

Title	The Study of Kant's Philosophical Methodology(The last part)
Sub Title	
Author	山本, 万二郎(Yamamoto, Manjiro)
Publisher	三田哲學會
Publication year	1953
Jtitle	哲學 No.29 (1953. 3) ,p.A2- A4
JaLC DOI	
Abstract	
Notes	Abstract
Genre	
URL	https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AN00150430-00000029-0273

慶應義塾大学学術情報リポジトリ(KOARA)に掲載されているコンテンツの著作権は、それぞれの著作者、学会または出版社/発行者に帰属し、その権利は著作権法によって保護されています。引用にあたっては、著作権法を遵守してご利用ください。

The copyrights of content available on the KeiO Associated Repository of Academic resources (KOARA) belong to the respective authors, academic societies, or publishers/issuers, and these rights are protected by the Japanese Copyright Act. When quoting the content, please follow the Japanese copyright act.

Man as a finite being cannot escape death, illness, suffering, conflict, sin and so forth (Grenzsituation). Existence to be analyzed by the philosophy of existence is human being in this Grenzsituation. But we must note that human being finds itself also in history. In this sense, human being is a historical existence. Any existence that finds itself in history is subject to change in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason. Even the Grenzsituation changes its meaning in history, inasmuch as the limitation of man is in a sense historical.

Grenzsituation, expressed in another way, is the forfeiture of man's self. Man's forfeiture of self occurs in history and its meaning changes with the history. When we understand existence as historical existence which is subject to change, we can override our limitations and elevate ourselves above the pit of nothingness.

Philosophy of existence in the form thus far conceived does not seem to have grasped the meaning of Grenzsituation from the viewpoint of historical existence. My monograph is an attempt to clarify the meaning of "existence" from various angles by casting light on it from the viewpoint of historical existence.

The Study of Kant's Philosophical Methodology

(The last part)

Manjiro Yamamoto

7) The transcendental method and its circulative character.

There are found two phases in its circulative character; the circle of demonstration (Vaihinger) and the circle of evidence (Nelson etc.). We can get free from them by K. Fischer's explanation and the experimental method. Nevertheless there rests

such a fundamental circle as pointed out by Fichte and Lotze. But it is due rather to the relativity of human nature itself than to the transcendental method.

8) The transcendental method and its formality.

The transcendental principles are, according to Scheler, abstracted without consideration about a point of view of cultural history, therefore they are merely formal, nevertheless the demand to be formal is not fulfilled. For example Kant's concept of causality. But we must remark that such a demand itself is under historical conditions.

9) Many meanings of method-concept (the method of recognizing objects and the method of forming a system).

We must divide these two phases of method in philosophy as well as in science. So besides the philosophical fundamental method we can find the philosophical and scientific methods of recognizing objects and the philosophical and scientific methods of forming a system in respective parts of Critique.

10) The method of classification as a procedure of forming a system (the analytic and the synthetic logic as its foundation).

We can find the method of classification in architectonic. There he uses dichotomy. But he says in Critique of judgment, there are analytic and synthetic classifications, and the former is dichotomy, the latter trichotomy; that is grounded on the principle of contradiction, but this is natural and his own method. Then we must consider if he uses a different principle in case of trichotomy from the principle of contradiction. I think he doesn't.

11) The postulating method as the fundamental procedure of the method of forming a system.

In a narrow sense it is the method of forming a system of Critique, but in a wide and fundamental sense it includes the

method of forming a system of system (the method of classification). Because it is on the ground of postulate that we can progress from Critique of Pure Reason to Critique of Practical Reason, and on the other hand the method of classification is based on the fundamental motive of forming a system, that is just the postulating method. We can find it in the last part of Dialectic.

12) Conclusion.

Neither the critical method nor the transcendental method necessarily connects with the transcendental idealism. So the accusation that the transcendental method is subjective is not correct.

The Copernicusian revolution is to be connected with the critical method, and not with the transcendental method or the experimental method—to say nothing of the transcendental idealism.

Thought-method of S. Kierkegaard

Methodological sense of conceptions of “Subjectivity” and “Irony”

Hidehito Otani

“Philosophy” is “to do philosophy.” The first and fundamental problem of philosophy is philosophy in itself; and it is a constant relation in which it relates to itself, as G. Simmel said. And in this point consists the “Wesenseigentümlichkeit” which distinguishes itself fundamentally from other sciences. It is too famous that Kant has said about the essence of “Philosophy” like this; Man can not study “Philosophy”, except “to do philosophy”.