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NOTES ON THE PORTUGUESE TRADE IN JAPAN DURING THE KWANEI PERIOD. (1624-1643).

By

C. R. BOXER.

Although the chief subject of this paper is the discussion and consideration of some letters and receipts given by Portuguese merchants to Japanese financiers in Kyūshū during the years 1630-1640, yet it will be as well to consider the position of the Lusitanian traders in Japan during the whole of the *Kwanei* period, so as to place these documents in their proper light.

It is well known that the Portuguese merchants frequented Japan, soon after its chance discovery by some ship-wrecked sailors in or about 1543, but this trade did not assume a regular settled condition until after the Portuguese had secured a permanent base at Macau in 1557, whilst subsequent to the opening of Nagasaki to foreign traders in 1570, the trade of the Portuguese to Japan was limited to that between these two ports, to all intents and purposes. The system was for the Portuguese to send annually a large ship, laden with Indian and Chinese goods,—chiefly the latter, of which raw silk was the most valued commodity—, which left Macau in July or August, and, after staying for some months in Nagasaki, returned in the early part of the following year (Jan.—March), laden chiefly with silver bullion. This intercourse continued regularly for many years, except when interrupted by such untoward events as the loss of the *Madre de Deus* in 1610, or the capture of the ship by the Dutch in the harbour of Macau in 1603. In the early years of the seventeenth century however, the frequent attempts made by the Hollanders to intercept and capture the annual Macau ship on its voyage to or from Japan, so seriously inconvenienced the Portuguese, that in 1618 they abandoned their custom of importing all their cargo in one large vessel, and from then on came annually in several small ships of

the type known as *galiota* or *navetta*, which being very speedy and handy, could usually outsail the heavier Dutch craft. The number of such ships varied from year to year, in accordance with the amount of cargo available and the prosperity of the trade, but never exceeded 8 nor fell below 2 craft a year.

Having explained this much by way of a general introduction to the subject of our paper, we may now go somewhat further into detail. At what period the Portuguese began to borrow money from wealthy Japanese traders and financiers I do not know, but imagine that the practice began at a fairly early date, although the earliest reference to it which I have found, refers to the year 1617, whilst all documents and letters referring to such financial transactions hitherto discovered in Japan itself, fall within the decade 1630—1640. But although in all probability the Portuguese borrowed money from the Kyūshū financiers already during the the XVIth century, it was evidently in the first quarter of the following century that these transactions were carried out on a really large scale, as may be gathered from the following quotation from *Decada 13* of the History of India written by the Chronicler Antonio Bocarro,—⁽¹⁾

“At this time (1617) the profits of these voyages [to Japan] had greatly increased, as likewise the inhabitants of Macao were become very wealthy owing to the large sums of money which they obtained from the Japanese, some for use on commission and others borrowed on interest.”

This extract is interesting because it shows that the money was obtained in two ways; in the first way the Portuguese merely used it as the Japanese lender directed and took a commission, whilst in the second way the Portuguese borrowed the money for their own use, and paid it back later with interest. This second method speedily became the more general one, and practically all of the existing documents refer to it.

In 1625 (*Kwanei* 2) the Portuguese were forbidden to reside permanently in Japan, as they had hitherto been allowed to do in Nagasaki, where many of them had large families with fine houses and gardens etc. In consequence of this Edict, the Lusitanian vessels

henceforth usually left Nagasaki in November or December instead of staying over the New Year, but it appears that two or three representatives were allowed to stay on in the town nevertheless. At any rate, we meet with mention of them in Dutch records.

In 1628 an affair occurred in Siam which had an important effect on the position and trade of the Portuguese in Japan, whilst for the origin of this affair in itself, we have to go back to the year 1622.⁽²⁾

In mid-summer of that year a Dutch force which attacked the Portuguese settlement of Macau was repulsed with heavy loss, but fearing a repetition of the attack, the citizens applied for assistance to the Governor of Manilla, who sent a ship with some infantry and artillery under the command of the Sergeant-Major, Don Fernando de Silva, as a reinforcement. Shortly afterwards however, Dom Francisco Mascarenhas, who had been appointed the first Captain-General of Macau by the Viceroy of Goa, arrived at his new post with men and munitions, so that the Spaniards were no longer needed. They accordingly left the City in 1623, but on the return voyage Don Fernando de Silva touched at Siam, where he became involved in a quarrel with the large Japanese colony which then frequented the Siamese capital, and lost both his life and his ship in the subsequent fight.

News of this disaster arrived at Manilla in 1625, but the new Governor, Don Juan Ninõ de Tabora, had too many other matters to attend to at the moment, to be able to take punitive measures. In 1627 a small vessel arrived at Manilla from Macau, with news that a Dutch squadron was waiting off the China coast to intercept the Portuguese galliots due to sail to Japan and Manilla. By this vessel, the Portuguese asked for a Spanish squadron to come to assist them, promising to pay a large part of the cost of fitting out the same. Accordingly the Governor despatched D. Juan de Alcaraso in command of a force consisting of the two galleons *San Ildefonso*, and *Nuestra Señora de Peña de Francia* and a smaller ship, with instructions that after driving away the Dutch ships from the vicinity of Macau, they were to visit Siam and take vengeance for the loss of Don Fernando de Silva's ship in 1624.

Don Juan de Alcaraso's squadron did not meet any Dutch vessels during its cruise, but on reaching Siam in the following year, it attacked and destroyed a number of Siamese junks, including one which had just returned from China with some Ambassadors on board. The Spaniards did not limit themselves to attacking Siamese shipping only, but remembering the part played by the Japanese in the defeat and death of Don Fernando de Silva in 1624, they also captured a Japanese junk, after killing many of the crew, and siezed the Shogun's pass or *Goshuin* which it had on board. This event took place in May 1628, and when news of the outrage reached Japan, great was the indignation of the *Bakufu* thereat.

At this time there was no trade between the Phillipines and Japan, relations with Manilla having been broken off some 3 or 4 years previously, but the Japanese were well aware that Spain and Portugal were ruled by the same Monarch, and they therefore placed an embargo on the galliots from Macau in Nagasaki harbour, informing the Portuguese that their own lives and goods would suffer, unless satisfaction was speedily forthcoming. In vain the Lusitanians pleaded that they were in no way responsible for the misdeeds of the Spaniards in Siam, and that they could not fairly be held to account for the same. The Nagasaki authorities retorted that both Spaniards and Portuguese were under the same crown, and equally responsible for the crimes of the other.

Thus faced with the loss of the profitable Japan commerce, the Senate of Macau dispatched urgent appeals to the governor of Manilla, urging him to yield to the Japanese demands and thereby save not only the rich Japan trade, but the lives and goods of the Portuguese which were held in forfeit at Nagasaki. Additional force was lent to these appeals by the arrival of two Japanese embassies at Manilla in 1630, one from the *Bugyo* of Nagasaki and the other from the Daimio of Satsuma demanding satisfaction for the affront. As a matter of fact, the appeals of the Portuguese had been partly successful, as a council held in January 1629, had decided that the capture of the Japanese junk in the Mekong River in May 1628 had been illegal, as the Spanish commander

had not been empowered to capture Japanese vessels but only Siamese. The council added that in view of the persecution of the Christians in Japan, execution of Spanish priests, and seizure of the *San Felipe* by Hideyoshi in 1596, the Spaniards had every right to avenge themselves on the Japanese, but that in view of the missionary enterprise and peril of the Macau trade, it would be unwise to do so. The Governor therefore sent back to Nagasaki the 42 Japanese prisoners who had been taken in the junk the previous year, together with a letter offering to renew the ancient commercial relations between Manilla and Japan on certain conditions. With regard to the Nagasaki and Satsuma envoys who had arrived in 1630, the Spaniards considered that their real object was to spy out the land, and therefore whilst entertaining them hospitably, they took care to let them see the strength of the city and its fortifications, especially the number of cannon, of which there were very many, since on an average one gun was cast there daily.

Meanwhile the Portuguese in Macau had resolved on sending a special mission to Japan to try to appease the wrath of the Japanese authorities with explanations and apologies.⁽³⁾ The newly-arrived Captain-General Dom Hieronymo da Silueira was first selected, on account of his noble birth and distinguished record of military service, as it was felt that such an officer would be more acceptable to the Japanese than an ordinary merchant of Macau,—the status of a trader in Japan being then a very low one. Dom Hieronymo at first accepted the offer, but subsequently thought better of it, and excused himself on the plea of new orders from Goa and the imminence of a Dutch attack. This refusal greatly upset the citizens of Macau, but Dom Hieronymo remained deaf to all pleading and persisted in his refusal. In this predicament, a solution was reached by appointment of his brother, Dom Gonçalo da Silueira, who nobly offered to go in his place, with the post and rank of Captain-General of the city of Macau, in order to make a better impression on the Japanese. This public-spirited offer was accepted, and Dom Gonçalo duly appointed special envoy in July 1630. The choice was a happy one, as he had an even more distinguished record of service than his brother; having fought at Ormuz and in the Persian Gulf during

the years 1620-1629, and subsequently in the expedition under the great captain Nuno Alvarez Botelho which had crushed the Achinese at Malacca in 1629, and taken several Dutch and English ships in Sumatra in the spring of 1630.⁽⁴⁾

Unfortunately the Portuguese records are silent about the result of Dom Gonçalo da Silueira's mission, but we get a glimpse of it from Dutch sources.⁽⁵⁾ From letters written by Cornelis van Nieuwenroode, the Dutch *opperhoofd* at Hirado, to his superiors in Formosa and Batavia, we gather that Dom Gonçalo was not allowed to proceed to Yedo on his arrival, but detained in Nagasaki despite his urgent requests, and told that he would not be able to obtain audience until the Siam affair had been satisfactorily settled. From a document recently printed in the *Archivos de Macau*, it appears that the efforts of another member of the Macau mission, one Simaõ Vaz de Paiva, had met with better success, and that he had persuaded the *Bugyō* of Nagasaki, Takenaka Unemenosho, to raise the two-year embargo on Portuguese ships and goods, placing the responsibility of obtaining satisfaction from the Spaniards in his (Paiva's) hands, who for that purpose accompanied the Japanese envoys to Manilla. In any case, whether owing to the efforts of Dom Gonçalo da Silueira, or to those of Simaõ Vaz de Paiva, or to both, the embargo was raised, and on the 8th of November 1630, five Portuguese galliots and one junk left Nagasaki very richly laden with a large amount of silver bullion borrowed at interest from the Japanese, for which sum the Ambassador Dom Gonçalo da Silueira remained at Nagasaki as surety together with his galliot. This silver bullion borrowed on *respondencia* as the Portuguese called it or on *bodemerije* as the Hollanders termed it, brings us to a consideration of this most interesting aspect of the Portuguese trade with Japan.

Respondencia and *bottomry* as they are termed in English, are old trade technicalities, meaning, in the first case, money which was borrowed on the goods and merchandise contained in the vessel, and in the second case, money which was borrowed on the vessel itself. In the seventeenth century Portuguese and Dutch records with which we are dealing, however, it is plain that by *Respondencia* and *bodemerije*, both Portuguese

and Dutch referred to the same thing—that is money borrowed on security (mortgage) of the ships and (or) their cargo.

Many of the documents recently published in the *Archivos de Macau*, refer at length to the large sums of money that the Portuguese borrowed on *respondencia* from both Japanese in Nagasaki and Spaniards at Manilla, in order to finance their own trading operations in the annual summer fair held at Canton, but despite these numerous references the general procedure is by no means clear, for there are many puzzling and contradictory entries. What is clear from a perusal of these documents however, is that whilst some of the Macau merchants made great profits in this way, others failed in their speculations, and thus ruined not only themselves but their Japanese creditors as well. The amount of interest paid on this *respondencia*, varied from time to time, sometimes being as high as 40% or 50% apparently, though more usually between 20% and 30%. As the money was borrowed at such high (yearly) rates of interest, it is obvious that the Portuguese had to make very large profits in the Canton market in order to be able to make sufficient to be able to pay back their Japanese creditors with interest. A study of the lists of the cargos imported by the Portuguese into Japan during the decade 1630-1639, does not show that they imported much bullion,—scarcely any in fact. The vast majority of their imports consisted in various sorts of Chinese silk piece-goods and raw silks, and it seems therefore that the system was to borrow money from the Japanese, employ this to buy raw silks etc at Canton, and then import these into Japan, where they could be sold at such prices that the Portuguese not only could repay their Japanese creditors, but had sufficient profit for themselves. Some such consideration at all events, will be drawn from a perusal of the original documents and *Respondencia* bonds which we refer to later in more detail, but now it may be asked why the Portuguese of Macau had to depend on Japanese capital to such a large extent?

Ever since the early years of the XVIIth century, the far Eastern seas had been frequented by Dutch shipping, and it had become increasingly difficult for Portuguese vessels to reach Macau from Goa. From

about 1630, the Dutch constantly maintained a squadron to cruise in the straits of Malacca in order to intercept Portuguese vessels trying to pass from India to China or *vice-versa*, whilst from 1636 another powerful squadron annually blockaded Goa. As the Hollanders gradually tightened their grip on the strait of Singapore, fewer and fewer Portuguese vessels were able to slip through in safety, and communication between Goa and Macau was rendered so precarious that it was regarded as a miracle if a single ship got through. Thus, during the six year rule of the Viceroy Dom Miguel de Noronha, Conde de Linhares, from October 1629 till December 1635, the Portuguese lost over 150 ships captured or destroyed by the Dutch, with an estimated loss of 1,500 men and 7½ million *xerafins*.⁽⁶⁾ And yet this was considered a relatively prosperous period! Small wonder then that the Portuguese of Macau, cut off almost entirely from their headquarters of Goa, became increasingly dependent upon the money borrowed on *respondencia* in Nagasaki and Manilla to continue their China trade, their only other outlets being Macassar, Timor and Solor in the South Seas, with which places they still enjoyed a thriving commerce. But we have digressed and must return to our theme.

The Embargo laid on the Portuguese shipping in Nagasaki during 1628-1630, was the more annoying for the Lusitanians since they had hoped to take advantage of the total stoppage of the commerce of their hated Hollander rivals at Hirado, which had likewise lain under an embargo since 1628 in consequence of the celebrated Nuyts affair. The embargo on Dutch trade in Japan, which lasted from 1628 till 1632, has already been fully dealt with by Nachod and other historians⁽⁷⁾ and need not be discussed here, but it is interesting to note that as commercial relations with Manilla had been broken off in 1625, and as both Dutch and Portuguese were under an embargo in 1628-1630, the Japanese *goshuin-sen* or licensed junks had a good opportunity to develop their overseas trade in Siam, Tonquin and Formosa, which opportunity they did not neglect to use, as is proved by the frequent if spiteful references to their activities in both Portuguese and Dutch records of the period. But this prosperity was short-lived as we shall see, and

formed only the sunset-glow of the Tokugawa mercantile marine. More important perhaps was the increasing participation of the Chinese in the Japan trade, on which all modern writers are practically silent, yet in the year 1630-1631 about 70-80 Chinese junks arrived in Nagasaki, Satsuma and the Riukiu islands.

The mission of Takenaka Unemenosho returned from Manilla in 1631, having made a profitable voyage, and with offers on the part of the Spaniards to renew commercial relations. Although both parties were thus apparently desirous of mutual trade, it would seem that the *Bakufu* stepped in and forbade it. At any rate regular commercial intercourse was not resumed, and very soon afterwards the Shogunal authorities mooted the idea of a joint Japanese-Dutch attack on Manilla to the Hollanders.

Meanwhile Saimão Vaz de Paiva was sent again to Japan in 1631 to endeavour finally to settle the question of the Siam affair of 1628, which now seemed well on the way to liquidation owing to the Spaniards releasing their 42 Japanese captives in 1629, to the raising of the embargo on Portuguese shipping in November 1630, and to de Paiva's own good relations with the *Bugyo*, Takenaka Unemenosho.⁽⁹⁾ He was apparently successful to some extent, as the embargo was not reimposed, and the Dutch records state that a Portuguese Ambassador left Nagasaki for Yedo on the 16th November 1631, but whether this statement refers to Paiva or to Dom Gonçalo da Silueira, who had been waiting for over a year in Nagasaki, is not clear. Probably it refers to the former, as a year later, in December 1632, we find Dom Gonçalo still waiting in Nagasaki and he did not, it appears, finally obtain audience until 1634, when presumably Japanese pride, which had been so sadly ruffled by the capture of the *Goshuin-sen* in Siam in 1628, was finally soothed.

From Dutch records we learn that three Portuguese galliots arrived in Nagasaki during 16-20th August, but that the *Capitão-Mor* of the voyage with two other vessels was overdue, and 3 months later he had still not arrived and presumably never did.⁽⁹⁾

From this year 1631, dates the first of the contemporary documents

relating to *respondencia* which still exist in Japan.⁽¹⁰⁾ It is a letter written by one Gaspar Barboza Pereira in Macau, dated the 20th July 1631, and addressed to Snõr Ximaya gompê (ie^{Mr.} Shimaya Gompei), dealing with money borrowed by the writer and other Portuguese from the latter, who appears to have been a wealthy financier or broker of Nagasaki. Unlike the other *Respondencia* bonds which will be discussed later and which appear to have been drawn up by a secretary or notary, this document is all in the writer's own hand, and far from easy to decipher.

In the first part of this letter, the writer states he is writing on behalf of his relative Miguel Pereira who has been unavoidably detained in Canton on business and cannot sail in the first ships, but will follow with the *Capitão-mor* in one of the two ships which are to sail later. (As will be seen from the Dutch letter quoted above, these two other ships either never sailed or never arrived after all). Miguel Pereira, adds the writer, will indubitably follow in the next ship and pay back in full all that he owes with the interest on the *respondencia* (amount not stated), so that the recipient is asked not to misjudge him for not coming on the first ships, and not to heed any slanders or rumours he may hear as to his (=Pereira's) financial solvency, which is quite sound. The delay is not his fault, but that of the 'villainous Chinese' at Canton who were so slow in obtaining the required piece-goods from Nanking. There were some others available in Canton, but Miguel Pereira did not care to buy them as they were 2 or 3 years old and in bad condition.

So much for the first part of this letter which is quite clear, but the latter half is far from being so, and probably can only be fully understood by someone deeply versed in the niceties of XVIIth century Portuguese commercial technicalities, which I do not profess to be. It appears however that the writer, (Gaspar Barboza Pereira), had been asked by Shimaya Gompei in a letter sent by the ships of 1630, to try to collect the money due to him (Shimaya) by various Portuguese for the amounts borrowed by them on *respondencia* in previous years. This, Barboza Pereira states, he tried to do, but the action aroused such an outcry amongst the creditors who unanimously protested that they would all be ruined thereby and that Shimaya would therefore get nothing, that he

was compelled to desist. He appears, however, to have arrived at some sort of a compromise, as he writes that he is sending some money (about 200 taels) in repayment of the principal of one debt, but cannot raise anything of the interest. One Paullo Dias is mentioned as the principle debtor. The witer concludes by saying that he has given Afonso de Moraes, the factor of one of the ships, order to pay one-third of the amount of the debt of Miguel Pereira, and that the other two-thirds will follow later on the two remaining ships, (which, as noted above, apparently never arrived), and asks him to assure all the other Japanese from whom Miguel Pereira borrowed money on *Respondencia* that they all will be duly paid in full.

From this interesting letter we see that a number of the Macaonese merchants were unable to pay their debts in Japan, and from another document of the same year, printed in the *Archivos de Macau*, we gather that the number of such debtors had assumed very serious dimensions. This document, dated 7th June 1631, states that grave concern had been aroused by the large sums of money borrowed on *respondencia* from Manilla and Nagasaki, and that the increasingly large number of debtors threatened not only the good name, but also the financial stability of the City. Hence it was decided that nobody who owed money on *respondencia* in Manilla or Nagasaki would be allowed to visit those cities that year, nor send any money by his friends. The object of this curious decision is far from clear, but in any case it seems to have been a dead letter from the start, as a perusal of Gaspar Barboza Pereira's letter, above printed, shows. Owing to the complexities of the Japan trade, a special committee of four was elected in May 1632 to help the city of Macau deal with the problem. Two of these members were Agostinho Lobo and Pero Fernandez de Carvalho, both of whom had a long and varied experience in Japan and whom we shall meet later in connection with the *Respondencia* bonds.

The recently printed *Archivos de Macau* contain scores of documents dating from the years 1632-1639 about the *Respondencia* problem and the payment (or non-payment) of Portuguese debts in Japan, but unfortunately many of them are confused and contradictory and do not throw as much light on the problem as might be expected, whilst the fact that they are not arranged nor printed in chronological order, renders a thorough com-

parison and collation of them rather difficult. Furthermore there are gaps in the correspondence which make it impossible to follow through any particular case from start to finish, apart from the fact that we have neither time nor space here to consider all the documents. I therefore propose to confine myself, as far as possible, to those which are directly connected with the particular *Respondencia* bonds still existing in Japan, filling in the gaps from Dutch and other contemporary sources.

In August of the year 1632, three or four richly laden galliots arrived in Nagasaki from Macau, but at first could not sell their goods, as the Portuguese declined to do so at the usual fixed *pancada* rate on the ground that it was too low. This was probably because they counted on making a large profit as the embargo on the Dutch shipping in Hirado was still in force, whilst the Chinese had been so infuriated by the treatment they received at the hands of the Japanese officials in 1631, that they had only sent 3 small junks instead of the usual 50 or 60, whence the price of Chinese goods had soared sky-high. However in November 1632, the Japanese raised the embargo on the Dutch shipping in Hirado, on the ground that with the surrender of the person of Peter Nuyts, ex-Governor of Formosa, the Hollanders had largely atoned for the Taiwan *fracas* of 1628. This being so, the Portuguese now had a competitor again, and were eventually compelled to sell their goods at the fixed *pancada* rate as before. They sent an envoy to the Shogun's court to complain about this procedure but in vain, whilst the hapless Dom Gonçalo passed his third year in Nagasaki without an audience, as the *Bakufu* officials declined to receive him at Yedo until they had received further information about the crew of the *goshuin-sen* siezed by the Spaniards in Siam 5 years previously. From this year of 1632, dates the first *Respondencia* Bond, which is still preserved in Japan.⁽¹²⁾ It was drawn up and signed by the Factor of the City of Macau, Agostinho Lobo, and dated in Nagasaki on the 16th of November. Incidentally another document printed in the *Arquivos de Macau* informs us that Agostinho Lobo had been specially elected Factor of the City for the voyage of that year on account of his exceptional honesty, integrity and ability in dealing with the Japanese.⁽¹³⁾ He had previously been *Capitão-mor* of the annual Macau fleet in 1624

and again in 1625, so evidently was an old Japan 'hand.'

The document itself is very interesting and runs as roughly as follows — Agostinho Lobo states that he had borrowed 3,000 taels of bar-silver and loaned it to Luis Tavares, a citizen of Nagasaki, (this is curious, as the Portuguese were supposed to have been prohibited from owning land or property in Nagasaki since 8 or 9 years), at 33% interest. Furthermore the said Luis Tavares declared that he recognized that this sum of 3,000 taels had been borrowed from Nakano Hikobioei, a merchant of Hakata, *Nacano ficobioijy mercador facata* in the original. He further declared that this money was to be embarked on board the ship *S. Jorge* in charge of the Factor Lourenço de Liz Velho, for Macau, whilst next year it was to be returned, both principal and interest, in the first ships which should leave Macau together, and, if any come later, no money should be sent in these, but in the first lot only. In the event of only one ship being sent, then the whole amount was to be placed on board this ship, provided she came with a cargo of goods, but if empty or in ballast, then no money was to be sent at all. Finally it was stated that this money had been borrowed on behalf of the City of Macau and would be punctually repaid, whilst in the event of the ships 'wintering' (*ie* no voyage being made) then another 10% would be added to the interest for the year's delay. Thus far our document.

The various stipulations made by Nakano Hikobioei as to the way in which his money was to be returned in the following year are interesting. The first condition, namely that the money should be placed on board the first ships to leave and not in those of the second batch (if any), was obviously designed to prevent a repetition of the fiasco of the previous year, when the *Capitão-Mor* and two ships set out after the others but were forced back by contrary winds. The reason why if one ship was sent, the money was only to be returned in it if the vessel came loaded is also obvious, for the Portuguese would take greater care to prevent any harm befalling a fully laden ship, than they might do if only the worthy Nakano's silver bullion was at stake. Lastly the stipulation that an additional 10% was to be paid if the vessel did not return next year is quite legitimate, and this clause is to

be found in all the other *Respondencia* bonds known.

Some informative documents in the Macau Archives throw much light upon this particular Bond. From these we learn that in 1631 the Japanese had detained a quantity of the cargos sent in that year, as security for the unpaid debts owed them by many merchants of Macau for money borrowed in earlier years. These Japanese debtors, the Nagasaki authorities, and two Portuguese officials who had remained in the city, (Lourenço de Liz and Luis Tavares whose names occur as such in our above-quoted document), all wrote to the authorities at Macau, urging them to send all Portuguese who owed debts to Nagasaki forthwith, in order that these gentry might try to come to some agreement with their creditors. They added that if this was not done, the lives and goods of all Portuguese remaining in Nagasaki would be placed in dire peril, and the profitable Japan trade threatened with extinction. On the other hand, if the debtors were sent to meet their creditors, they would run no risk of life or limb in doing so, as the Japanese did not interfere with the Portuguese in criminal or judicial matters, but handed over all foreigners who were accused of crimes (assisting R. C. priests only excepted) to the *Capitão-Mor*, for transport to Macau for punishment according to Portuguese Laws. They also gave some examples to prove this, amongst others that of a certain Bastião Gonsalves who had gone bankrupt in Japan years before. Accordingly at a general meeting presided over by the Captain-General and Bishop of Macau on the 31st June 1632, it was decided that all debtors should be sent to meet their creditors in Japan, whilst letters should be written explaining that the former had failed to meet their obligations, not through any fault of their own, but owing to tardiness and bad faith on the part of *their* Chinese debtors.⁽¹⁴⁾

From another document in the Macau Archives referring to the money brought back from Japan by the factor Agostinho Lobo in the ship *São Jorge* early in 1633, we see that in the previous year he had borrowed a total of 66,600 taels on *respondencia*, besides the sum of 150,000 taels that the former Factor, Francisco de Lis Velho had left unpaid from 1631. Of the former sum of 66,600 taels, some 28,000 had

3000d8

Dios em Agostinho Lobo Feitor da cidade de Meias e seu v. e em tres mil e quatro
de Rezas. Elya a do Luis tauarus morador nesta cidade de nagasaki, arrendou e arrendo
de trinta e tres por cento, e declarou o d. Luis tauarus ser a dita proutade. Nacido fecho
merca do falata, e vai correndo o visco daqui para Meias no navio de fozge com o
embarcado. Feitor Lourenco de lizo Velho, e de Meias para a cidade de Meias o visco
prouta no primeiro navio de partida junto da d. yagam, em que fozge de Meias no
visco de Meias, e lizo de Meias no visco de Meias, e sempre da viagem para o visco de Meias,
com declaracao de lizo de Meias no visco de Meias, e de Meias no visco de Meias, e qual
prouta fozme para mandar a dita cidade de Meias, o qual pagamento de fozge de Meias e
de Meias, e quando invernada para a dita cidade de Meias, e por fozge de Meias
de Meias no visco de Meias, em Nagasaki a 16 de Novembro de 1632.

Agostinho Lobo

Responsencia Bond for three thousand taels signed by Agostinho Lobo in Nagasaki 16. xi. 1632. (See p. 13 of Text)

it once been paid out again in Japan in order to redeem the goods of the Portuguese detained as security for the unpaid debts of 1631.⁽¹⁹⁾ Thus the Portuguese were simply robbing Peter to pay Paul, and apparently borrowed lavishly from one lot of Japanese merchants to pay the debts due to another set! It is interesting to note that Agostinho Lobo had borrowed 3,000 taels at 33 % from Nakano Hikobiceï in 1632 according to the *Respondencia* Bond above quoted. As we see from the Macau document that he had borrowed a total of 66,600 taels altogether, it appears that he must have borrowed from scores of other Japanese merchants as well, for the usual amount borrowed from one man was about 5,000 taels. Add to this the previous years debts, and the enormous extent of the indebtedness of the Portuguese in Kyūshū will be recognized. It is easy to sympathize with the authorities in Macau who saw their city being snowballed under an avalanche of debt, whilst the high rate of interest exacted by the Japanese also becomes understandable. We have no space to recount the further measures adopted by the Lusitanian authorities to cope with the situation in 1632, but must pass on to the next year.⁽²⁰⁾

At a general meeting held on the 14th of June 1633, with a view to deciding on ways and means to pay the debts in Japan, it was proposed to effect this by raising the customs dues and other local taxes 10 %, but this fell through after a heated discussion. It was decided nevertheless to make the voyage, which was done with 4 galliots under the command of Lopo Sarmiento de Carvalho. This year's events are very fully recounted by the Dutch and we will narrate them briefly. The *Bugyo* Takenaka was dispossessed of his government on the grounds of 'squeezing' the Chinese traders inordinately, issuing his own 'passes' to junks instead of the Shogun's License, illegally trading to Manilla and half-hearted persecution of the Christians. This last charge at all events was singularly ill-founded, be it said in passing, for he it was who had caused the apostacy of the aged Jesuit Provincial, Christavaõ Ferreira. In his place were appointed Soga Matazayemon and Imamura Denshiro. This year the price of silk goods was greatly cheapened owing to the large quantity brought by both Chinese and Japanese junks from Tonkin.

Cochin China and Fukien, so that the Portuguese refused to sell their raw silks at the fixed *pancado* price. The two new *Bugyo* were in no mood to stand any nonsense, and told them that if they did not wish to sell, then they could clear out bag and baggage to Macau, regardless of the state of the monsoon. Thus the Portuguese were forced to sell their goods at 70 or 80 taels less than they had been originally offered, the prices of the various sorts ranging from 280 to 170 taels the *picul*, according to quality.⁽¹⁷⁾ The malicious enjoyment of the Dutch at the discomforture of their enemies, was however speedily nipped in the bud by the extension of the silk *pancado* to them for the first time, and the prohibition of their ships from leaving Hirado roadstead until at least 20 days after the departure of the Portuguese galliots from Nagasaki. The hapless Dom Gonçalo da Silueira was still vainly waiting in Nagasaki for leave to proceed to Yedo, and a request of his for an interview with three Shogunal commissioners who had come down on a tour of inspection from Yedo was insultingly refused, but at long last he was allowed to proceed to the capital at the year's end. Meanwhile the bluff of the Portuguese had been called. The Japanese finally having realised that the Portuguese were simply paying their creditors with money borrowed from other Japanese, put their heads together and on an agreed day made a unanimous demand to their debtors for a settlement of all outstanding debts, save only the large amount borrowed on the ship *S. Jorge* of last year. The result was a *débauche*. Only a few of the Lusitanians could pay their debts, and amongst the defaulters were four merchants who failed with amounts of 200,000; 300,000; 350,000 and 400,000 taels respectively! The unfortunate bankrupts could give no satisfaction to their creditors other than the statement that with the arrival of the galliots, they would have sufficient funds to redeem their dues. On the arrival of these vessels, it was found that there was little or nothing on their account, and they were therefore given into custody of the *Capitão-mor*, with strict injunctions that on their return to Macau all their houses, goods and movable property were to be sold, whilst they infallibly would have to return to Japan in the following year with the proceeds of such sales, in order to satisfy their creditors at least in

part.⁽¹⁸⁾ Echoes of this tragedy are found in the two documents which we now have to consider.

The first is a continuation of the *Respondencia* Bond for 3,000 taels at 33% borrowed by Agostinho Lobo from Nakano Hikobioei in November 1632, already alluded to. On the *verso* of this bond, is a receipt for 1995 taels, being the principal and interest on half of the amount borrowed, the other half to remain as before. This receipt is signed in Nagasaki on the 12th October 1633, and endorsed by Nakano himself to the same effect in Japanese. Evidently Agostinho Lobo was one of the lucky—or honest—few.

The second document⁽¹⁹⁾ is a pathetic statement by one Francisco Carvalho 'the old.' In it he states that he has borrowed 700 taels on *respondencia* from Shimaya Gompei, which he cannot repay owing to illness and bankruptcy. He states however that his son-in-law Sebastião Dalmeida, and two friends will pay for him, and he pledges himself that the amount will be paid off in three years time, by paying one third of the total each year. He promises to sell all that he has in Macau if necessary, as well as all the property of his son-in-law, whilst either he or his son-in-law will come to Japan each year in person, until the whole amount is paid. In the event of his death, Sebastião Dalmeida will be responsible for payment, whilst if there should be any neglect therein, may they both burn in Hell forever. The document is dated in Nagasaki, 16th October 1633, and signed by Carvalho himself in a feeble and shaky hand, in addition to three other witnesses, Pero Rodrigues, Antonio Carvalho and Antonio Neretti. The Portuguese galliots left Nagasaki on their return voyage on October 23, with comparatively little bullion on board, as the Japanese merchants felt that they could not trust them any longer. As has been previously stated, the Portuguese mission at last proceeded to Yedo at the year's end, and after a preliminary rebuff in February, they were finally granted audience on March 14th 1634,—the same day as the Dutch.⁽²⁰⁾

Incidentally in order to round off the case of Francisco Carvalho 'the old,' we may mention that a document in the Macau Archives dated 13th November 1636, shows that some 20,000 taels had been paid

on his account by some friends to his debtors in Japan, but that these friends accepted 14,300 taels, being all he had, in final and full payment from him. 'Misfortunes never come singly,' and in the same year of 1633 that the Portuguese were so harassed in Nagasaki, the Spaniards in Manilla confiscated 90,000 *pezos* which they alleged to be due to them. But worse was to follow.

In July 1634, five richly laden galliots left Macao for Nagasaki under the command of the *Capitão-mor* Lopo Sarmiento de Carvalho. Whilst still in the China Sea off Pedra branca, they met a large fleet of Chinese pirate junks under the celebrated corsair Yang-louw, and in the resulting battle, one vessel was taken by the Chinese, three fled back to Macau and only one, the flagship *Santo Antonio*, continued on her voyage to Nagasaki which she reached on the last day of August. The authorities at Macau were at first at a loss how to find cash wherewith to ransom their fellow-townsmen from the clutches of the Chinese, and they finally resolved to take it out of a sum of money belonging to the Spaniards of Manilla deposited in Macau,—tit for tat for the Dons' action in the previous year⁽²¹⁾. When the solitary galliot reached Nagasaki, the troubles of the Lusitanians were by no means over. One of the merchants on board the *Santo Antonio* named Jeronymo Luiz de Gouvea, had been imprudent enough to carry a letter from a Japanese Jesuit in Macau, one Paulo dos Sanctos by name, to another Japanese in Nagasaki demanding payment of a debt. This letter was discovered by the authorities and the unfortunate Jeronymo Luis siezed and imprisoned, being burnt at the stake on the 8th of October in the following year together with 9 other Japanese, including three women, and 3 Chinese (including a son of the pirate 'Augustin') who were beheaded. A year later, his (Luis) son was executed together with some Japanese Christians. On the discovery of this letter in 1634, the Nagasaki authorities at once wrote to Macau, urging that Paulo dos Sanctos should be sent to India or somewhere whence he could no longer correspond with Japan. This demand was strongly supported by all the civil and military authorities in Macau, and even the all-powerful ecclesiastical element thought it as well to send him to Cochin-China. He was back in a few months, however, and in December 1635 we find

Manuel Ramos, the *Ouvidor* of Macau writing to the Viceroy at Goa, asking him to send an express order for the priest to go to Cochin once and for all, since the Japanese were in no mood to be trifled with in that respect.⁽²²⁾

Even though only one galliot reached Japan in 1634, as has been said, yet she made a very profitable voyage, as in this year the *Bakufu* tightened up the *Goshuin* Regulations, and very few Japanese junks were licensed to go abroad, trade with Formosa being definitely forbidden, and the Dutch told that they could deal as they liked with any Japanese junks who called there. Consequently the price of silk goods rose, and the Portuguese were able to export 490 chests of silver in their solitary galliot, though doubtless this was not much compared to what was taken by the 8 Dutch ships which visited Hirado in the course of that year.

On February 15th 1635, the Portuguese had their annual audience at Yedo, and on the 9th August, three richly-laden galliots arrived at Nagasaki from Macau. The doings of the Portuguese in Japan this year, have been related elsewhere at length, so we can be brief. The foundation of Deshima had begun in the previous year, and work on the reclaimed land continued all through this. Two new *Bugyo* of Nagasaki were appointed, namely Sakakibara, Hida no kami, and Sengoku, Yamato no kami; the former speedily earned an unenviable reputation amongst the Hollanders who nicknamed him *Duc d'Alva*, on account of his opposition to them. The Dutch repeatedly protested to the local Daimio, and to the *Bakufu* authorities, against the prohibition of their ships sailing until 20 days after the departure of the Portuguese galliots, but in vain. This restriction imposed by the Japanese was perfectly natural, as much of the cargo in the Lusitanian vessels was composed of their own bullion, which they had no desire to see become a good prize of the Dutch. The Japanese even wished the Hollanders to promise not to attack the Portuguese galliots under any circumstances and in any place, but this the Hollanders flatly refused to do.

During these years, one of the Hollanders, named Willem Verstægen, was stationed at Nagasaki as agent for the Hirado factory, and to keep an eye on the doings of the Portuguese and Chinese traders. His frequent

letters to headquarters at Hirado throw a valuable light on many details of the Portuguese trade, whilst he was also well-informed about Japanese affairs, since his wife was half Japanese, being the daughter of Melchior van Santvoort, one of the survivors of the *Liefde* of 1600, by a native woman.⁽²³⁾

The galliots left Nagasaki on October 30th carrying 1500 chests of silver, much of it, as usual, borrowed from Japanese merchants on *respondencia*. The annual mission which was left behind (six whites and six half-castes) proceeded to Yedo as usual, where they had their audience on the 21st February 1636, but on their return to Nagasaki were strictly confined in the narrow prison of Deshima which had just been completed.

In Macau this year Dom Gonçalo da Silueira had been elected to command the annual voyage to Japan, presumably in recognition of his services and sufferings in connection with the mission he had headed to Japan in 1630-1634. He set sail in command of 4 galliots, but they had not gone far when they were sighted and chased by a Dutch squadron under Van den Burgh on its way to Formosa, but the latter soon abandoned the pursuit, as he considered that the capture of the Portuguese vessels would involve the Hollanders at Hirado in complications with the Japanese authorities.⁽²⁴⁾ Indeed the Hollanders now confined their efforts to intercepting the Portuguese galliots between Macau and Malacca, letting them sail of north of Macau unhindered, as they realised that much, if not most, of the Lusitanian cargos were being carried on account of the Japanese. Accordingly Dom Gonçalo arrived safely in Nagasaki on the 8th of August, but the crew of 800 souls and the rich cargos were all strictly searched, and the ships' sails and rudders removed, before being landed and shut up in Deshima.

The Lusitanians do not seem to have brought much silk this year, only a beggarly 250 *piculs* in comparison with the 1421 *piculs* brought by the Dutch, but in order to spoil the market for their heretic rivals, the Portuguese offered to sell their silk at less than the fixed *pancado* rate,—much to the indignation of their competitors who saw the price thus forced down. Curiously enough, however, the Japanese complained that the Portuguese galliots were worth much more than the Dutch ships,

both coming and going, and urged the Hollanders to increase the value of their imports. It was said that the 4 galliots when they left, exported over 2,350 chests of silver, each chest being worth 1,000 taels at 57 *stuivers* the tael, making a total value of *florins* 6,697,500, whilst the value of the goods exported by the 9 Dutch ships which sailed from Hirado in the same year was only *florins* 3,192,815, or less than half the value of the Portuguese cargos.⁽²⁵⁾ We have seen however that by this time the Portuguese had been reduced to the position of being little better than carriers for Japanese financiers, whilst the Hollanders were not nearly so dependent on Japanese capital, in fact they were lenders rather than borrowers, the Daimio of Hirado in particular being deeply indebted to them.

When the Portuguese galliots left Nagasaki in October 1636, they took away with them some 287 men, women and children who were relatives or children of former Portuguese inhabitants of Nagasaki, and now exiled by order of the *Bakufu* to Macau. Pathetic scenes were witnessed at their embarkation Willem Versteegen tells us, perhaps filled with some forboding that the same thing would happen to his wife in a few years, as was indeed the case. The Portuguese had been involved in still further trouble this year, for 26 of their Deshima caretakers had been arrested and tortured for smuggling goods from them, whilst 68 other Japanese were subsequently imprisoned and examined in connection with this affair, including some interpreters. Among the interpreters, incidentally Dom Gonçalo tells us, was the apostate priest Christovão Ferreira, whom he considered showed signs of repentance for his fall from grace.⁽²⁶⁾

We learn from a document in the Macau archives dated 23^d July 1636, that the City of Macau then owed 70,000 taels to its Japanese creditors; whilst from two others dated 10 and 13 November respectively, we see that there were riots in the city on account of the method by which the authorities had proceeded in paying the debts of bankrupts in Japan, and the citizens dragged them to the Council-Chamber, insisting that the losses should be equally borne by all.

On the 21st of August 1637, five richly-laden Portuguese galliots arrived in Nagasaki harbour followed on the next day by another. About the cargos brought by these 6 vessels we are singularly well-informed,

as a detailed price-list thereof is printed on folios 84-86 of Zeygert van Rechteren's voyage in Volume II of the *Begin ende Voortgangh* published at Amsterdam in 1646. The majority of the cargo consisted of Chinese and Tonkinese silk-stuffs, and in all respects closely resembles the cargo lists of Dutch imports in 1672-1674 printed by me elsewhere.⁽²⁷⁾ The total value of the cargo was estimated at 2,141,468 taels or *florins* 6,103,183. The crews of the galliots numbered 972 men of whom only 150 were white; all were closely searched to their skins before being allowed to land, when they were shut up in Deshima.

This year no fewer than 64 Chinese junks arrived in Nagasaki—to which port they had been restricted since 1635—and this, combined with the large cargo of Chinese goods brought by the Portuguese galliots, forced down the prices of silk-stuffs to such an extent, that both Hollanders and Lusitanians bitterly complained.⁽²⁸⁾

Early this year an important Embassy arrived from Korea, to ask for Japanese assistance against the Tartar invaders. There is a long and interesting account of this Embassy in the Dutch records, but as it is not directly connected with our subject, we must pass on to other matters.

The *Bakufu* authorities were strongly tending to expel the Portuguese altogether, and in addition to increasing the already galling restrictions laid on them in Deshima, the Nagasaki *Bugyō* held frequent consultations with the Dutch about the advisability of a joint attack on the Iberian settlements at Macau, Manilla and Keelung.

There was however a strong undercurrent of opposition to this amongst the Kyūshū traders, who had no wish to lose all of the silver bullion which they had so freely lent to the Portuguese; whilst even amongst the officials, there were some like Heizo, the *Daikwan* of Nagasaki, who had a good deal at stake in the Macau trade. This Heizo—the Phesadonne of Dutch and Portuguese records—was considered by the Portuguese to be one of their strongest supporters, but we also find that he was on good terms with the Dutch, freely discussing with François Caron about the prospects of an attack on Macau, so that he was evidently not far from a little judicious trimming.

In October this year the *Respondencia* problem led to a serious affair in Nagasaki. A Portuguese merchant was accosted by a Japanese and asked to pay a debt of 8 chests of silver, borrowed by another Portuguese the year before who had not returned; the Portuguese merchant disclaimed any connection with the fraudulent debtor, and declined to be made responsible for his debts. The Japanese trader thereupon appealed to the *Bugyō* of Nagasaki who ordered that the Portuguese should be brought bound hand and foot into the street, where anybody who wished to cut off his head could do so. The result was that the unfortunate Portuguese being brought bound into the street was forced to promise payment in order to escape instant death. He could not however raise sufficient money himself, and all the other Portuguese were obliged to contribute something to enable him to discharge the debt.⁽²⁹⁾

Nor was this the only such incident. Just before the galliots sailed on their return voyage to Macau, they were boarded by a *posse* of Nagasaki officials who arrested and carried off with them Captain Duarte Correa. This man was later imprisoned in Omura, and has left us a very valuable account of the Shimabara rebellion, written shortly before his Martyr's death in a slow fire in October 1638. Despite all this outrageous treatment, the Portuguese seem to have had a fairly good year of it, as the Dutchman Hendrik Hagenauer noted in his journal under Nov: 8,th—"heard that the 6 Portuguese galliots had left for Macau on the 6th inst, with about 2,600 chests of silver worth 80 tons of gold (8 Million *florins*), which is a splendid Capital considering the poor market." It is needless to add that most of this was really borrowed on *respondencia*, as will be seen from the following bond still preserved in Japan,⁽³⁰⁾ and which dates from this year,—

'By these presents I the undersigned, Tristaõ Tavares, married man and citizen of Macao, declare it to be true that I borrowed from Messers Itocozaimon-dono and Figuebice (=Hikibioei) dono, merchants of Hakata, the sum of five thousand taels in bar silver on *respondencia* for the city of Macao at 31%. This sum will be sent from here to Macao equally divided amongst the 6 ships making the voyage, whilst (next year) it

will be returned similarly subdivided amongst the ships making the voyage, provided that they all leave together by the same tide on the same day; should only one ship be sent, then the money is not to be embarked therein, but if two, then it will be equally divided amongst them; whilst should any ships leave later, no money is to be embarked therein, and in the event of the voyage being cancelled, I will pay another 10%; forasmuch as we are all content herewith, and I obliged to carry out the above contract, I sign this, with the declaration that should neither I nor my brother come back to Japan, I will cause payment to be made on my behalf by the trustworthy persons who may be in charge of my goods and even if I do not order this, yet the persons who come in charge of my goods shall be held responsible for making the said payment in accordance with this. In witness whereof I sign here, today sixth of november of the year sixteen hundred and thirty seven.' (Followed by Tavares signature & that of a witness).

At the end of the year the Portuguese mission proceeded to Yedo as usual, but they were refused audience on the 6th of February 1638, probably in consequence of the outbreak of the Shimabara rebellion, with which they were suspected of having some connection.

In July 1638 two vessels were fitted out for the Macau voyage, one of them being a fine newly-built ship which the citizens had insisted that the authorities should employ in the voyage. This ship named *Nossa Senhora da Conceição*, together with another named *Nossa Senhora do Rosario e São Gonsalo*, reached Nagasaki on the 23rd August under the command of Dom João de Almeida. According to the Dutch, these vessels were manned by 340 men of whom 90 were white, whilst they only brought 230 *piculs* of raw silk of which 150 were for account of Heizo, the *Daikwan* of Nagasaki, the remaining 80 *piculs* being the Portuguese own property.⁽³¹⁾ This is interesting as one more proof of the fact that the Portuguese were now reduced to the position of being little better than carriers for the Japanese, being utilised by the latter on an increasing scale since the *Goshuin* traffic had been prohibited in 1636. Still the fact that the outlets for Japan's foreign trade had been so reduced, was of considerable advantage to the Portuguese, inasmuch

as the interest rates on the *Respondencia* bonds were much cheaper this year. The Hollanders likewise inform us that the Portuguese sailed on their return voyage to Macau on the 20th October 1638, carrying 1,259 chests of silver worth 1,000 taels each, in addition to another 400,000 taels borrowed on bottomry (= *respondencia*), at 25 % 26 % and 27 %. This affords interesting confirmation of the following *Respondencia* bond, the last of those which are still preserved in Japan, in so far as is known.⁽³²⁾

“I, Pero Fernandez de Carvalho, Factor of the City of Macao, state that I borrowed four thousand taels of bar silver from Suyetsugu Socotu (*sic* for Sotoku), merchant of Hakata, at twenty five percent, on behalf of the City of Macau. The said Suyetsugu declared that the sum total of the said four thousand taels is to go from here to Macau divided equally in the two ships *Nossa Senhora de Conceição* and *Nossa S^{ra} de Rosario e São Gonsalo*. From Macau to this City (next year) the amount is to be sent equally divided amongst the ships of the voyage which leave together first, and in case only one is sent, it will take only a third of the whole, whilst if the voyage is cancelled, another 10 % must be paid. This silver bullion and the profits earned thereon, will be repaid by the Factor who succeeds me for and on behalf of the City of Macao.

Nagasaki, sixth of October, sixteen hundred and thirty eight, (signed) *Pero Fernandez de Carvalho*.” This bond is endorsed on the back in Japanese for 40 *kwan* of bar-silver, 2^d day of the 9th month of the 15th year of *Kwanei*.

Further light is thrown on the above *Respondencia* bond by a document in the Archives of Macau dated 22^d of December 1638, in which it is stated amongst other things, that Pero Fernandez de Carvalho had borrowed a total of 97,000 taels in Japan on behalf of the City of Macau, from which 13,000 taels were to be deducted and given to Carvalho as he had been previously promised this *douceur*,—it is not stated why, but presumably in return for valuable services rendered. We may mention in passing that the Hollanders borrowed money in Kyoto this year at 2 % a month or 24 % a year,—practically the same as was charged the Portuguese.

As a consequence of the Shimabara rebellion, the *Bakufu* had finally made up their minds to expel the Portuguese for good and all, and an Edict to this effect was issued toward the end of the year 1638.

Consequently, when in the autumn of 1639 the Portuguese galliots came to Nagasaki, it was for the last time. The *Capitão-mor*, Vasco Palha da Almeida, was handed a copy of the exclusion edict, and told to leave with the first favourable wind. The officials would not even allow the Portuguese to pay any of the debts they owed on *respondencia* to the Japanese merchants—to the no little chagrin of the latter, one may imagine. Rice and drinking water only were provided, and on the 17th October 1639, Almeida set sail to Macau. The curtain was rung down on nearly a century of continuous commercial intercourse.

When Almeida reached Macau at the end of October with his two galliots still laden with their original cargoes, great was the consternation at the news.

On the 1st November, it was decided at a meeting of the municipal authorities, to issue a proclamation ordering all persons who owed any money to Japanese, to hand it over within 6 days to the city authorities for safe-keeping. This proclamation was issued in accordance with the parting advice given the Portuguese by the Nagasaki interpreters. From another document dated 13th November 1639, we see that this order had not been uniformly obeyed, and Tristaõ Tavares (the signer of the 1637 *Respondencia* bond translated above) was cited as having contemptuously refused to pay. This action aroused the ire of the City Fathers, who issued another proclamation ordering Tavares to pay in full within 24 hours, on pain of having all his goods confiscated and his house razed to the ground. The result of this drastic order is not stated, but another document, dated 20th December 1639, informs us that it was unanimously resolved not to pay the *respondencias* for that year, and that all persons who had subscribed goods or money to the voyage should have the same returned to them in the original condition.⁽⁵⁹⁾

Many of the inhabitants could not pay in cash the money they owed to the Japanese under the terms of the proclamation of 1st November cited above, and the officials siezed upon movable property of equal

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4000^{taels} Digo eu Pero Fernandez de Carvalho, Feitor da cidade de Macao
que entomey quatro mil taels de prata de barras. A suje teugu sócotu mercader
de facata auinte Esrico por cento pera adita Cidade de Macao, e declarau o ditto
sujeteugu sócotu que orrisco dos ditz quatro mil taels uay dagui pera Macao
nos dous navios Capitania Nossa s. de Conuicad, e nois as do Holando, esad
gonsalo donde vou embarcado igualmente, e de Macao pera esta Cidade de Nan
gasaque Vira orrisco da dita coantia em todos os navios da Viage que partirem
Junto rata por cantidade, Esendo caso que nas venha mai que hu nelle disseto
mana ateca parte do riqno, Enas hauendo viage se lhe pagara mai dez por cento
agual prata com seus ganhos pagara o Feitor do Louo que mesoceder por quando
Esperia adita Cidade, Nangasaque, feri de outubro de Jercientos e trinta e to ho ho.

P. Fernandez de Carvalho

Respondencia Bond for four thousand taels signed by Pero Fernandez de Carvalho in Nagasaki, 6. x. 1638. (See p. 25 of Text)

value instead. On the 4th January 1640 it was decided to store all these goods and money owing to the Japanese, in the two convents of the Jesuits and Franciscans for safe-custody. What finally became of this money I do not know, but certainly the Japanese never saw the colour of it.

In 1640 it was resolved to send an Embassy to Nagasaki to ask for the reopening of trade with Japan. I have already dealt very fully with this Embassy in an article based on the original sources and published in the *Anaes do Club Militar Naval* of Lisbon in 1932, and furthermore its fate is well known. Hence it will be enough here to say that at a meeting of the Municipal Council on the 18th May, it was decided that the Ambassadors should take with them to Japan 6,000 taels for their living expences, with power of attorney to borrow more, pledging the credit of the City if necessary. It was further decided on the 19th June 1640, that if the commerce should be resumed, then the Ambassadors could borrow up to 100,000 taels on *respondencia* on behalf of the city of Macao, but this, needless to say, never materialized. From the above quoted Documents in the Macau Archives, we also learn that the City itself owed in Japan 200,000 taels, besides another 140,000 owed on behalf of those who had gone bankrupt in Japan. There were evidently other debts as well, as in the account of the illfated Embassy of 1640, it is noted that such was the terror inspired by the draconic severity of the *Bakufu*, that although the Portuguese owed about 700,000 taels in Nagasaki, not one of their numerous creditors dared to mention a single word about the matter.⁽³⁴⁾

The last reference to these debts which I have been able to trace, is in connection with the Portuguese Embassy to Japan of 1644—1647. When the galleon carrying the Ambassador was temporarily siezed by the Dutch in Batavia, on her way to Macau at the end of 1644, the Captain, Antonio Fialho Ferreira, told the Governor-General Van Diemen that he expected to be favourably recieved in Nagasaki, since he had an order from his King to pay all the debts of the Portuguese in Japan 'which amounted to a very great sum.' Van Diemen slyly opined that the Portuguese was only bluffing, as was certainly the case, for there was little or no money on board his ship, whilst the Macau

treasury was in a state of chronic penury.⁽⁸⁾

Such then is the story of the Portuguese trade in Japan during the *Kwanei* period, and as we gaze upon these 300 year-old *Respondencia* Bonds and picture the City fathers of Macau struggling with their ever-increasing load of debt, we realize, in the face of present day conditions, the truth of the French Proverb,—*plus que ça change plus que c'est la même chose!*

NOTES

- (1) Published at Lisbon in 1876.
- (2) What follows is chiefly taken from the documents published in the painstaking work of COLIN PASTELLS, *Laber Evangelica*, Barcelona 1904. Tomo I, pp. 226-243.
- (3) cf. the documents printed on this mission in *Arquivos de Macau*, 1929-30. (Vol. II, p. 3; Vol. III, pp. 55, 107.) Of this valuable compilation, 3 volumes have so far (1933) appeared.
- (4) For Dom Gonçalo's earlier career as a soldier in the Indies, see my *Commentaries of Ruy Freyre de Andrada*, London, Routledge, 1928. *passim*.
- (5) Chiefly from the letters of the Hirado Factory as summarized in *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia 1631-1634*, *passim*.
- (6) From the very interesting detailed list published in *Historia da Fundação do Real Convento de Santa Monica da Cidade de Goa*. Lisboa, 1699; translated into English in the 1915 volume of the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*. Unfortunately no dates are given in the original work, whilst the translation is not free from errors, but it is possible to identify most of the losses in the contemporary Batavia *Dagh-Registers*.
- (7) cf. NACHOD, *Beziehungen der Niederländischen Ostindischen Kompagnie zu Japan im siebzehnten Jahrhundert*. Leipzig, 1897. pp. 195-220 for the most extended account. Murdoch also gives a good description in Vol. II of his *History*.
- (8) *Arquivos de Macau*. Vol. I, p. 125.

- (9) *Dagh-Register. Batavia, 27 ii 1632.*
- (10) I have to thank professor Muto Chozo of Nagasaki for being able to secure a photograph of this document, the original being preserved in Fukuoka city.
- (11) *Dagh Register Batavia, 22 ii 1633.*
- (12) Belonging to Mr. Y. Matsunaga of Tokio. I have to thank Mr. K. Yoshida of Keio University for drawing my attention to these documents.
- (13) *Arquivos de Macau. Vol. I. p. 368*
- (14) *Idem. pp. 373 ff.*
- (15) *Idem. Vol. III. p. 123.*
- (16) It may be added in passing, that one of the galliots which left Nagasaki for Macau in December 1632, carrying 800,000 taels of silver, lost her mast in a typhoon and was forced to put into Satsuma to refit. Possibly this was the *S. Jorge*. (*Dagh-Register Batavia, 22 iii 1633*).
- (17) *Dagh-Register Batavia 19 ii 1634* and *Japansch Brieven boek, 1633-1639* in the Hague Archives. For the loan of a series of extracts from this last, I have to thank Mr. J. H. Griffiths of Kobe.
- (18) *Dagh-Register. Batavia 1634, pp. 250-1.*
- (19) cf. note (10) *supra*, this document likewise being preserved in Fukuoka city.
- (20) *Dagh-Register 1634* and *Japansch Brievenboek, op-cit.*
- (21) *Arquivos de Macau. Vol. II. p. 231 ff; Dagh-Register Batavia, 4 vii 1634* and *Japansch Brievenboek op. cit.* We may mention here that Yang Louw had also taken a Dutch ship, the *Blyde Boodschap* off the Pescadores in the same year, and some of the prisoners taken by him then were ransomed with his Portuguese captives and sent to Macau. (*D. R. B. 21 iv 1636 & 31 x 1636*)
- (22) For the foregoing see the letters of Manuel Ramos printed by me in *Boletim da Agencia Geral das Colouias, Lisboa, 1930, pp. 47-55.* (English translation in *Transactions of the Japan Society, London 1930*, but contains several errors in the paragraphs referring to the *Respondencia* problem). Cf also *Jap. Brievenboek, W. Verstegen to N. Couckebacker, 8 viii 1634 & 12 viii 1634 etc.*
- (23) *Japansch Brievenboek in voce 1635. Dagh-Register Batavia 1636, and Valentyn Japan p. 114.* H. Hagenauer in *Begin ende Voortgangh. Amsterdam, 1646, Vol. II. p. 86.*
- (24) *Jap. Brievenboek, 1636.*
- (25) Hagenauer in *Begin ende Voortgangh II. pp. 98, 100-101; Valentyn Japan, p. 118. Jap. Br. 1636.* Estimates however vary; another one based on intercepted Portuguese letters, places their imports at 2,317,214 florins, exports at

- 6,604,059 *florins*. The Portuguese stated there was more silver bullion available than they could take up. (*D. R. B.* 3 iii 1637).
- (26) *Japansch Brievenboek* 1636, DEPLACE, *Catholicisme au Japon*. Bruxelles. II. p. 218.
- (27) In *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. VII, Tokyo, 1930. pp. 184-195.
- (28) *Begin ende Voortgangh* loc. cit. *Japansch Brievenboek* loc. cit.
- (29) Willem Versteegen in *Japansch Brievenboek*, loc. cit.
- (30) Belonging to Mr. Y. Matsunaga of Tokyo. Mr. K. Yoshida kindly drew my attention to this.
- (31) Willem Versteegen in *Japansch Brievenboek*. *Archivos de Macau*, Vol. III. *passim*.
- (32) Belonging to Mr Y. Matsunaga. I was able to copy it through the courtesy of Mr. K. Yoshida.
- (33) *Arquivos de Macau*. Vols. I-III, *passim*.
- (34) *Relacion* &c. printed in Manila 1641, and my article in the *Anaes do club Militar Naval*. p. 32.
- (35) cf. my *Portuguese Embassy to Japan in 1644-1647*, London 1928. p. 41-2.

PERSONALIA

The following notes about the signatories of the three *Respondencia* Bonds of 1632, 1637 and 1638 have been culled from contemporary documents printed in *Arquivos de Macau*.

Pero Fernandez de Carvalho. One of the most prominent citizens of Macau during the first half of the XVIIth century. He was elected one of a committee of 4 members whose duty was to assist the municipal authorities with their advice, on the 2^d January 1631, but resigned two days later, Antonio Galvaõ Godinho being elected in his place. He was made *Feitor do povo* or Agent of the People in 1636-1638, whilst in August 1637 he was a member of two committees established to treat with Weddel's 4 English ships then lying in the roadstead, and with the Mandarins at Canton who had been practising various extortions against the Portuguese traders. In July 1641, he was elected member of a committee

instituted for the purpose of examining and repairing the City's fortifications and supply of war materials, but resigned on Sept. 12th of the same year on the grounds of old-age and ill-health. He was also a member of the Council of War which assisted the Captain-General, Dom Lobo da Silveira, at this time. He was evidently mortally ill in 1645-6, as in those years his signature appears on all documents by proxy since he could not sign himself.

Agostinho Lobo. Another leading inhabitant of Macau during this period. He was Captain-Major of a fleet of 5 vessels to Japan in 1624 and again in the following year. He was unanimously elected Peoples Agent for the Japan voyage in June 1632, on account of his exceptional capability, authority and zeal. He also served on many committees during this period, including the above-mentioned mission to Canton in August 1637 to protest against the corruption and venality of the local Chinese officials.

Tristão Tavares. Was *Escrivao da Camara* or Town-clerk of Macau for many years, and his signature as such occurs on numerous documents of the period. He was apparently a brother of the Luis Tavares who is mentioned in the text as being an inhabitant of Nagasaki. He was still alive and active in 1646, as his name occurs in documents of that date. He may possibly have been a relative of the famous gun-founder, Manuel Tavares Bocarro, who flourished in Macau during these years, and one of whose cannon is still preserved at Kagoshima.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE PORTUGUESE

寛永	YEAR	CAPITÃO-MOR	NUMBER OF SHIPS	
一	1624	AGOSTINHO LOBO	5	長谷
二	1625	AGOSTINHO LOBO	5	長谷
三	1626	LUIZ PAES PACHECO	6	水野
四	1627		One advice-ship only.	水野
五	1628	ANTONIO MONTEIRO	5	水野
六	1629	ANTONIO DE OLIVEIRA ARANHA	2	竹中
七	1630	DOM GONCALO DA SILVEIRA	Uncertain.	竹中
八	1631	LOURENÇO DE LIS VELHO	3	竹中
九	1632	LOPO SARMENTO DE CARVALHO	3 or 4	竹中
十	1633	LOPO SARMENTO DE CARVALHO	4	曾我村
十一	1634	LOPO SARMENTO DE CARVALHO	1	榑原 神具
十二	1635		3	榑原 仙石
十三	1636	DOM GONÇALO DA SILVEIRA	4	榑原 馬場三
十四	1637	DOM FRANCISCO DE CASTELLOBRANCO	6	榑原 馬場三
十五	1638	DOM JOÃO PEREIRA	2	榑原 馬場三
十六	1639	VASCO PALHO DE ALMEIDA	2	馬場三 大河
十七	1640	EMBASSY FROM MACAU	1	榑原 馬場三

E TRADE IN JAPAN DURING THE KWANEI PERIOD

BUGYŌ OF NAGASAKI	REMARKS
權六 Hasegawa Gonroku	
權六 Hasegawa Gonroku	In this year the Portuguese were forbidden to reside in Japan. Trade with Manilla forbidden.
内守 Mizuno Kawachino kami	
内守 Mizuno Kawachino kami	The annual fleet of galliots was prevented from leaving Macau on account of Dutch cruisers, one of which was captured by the Portuguese.
内守 Mizuno Kawachino kami	On account of the Spaniards taking a Japanese junk in May of this year, Portuguese ships in Nagasaki were placed under an embargo.
女正 Takenaka Unemenosho	Embargo on Portuguese shipping & goods maintained. The Dutch were also under an embargo from 1628-1632.
女正 Takenaka Unemenosho	The Dutch state that 5 or 6 galliots left Nagasaki for Macau this year, but they seem to have been the ones detained from 1628-1629. Embargo raised in October.
女正 Takenaka Unemenosho	5 ships should have sailed from Macau, but 2 of them started too late and never made the voyage apparently.
女正 Takenaka Unemenosho	The Dutch and Portuguese sources vary as to the exact number of galliots this year between 2 and 4.
左衛門 (四郎) Soga Matazayemon 内記 Imamura Den-hirō	Portuguese records mention only 1 or 2 galliots, but reliable Dutch documents give 4. Two Bugyō appointed.
内記 (内記) Sakakibara Hidanokami 内記 Kamio Naiki	5 galliots started, but one was captured by Chinese pirates and 3 others forced back to Macau.
内記 (内記) Sakakibara 和守 Sengoku Yamato no kami	Portuguese records state that there was no voyage this year, but reliable Dutch sources tell of 3 galliots arriving in 1635. The Chinese junks were limited to Nagasaki.
内記 (内記) Sakakibara 左衛門 Baba Saburozayemon	In this year the Bakufu issued their celebrated Edict forbidding Japanese trade & residence abroad.
内記 (内記) Sakakibara 左衛門 Baba Saburozayemon	Portuguese Capitaō-Mor and 2 others were arrested and detained in Nagasaki this year on account of suspected complicity in the Shimabara Rebellion.
内記 (内記) Sakakibara 左衛門 Baba Saburozayemon	Last year of the Portuguese trade. Exclusion Edict issued. Sakakibara was retired in the summer.
左衛門 (左衛門) Baba Saburozayemon 善兵衛 Okawachi Zembei	4 galliots started, but one was wrecked and one put back to Macau, whilst the other two were sent away without being allowed to trade.
右衛門 (右衛門) Tsuge Heieyemon 左衛門 Baba Saburozayemon	61 members of the Embassy were beheaded and their ship burnt. 13 survivors sent back to Macau with the news.