Refusal of Resolution: Open-Endedness in *Amours de Voyage*

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I

*Amours de Voyage* was received rather negatively on both sides of the Atlantic. In 1849 Clough showed the poem in manuscript to J. C. Shairp, his close friend. Upset about the “ceaseless self-introspection and criticism” which makes “everything [crumble] to dust,” he wrote to Clough:

No, I would cast it behind me and the spirit from which it emanates and to higher, more healthful, hopeful things purely aspire. I won’t flatter; but you were not made, my dear Clough, to make sport before The Philistines in this way, but for something else. . . . On the whole I regard ‘Les Amours’ as your nature ridding itself of long-gathered bile. . . . Don’t publish it—-or if it must be published—-not in a book—-but in some periodical. (*Correspondence*, I. 275)(1)

Clough’s response is significant because it clearly indicates his overall intent and his attitude towards the reading public. He tells Shairp that it is about the “execution rather than conception” of the poem that he has been worrying, primarily about the execution of the hexameters (*Correspondence*, I. 276). After Shairp writes back, again complaining about the conception of the poem, Clough responds by saying “Your censure of the conception almost provoked me into
publishing—because it showed how washy the world is in its confidences" (Correspondence, I. 278). The poem was finally published in 1858, about nine years after Clough had first drafted it. The atmosphere had not really changed much. Emerson, who had been unreservedly positive in his response to The Bothie, was not satisfied with Amours, especially with its "aulking end," which did not resolve or close the problems and issues raised by the poem but left its hero in the same state as in the beginning of the poem—indecisive, inactive, in a state of velleity. Emerson censured the ending of Amours:

How can you waste such power on a broken dream? Why lead us up the tower to tumble us down? There is a statute of Parnassus, that the author shall keep faith with the reader; but you choose to trifle with him. It is true a few persons compassionately tell me, that the piece is all right, and that they like this veracity of much preparation to no result. But I hold tis bad enough in life, & inadmissable in poetry.

(Correspondence, II. 548)

About Emerson’s response to the conception, Clough wrote to C. E. Norton, revealing a bit of frustration or resignation:

Also he reprimanded me strongly for the termination of the Amours de Voyage, in which he may be right and I may be wrong and all my defense can only be that I always meant it to be so and began it with the full intention of its ending so—but very likely I was wrong all the same . . . .

(Correspondence, II. 551)

But, in his revisions in the nine years between writing the poem and publishing it, Clough remained true to his original intention and conception, refusing to close the poem in a way that would be "pleasing" to, or that was expected by, his readers. In the envoy to the
poem, Clough addresses these expectations:

So, go forth to the world, to the good report and the evil!
Go, little book! thy tale, is it not evil and good?
Go, and if strangers revile, pass quietly by without answer.

(V. 217–219)\(^3\)

Clough had his work to do, and he did it exactly the way he wished and not the way he was supposed to.

II

Like *The Bothie, Amours de Voyage* is a “verse novel” in hexameters, but the story is told exclusively in the epistolary form. The majority of the letters are from Claude, a somewhat arrogant and oversensitive young Englishman. Claude meets the Trevellyns, a middle-class English family, while travelling on the Continent. Then he discovers that he might be in love with Mary, one of the daughters. She is also in love with him, but Claude so incessantly and assiduously examines his own thoughts that even that is put in doubt. Much debate and speculations go on in his mind as to whether he is really in love. He fails to propose to Mary before the family continues on their tour, and spends most of the remainder of the poem unsuccessfully trying to catch up with them. Unlike *The Bothie, Amours* does not give us the expected and positive ending: Claude never does catch up with Mary and eventually gives up the pursuit; thus, the two “lovers” never meet again, and things do not end happily ever after. After giving up the chase, he begins to console himself with the thought that he had not really been in love at all. Indeed, things never really seem to “happen” at all. As Armstrong and others have noted, “Claude can make up his mind about nothing; ‘Il doutait de tout, meme de l’amour,’ runs one of the epigraphs to the poem.”\(^4\)
As Claude doubts everything, even love, so the poem raises concepts as problems but refuses to close them. For example, while Claude, as J. D. Jump puts it, "finds himself a spectator of the attack on the short-lived Roman Republic by the French and Neapolitan armies,"(5) he ponders the nobility of sacrificing oneself for one's county and for "the British female." Claude remarks to Eustace:

*DULCE* it is, and *decorum*, no doubt, for the country to fall,---to
Offer one's blood an oblation to Freedom, and die for the Cause; yet
Still, individual culture is also something, and no man
Feels quite distinct the assurance that he of all others is called on,
Or would be justified, even, in taking away from the world that
Precious creature, himself. . . .  (II. 30-35)

And two letters later, Claude says:

Am I prepared to lay down my life for the British female? Really, who knows? One has bowed and talked, till, little by little,
All the natural heat has escaped of the chivalrous spirit.
Oh, one conformed, of course; but one doesn't die for good manners,
Stab or shoot, or be shot, by way of graceful attention.  
(II. 66-70)

Claude is unable to commit himself to any cause of stance (unless we say that he can decide not to commit himself to any cause or stance). Action is intimately connected to knowledge. He remains inactive, longing for the certainty of uncompromised truth.(6) He longs to achieve
“a perfect and absolute something” (III. 144).

Warwick Slinn cogently discusses Claude as an “epistemological idealist” whose attempts at creating a “Cartesian” “separate and discrete self” necessarily fail. Arguing against Claude’s passivity, Slinn describes him as “an idealist who confronts the limits to his own idealism.” He wants “fixity and certainty” but grows increasingly conscious of his “confrontation with the groundlessness of experience and belief” because his quest for the certainty of the Absolute is located in the self. He is a “subjectivist” who “prefers to identify with the potentially infinite and permanent world within,” which leads to that “potential unity with the divine absolute which that brings.” The “permanence” of the inner world is opposed to the outer world of “process and flux,” but Claude becomes increasingly aware of “the inseparability of empirical reality from subjectivity and the inseparability of both of these from the mediations of discourse. As a writer of letters, Claude produces biography-in-the-making, an ongoing process of textualizing existence.”(7) In his letter writing, in which he is also constructing his self, Claude seeks to impose order and unity on life.

Wanting to act with absolute certainty, Claude explores the Victorian ideal that “action will furnish belief.” Houghton, in The Victorian Frame of Mind, stressing the importance of Carlyle as the “Major prophet” of that ideal, remarks that:

As the difficulties of belief increased, the essence of religion of Christians---and for agnostics the “meaning of life”---came more and more to lie in strenuous labor for the good of society. That was not only a rational alternative to fruitless speculation but also a practical means of exorcizing the mood of ennui and despair which so often
accompanied the loss of faith. For these reasons, a religion of work, with or without a supernatural context, came to be, in fact, the actual faith of many Victorians: it could resolve both intellectual perplexity and psychological depression.\(^{(8)}\)

For Claude, however, this idea becomes merely another source of anxiety. Puzzling over the idea, he writes to Eustace:

*Action will furnish belief,*--*but will that belief be the true one?*

This is the point, you know. However, it doesn't much matter.

What one wants, I suppose, is to predetermine the action, so as to make it entail, not a chance-belief, but the true one.

*Out of the question, you say; if a thing isn't wrong, we may do it.*

Ah! but this wrong, you see--*but I do not know that it matters.* \((V. 20-25)\)

But it does matter to Claude, who spends so much time and energy pondering the problems. He points out the tautological fallacy of action furnishing belief if belief guarantees the rightness of action. The response of Claude's imagined/absent polemical opponent is cut off, throwing the idea back onto the reader for completion. The "wrong," or the thing that isn't wrong, is determined "wrong" only in relation to the belief or system, and is thus subject to the same tautological fallacy---the "true belief" may turn out to be a "chance one"; we are simply closed off from any sure knowledge. The "concept" becomes a problem. Rather than giving us the Victorian Ideology which allows us to rest in the certainty of the "Everlasting Yea," Clough breaks down the very
categories that are supposed to provide, or allow us to achieve, synthesis: “but will that belief be the true one?” (italics mine). His language keeps taking him to the point where he realizes that he cannot state the Truth, and he evades the knowledge by minimizing its importance. We watch Claude struggle with the ideal and deconstruct his own “certainty.”

What with trusting myself and seeking support from within me,
Almost I could believe I had gained a religious assurance,
Found in my own poor soul a great moral basis to rest on.
Ah, but indeed I see, I feel it factitious entirely;
I refuse, reject, and put it utterly from me; (V. 95-99)

John Goode, noting that “The central preoccupation of Amours de Voyage is continuity” (Goode, 277), discusses the various languages of the poem. He points out that, although Claude “is to celebrate the available languages of coherence,” the verse of the poem “always works to the same end which is the self-exposure of language” (Goode, 292-94). In discussing one passage from the poem (III. 79-97), Goode points to Claude’s subjectivity and inability to articulate the language of coherence:

In the anarchy of the sea, there is no defined and stable distinction between inner and outer. ‘Cormorants, ducks, and gulls, fill ye my imagination’ takes us into a nightmare world of invading flux. The important point, however, is that this is arrived at through a dramatic interplay of traditional metaphoric vehicles of coherence. Language itself is treacherous. (Goode, 295-296)

In arguing for the greatness of the poem, Goode says that “Formally, it is not merely experimental, it is an experiment. Its expansiveness gives
us the opportunity to watch available languages, metaphors and intonations work themselves out and mutate into something else" (Goode, 294). But this mutation is never final or complete. By implication Claude will continue throughout his "life" to try out different languages, combining them, altering them, trying to create new ones, always trying to account for the facts of existence, but always caught up in language and inherited languages. The univocal utterance that Claude desires is always impinged upon by and mingled with the heteroglossia of the outside. Claude's languages of coherence are defined by, and dissolve and mingle with, the languages of desire, doubt, and chaos.

Trying out the language of Romantic organicism, Claude asserts his unity with Nature:

All that is Nature's is I, and I all things that are Nature's.
Yes, as I walk, I behold, in a luminous, large intuition,
That I can be and become anything that I meet with or look at:
I am the ox in the dray, the ass with the garden-stuff panniers;

These little "snapshots" give way to a "motion picture," the copulative verbs to active verbs, identity to difference:

I am the dog in the doorway, the kitten that plays in the window,
On sunny slab of the ruin the furtive and fugitive lizard,
Swallow above me that twitters, and fly that is buzzing about me;

Claude has gotten caught up in his own creation (and the language of his own creation). The "rhetoric" of "fact" modulates into the poetry of "fancy," his Wordsworthian seriousness almost becoming comic in the
line of the alliterative lizard, the absence of any verb mimicking the lizard's motionlessness. The swallow and fly are distinctly separate from Claude, and the present progressive ("is buzzing") returns him fully to his own discrete consciousness and identity:

Yea, and detect, as I go, by a faint but a faithful assurance,
E'en from the stones of the street, as from rocks or trees of the forest,
Something of kindred, a common, though latent vitality, greet me,

(III. 167–169)

In these passages, Claude has moved from an assertion of identity with Nature to a conditional assertion ("can be") within which he tries out his various identifications. His vision becomes increasingly narrower and smaller: from ox to ass to dog to kitten to lizard to swallow to fly. He steadily moves down the "Great Chain of Being." Indeed, from creatures of sense and notion, he then moves down to mineral and vegetable. What was expansive and expanding in "Natura Naturans" is diminishing in Amours. The "serpent" has been admitted into Claude's garden. The unity of/with Nature is also the chaos of flux, the "permanence" of Nature's process reminding him of the impermanence of culture and humanity: the lizard lounges on the "sunny slab of the ruin."

To avoid dealing with the fragmentation of culture and the "disease of language" (Goode, 296), Claude contemplates giving up language altogether. Like the speaker in "Natura Naturans," Claude seems to delight in both the interconnection with Nature and in his language, but Claude's delight quickly gives way to melancholy. Whereas the speaker of the earlier poem delighted in an
unself-conscious consciousness of his interconnection with Nature, Claude becomes increasingly self-conscious and desires the "death" of consciousness. Claude,

And, to escape from our strivings, mistakings, misgrowths, and perversions,

Fain could demand to return to that perfect and primitive silence,

Fain be enfolded and fixed, as of old, in their rigid embraces. (III. 170-172)

Claude's "silence" is not Clough's "silence" of "Paper on Religion." Clough's "silence" is a linguistic construct that knows itself as a linguistic construct. Claude's "silence" is an escape from language, an attempt at forgetting constructs. Clough confronts; Claude would avoid. And an escape from language means an escape from an interchange between self and world. Because the self cannot be guaranteed without the existence of others or world, this silence will be the death of the self. It is interesting to compare Claude who doesn't take any further action with Arnold's Empedocles who leaps into the crater on Etna to achieve this silence.

Claude sees reality in terms of binary oppositions. Claude mistakenly "places himself within the binary formulae of . . . social and intellectual values: true/false, natural/artificial, utilitarian/useless" (Slinn, 110-111). In terms of oppositions, Goode argues that order gives way to chaos. Making a case for the ironic openness of the poem, he says that,

In Clough there is no grasping of surviving fragments of tradition in a culturally sterile world. The tradition itself is what overwhelms and betrays: culture is a lie, anarchy the only truth. . . . Clough creates a form which gives 'the
strange disease of modern life’ a local habitation and a name. The disease is a disease of language, the available rhetorics are shipwrecked on the ocean of protracted exposure. Many images are called, but in the end there are few left to be chosen. (Goode, 296)

Slinn counters Goode’s contention that “merely total empiricism’’ “replaces” unreliable subjectivism, and argues that the “opposites themselves partake of flux and dynamic process.” He shows “that the ‘chaos of the multiform’ is itself a construct and that the text’s thematic empiricism cannot be detached from an equal and inseparable subjectivism” (Slinn, 91–92). Slinn is right that the “chaos of the multiform” is a construct, that the poem does not argue that “anarchy (is) the only truth.” But whereas Slinn focuses on the opposition of “fact” and “factitious”---that “There is no way of separating fact from the factitious when within the discourse of self the two are intertwined” (Slinn, 112)---I wish to focus on the opposition of “affinity” and “juxtaposition.”

Juxtaposition itself is the “chaos of the multiform.” It is the flux, anarchy, chance---the lack of continuity, unity, ordered totality---that Claude fights so hard against and that he apparently submits to in the end. Affinity means, on the one hand, sympathy, communication, connection and interconnection, and on the other, unity, control, and the total knowable and predictable connection of all things. At their extremes, juxtaposition is the absolute separateness of all things, affinity the absolute interconnection of all things---complete division, complete unity. Claude, in his binary method of thinking, must have either one or the other, but the text insists on both one and the other. The poem refuses to offer either as complete in itself, and refuses to condemn either as wrong in itself. The terms are not brought together
into a dialectical synthesis but rather play off against one another in a perpetual deferral of totality and telos. As Slinn argues,

In *Amours de Voyage* poetry offers no pretensions about the ideal so beloved by Matthew Arnold of uniting self and world; the relationship between the historical and the imaginative or between the literal and the figurative is demystified, not transcendentally sublime. It is rendered dialectical in the sense of being immersed in the fluidity of textual process where meaning and oppositions shift and transform, but a dialectic which founders on the impasse of insoluble division that characterizes subjectivity.

(Slinn, 117)

Thus, “There is no end, no telos to bestow order and meaningfulness, only collapsing opposites” (Slinn, 103).

Claude himself directly contrasts or juxtaposes the problems of juxtaposition and affinity:

JUXTAPOSITION is great —but, you tell me, affinity greater.

Ah, my friend, there are many affinities, greater and lesser,

Stronger and weaker; and each, by the favour of juxtaposition,

Potent, efficient, in force,—for a time; but none, let me tell you,

Save by the law of the land and the ruinous force of the will, ah,

None, I fear me, at last quite sure to be final and perfect.

(III. 151-156)

His is a reluctant resignation to the greater power of juxtaposition
accompanied by a correspondent melancholy longing for a "final and
perfect" unity. Indeed, we might say that Claude, by sticking to his
dualistic thinking, both accepts and denies juxtaposition. Juxtaposition
is, for Claude, the outside world. He reluctantly accepts that world as
flux, accepts the loss of unity and continuity and the Absolute out there.
However, knowledge allows him the limited autonomy of imposing
order on the world. In denying affinity, he also denies the connections
and human ties that threaten his control and supposed autonomy.
Juxtaposition, as it denies affinity, protects his autonomy by protecting
him from acting and so connecting with the outside world. In the
penultimate letter, knowledge itself becomes idealized:

Ere our death-day.

Faith, I think, does pass, and Love; but Knowledge
abideth.

Let us seek Knowledge; --the rest must come and go as it
happens.

Knowledge is hard to seek, and harder yet to adhere to.

Knowledge is painful often: and yet when we know, we
are happy.

Seek it, and leave mere Faith and Love to come with the
chances.

As for Hope,---to-morrow I hope to be starting for Naples.

(V.197-203)

By retreating into "Knowledge," Claude seeks a temporal stability that
nature and humanity (the outside world of flux) could not provide. But
Claude’s knowledge excludes as much as it includes. In seeking the
stability of empiricism, he denies the instable human, the part of the
changing world that connects with and so changes him. In separating
"Faith" and "Love" from "Knowledge," he denies Affinity. Like
“Hope,” they too are subject to “chance” or Juxtaposition.

Claude wants a fixed point of view. Micklus makes the interesting point that

. . . rather than accept life’s ambiguities as they stand, Claude forever tries to wrestle his perceptions into one narrow perspective. Even in his last letter we find him wondering “which is worst, the priest or the soldier?” (V. x). Claude cannot accept the possibility that both are equally bad—-or good. To do so, he supposes, is to invite chaos. . . . Paradoxically, in seeking absolute truths Claude invites chaos anyway by failing to realize that in the dynamic world of Amours there are no absolute.”(11)

And we can say that it is his desire for the absolute that causes him so much of his agony. For Claude, it seems, to be conscious is to desire. As he remarks:

. . . could we eliminate only

This vile hungering impulse, this demon within us of craving,

Life were beatitude, living a perfect divine satisfaction.

(III . 179-181)

In his dualistic thinking, Claude, giving up his quest for absolute affinity, tries to establish an absolute juxtaposition. But neither construct will do. As Micklus says, “By providing us a continual train of juxtapositions, Clough constantly forces us to recognize life’s complexity and to avoid settling upon a limited point of view” (Micklus, 409). One might also say that, by providing us with a continual train of affinities we are encouraged to see the limitations of Claude’s viewpoint. In fearing to commit himself to another person, he refuses to act and refuses to accept the “fact” of the lesser affinities,
what we might call a Knowledge of Love. Because he cannot have the autonomy of the Absolute Affinity, he rejects the contamination of the human affinities and seeks his autonomy in the absolute of a dehumanized epistemological relativism.

To deny the possibility of knowing the (positive) Absolute or of creating a totalizing principle or system does not mean to fall into the (negative) absolute of chaos of relativism. Because one rejects a system or static idea does not mean that one must be “prevailed over by the world’s multitudinousness.”(12) Claude’s fear is Arnold’s fear. As Slinn remarks, “a condition of (Claude’s) very existence as psychological subject” is his “desire or need to ground his existence in some defining principle which will make sense of the transitions and passing conceptions of life’s voyage. So that while he accepts his participation in process, he also clings to his belief in the potential authority of knowledge . . . .”(Slinn, 113). Claude, whose “name through its Latin associations---clausa (a closing), claudere (to close)---directly invokes the attempt to achieve closure” (Slinn, 114), needs an idea of the world that will order existence. Clough, however, refuses to give it to him. Neither does he give it to the reader. The reader sees a drama of the ongoing desire for belief, and of a dream of the ideal, which remains problematic to the last: Claude’s “belief” in knowledge is far from satisfactory for him and for us, not only because he has “settled” for a lesser or diminished ideal, but also because that ideal is tainted by his own fear of commitment to acting in the world. The only “positive” solution the poem gives---the lesser affinity of human love---is refused by Claude, for it gives no grounding or certainty. He remains essentially the same as he was at the beginning of the poem, a tourist, a sightseer on the outskirts of society and human relationships. Unmarried, Claude continues on to Egypt, a little worse
for his travels but, one fears, none the wiser.

III

Unlike Arnold who sought to "re-construct" "the world's multitudinousness," Clough insisted on the danger of adopting a system, distrusted beginning with "an Idea of the world." (LC, 63, 97)

*Action will furnish belief*, ... but will that belief be the true one?

Indeed, it is that problem of never knowing the right idea, the impossibility of ever arriving at any idea that is the right one, that is the subject of much of Clough's work as well as *Amours*.

Might it not divinely condescend to all infirmities; be in all points tempted as we are; exclude nothing, least of all guilt and distress, from its wide fraternization; not content itself merely with talking of what may be better elsewhere, but seek also to deal with what is here?

("Recent English Poetry," *SP*, 145)

Clough aims at painting the mental chaos as he sees it and not as he wishes to see it. In presenting "all infirmities," he is providing us with a mirror of the mind in conflict with itself and the society with which it interacts.

To tell the purport of our pain,
And what our silly joys contain,---
In lasting lineaments portray
The substance of the shadowy day,---
Our real and inner deeds rehearse,
And make our meaning clear in verse,---
Come, Poet, Come! 

("Come, Poet, Come", 353)

In doing so, he is refusing to bring any kind of conclusion or
ending to *Amours*, choosing instead to “portray” “man and his passion” in the ceaseless flux of the contemporary: “our pain,” “our silly joys.”

**NOTES**

This is a revised English version of what I discussed in “Ironic Openness in Clough’s *Amours de Voyage*,” Kyorin University Review of the Faculty of Foreign Languages 8 (1996), 63–74 (In Japanese).


(3) All quotations from Clough’s poems are taken from *The Poems of Arthur Hugh Clough*, ed. by Frederick J. Mulhauser (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).


(6) Dorothy Mermin discusses Claude as a Romantic or would-be Romantic who cannot achieve the ideal despite his desire to. She observes that “The distinctive note of Clough’s poems, as of Claude’s letters, is their refusal of romantic transcendence and of the transformations by which the imagination possesses the world. In his poems Clough tries to leave the world as he found it, with only clarity added.” See Dorothy Mermin, *The Audience in the Poem: Five Victorian Poets* (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1983), p.122. John Goode says that for him the poem is “the major masterpiece of high Victorian poetry” and argues that “The central pre-occupation of *Amours de Voyage* is a search for continuity. This grows from a need to establish a viable relationship between self and world, but, more importantly, it demands a resolution of the conflict between the two empirically verifiable attributes of self, eyes and shadow—the self as perceiver and subject . . . and the self as phenomenon and object of others’ perception . . . .” See John Goode, “*Amours de Voyage*: the Aqueous Poem,” *The Major Victorian
Poets: Reconsiderations, ed. by Isobel Armstrong (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1969), pp. 276-277. Hereafter cited as Goode. The continuity is not achieved by Claude. Goode’s point is that Clough is taking as his topic the search for continuity and that search “only” yields irony, qualifications, and juxtaposition.


(9) In “Natura Naturans,” we see the opposite movement: “What moss, and tree, and livelier thing, / What Earth, Sun, Star . . .” (I, 70-71). Clough seems to have deliberately inverted his catalogue in Amours to reflect the doubting Claude. It is worth noting that the speaker in “Natura Naturans” is not so ordered in his initial reporting, but is carried away by his associations, enraptured by the moment. He remains joyous; Claude does not.

