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## 'Action'

Takashi Koizumi

It seems to me that we have treated the concept of 'action' as something clear in the field of moral philosophy. For, when we consider an action, we ask first of all what its motive is, what its purpose is. In this asking we presuppose that all actions have in common psychological factors of the kind: motive, deliberation, decision, etc. And we presuppose that if we examine the psychological factors of an action we can evaluate it as a whole. I shall call this viewpoint psychologism.

Now is this psychologism correct? This is what I intended to consider in this treatise. Recently this view has encountered criticism from H.L.A. Hart and A.I. Melden. I make use of their arguments as clues to the problem, examining whether or not their arguments are appropriate to it. I find that Hart's arguments are not appropriate. For he criticizes psychologism on the basis of his analysis of action-sentences; but psychologism is not concerned with action-sentences but with action itself. What is more, he criticizes it on the ground that although a criminal action has a psychological factor it is defensible. In order to prove this defensibility he gives illustrations from legal actions, not from moral ones; so he does not show the defensibility of the latter. Thus his criticisms are not applicable to psychologism. On the other hand, Melden is correct in saying that an habitual action regarded as moral contains no psychological factor. But he takes no notice of the point that an habitual action which he calls 'following a rule' is not moral until its agent chooses to obey the moral rule. Therefore his argument is also incomplete. Lastly I ask again whether psychologism is correct or not, and find that it has several weakpoints. From these analyses I draw a conclusion that these three viewpoints are insufficient for the theory of action and that each of them, however, has its availability in its limited field. And I offer a suggestion which may lead us to a new theory of action.