

Title	Truth of judgement and its recognition
Sub Title	
Author	有働, 勤吉(Udo, Kinkichi)
Publisher	三田哲學會
Publication year	1963
Jtitle	哲學 No.45 (1963. 12) ,p.A3- A3
JaLC DOI	
Abstract	
Notes	Abstract
Genre	
URL	https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AN00150430-00000045-0161

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Truth of Judgement and its Recognition

Kinkichi Udo

It has become one of the most interesting and important problems in the modern philosophy to examine whether knowledge is idealistic or realistic since Descartes declared contrary to the aristotelian-thomistic noetic, his philosophical, revolutionary position, presenting the well-known formula: *cogito ergo sum*.

In this article, according to the thomistic noetic which is insisting that truth and knowledge must be realistic, I especially intended to investigate the reason why truth of judgement is called true in the proper sense of the word.

A proposition and a judgement are logically true when things actually are as they say they are. It can be deduced from the above that *being true* of the proposition and the judgement is nothing other than their correspondency to things, i.e. the essential adequacy between the composition of the intellect and the disposition of things. Then, in what way can this kind of *being true* be recognized?

In order to recognize this kind of *being true*, that is, truth of propositions and judgements, we must examine if things actually are (*esse rei*) as they say they are, with actual help of sensitive perception which is *cognitio experimentalis*. We are thus led to the conclusion that the recognition of truth of judgement is founded not in quiddity or entity i.e. *modus essendi*, but in existence of things, i.e. *actus essendi*.