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## On Thing in Itself as a Necessary Presupposition of Thouness

—On Thouness as a Necessary Presupposition of Love—

*Masao Matsumoto*

Since the translation of "The Mind and Heart of Love", a work by Rev. M. C. D'Arcy, was recently published, I tried to give a sort of comment and criticism on the several subjects I picked up from it.

According to modern subjectivism, thing in itself is denied and thing as such is considered nothing else but an objectivation or projection of a central subject, in a word, it becomes merely a certain mode of subject itself. In such German idealism, just like in oriental monism, all is ego though it does recognize the difference between small and big ego and there is no room for the true existence of thouness.

Thing in itself is exactly what the category of substance signified in the traditional philosophy and it occupied a highly estimated position in the field though modern philosophy lowered and dismissed it. Substance means simply that a thing is identical with itself solely by itself without any help from the other and does not mean necessarily that a thing is immutable and incorruptible in its essence. It is an assurance that some things can keep their own subjectivity in a perfect independence from conscious subject or ego. Therefore thing in itself is a necessary presupposition of thouness.

It is said that true love exists between "I and you", not between "I and it". However even in the case of "I and it", "it" is not a merely projection of "I", "it" really transcends me as a thing in itself. In the case of "I and you", "you" transcends me as a thing in itself; yet here "you" is not only "in itself" but also "for itself", and so "you" is a subject (a mind) just like "I".

Considering the difference between Eros and Agape, it is commonly admitted that Eros is self-immanent-love and Agape is self-transcendent-love. I am opposed to this doctrine and wish to say that the former is a love for man and the latter is a love for God. And in these cases of (1) thing-love (if admitted to say so) and (2) man-love and (3) god-love, both that self-immanent-love and that self-transcendent-love always coexist but in some different degrees as follows. In the case of (1) the former must be more and the latter less, in the case of (2) the former and the latter are almost equal in amount and in the case of (3) the former must be quite less and the latter must be the most part.

This self-immanent-love is compared to animus, that is, the masculine character and this self-transcendent-love to anima, that is, the feminine character. According to Rev. D'Arcy, the former is further considered as an essential ego and the latter as an existential ego and humanism corresponds to the former and mysticism to the latter. Against this conclusion I suggested that there is no real division between both egos and their operations are mostly done together. So in a long run they must be considered one. Thus I emphasized the roll which animus takes in mysticism when not only anima but also animus, that is, the whole ego is overwhelmed by the gift from above. In the end I argued against Rev. D'Arcy's voluntarism which claims the immanent character of reason and the transcendent character of will, with the intellectualism which, to my analysis, depends on the fact of transcendency of reason and of immanency of will.