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The empirical character of objects in ontology

Kinkichi Udo

The present article is an attempt to show that ontology, starting from *ens per se notum*, can not be anything but an empirical realism radically founded on aposteriorism.

It begins with a critical analysis of Descartes' well-known formula: "*cogito, ergo sum*", which took as the starting point of philosophy not reality, but consciousness; and then points out that philosophy should start from *ens per se notum*.

Secondly, after a brief outline of the *objectum quod* and *objectum quo* in ontology, a distinction is made between two different aspects of the evidence for being, namely, 'the existentially evident', and 'the essentially evident' and it is proved that the former must be prior to the latter since human knowledge proceeds from *cognitio experimentalis* through sensitive perception, to *cognitio conceptualis*.

The article concludes with a description of physics in the traditional sense, and an examination of the original meaning of such expressions as 'physics the way to metaphysics' and 'metaphysics begins with physics', so that it may readily be seen how the two objects in ontology above mentioned can be empirical in character.