. The glacier of white supremacy flows across all Asia (including Siberia and Kazakastan) to Shanghai. Only four brown peaks thrust up through the suffocating mantle: Ethiopia, Thailand, Afganistan, Japan. Jump forward fifty-one years and, on the globe today, the great glacier is in rapid retreat. But the experience of surviving the ice age was something reserved to yellow, brown and black-men—those who wear what was once cruelly called “the badge of servitude”. It is doubtful if those of us whose skins are pinkish white can ever hope to comprehend the thing emotionally.”¹

Albeit often the third world countries are grouped into a single category, yet with inherent differences among them they react differently to the modernization process. Accordingly, the nature and process of adjustment with industrialization also depicts markedly differential needs. But avoiding too much details lest we lose our context, we need to consider the differences in modernization process of various underdeveloped countries on some broad based generalization. Of particular interest here will be a consideration to situations of developing countries with long experience of colonial² subordination.³

Indeed, most of the developing countries of the present day underwent, at some time or other, the experience of colonial rule. A few of them are still colonies. Many, including some major nations with large populations, became independent comparatively recently. In South Asia there was a rush to independence shortly after the end of the Second World War, while in Africa there was a similar rush around the so-called ‘Year of Africa’, 1960. Others have been politically independent since the early nineteenth century, such as the Latin American countries. In some countries, however, the political independence was attained by ‘white’ communities who continued to dominate the populations of non-European decent. In this way a

colonial situation has become internalized, as it is, in countries like South Africa. At an earlier period the independence of Latin American countries may be seen in a somewhat similar light. But for purpose of brevity (and avoiding enclavement into complexity), the discussions here will be limited to only recently independent developing countries. Examples will be drawn mainly from colonial experience of Indian subcontinent (i. e. the British India) because of the writer's acquaintance with the first-hand knowledge on the effects of colonial subordination in the Indian subcontinent only.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERRENCE

The history of colonial areas, if read in the light of modern psychology and sociology, illustrates the nature of society's reaction to the alien invaders. Westerners possessing advanced techniques come to traditional society and subordinated the indigenous population. Naturally, we ask why the later (as is evident in most of the instances) have been slow to react in pursuing progress and development, in an attempt to strengthen themselves, and thus escape subordination, as Japan eventually did.

The colonizers, subordinated the indigenous people by force, virtually every where disrupted the native culture and violated its deepest and moral values.⁴ For example, in the Indian subcontinent by introducing Western systems of land ownership by individuals in "fee simple", they destroyed the rights in land that were the basis of community life and that were sanctioned by sanctions as deep-rooted as, say the rights of parents to rear their own children. By introducing Western laws and rules of evidence they insured that their own system of court would flaunt basic moral codes of the country. By introducing 'contract' they deprived the unfortunate people of their right to lead their simple life. They also showed contempt for religion. Etc.⁵

The result of such disruption and of the apparent hopelessness of

rebellion created emotional uncertainty that, in broad generalization, created two important relevant effects :

1. It worked strongly against the acquisition of "achievement motivation".
2. It created (probably influenced by contempt toward the new changes introduced by colonizers) an intense desire to hold on to the old values, and thus created a deep unconscious antipathy among the general people toward the new technologies and institutions of the West.

Consequently, the colonial administrators effectively blocked incentive to participate in economic development, even though they may have provided knowledge of, or exposure to, advanced techniques.

The Japanese Case: In Japan, on the other hand, the aliens created fear of subordination ; but they did not occupy the land, disrupt the culture, and occasion an antipathy to their occupants. This contrast between Japan and other Asian countries in relations to the West is perhaps of major significance (as Hagen also perceives) in explaining the rapid development of Japan.⁶

A little discussion on the history of Japan is of importance. The Japanese knew of Western invasion on Asian countries, viz, Indian subcontinent, Indonesia and even China in nineteenth century. The Tokugawa Shogunate (who held the military office of dictatorship from 1603 to 1868) ejected and kept the foreigners out of Japan,⁷ because of a justifiable fear of increase in power and domain of the foreigners. The small outlet at Nagasaki served as a small riverlet for foreign learnings and art.

But when in 1853 Perry appeared with warships and demanded Japan open to foreigners, anti-foreign feelings became intense. With tumultations in following few years, the Japanese accepted the foreigners and foreign technology with only desire to learn the art of superior technology from them, and save the nation from future subordination.

Of course, it is difficult to say what would have happened if Japan was subjugated by them? But it can obviously be said that the picture of today's Japan would have been different, and probably the colonial rule might have brought the 'emotional' confusion and breakdown it brought elsewhere.⁸

After the Second World War, we find, in conformity to the above paradigm, Japan's spectacular rise in economic growth. Military strategy facing a defeat, Japanese fear for subordination was channeled toward high economic development to keep the country in 'freedom'.

The Japanese modernization was not sudden and artificial. It had its life-line deep rooted in the total value system of the society. The reaction to subordination, or very real and justified fear of subordination, provided energy for social revolution. With these developments, Japan created the economic institutions that she lacked. But the old powerfully influence the new. The course of her development from Meiji restoration (1868 A.D.) to the present shows marked difference from that of the Western, because the process was powerfully influenced by the persistence of previous social values and relationships.⁹

UNEVEN CHANGE INSTIGATED

A characteristic of the total process of transition and change in recently developing countries is that it has been, and continues to be, unbalanced. Certain major elements of this lack of balance have long been recognized and more or less correctly attributed to the nature of colonialism.¹⁰ As a result of change occurring under the environment of clash with colonizers, these societies have run into an inferior, dependent, and unbalance position in relation to the world development process. In order to understand some of the dynamic problems to which this process has given rise, certain aspects of this uneven and unbalanced changes should be analysed.

Change directed to 'Centre': The first major aspect is the lack of balance in processes of change and transition that can be found between the central level and local level. Most changes introduced either directly or indirectly by the colonial powers (or by the traditional authorities of the independent nations who were groomed by the colonial powers) have been focused on the central institutions of the society. The most obvious changes were in the broad frameworks of political and economic institutions. In the political field, the introduction of unitary systems of administration, the unification and regularization of taxation, the establishment of modern court procedures, and at later stages, the introduction of limited types of representation, have greatly changed overall political structure and orientations. Similar attempts to change the central foci of the institutional framework was made on a more limited scale in the educational field by endeavoring to provide new types of modern education for selected local elites.

At local levels: At the local level of village or community unit, colonial or indigenous local rulers attempted to contain most changes within the limits of traditional groups and, or, to limit, as much as possible, the extent of any change. But many changes did develop within the local communities, as the literature on detribalization, social and economic disorganization in villages, and disorganization in the community administration indicates. The important thing for our analysis is that the rulers tried, in so far as possible, to contain these changes within traditional systems, and most of their administrative efforts on local level were aimed at strengthening of existing organizations and relations, at maintaining peace and order, and at reorganizing the systems of taxation. Thus, while the administration attempted to introduce innovations—particularly new taxes and efficient administration—it tried to accomplish this within a relatively unchanging social setting. Here existed a basic contradiction: on the one hand, attempts were made to establish broad,

modern administrative, political and economic settings, while on the other hand, these changes were to be limited and based on relatively unchanged sub-groups and on traditional attitudes and loyalties. This contradictory attitude could be found in most spheres of today's underdeveloped countries.

In Economic Fields: In the economic field, major efforts were made to facilitate the functioning of market-oriented economy—albeit of a very specific kind. This economy had to operate, as it were, without full development of new economic motivations, which would have disturbed the existing social order, and also would have delimited economic prosperity of the colonizing countries. In India the Britishers purposefully destroyed the indigenous cotton industry of the country¹² to create markets for their home products.¹³ There was a constant pressure from colonizers that colonies, should go for mining and producing agricultural cash crops (viz, tea and indigo in India, rubber in Malaysia, cotton and coffee in Uganda, etc.) to feed the need of colonizing countries, and not persure industrial progress and subservient economic development.¹⁴ In most cases such mining and agricultural operations led to semi-slavery type of forced labour mobilization, concentration and mass transportation.¹⁵

In Education: In the field of education, where innovations were much less broad, there existed the tendency to impart the rudiments of Western education without changing much the systems of values and aspirations. However, in economic and educational fields of action, at least, partial solution could be found. Some indigenous groups found place in newly established economic, educational and professional organizations. Literacy grew to some extent. European language was left as a legacy. Expectation of monetary rewards in education became customary and permissible for most of the newly educated groups.¹⁶

But the most striking effect of changes in the field of education in Indian sub-continent was that it adversely affected the indigenous

education system and created a huge credibility gap in the indigenous system and its values in the society. The people, en-mass with a deep rejection for colonizer's system of education, became the 'escape-goat' of the change, and eventually emerged over time as a large mass of illiterate people. One more reason to add, it can be pointed out, there was almost no specific programme for providing mass education to the people.

Political Fields: Internal contradictions were most pronounced in the political field. Since the colonial powers and the indigenous rulers were interested in political loyalty, they aimed at maintaining a relatively positive type of obedience and identification, and were always ready, whenever possible, to utilize existing traditional loyalties or to transfer them to the new setting without much change in their basic social and cultural orientations. While the administrators were interested in loyalty and were concerned with the transformation of certain institutional aspects—especially technical aspects—of the social structure, they wanted at the same time to base these innovations not on a new type of solidarity and general political orientation and participation of the main strata of the population.¹⁷ Rather they tried to base the new political-administrative structure on orientations limited to technical, administrative changes for the bulk of population, and on more general and active identification for a limited and selected group at the centre. The full dynamic indications of this unbalanced development can only be understood if some additional aspects of unevenness of change are analyzed. These are aspects derived from the colonial or semicolonial political situation.

SEGREGATION

The two chief results derived from colonial nexus, that bear legacies in the present developing countries, were (i) segregation between Europeans and natives, and (ii) discrimination against the natives in most of the newly developed institutions.¹⁸ The extent

of segregation and the intensity of discrimination varied in different institutional spheres and was often coupled with attempts to maintain the traditional native culture and even to idealize and romanticize it. The attempts at 'segregation' and at minimal development of a common framework were most prominent in the fields of politics and social solidarity; they were somewhat less in the fields of administration and in the economy. It also created vested interest groups in line with colonizers.

This segregation slowly gave rise to an anomic situation where some natives living in cities—the so-called 'modern elite'—adopted some behaviour patterns of the colonizers and were labelled collaborators. They received contempt of the general people and started feeling themselves alienated. In the long run this resulted into creation of a dual society where alienation between rural and urban grew wider.¹⁹ The present distrust of the rural folk toward the urban folk in Bangladesh owes some of its roots to this segregation.

The uneven changes instigated by the colonizers created a problem which Eisenstadt summarises as follows:

".....the basic problem in these societies was the expectation that the native population would accept certain broad, modern institutional settings organized according to principles of universalism, specificity, and common secular solidarity, and would perform within them various roles—while at the same time, they were denied some of the basic rewards inherent in these settings. They were denied above all full participation in a common political system and full integration in a common system of solidarity. In other words, they were expected to act on the basis of a motivational system derived from a different social structure which the colonial powers and indigenous rulers tried to maintain. Quite obviously these societies faced acute problems of integration which could not be solved, except momentarily, within the framework of colonial or semi-colonial societies."²⁰

However, these process of uneven changes did not and could not stop at a given time and freeze, as it were, the society's development at a certain stage. Many such attempts were made, as is evident

by the attempts at adhering to inherited system of rule, on the one hand, and by widespread efforts of the indigenous rulers to limit changes to purely technical matters, on the other. But such devices could not succeed for long. The economic needs of the people as well as the ruling class, their growing dependency on international markets and the international political system and the changes within it, preclude any freezing of development at a given stage. Thus all these processes tended to affect 'native' social system to an increasing degree and to draw over wider strata of these latecomers into the orbit of modern institutional settings.²¹ Different countries are today at different stages of development in this process. But the greater the tempo of these changes, the greater the unevenness and lack of balance, and the greater the problems of acute mal-integration these societies are facing today. Eisenstadt opines:

".....these problems of mal-integration arose at various levels and in different social spheres—in the economic and ecological spheres, in education, in family life, and others. But they were necessarily most acute in the political and solidarity spheres; there the colonial or Western impact had undermined most of the old integrative principles and organizations both at local and national level. While partial solutions could sometimes be found for economic and technical problems, their very partiality only tended to emphasize the alien political framework and the mal-integration in the solidarity sphere."²²

Dual Society: Considering in the light of above discussion, the present course of urban-centred development in many countries appears understandable. But as we have already mentioned, such developments are creating as well grave social and personal disadvantages. Urban unemployment, we find, is qualitatively worse—it is more absolute, more frustrating, more debilitating—than rural unemployment. And quite plainly, it is more productive of social violence and political upheaval.²³

Most disturbing of all, urban-centred development maximises the drift of these developing countries toward the condition of polarized

'dual' society. Demographically speaking, life in Bangladesh being rather than literally dichotomized, is distributed through a spectrum of place sized. But culturally, one cannot escape the dichotomy between the new and the old, the scientific and traditional, the experimental and fatalistic, the achievement-oriented and the status-dominated. Instead of narrowing this gap, urban-centred development widens it by tending to polarize the demographic spectrum. Its effect is to gather the progressive elements in the society into urban concentrations that, in terms of income and ideas, pull farther and farther away from traditional rural mass which comprize the overwhelming majority of more than 85% in the country.²⁴ The deepening internal contrast and tensions, implicit in the trend towards dual society, creates a widening breach between the modern and traditional sectors of the society, and inherently incompatible with an attempt to achieve radical economic change peacefully.²⁵

URBANISM

In the light of the foregoing discussion, it would not be surprising to find a wide discontent toward urbanization. Many regard urbanization in an adverse light, as a source of human problems and sufferings and hence as constituting a problem in itself. This anti-urban bias is, of course, not new and confined to the developing countries alone.

But on the other hand, it can be said, urbanism is so completely bound up with the development process in these countries as well as the international system that it is impossible to have one without the other. Urbanism, indeed, can be regarded as a part of development process. Lerner shows that urbanization is correlated with other aspect of modernity, such as literacy, both in statistical terms and as a matter of necessity.²⁶ In this view, although we cannot deny the social and personal problems associated with urbanization, the urbanism itself is not regarded as a problem but as a solution.

Now, a healthy growth of urbanism means it is supported by increasing productivity. The roots to productivity lie in rural economy. In many developing countries the basic problem is the same: to shift from a rural base to the urban base. But the fact is that the drift of population to urban areas is more than the absorbing capacity of these areas, and we face the problem of over-urbanization. Such drift to cities poses all sorts of problems. Yet, the "really important problem is that of creating urban employment fast enough to keep pace with it".²⁷

The Urban Immigrants: Now, keeping aside all the problems of tension, duality, lack of motivation, illiteracy, uneven development and all others, we have explained as legacies of colonial period, let us consider the individuals—the people who are immigrating to urban centres in these societies. We find a concomitant set of meseries people are undergoing in the process. Not to tell of poverty. Not to tell of cramped living condition and problems with basic needs of life—food, shelter, health and education. Not to tell of over-population, unemployment, and lack of rapid economic development.²⁸ Let us examine the process of adaptation to the changed environment. Obviously, this process is more taxing because of already mentioned polarizing society.

Any study of urbanization process draw attention to a series of social and economic facts which are often obscured in these developing countries because of differences in speed of urbanization and because of the contrast between the culture of immigrants from a remote village and that which he meets in an already partly 'westernized' city. There are many problems which play a significant part in the process of transforming peasants into city people. Among them are the need to overcome forces fostering 'anomie' on the part of immigrant who is torn lose from an environment in which he felt secure, and thrown into a city where impersonal forces predominate and primary groups outside the immediate family are

scars or absent; the problem of adjustment of these migrants, who may be regarded as culturally marginal, to a new form of life; and the intermingling of ethnic or linguistic groups which often provoke the establishment of new quasi-caste relations.²⁹ These are among the important factors making for the vulnerability to radical development programmes to which workers in newly formed urban enclosures are often subject. Hoselitz emphasizes, they are among the main background forces at work determining the forms of social organization that will prevail in the urban centre of a culture—centres which tend to impress their characteristics on the rest of the society as it undergoes economic development.³⁰

The immigrant's posture in the new urban context involves response to his old culture, conflict and tensions with the new—and usually quite different—urban context and the new role. Not only must he survive physically, he must survive in largely alien socio-economic context. It is impossible to explain it in its full context here. Obviously, resocialization of the rural immigrants to cities is required for adaptation to this new way of life. This proceeds differentially in terms of rate of change of specific urban practices. He may, for instance, accept modern pecuniary relationship but retain the use of rural medicine men.³¹ Conflicts between and among such differences in acceptability of urban practices are very much prevalent in a country like Bangladesh. They invariably lead to strain, discontents, conflicts and discontinuities. A member of rural society is expected to exhibit a different acceptability process of the practices and customs he is surrounded with. The pressure for accepting prevailing practices in rural areas usually result in unquestioning compliance. But in urban areas virtually everything may appear strange to the new comer and lead him to retain selected rural customs. Further, free from village restraints, he may gravitate toward his own kind, i. e., his own rural community. Breese assigns this to the anomie—normlessness—and to being 'lost' in the urban society that drives

large number of single, unattached persons immigrating from villages to associate themselves with former village residents.³² Such enclavements are facilitating to adaptation process to urban life if they are used as a temporary step in the process. But because of polarization in two lives this process of change to urbanism becomes complicated and taxing not only to the individual but also the society.

EPILOGUE

One of the problems always connected with social change is the rate at which the change takes place. It is of particular interest in our case. Because, depending on the grooming of people as well as the social system and institutions, there, indeed, exists a limit on the rate of social change to which human beings can adjust. Save for short-run periods in history this probably has never been an endemic problem until the development of industrial societies.

Nevertheless, even in cases of rapid changes, societies vary radically as to the rate of changes to which their members can adjust readily. Of course, there is no reason to believe that the greater the rate of change to which people have been accustomed, the greater is the rate of adjustments to increased rates of change. But it can probably be said that in cases of radical changes of economic modernization and industrialization, where governments play major role, some efforts can be made through social planning and engineering to reduce the dislocations ('gaps' and 'anomie') occurring at the lack of necessary adjustment (and adaptability) with the new changes. And for this, we need to examine the existing condition of societies where such change are taking place.

This paper ponders on explaining this from a particular and limited aspect, viz., the legacies of colonial nexus and its effects on the present process of development in the third world countries. Polarization of societies has been taken up as a subject for discussion.

NOTES

1. Patric KEATLEY, 'Imperial Ace Age, *The Guardian*, 5 April 1965.
2. A colony is defined by the O. E. D. as "a settlment in a new country; a body of people who settle in a new locality, forming a community subject to or connected with their parent state; the community so formed, consisting of original settlers and their descendants and sucesors, as long as the connection with the parent state is kept up..... The territory peopled by such a community." (J. E. GOLDTHORPE, 'The Sociology of the Third World: Disparity and Involvement', CUP, London (1975) p. 40). Thus the word can be applied in its literal dictionary sense.
3. For discussing such experience, the colonial past must often be considered at two distinct levels—what actually happened, and the way in which people now perceive, evaluate, reflect upon, and react to their perception of what happened. We are concerned, that is, with the colonial past both as history and as myth. Both are facts; what actually happened is of course fact at one level, but at another level the social facts of present situations including people's ideas about what hppened in the past, even though those ideas may be selected, distorted or in part just plain wrong. (GOLDTHORPE, *op. cit.*)
4. Everette E. HAGEN, 'A Framework for Analysing Economic and Political Change'; in ASHER, etc., 'Development of Emerging Countries—An Agenda for Research', Brookings, Washington (1962) p. 24.
5. A. B. SHAH & C. R. M. RAO, 'Tradition and Modernity in India', Manaktalas, Bombay (1965).
6. E. E. HAGEN, 'The Process of Economic Development'; in *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol 5, No. 3, (April 1975).
7. Except with a small outlet in Nagasaki for Dutch traders partly to obtain desired imports and partly to keep a channel of information concerning the West.
8. HAGEN, *ibid*, p. 211.
9. Edwin O. REISCHAUER, 'Historian's View on Japanese Culture and Modernization' (A guest speech delivered at International Conference on Japanese Studies, 1972), *Mainichi Daily News*, 22 Oct. 1972.
10. S. N. EISENSTADT, 'Essays on Sociological Aspects of Political and Economic Development', The Hague: Mouton (1961) pp. 12-17.
11. J. E. GOLDTHORPE, 'The Sociology of the Third World: Disparity and Involvement', Cambridge University Press, London (1975) pp. 39-76.
12. The social effects of this destruction were too large in India in the late century. A ruthless destruction was done on the crafts of "Dacca Muslin"—a much afamed silk industry of older days.
13. Eugene STALEY, 'The Future of Underdeveloped Countries', Fredrick

A. Praeger, NY (1961) p. 278.

14. Gunar MYRDAL, 'Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations', Vintage Books: Random House, NY (1972).
15. GOLDTHORPE, op. cit., p. 71
 "Foreign labourers, isolated in unfamiliar surroundings, were more docile, more easily organized for effective work, and more permanently attached.....Secondly.....the difficulties in attracting local people to wage employment were serious—though again we must remember that the matter was never considered on any assumption other than an extremely low level of wages. And thirdly, no one who had any say in policy saw anything wrong in bringing in foreign labour."
 (MYRADA)
 Of course, we agree "that there was great diversity in the colonial experience. Some colonial regimes were harshly repressive, alienated much land to white settlers, used forced labour or other methods of ensuring a plentiful supply of cheap labour for European mines, plantations, or farms, and neglected or failed adequately to develop native education, health, or economic development. Others, by contrast, were mild.....alienated little or no land, encouraged native education, and welcomed the emergence of indigenous elite.....(But) whether the regime was harsh or mild, exploitative or benificent, howeve, it was always resented by the natives or non-whites—especially the more intelligent, educated and urbanized people amonge them."
 (GOLDTHORPE)
16. Ibid, pp. 39-76.
17. Ibid. The 'Zamindari sustem' in British India was an example of it.
18. HAGEN, op. cit., p. 24. Also GOLDTHORPE, op. cit.
19. HAGEN, ibid, p. 16.
20. S. N. EISENSTADT, 'Brakdowns of Modernization', Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 12, No. 4, July 1964.
21. Marion J. LEVY Jr, 'Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors', Basic Book, NY (1972).
22. EISENSTADT, op. cit.
23. Bert F. HOSELITZ, 'Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth', Free Press (1960) p. 163.
24. It can be said true for many other countries.
25. John P. LEWIS, 'Quiet Crisis of India', Brookings Institute, Washington (1962) p. 176.
26. Daniel LERNER, 'The Passing of Traditional Society', Glence, Ill, (1958) p. 58.
27. GOLDTHORPE, op. cit., p. 121.
28. They have widely been discussed. Any report from a developing

country will focus light on these problems. Besides, quite a few good UN reports are also available dealing on the problems.

29. Robert A. NISBET, 'The Quest for Community', Oxford Univ. Press, NY, (1953).
30. HOSELITZ, op. cit., pp. cit., pp. 180-81.
31. SHAH & RAO, op. cit.
32. Gerald BREESE, 'Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries', Prentice-Hall Inc., NJ (1966).