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Author	小泉, 仰(Koizumi, Takashi)
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
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prendre une culture, c'est comprendre l'unité de ses traits ou de ses institutions : la comprendre comme un tout. Or ce qui unit la culture et la personnalité se trouve, semble-t-il, dans le concept de la personnalité de base. Car entre celle-ci et la culture il y a une relation étroite ; la personnalité de base est à la fois le sens de l'individu et de la culture. C'est ce qu'exprime le schéma ci-joint.

le système projectif est d'abord le produit des expériences que l'enfant fait dans le cadre des institutions primaires d'une société et ce système projectif, à son tour, influence la forme des autres institutions de la société (les institutions secondaires), par

exemple son folklore et sa religion ; secondaires, selon qu'elles expriment la réaction de l'individu au milieu qui agit sur lui.



touche notamment aux manières de penser, au système de valeurs, au "super-ego" et aux principes religieux.

sont celles qui posent les problèmes d'adaptation fondamentaux et inévitables ; primaires, selon qu'elles expriment l'action du milieu sur l'individu.

## The Open Questions about the Theory of Value in Intuitionism

*Takashi Koizumi*

I intended in my treatise to make clear the open questions

about the theory of value in intuitionism. Most of intuitionistic theory of value are intimately connected with the objective theory of value. Far from that, they presuppose the latter.

Accordingly, first of all, I tried to testify whether or not we might approve of the objective theory of value, and then to find the open questions out. I believe that I found them in this theory by means of investigating the arguments in which the intuitionists regarded the value as an objective quality. For example, both Max Scheler and G. E. Moore, representatives of the intuitionists, asserted that the value is a non-natural simple quality. And both of them thought they could demonstrate the being and the characteristics of the value by means of comparing the value with colour. Accordingly, I brought forward my argument in the following order :

- 1) Differences between value and colour,
- 2) Contingency of agreement about the value,
- 3) Changeability of value in accordance with the situations and the persons,
- 4) The characteristics of ethical judgment, which follow from the objective theory of value. (According to the intuitionists, all ethical judgments are synthetic, and either true or false.)

I cannot but conclude through the above analyses that many open questions of intuitionism are derived from the connection between intuitionism and objectivism about value.

I think the intuitionistic theory of value is by nature the subjective theory of it.

Therefore, according to the intuitionists, we cannot help meeting the opposite estimations of the same value or the opposite ethical judgments, both of which are justified by them.

Consequently, we must say that the theory of intuitionism has no ability to sufficiently resolve the social ethical problems.

Therefore, lastly, I gave some suggestions as the clues to resolve these problems. That is, I suggested that we could find out the important keys to resolve the social ethical problems in the studies of the regels or the reasons that make the value valuable in society.

### **Translation :**

St. Thomas; "DE VERITATE" and "DE FALSITAS".

*Shuji, Minowa*

This is the translation of the "DE VERITATE" and the "DE FALSITAS" in the Summa Theologica by St Thomas.

Firstly, in these two "Quaestiones", St. Thomas gives us the philosophical and ontological definitions about the truth and the falsehood, and also he shows the difference between the "Veritas rei" and the "Veritas intellectus", ie, "Truth in things" and "Truth in judgement".

At a glance, it seems strange for us to find these "Quaestiones" in his theologia, not in Ontologia. But his Theologia is really his unique Ontologia, therefore he treats about these problems from the ontological point of view.

Secondly, we can find out the essence of the philosophy of St. Thomas in the later chapters of these "Quaestiones", i. e. the "Intellectualism of St, Thomas".

We can describe his definitions of the truth and the falsehood as follows;

"Veritas principaliter est in intellectu, secundario in rebus, in ordine ad intellectum, a quo dependet".

"Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus"