

Title	An Approach to the Fragment of Milesian Anaximander : A first Boundary Stone on tropos from Mythos to Logos
Sub Title	
Author	山崎, 照雄(Yamasaki, Teruo)
Publisher	三田哲學會
Publication year	1968
Jtitle	哲學 No.53 (1968. 9) ,p.23- 45
JaLC DOI	
Abstract	
Notes	守屋謙二先生古稀記念論文集
Genre	Journal Article
URL	https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AN00150430-00000053-0029

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An Approach to the Fragment of Milesian Anaximander

—A *first* Boundary Stone on *tropos* from Mythos to Logos—

Teruo Yamasaki

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I.

In the progress of Man’s intellectual recognition, the road from *Χάος* (chaos) to *Κόσμος* (kosmos) was probably not short. In the Greek language, things told and spoken of were expressed by the term, *λεγόμενον* (legomenon). The verb (legō-) means to collect and count, which is the same as the terms “zahlen” (count) and “erzählen” (tell), both derived from the same German root. *λεγο*, which had the concept of sequence, repetition and order, was related to the sense of evaluation and had the meaning of “talk”. Logos was the way of man’s thinking and was a criterion for his acts.

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But I assume that the course from *Mýthos* (mythos), the story of their gods and goddesses to the distinct logos seemed neither fairly short, nor smooth.

α

The gods, *οἱ θεοὶ*, were positively the abstract ideas and conception of an archaic people, according to the explanation by J. E. Harrison.* She clearly states that the so-called archaic gods never existed. What really existed were their reactions to their environment, public emotions and action. She reiterated that the abstract ideas were arisen from the concrete facts which alone could have given them birth. That means, without *perception* of the facts, *conception* which is the origin of *expression* cannot exist.

Inevitably, they highly evaluated the four seasons of the year. That they cared for the seasonal circle and that they respected rituals were simply because on them depended man's primary requirements, such as obtaining food and bearing children. Therefore it could be said that research on rituals of a certain race was meaningless without taking into consideration the various facts regarding their indigenous climate and environment in which they lived.*

Now, as far as I know, the term "religion" is traced back to its origin "religio" (lat.). The verb "lig(o)" which was derived from the same origin "religare", originally meant "to relate" something to somebody and was assumed to mean the communication between man and god. Myth, by origin, might be the mutual communication between god and man.

Here, Harrison explains the myths not only from the standpoint

* Jane Ellen Harrison, *Ancient Art and Ritual*, 1913.

J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Chap. VI (The Making of a Goddess), Chap. VII (The Making of a God). 1908.

* J. E. Harrison, *Ancient Art and Ritual*, (p. 50 f)

of a linguistic factor but based on the previous opinion (based on the primary requirements of human beings) that myths were mostly generated from ritual activities and gestures, carried out to deepen man's communication with god. On the other hand she takes up an acting factor of *δρόμενον* (dromenon)—what is done and acted—and stresses its importance.* Thus, she states “There is scarcely a problem in the origins of Greek mythology and religion that has been solved within the domain of Greek thinking only”. (ibid., p. 14)

β

On the contrary, Walter F. Otto, for example, denies her theory and points out an error to consider narrow sensed ritual (being done) and myths (being told) in a subordinate relationship and seek the primal importance of them, because they were the same thing by origin in the mythos as “Urphänomen^{**}”. He expresses his thinking that the myths are generated out of man's perception of things existing around him, and therefore “Seinswahrheit” is included in the myths. By this thought in the ritual, man exalted himself to the divine things, lived and acted with the gods; on the other hand in the myths, in a narrow sense, the divine things degraded and altered themselves so low as human being.^{***}

* *ibid.*, (p. 35. f)

** Walter F. Otto, *Theophania, der Geist der altgriechischen Religion*, 1956.
 “ ” ” , *Die Götter Griechenlands*, 1929.

*** He understands it man's Theomorphism rather than god's Anthropomorphism. “—Der Sinn und das Bestreben der Griechen ist, den Menschen zu vergöttern, nicht die Gottheit zu vermenscheln. Hier ist ein Themorphism, kein Anthropomorphism!” Goethe (*Myrons Kuh* 1818.) He also thinks that is a mistake of the means to the end to seek the origin of myths in the domain of legomenon. He coincides with Christian Gottlob Heyne's opinion that myths were nothing but “Ursprache” (metaphorical truth) pertaining to man's spirit, because it could not express its astonishment unless through metaphor when it made contact to powerful “Gestalten der Weltwirklichkeit” (configurations of the world's actuality).

Therefore W. F. Otto regards the myths as god's presentation, "Theophania", not prelogical thinking. That means, within the myths as a term (or a legomenon), "Urgestalt" which is the origin of the god and the direct theophania of his power is spoken through *Μοῦσα* (one and also many) as self-presentation of the gods.

He says that if they are original myths, they do not hold individual authority but they mean the whole existence of the world based on the exposure of the gods' power to man whatever the gods may be called or however distinguished from the other gods—the gods are one complete world to man.* Otto, on the contrary to Harrison, rejects the opinion** that a certain daimon or spirit (the limited power exercised in a certain domain of activity) is elevated to the gods as a nonsensically evolutionary assertion.

That the gods of Olympus appeared only to the Greeks was because they sought for something beautiful and perpetually joyful at the bottom of things and facts, and found it in the living intelligence regarding the existence of things and facts. It was not something they wished for or created intentionally. At the very bottom of "Abgrund von dem Dasein," although the pressure of living is still very heavy, everything is light, quiet and pleasant. Living, with all its affliction, pathos and destruction, is absorbed into

* According to Otto's opinion, only the Greek gods grasp existence of one complete world as the only gods, in front of them the depth, extent and height of the world can be exposed.

** Nature's cyclic circulation in winter and summer, each containing smaller circulation of day and night. Through the cyclic rituals, things annually perceived (repetitive perception) make a memory or an image in man's heart and form a perpetual and abstract conception. It is an image that the archaic primitive people never saw but conceived—(for example, spirit of a doll or plant)—a kind of daimon or spirit. It dies and revives and circulates forever. According to Harrison, "Thus ritual makes, as it were, a bridge between life and art, (p. 135.)

perpetuity—the gods.

—Und alles Drängen, alles Ringen
ist ewige Ruh in Gott dem Herrn.

Goethe (Z. Xen. VII.)

However, I can hardly submit to Otto's critique and interpretation on the passage once written by Goethe and sent to Johann J. Winckelmann about the statue of Zeus at Olympia which was later appreciated as "die Wahrheit der Mythologie". Here I quote, "God altered himself into man—to exalt man to god".*

But the ordinance of Greek people's behavior, in general, was based on neither modern intention nor obedience, but on the perfect reversion of "Dasein" and their world to logos. Eventually the understanding ability and experience were of vital importance to the ancient Greeks, and I cannot help agreeing with him at the point that Winckelmann learnt no other than from the Greeks—anything perfect and divine is peaceful and quiet.**

γ

However, an extremely subtle question is left for us to study. Generally speaking, the very origin of philosophy can be seen in the transition from mythos to logos and also from legomenon about the gods to the theory of learning. We must enquire what is the substantial myths. We should not speak of it as merely a primitive story. The original Greek term "mythos" did not stop to mean legomenon. We must understand mythos as the most primitive form

* Der Gott war zum Menschen geworden, um den Menschen zum Gott zu erheben.—Winckelmann und sein Jahrhundert. In Briefen Aufsätzen herg. von Goethe 1805. Tübingen.

** Johann J. Winckelmann, Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums, 1764. Bd. V. 3. 3 ff.

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of thinking concerning their life and world that sprouted at the bottom of the heart of mankind. We are perhaps unable to accept the explanation as it stands, but presumably, it is a legomenon with some hidden meanings behind.

It is a kind of creative idea facing toward our surroundings; it usually appears before we approach to science or philosophy, and also prepares for philosophy and science, and includes a germinating power in itself. The metaphorical interpretations of mythos were at its peak at the time of Sophist (B.C. 5), their enlightenment age. When education spread over in Greece, their intellectual centre was transferred from Ionia to Athena, the cultural centre of the Mediterranean world. Sophist (Sophistēs—intellectual people, B.C. 5) who led the intellectual van of new age, mostly interpreted mythos as something secretly implying contemplating, natural scientific, ethical and religious truth.*

Now, W. F. Otto indicates his notion of the ancient Greek gods. He points out the characteristics of them not as Jewish or Christian but as plural gods, abhorrence to the previous religion. They had heretic characteristic, existed in the form of man, closely related with nature and morally ill-behaved. Here, Otto writes a passage worth noticing, “Apart from all the other heretic religions, it is Greek like. But what does this *Greek like* mean? It is no exaggeration to say that this is the question never seriously inquired before.”**

Could we find a distinct difference and a leap in a spiritual

* In Platon's writings, Socrates implicitly explains the world beyond or destiny of man's spirit and creates certain kinds of philosophical myth, saying it foolish to believe the story into its details but facts beyond our intelligence are almost like that.

** Walter F. Otto, *Theophania, der Geist der altgriechischen Religion* Rowohlt's deutsche Enzyklopädie XV. 1956. S. 4.

development between mythos and logos as philosophy? Furthermore, what are the differences centered around physis between philosophy and science, meta-physis and physik, or *οἱ θεοὶ* in mythos and *ὁ θεός* by the philosophers in the early days—or perhaps in a more felicitous term—deity thing *τὸ θεῖον*?

Next, let me refer to the fragment of a Milesian, Anaximander, believed to be the one and only and the oldest document worth reliable. But I must say that my humble report is limited to what it tells about. The observation based on archaeology and philology will be reserved for some other occasion. Here, I submit a fragmentary idea concerning the simple, and thus extremely obscure theme of the content.

If I dare to express my opinion raking a risk of causing some misunderstandings, a contrast of J. E. Harrison to W. F. Otto can be studied in comparison of W. K. Guthrie to M. Heidegger in their posture of the research on the fragment, which itself is embryo and rudimentary as well, a simple form the earliest stage of philosophy. Harrison prudently draws a conclusion by the steady method, avoids any leap in her theory, while Otto, with his “awakened spirit” always makes object itself to express its reserved meaning* and discovers self-presentation of truth.

II.

α

The brief fragment of Anaximander has been the target of endless discussion as the oldest document in Greece, consequently, in the western history of philosophy. The account which Simplicius gives, in large part from Theophrastus, is as follows.

* For example, he thinks that it is nonsense to explain Greek religion through the living condition or spiritual attitude of the early Greeks.

Ἀναξίμανδρος . . . ἀρχὴν τε καὶ στοιχείον εἶρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἀπειρον, πρῶτος τοῦτο τοῦνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς. ((λέγει δ' αὐτῆν μήτε ὕδωρ μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν καλουμένων εἶναι στοιχείων, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἀπειρον, ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους. [ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν, διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοισι τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν,] ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν λέγων.)) δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τὴν εἰς ἀλλήλα μεταβολὴν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων οὗτος θεασάμενος οὐκ ἠξίωσεν ἐν τι τούτων ὑποκείμενον ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτα.

Anaximander . . . declared the Boundless to be principle and element of existing things, having been the first to introduce this very term of “principle”; ((he says that “it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some different, boundless nature, from which all the heavens arise and the *κόσμοι* within them; [out of those things whence is the generation for existing things, into these again does their destruction take place, according to what must needs be: for they make amends and give reparation to one another for their offense, according to the ordinance of time,] speaking of them thus in rather poetical terms.)) It is clear that, having observed the change of the four elements into one another, he did not think fit to make any one of these the material substratum, but something else besides these. (Simplic. *Phy.* 24, 13 from Theophrastus *Phys. Opin.* fr. 2, *Dox.* 476, cited above, 1-6.* S)

Underline, (()), and [] by the author.

* There is a lot to be discussed in this Simplicius description. For example, regarding the interpretation of the underlined part, there has been two main theories since the early days. One of them, represented by D. H. Kahn, as same as W. Jaeger, understands it the person who used

β

Before going into further study, I indicate two points here. One of which is concerned with supplementary part written by Simplicius. But the point of view regarding the origin of process of things makes us think it was obviously written by Aristoteles. Another part is *κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν . . . κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν*, in the latter half, which is more important than the previous, believed to have described Anaximander's own words in oratio obliqua. I myself consider it the most positive minimum test of Anaximander.

the term, *ἀρχή* (principle) for the first time. On the contrary, J. Burnet, G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and others believe that Anaximander called apeiron by the term "archē" (principle), meaning the first person who used the term *ἄπειρον* for description of *ἀρχή*. Guthrie, having Kirk and Raven in his mind, says here, "the first to introduce this name for "Archē", and agrees with Kirk and Raven, but concludes that both *archē* and *apeiron* are the terms used by Anaximander. Kahn (the same as Jaeger) does not stop to interpret that Anaximander was the first to adopt the term *ἀρχή* with its meaning different from that of Aristoteles and that Anaximander was also the first to adopt the term *ἄπειρον*.

The phrase in [], believed to be Anaximander's authentic writing with a supplement by Simplicius, are contrasted to Guthrie's translation as follows.

"[Things perish into those things out of which they have their being, as is due; for they make just recompense to one another for their injustice according to the ordinance [or perhaps "assessment"] of time—so he puts it in somewhat poetical terms.]

It is clear that when he observed how the four elements change into each other, he did not think it reasonable to conceive of one of these as underlying the rest, but posited something else.

οὗτος δὲ οὐκ ἀλλοιούμενου τοῦ στοιχείου τὴν γένεσιν ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποκρινομένων τῶν ἐναντίων διὰ τῆς αἰδίου κινήσεως.

Moreover he does not account for *genesis* by a qualitative alteration of the element, but by a separation of the opposites caused by the eternal motion.

In accordance with the first part, Guthrie^{*} seeks the basis of interpretation in a narrow sensed natural phenomenon. Taking an example of fire and water, he indicates the conflict between the opposites as non-disputable facts. The term, "injustice" in the passage—"They make just recompense to one another for their injustice", means encroachment of fire, swallowing up its competitor, water. When a thing is encroached by an opposite thing, it tries to recompense the lost territory at once. Mutual advance and retreat between opposite things such as hot and dry, cold and wet, light and dark or day and night are nothing but alteration of the season.

To sum up, this conception of circularity was probably the fundamental idea of Anaximander and was symbolized by the alteration of injustice and reparation. The process of becoming and perishing is circular. Consequently, perishing does not mean vanishing into naught but altering into a different form. In other words, it is mutual alteration between matters. It was characteristics of Milesians' thought that once things in opposite begin to separate, process of cosmogony takes place, exercising forces pertaining to matters. He says in the previous phrase, "Things perish into that out of which they have their being." It means that an element transformed itself into something else, for instance, fire covers water completely to dry it up. Then cosmic balance, maintained by the mutual encroachment of the opposite things and recession as "penalty" for "injustice" done.

Guthrie assumes this cyclic process nothing but an annual change. Thus, the opinion "Things perish into that out of which they come because things must make just recompense to one another", explains the cyclic and seasonal rhythm maintaining a single cosmos—reab-

* W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. I: The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans, 1962 p. 80.

" " " " , The Greek Philosophers, From Thales to Aristotle, 1967.

sorbing of the separated contents of cosmos to the original apeiron.

Next point is *κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν* mentioned before. Guthrie is not satisfied with the ordinal translation, “according to the ordinance of time”, and he takes a prudent attitude toward writing the term “assessment”, cautiously adding, “perhaps”. The term *τάξιν* with its meaning plays a fairly important role in Anaximander’s fragment. Among scholars from the modern to the present age, most of them merely use the German translation “Ordnung” with the exception of Walter Kranz^{*} using the term “Anordnung” and Jaeger^{**} distinctly interpreting it “Verfügung”.

γ

Now, in regard to the aforesaid interpretation, I would like to allude to Martin Heidegger’s^{***} expression and his fundamental attitude toward the fragment. He and Burnet^{****} define the authentic phrase written by Anaximander to the last half part beginning with “*κατὰ τὸ χρεών . . .*”, and says that the first half is extremely Aristotelian,^{*****} and can hardly be a primitive expression in the early days, from the point of its structure and sound. He accepts the last half as worthy of “poetic expression” stated by Simplicius. At the same time, he deletes the end of the last part, *κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν* without any hesitation since it characterizes Aristotelian fashion of

* Walter Kranz, *Philologos*. 93, 1939, S. 430 ff.

** Werner Jaeger, *Paideia I, Die Formung des griechischen Menschen*. 1934, S. 217.

*** Martin Heidegger, *Der Spruch des Anaximander*, Holzwege. 1957.

**** John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 1920.

***** Wohl dagegen ist der ganze vor *κατὰ τὸ χρεών* stehende Satz nach Bau und Klang weit eher aristotelisch als archaisch. Den gleichen späteren Zug verrät auch das *κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν* am Ende des gewöhnlich angenommenen Textes. Wer sich dazu versteht, das von Burnet angezweifelte Textstück zu streichen, kann auch das gewöhnlich angenommene Schlußstück nicht halten. (*ibid.*, S. 314)

the latter period.*

On the other hand he successively alluded to the important word *γένεσις* in the first half and the term, *φθορά* placed in contrast. His opinion is that we must understand these words simply “griechisch” whether they are derivated in the preconceptional period or Platonic or Aristotelian conceptional words during the latter period.**

But Heidegger’s opinion is slightly contradictory—he deletes the word from the point of the periodic investigation which appeals us to appreciate the “griechisch” interpretation of the rest of the words and phrases.

Hereafter he hastily evolves his extremely original and unique theory (or exceedingly forcible in his own way but toward bright conclusion of his own original philosophical stage.). In other words, Heidegger judges the theme of Anaximander’s minimum text, though it is not clearly stated, positively “τὰ ὄντα”.

It is thing (Ding) in general, not the so-called natural thing, nor the thing in the modern sense. The subject is obviously “das Seiende im Ganzen”. The word “they” (*αὐτά*) means a thing only existing, *τὰ ὄντα*, which is “das Anwesende im Ganzen”, everything

* Das sind auch genau die Worte, in Bezug auf welche Theophrast vermerkt, daß Anaximander in einer mehr poetischen Weise spreche. Seitdem ich vor einigen Jahren noch einmal die ganze, in meinen Vorlesungen öfter behandelte Frage durchdacht habe, neige ich dazu, nur diese Worte als die unmittelbar echten des Anaximander anzunehmen, ... (*ibid.*) allerdings unter der Voraussetzung, daß der voraufgehende Text nicht einfach ausgeschieden, sondern auf Grund der Strenge und Sagekraft seines Gedankens als mittelbares Zeugnis des Anaximandrischen Denkens festgehalten wird. ... (*ibid.*, S. 315).

** Daß *γένεσις* und *φθορά* bei Platon und Aristoteles feste Begriffswörter sind und dann zu Schulwörtern werden, trifft zu. (*ibid.*, S. 314) ... Damit ist gefordert, daß wir gerade die Worte *γένεσις* und *φθορά* so verstehen, wie sie griechisch gedacht sind, mögen sie verbegriffliche Worte sein oder platonisch-aristotelische Begriffswörter. (*ibid.*, S. 315)

in the sense of “das Seiende” is the theme for him. Here, his so-called “aus der Sache selbst her zu fragen” is pushed to foreground.

From the grammatical aspect, he recognizes the fragment consisting of the two sentences and states that “things” (Dinge, *θντα*) in question of the meaning in the first sentence is, literally speaking, a plural neuter noun, *τὰ θντα*, indicating *τὰ πολλά* in the meaning of “Mannigkeit des Seiendes.”

He further says that the term “things” does not mean any voluntary or undefined diversity but rather *τὰ πάντα*, which is “das All des Seienden”. Therefore *das αὐτά* in the second sentence beginning with “That means they give each other . . . (*διδοῦναι γὰρ αὐτα . . .*)”, summarizes *das τοῖς οἴσιν* in the first sentence.^{*} That he cleverly singularizes the plural neuter noun is evidently far from Guthrie or Kahn^{**} whose ideas indicate that the plural form only means *στοιχεῖα*”.

Here again we can recall the criticism on the so-called grammatical *tour de force* for explaining the plurals *ἐξ ὧν* and *εἰς ταῦτα* as if they referred to a singular antecedent, *τὸ ἄπειρον*. This criticism is inevitable on the assumption that most commentators from Aetius to Diels thought the passage was expressing genesis of many things from *ἄπειρον*.

However, Heidegger evolves his unique theory of the translation centred around things, language and thought. He states that we are

* “Von den *θντα* ist die Rede; *τὸ θντα* bedeutet wörtlich übersetzt: das Seiende. Der Plural des Neutrums nennt *τὰ πολλά*, . . . Aber *τὰ θντα* meint nicht eine beliebige oder eine grenzenlose Mannigfaltigkeit, sondern *τὰ πάντα*, das All des Seienden. Deshalb bedeutet *τὰ θντα* das mannigfaltig Seiende im Ganzen.” “Das *αὐτά* (in dem zweiten Satz)” nimmt das *τοῖς οἴσιν* des ersten Satzes wieder auf. (*ibid.*, S. 304).

** Charles H. Kahn, *Anaximander and the Origin of Greek Cosmology* 1960 p. 167, p. 195.

moored to the substantial experience of language and since our translation is unavoidably restricted, a word expressing a thought can only be translated through the communication between thinking and things described.

In that sense, Heidegger says “Das Denken jedoch ist Dichten” (ibid., S. 303). With such a basic attitude of interpretation, he persists that the passage has a theme of “Das Sein des Seiendes.” In order to obtain a correct theme of the fragment from the same point of view, he tries to evolve a new theory regarding *κατὰ τὸ χρεών* the phrase usually translated into “according to necessity,” (nach od. gemäß der Notwendigkeit), particularly in the meaning of *ἡ χεῖρ* (the hand) in *Χρεών* and decisively translated it “Brauch”.

However, we need not follow all the assumption into detail any more. At this stage, it is sufficient to pay attention to his advocacy upon Anaximander’s saying—„... uns hinhörend auf das einzulassen, was in dem Spruch zur Sprache kommt.“ — „Erst aus solchem Zuhören glückt eine Zwiesprache mit dem frühgriechischen Denken.”

Heidegger’s translation from *κατὰ τὸ χρεών* is as follows for your reference. „... entlang dem Brauch; gehören nämlich lassen sie

* Das Denken sagt das Diktat der Wahrheit des Seins, Das Denken ist das ursprüngliche dictare. Das Denken ist die Urdichtung, ... Das dichtende Wesen des Denkens verwahrt das Walten der Wahrheit des Seins. (Heidegger, *ibid.*, S. 303)

** The Non-Limited is the original material of existing things; further, the source from which existing things derive their existence is also that to which they return at their destruction, *according to necessity*; for they give justice and make reparation to one another for their injustice, according to the arrangement of Time. (Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, A complete translation of the Fragments in Diels*, 1952, p. 19).

*** (Heidegger, *ibid.*, S. 337)

**** *ibid.*, S. 338.

***** *ibid.*, S. 306.

Fug somit auch Ruch eines dem anderen (im Verwinden) des Un-Fugs.*

III.

α

The language Anaximander used was the colloquial tongue of sixth century Ionia, not the archaic dialect of the epic legend. This is the immediate inference drawn from the fact that what he wrote was a prose. In the description about these fragments, we find many words later used as philosophical terms. However, early Ionians did not express their thinking by the terms such as “substance” (οὐσία) and “attribute” (πάθος) or “coming to be” (απλῶς) in the sense of absoluteness, substatum (ὑποκείμενον) or element (στοιχείον) etc. These are the technical terms completed after the logical analysis by Plato, followed by strenuous efforts of Aristoteles himself.

Language and idea, although closely related with each other, cannot be denied of their contrary characteristics. There are the extreme things, in general, that cannot be verbally expressed. On the other hand some words are unable to become things. I suppose both of them are indispensable for the grasping of the real aspect of things. Therefore, Milesians in Ionia were the first philosophers who tried to simplify reality on the basis of logic. This tendency is also seen in the field of religion. Here, the simplification of the world tends to appeal to aesthetic interest rather than to man's logical interest.

* *ibid.*, S. 342 “Weder können wir die Übersetzung wissenschaftlich beweisen, noch dürfen wir sie auf irgend eine Autorität hin nur glauben. *Der wissenschaftliche Beweis trägt zu kurz.* Der Glaube hat im Denken keinen Platz. Die Übersetzung läßt sich *nur* im Denken des Spruchs nachdenken. *Das Denken aber ist das Dichten der Wahrheit des Seins in der geschichtlichen Zwiesprache der Denkenden.* Darum wird der Spruch nie ansprechen, solange wir ihn *nur* historisch und philologisch erklären. (*ibid.*, S. 343, *Italic* by the auther.)

An approach to the Fragment of Milesian Anaximander

Although the terms, “substratum” or “element” were beyond the reach of Milesians, Anaximander adopted the term “archē” to two fundamental Milesian concepts; the first being the starting point, the second, originating cause (or substratum expressed by Aristoteles.) There are both the light of rational thinking and mythical shadow vaguely remained there.

To seek uniformity of the universe at the bottom of various phenomena is the eternal and catholic search in the fields of religion, aesthetics, philosophy and science throughout all the history of man. Although Milesians could left only their toes of the first foot-print on mythical foundation, they probably stood as a bridge between the two worlds, Mythos and Logos, since they eliminated the mythical settings and dared to explain diversity of nature (in a broad sense) only in terms of something pertaining to nature itself—though Thales, a Milesian leader, intentionally wished to leave the world of myth and sought for rationalization, he was still led by archaic concept unable to drive out of his heart. The impulse to discard accidental and individual and to uniform into universality and perpetuity made him express his rather extreme opinion, “The primary principle of all things is hydōr” . . . But as Aristoteles frankly states that he assumed it because it “is said” by Thales.

Eventually the first boundary stone on the *tropos* (method) from Mythos to Logos is nothing but Anaximander’s fragment. Although Milesian creed had intimate resemblance to general way of thinking of indigenous people at that particular period, Guthrie states that the crucial difference between them lies in their determination to accept the new method of thinking, critical spirit, and rationally uniformed scheme. He metaphorically describes the circumstances as follows.

“The search for unity emerged from mythical thing and entered its scientific phase existed in B.C. 6 Miletus. There is a long way to go. Philosophy is so recently born that it can scarcely stand on its own legs, . . . ; but it is born, because someone has sought the desired

unity in a natural substance and removed gods from the cosmogonical scene.*” Searching for the intimacy and reversivity between things and language, I feel I must look at the situation both mythical “vorgeburtlich” and logical “nachgeburtlich” situation of philosophy. Milesians were believed to be concerned only about “What is the world made of?” However, it does not mean the concentration of “principles of a material kind” but rather “nature” (physis) than “matter”. We must leave Aristotelian opinion behind and find a correct key word in “physis”.

Anaximander brought apeiron into his conception and called archē “deathless and imperishable” It is, first of all, temporally infinitive and contains contradictory feeling. Archē did not have an archē as the beginning and also no ending because it means limited. It then refers to a thing without external boundary, and is used for sphere and circle, and means circulation and periodic time. The image of the turning circle is expressed in our terminology; “cycle” is derived from κύκλος (originally “wheel”), and period from περίοδος “revolution.”

Since Milesians applied a double function to archē, the power to include encircle and to govern all things as the “immortal and unperishable” sacred apeiron, Anaximander recognized deity in the archē and later monist philosophers opened the road which attributed consciousness and intelligence explicitly to their archē^{**} (ibid., p. 88).

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In giving a conclusion for this theme of Anaximander’s fragment, the melting spot of the endless discussion since the early days, I should be prudent and rather avoid bringing it a finish in a haste.

* W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. I. p. 70 f.

** From Kosmogonia to Kosmologia, by the author—Formation of Ionian School and its Background—(No. 22, P. 1 ~ P. 39 a separate volume of “Hōgaku Kenkyu,” No. 23 and onward serially published)

However, I feel I must at least touch whereabouts of this dispute after I introduce the German translations^{*} including Nietzsche.

The interpretations by Nietzsche^{**} and Diels^{***} are centred around the concept of “das Unendliche”, the source of all things. *ἀδικία*, which is obliged to do its penance clearly shows the effect and analogy of Orphic doctrine, based on “Abfall vom Ursein,” meaning “falling off from higher *ἀπειρον* to incomplete and injustice existence. That means we underdo this life as the result of the crime we

* “Woraus die Dinge entstehen, dahinein findet auch ihr Untergang statt, vergehen sie mit Notwendigkeit; denn sie leisten einander Buße und Vergeltung für ihr Unrecht nach der Ordnung der Zeit.”

(Wilhelm Nestle)

* “Woraus aber die Dinge ihre Entstehung haben, darein findet auch ihr Untergang statt, gemäß der Notwendigkeit. Denn sie leisten einander Sühne und Buße für ihr Unrecht, gemäß der Ordnung der Zeit.”

(Wilhelm Capelle)

* “Woraus aber das Werden ist für die Dinge, in das hinein geschieht auch ihr Vergehen so wie es sein muß. Dann sie zahlen einander Strafe und Buße für ihre Ungerechtigkeit nach der Ordnung der Zeit.”

(Olof Gigon)

* “Woraus aber die Dinge das Entstehen haben, dahin geht auch ihr Vergehen nach der Notwendigkeit; denn sie zahlen einander Strafe und Buße für ihre Ruchlosigkeit nach der festgesetzten Zeit.”

(F. Nietzsche)

* “Woher die Dinge ihre Entstehung haben, dahin müssen sie auch zu Grunde gehen, nach der Notwendigkeit; denn sie müssen Buße zahlen und für ihre Ungerechtigkeit gerichtet werden, gemäß der Ordnung der Zeit.”

(H. Diels)

* “Woraus aber das Werden ist den seienden Dingen, in das hinein geschieht auch ihr Vergehen nach der Schuldigkeit; denn sie zahlen einander gerechte Stafe für ihre Ungerechtigkeit nach der Zeit Anordnung.”

(W. Kranz)

** Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen, 1873.

*** Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 1903.

committed, while generation itself is a crime which is to be punished by death. Nietzsche points out that the term, “mutually”, ἀλλήλοις, is intentionally omitted and thus hardly be supported as the opinion based on the so-called new-Orphic interpretation. Although Kahn indicates the above mentioned point, he thinks he must accept Simplicius’ interpretation (ibid., p. 195) if the anachronism of the four elements is rectified and coincides with W. Bröcher* explaining that it was conformed to Heraclitus’ idea of B. 126.**

Among the translations mentioned before, we notice that W. Kranz*** alone selected the word “Anordnung” for τάξις. Anaximander’s book was assumed to be preserved until B.C. 2 and attracted the attention of Aristoteles, Theophrastus, Eudemo, Eratosthenes and Apollodor. The book had a title περὶ φύσεως common to Presocratic writings. It is named “On Nature” or “On the Existent” in English, “Von der Natur” or “Über das Sein” in German.

I cannot help but seek the key word of the unclear theme of the fragment in the concept of physis. This concept is certainly neither physica, in a narrow sense, which later Aristoteles himself classified as the second philosophy (deutera philosophia) against metaphisica, the first philosophy (prōtē philosophia), nor in the meaning of nature against man which is now common sense to us. Moreover, it is not the physis in the concept of people whom Aristoteles named the Ionian philosophers, Physikoi or Physiologoi****, who assembled the whole nature on the principle of materialistic

* W. Bröcher, Heraklit zitiert Anaximander, Hermes, L. XXXIV. 1956. (S. 382–84)

** τὰ ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὸν φύχεται ὃ <γρὸν> ἀδαίνεται καρφαλέον νοτίζετ <αι>. Cold things warm themselves, warm cools, moist dries, parched is made wet. G.S. Kirk.

*** Walther Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker 12. Aufl., I, 1966.

**** Aristoteles, Met., A. 5. 986 b 14, 8, 989 b 30, 990 a 3, 9, 992 b 4, M. 4. 1078 b 17.

component.

I have no intention of joining the dispute on the concept of "physis" among scholars; there are three standpoints for the translation, "be" or "become (genesis)", or "the real substance". J. Burnet^{*} understands it as "the primary substance", "Urstoff", while W. A. Heidel^{**} calls it "growth" or "the process of growth" as the fundamental meaning, furthermore G. S. Kirk^{***} translates it "the real constitution". If we interpret "physis" merely substance (ousia), we must recall the challenging parody from Gorgias' book with the same title, "Peri physeōs he peri tou me ontos" (on the Non-existent or On Nature). It is not understood as coherent to naturalism placed against "nomos" in the era of Sophist.

At any rate, physis is the foundation of all the Greek ideas and the arterial conception. There is a great difference of the concept "physis" between Homer (Odyssee X. 303 and Ilias VI, 146 f) and in the phrase "Peri physeōs iotoria" in "Paidon" 96 a) by Platon. I cannot help but recall that the term physis in the archaic sense indicates vaguely "a thing in the distance in pursuit of truth as the ultimate purpose", and only gives hint not explaining what it is. On the other hand, the concept of physis, which was creation of Ionian science and a summary of the new world-view, was the basic concept of Kosmos. The Kosmos which had the symmetric characteristic, unique to geometrical Hellas, was not simply an extended body but the disposition decided on the temporal and special circle, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$. In the close relationship between concepts of space and time, Kosmos is also lifetime, ($\alpha\lambda\acute{\omega}\nu$). Here, between their nature and man's

* J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 10. ff, p. 363.

** W. A. Heidel, Peri Physeōs. A Study of the Conception of Natur among the pre-socratics. p.97 (Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Science, vol. XLV, 1910).

*** G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments, 1954. p. 227-231, p. 33, p. 158-160, p. 390, p. 395.

society in their polis organization, lies recognition of intelligence and reason as divine thing, τὸ θεῖον, that surpasses the merely successive or homogeneous (in the primitive sense) relationship, *symphiā*.

It is needless to refer to K. Joël^{*}, J. Stenzel^{**} or Jaeger^{***} as they stand apart from the popular interpretation, with which I cannot agree. It is a widely accepted theory that Milesians are not well matured, the so-called phenomena and orders of nature are grasped in an analogy to man's society.^{****} What Simplicius called "the poetic expression" in Anaximander's fragment cannot be understood as the personified interpretation of *χρόνος*, of the oldest court terminology, ordinance in B.C. 5 or military terms.

In Homer, at its earliest period, no border line was recognized between man's custom and order of the universe. In front of man stands not Nature, but the power of the gods, intervening into nature as well as man's life. For example, Horae are the Seasons and the astronomical Hours; have Fated portions for sisters, Moirae; their mother is Themis ("lawful establishment") and their names are Peace, Justice and Good Distribution; have relation with Dike, the term Law means Ceremony, Moral and Order of Nature.

* Karl Joël, *Der Ursprung der Naturphilosophie aus dem Geiste der Mystik*, 1906.

" " , *Geschichte der antiken philosophie* Bde. I. 1921.

** Julius Stenzel, *Die Metaphysik des Altertums*, 1924-31.

*** W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*,

**** The sentence of Anaximander's fragment, for example its phrase "diken kai tisin didonai," was usually said to be product of the age when no scientific terms existed, that the sentences or phrases were merely analogy or metapho from man's society so that we should not over-estimate their meanings behind. But I do not hold a negative view that the above mentioned facts were the reasons that indispensably brought analogy into use. If we call them analogy, it is on the contrary wrong to say that there is no analogy in the scientific terms. For example, the term, "natural law," itself is nothing but an analogy taken out of man's social relationship.

For example, since the concept of “cause,” *αἴτιον*, had apparently evolved from the idea of a “guilty man, he who is to blame,” *αἴτινος*, thus all philosophic terms have eventually been originated from rather simple and concrete usage of daily terms regarding human beings. Language is older than science, for the new wine must be served in whatever bottles kept at hand.

But despite the *symphiā* between man's society and nature though it looked simple and primitive, the nature and the man's society were, in fact, proceeding to a direction to exert themselves to cut off their mutual relationship. It can be said that preparation for the very first step of separation and elimination from subjective ideas—though almost impossible work in a sense. The experience spoken of, regarding Heidegger's so-called “das Sein des Seienden” was neither pessimistic, nihilistic, nor optimistic. We might be able to take a glance at “das Wesen des Tragischen” including an active meaning against fatal thing, grasped by the intelligence of the Greeks.

Supplement

The history of the Western philosophy, including this fragment of Anaximander, started with Milesians, who were believed to have given the first rational explanation to the world's *archē* (principle), not mythical or religious interpretation.

I have already tried to raise some questions, regarding the above theme, in my other thesis (aforementioned footnote p. 39) to discuss afresh the effect of Orient Mythology and their rationalism in Ionian School, and also evolution of their theory.

But according to this question, Otto Eissfeldt, for example, indicates the creation of the scientific cosmology by a Phoenician Sanchunjaton, preceding the Milesians who were actually the Greeks. He quotes from Eusebios of Caesarea's “*Praeparatio evangelica*” I, 10, 1-6, and indicates the surprising similarity in comparison of

the three; "Praeparatio evangelica", Anaximander's fragment and Cosmogony by Dēmokritos (Diels-Kranz, 68 B 5, 59 A 62). He states that the decipher on clay, excavated in Byblos or in Ras Shamra (Ugarit), in 1926, can prove the ground (0, Eissfeldt, Phönikische und griechische Kosmogonie; Éléments orientaux dans la religion grecque ancienne/Travaux du centre d'études supérieures spécialisé d'histoire des religions de Strasbourg, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960).

That is even we assume the Anaximander's fragment a boundary stone on *tropos* from Mythos to Logos, it requires a research and investigation whether it is really the first and the oldest clue, which will be referred to at some other occasion.

May, 1968