

Title	"L'objectivation des idees" : study of the epistemology in Thomist
Sub Title	
Author	箕輪, 秀二(Minowa, Syuji)
Publisher	三田哲學會
Publication year	1957
Jtitle	哲學 No.33 (1957. 3) ,p.A2- A4
JaLC DOI	
Abstract	
Notes	Abstract
Genre	
URL	https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AN00150430-00000033-0173

慶應義塾大学学術情報リポジトリ(KOARA)に掲載されているコンテンツの著作権は、それぞれの著作者、学会または出版社/発行者に帰属し、その権利は著作権法によって保護されています。引用にあたっては、著作権法を遵守してご利用ください。

The copyrights of content available on the KeiO Associated Repository of Academic resources (KOARA) belong to the respective authors, academic societies, or publishers/issuers, and these rights are protected by the Japanese Copyright Act. When quoting the content, please follow the Japanese copyright act.

appear. The relations of x to A and to B may be expressed in the following formulae: $B = \varphi(x)$, $A = \psi(x)$.

They mean that dependent variables are not a function of function, and that an intervening variable is a parameter in its functional relations to independent and dependent variables. From this point of view, field theory, in which different events are put on a same level, is valuable to psychological studies of behavior.

„L'objectivation des idées“

—Study of the Epistemology in Thomist—

Syuji Minowa

P. Maréchal researches «comment la coincidence de conditions ontologique subjectives (intelligences finis) et de conditions ontologique objectives (données extrinseques)» has the characters of the «prise de conscience».

In other words, his probleme is that: «comment la prise de conscience, effectivée dans l'acte immanante où communient objet et sujet, peut-elle être la conscience de l'objet, en taut qu'opposé au sujet?».

M. Maritain studys to show that «la chose est donnée avec l'objet et par lui, et qu'il est même absurde de les volior réparer». We cannot think that the «obejt» is identical with the «chose» at the beginning, on the contrary, we must verify «s'il bien ainsi».

For M. Maritain, therefore, the question in epistemology is that; «la pensée se donnant du premier coup comme assurée sur les choses et mesurée par un esse indépendant d'elle, comment juger si, comment, à quelles conditions et dans quelles mesure il en est bien ainsi».

Their resolutions to this problem are very personal, and different each other, but they both research the same one problem; „l'objectivation des idées.“

P. Maréchal neglects the resolutions that the thomist before him had researched in virtue of the «passivité».

In the case of their resolutions, we cannot prove the «perceptism intégral». Dissipating their ambiguity for this resolutions, tries P. Maréchal to surmount the kantian agonsticism by his unique theory—«le dynamisme intellectuel».

M. Maritain resolves this problem by his «l'intuition abstractive» and the characteristics of the «Verbum mentis»—le signe formel, not the «signe instrumental» of the object. «L'intuition abstractive» explain the «immanance d'objet», «le verbum mentis considered as «le signe formel» verify the «objectivation de la chose et de l'objet».

P. Maréchal, who depends upon the «l'action» of M. Blondel, M. Maritain, who neglects the «bergsonisme de fait» and estimates the valeurs of the «bergsonisme d'intuition», they try to establish the valeur of ideas in the metaphysical region, and investigate «comment est possible, et comment est fondée la prétention naturelle de l'intelligence».

Their capital interests for the «l'objectivation des idées» principally consist in the establishment of the realism of common sense against the idealism of Kant and of Descartes that starts from the «percipi», not the «esse».

At the first stage of 19th century, the thomist—P. Garrigou-Lagrange, P. Gardeil, P. Rousselot,—they all effort to research the one same problem; „L'objectivation des idées“

They both try to establish the valeur of the ideas in the metaphysical region, and to verify the realism of common sens in their different ways.

In my writing, I intend to show the methodes of resolution in M. Maréchal and in M. Maritain, and to study the meaning of their resolution to the «L'objectivation des idées» against the Critique of modern philosophy. End.

Problems of Being, Truth and Cognition in St. Thomas

Kinkichi Udo

In philosophy, as late J. Maréchal has pointed out, there would not be such problems difficult and misunderstood as those of Epistemology.

Since Descartes has presented his proposition: *cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am), it seems to me that the most of modern thinkers, though there are nuances among them respectively, have started their philosophy from the order of self-consciousness which scholastic philosophy called *intentio reflexiva*, and, moreover, have reposed on it.

According to St. Thomas, however, it is really impossible for human intellect to acknowledge itself before cognizing being, *ens*, which is extra-mental and corporeal. St. Thomas, telling that our intellect *intellectus*, intends being first of all; '*primum quod cadit in intellectum est ens.*' expresses his ontology of cognition that cognition, first, should be the cognition of being, in another word, that of the extra-mental and corporeal world (*intentio prima*) and then, self-consciousness (*intentio reflexiva*) can be gained after the reflexion on such act of knowing being.

In the first section of this treatise, I inquired St. Thomas' conception of truth and researched in what sense truth was the cause of cognition. By him, truth is properly in relation to the intellect.