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Abstract	The immigrant population in present-day Japan is increasing rapidly. Though the largest immigrant group is Chinese, only a few studies have focused on the identity of second-generation Chinese individuals, including Chinese/Japanese "hāfu" who have one Chinese and one Japanese parent, or the 1.5-generation who have Chinese parents but moved to Japan before turning 18. For second-generation immigrants, segmented assimilation theory underscores the positive effects on self-esteem of fluent bilingualism, homeland visits, and co-ethnic social capital. However, the political relationship between Japan and China is often antagonistic. Even if second-generation Chinese visit China or communicate with other immigrants in Japan to learn the Chinese language, a stigma might still be attached to their ethnic roots. In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with second-generation Chinese individuals in Japan. It was found that while some respondents were fluently bilingual, they were often stigmatized for their hybrid identity in both Japan and China. The individual cases considered herein show the positive effects of attaining bilingual fluency, and illustrate the complexity of social categories, discourses of "bloodline," and the possibilities of migration.
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“The Case Study of Second-Generation Immigrant’s Identity in Japan: The Cases of Fluent Bilinguals with Chinese Roots”

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The immigrant population in present-day Japan is increasing rapidly. Though the largest immigrant group is Chinese, only a few studies have focused on the identity of second-generation Chinese individuals, including Chinese/Japanese “*hāfu*” who have one Chinese and one Japanese parent, or the 1.5-generation who have Chinese parents but moved to Japan before turning 18. For second-generation immigrants, segmented assimilation theory underscores the positive effects on self-esteem of fluent bilingualism, homeland visits, and co-ethnic social capital. However, the political relationship between Japan and China is often antagonistic. Even if second-generation Chinese visit China or communicate with other immigrants in Japan to learn the Chinese language, a stigma might still be attached to their ethnic roots. In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with second-generation Chinese individuals in Japan. It was found that while some respondents were fluently bilingual, they were often stigmatized for their hybrid identity in both Japan and China. The individual cases considered herein show the positive effects of attaining bilingual fluency, and illustrate the complexity of social categories, discourses of “bloodline,” and the possibilities of migration.

Key words : stigma, segmented assimilation theory, Chinese/Japanese *hāfu*,
1.5-generation, protean identity

キーワード : ステイグマ, 分節同化理論, 日中ハーフ, 1.5世, 変幻自在なアイデン
ティティ

Introduction

In Japan, since economic growth began in the 1980s, the population of foreigners is increasing rapidly. In 2019, the number of foreigners rose to 2.26 million¹⁾, with the Chinese forming the largest numbers of immigrants since 2008²⁾. According to the statistic of the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, people who have foreign backgrounds, such as “*hāfu*” (a person who has a Japanese parent and a non-Japanese parent—similar to the concept of “multiracial”) formed approximately 2.6%

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of the Japanese population in 2015, and the number is expected to increase to approximately 12% by 2065. This means that if Japan continues to accept immigrants at the same pace, it will become as ethnically diverse as other host countries of immigrants, such as Italy (Korekawa, 2018). Therefore, it is necessary to consider immigrant families as members of Japanese society, not just temporary visitors. Unfortunately, immigrants who come from other Asian countries have often been discriminated against by natives. Consequently, some immigrant children regard their ethnic roots as a social stigma and try to hide it (Takahata, 2000; Zhao, 2010).

Compared to visible minorities, such as non-white immigrants in the US, it may appear that Asian immigrants suffer fewer problems. This is because, while the immigrants in the US often suffer from street gang violence³⁾, Asian immigrants in Japan can behave like the majority on the street, because most of them have a similar appearance as the Japanese. In other words, they can practice “passing” (the act of hiding to avoid stigma due to their invisibility). If one’s roots are already known by someone else, they can practice “covering” (the act of making one’s stigma inconspicuous) (Osanami-Törngren, 2017). Nevertheless, according to Erving Goffman, who came up with these concepts, even if the person succeeds in passing or covering, they feel highly anxious, as the secret can be discovered at any moment, and hiding their actual roots means betraying one of their own social categories. Hence, they must be sensitive in many situations, even in the typical situations where the majority never feel any problem (Goffman, 1963). To prevent this, we should seek an environment where second-generation immigrants can be incorporated into the host society without stigmatizing their ethnic roots.

According to Goffman, the person who has a stigmatized character or attribute can avoid anxiety by “the own,” the others who experience the same types of stigma (Goffman, 1963). This means that a second-generation immigrant can “de-stigmatize” their ethnic roots when they associate with fellow ethnics (hereinafter, co-ethnics). Thus, it can be said that second-generation immigrants can gain social capital to de-stigmatize their ethnic roots and to be mentally healthy, as they network with their peers. However, only a few studies have focused on the identity of second-generation Chinese in Japan, even though they are the biggest group of immigrants and are often discriminated against.

It is crucial to find out how second-generation Chinese choose their social category as “hāfu” or “Chinese” and reveal it to others as their identity. As Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut show in the segmented assimilation theory (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), immigrants often create communities based on social identities, such as the ethnic community (Miura, 2015), and de-stigmatize their roots by communication with their peers. Furthermore, it is also beneficial for de-stigmatization for the first-generation immigrants to make a round trip between the home country and the host country with their children (hereinafter, a homeland trip), because while their ethnic/racial roots become social stigma in host country, in contrast, their roots never become “characteristics” anymore in parent’s homeland (Kibria, 2002). In other words, children can feel that they have become “the majority” in the parent’s home country. To understand the process of selecting and showing identity by the second-generation Chinese, it is also necessary to find out what kind of “others” can provide social capital for them. This is not only useful in setting the platform for immigrant children in Japan, but also in analyzing

the difficulties of other invisible ethnic minorities, such as some Hispanics, who are considered as the majority, namely the Caucasian, in the US.

The primary purpose of this article is to reveal the identity of the second-generation Chinese using the framework of stigma and reconsider the effects of fluent bilingualism and social capital on de-stigmatization stated in the segmented assimilation theory. In other words, it aims to show how the second-generation Chinese recognize the images of a social category such as “hāfu” or “Chinese” and which category they choose to reveal to the majority strategically when they are living in unfavorable social contexts in the host society.

Literature Review

1. Identity studies of Chinese newcomers in Japan

As I mentioned earlier, compared with Chinese “old-comers,” who moved to Japan before World War 2 (hereinafter, the WW2), newcomers' ethnic identity is not being researched adequately.

Since Japan re-constructed its diplomatic relations with China in 1972, newcomers have spread to a broader area, while old-comers tended to live in a particular area (Zhong, 2016). Therefore, many of the Chinese newcomers' children go to public schools as do the majority children and face prejudice (Zhao, 2010), while old-comers' children go to Chinese schools in China town (Zhong, 2016). ZHAO Weiguo's study describes the process of adaptation of the second-generation Chinese in high school. For immigrant children, it is not easy to graduate from high school, because of insufficient support from Japanese society. However, even if the second-generation Chinese failed to graduate because of discrimination, many of them chose to stay in Japan and adjust or assimilate their identities in various ways (Zhao, 2010). This study describes the process in which the second-generation Chinese respond to difficulties and adjust their identity, but this is not enough to describe what kind of social capital they have.

On the other hand, Zhao's study is also useful to reconsider the effects of ethnic communities. Portes and Rumbaut underscored those effects without focusing on the immigrant child's real feelings about other children in the ethnic community as peers (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). It is true that some immigrant children have a fellow feeling with other co-ethnics (Kibria, 2002; Miura, 2015). However, at least in Japan, the second-generation Chinese do not always consider all other second-generation Chinese as their peers. Even among the 1.5-generation (the immigrants who have no majority parent and moved to the host society before turning 18) (Rumbaut, 2002)⁴, many often show a different attitude toward other 1.5-generation youths who have Chinese parents (hereinafter, CC 1.5G) coming from different provinces and speaking different dialects (Zhao, 2010). In addition, it is more complex for Chinese/Japanese hāfu (hereinafter, CJ hāfu), because the concept “hāfu” is ambiguous.

According to hāfu studies, in general, there is a tendency that the images of hāfu are limited to the person who has a different appearance from the majority. In media, the European/Japanese hāfu who are considered as the Caucasian are treated more positively than East Asian/Japanese hāfu because of

their appearance. Therefore, East Asian/Japanese hāfu are often denied their identity when they tell others that they consider themselves as hāfu (Shimoji, 2018). A few CJ hāfu started to express their identity by using the category “CJ hāfu” on YouTube, but it is still hard for them to find role-model or peers (Keane, 2019). In short, if a CJ hāfu wants to find peers, there will be only a few members in the community of hāfu who have Chinese roots. Thus, the first research question in this study was: Who can be peers to provide the social capital to de-stigmatize the ethnic roots of the second-generation Chinese?

2. The route to becoming fluent bilingual

Whether CJ hāfu consider themselves as hāfu or not also depends on the language. A study by LI Yuanxiang, one of the few articles that have treated the identity of CJ hāfu as the main theme, showed that the respondents considered themselves Japanese, not “CJ hāfu,” because they could only speak Japanese. Li claims that Japanese society is also responsible for this result. One of the reasons is the imperfection of bilingual education systems, and another is the tendency not to encourage children to learn foreign languages other than English. Li suggests that if Japanese society encourages children to learn Mandarin, they will regard their identity as CJ hāfu in a positive light (Li, 2017). In that case, if we improve the bilingual education system, will the second-generation Chinese be able to de-stigmatize their ethnic roots?

In migrant studies, the positive effects of fluent bilingualism have also appealed. According to the segmented assimilation theory, fluent bilingualism improves self-esteem and reduces depression in second-generation immigrants. If an immigrant child never inherits their parent’s mother language, they will lose the way to communicate well with parents that may affect their academic achievement. Furthermore, it reduces self-esteem and increases depression. When immigrant children fail to get academic achievement and self-esteem, they often drop out of school and become gang members. This is called “downward assimilation.” In contrast, if the child receives sufficient support from the co-ethnic community in the host country or is able to retain their parent’s mother language through homeland trips, the child can adapt to the host society, succeed academically, and prevent the loss of self-esteem and ethnic roots. The theory pointed out the role of ethnic community mainly because not every immigrant parent can let their children go to long-term or frequent homeland trip. However, the authors also showed homeland trips as helpful to immigrant parents (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).

Certainly, in Japan, some cases also showed the positive dimensions of homeland trip, especially the cases of Filipino/Japanese hāfu. Some Filipino/Japanese hāfu children, who have the same appearance as the Japanese majorities, could keep their parent’s mother language by making a homeland trip during vacations (Miura, 2015). Even in the case of practicing passing, a homeland trip made a Filipino/Japanese hāfu realize the goodness of the Philippines, and she stopped passing (Takahata, 2000).

However, Nazli Kibria’s research on Chinese and Korean cases in the US pointed out that these transnational engagements not only make benefits, but also show complexity. Kibria’s research also showed some positive points of homeland trip. Even when they live in the US, some second-generation

immigrants keep their Chineseness or Koreanness, because those respondents and their parents internalize the discourse of "blood." A second-generation Chinese said that even though they have grown up without much connection to the Chinese culture, "there's still something deep inside" the person that's Chinese, or, it is in the person's "blood." These second-generation Asians often feel deep connection to their homeland during homeland trips, such as foreign study programs from the US. Especially for the respondents who do not belong to the ethnic community, this trip provided the chance to make co-ethnic friends and escape from the positionality as a racial minority in their parent's homeland, because in that country, everyone belongs to the same race as them. Furthermore, because of the economic potential of China and Korea, improving their heritage language provides them an instrument advantage. However, Kibria also shows that even in (parent's) homeland, the second-generation immigrants are often marginalized. Especially in the Koreans' case, they are expected to speak the Korean language fluently and practice to behave in Korean society appropriately. Explaining things is difficult for the second-generation immigrants because they grew up in the US; as a result, the majorities often get shocked and look down upon them (Kibria, 2002: 303).

In addition, when compared to another country like the Philippines, the relationship between China and Japan cannot be described as very positive. According to a public opinion poll, many people in Japan and China see each other as "relatively unfavorable" or "unfavorable," because of the domination problems around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the range of atonement for WW2⁵). In fact, some CJ hāfu told Li that they also faced discrimination in China during a homeland trip (Li, 2018). As I mentioned earlier, the informants of Li's study are not bilingual, but there is another case of Osanami-Törngren's study in which a fluent bilingual CJ hāfu practiced passing as both Japanese and Chinese (Osanami-Törngren, 2017). Osanami-Törngren did not mention why she practiced such passing, but it is important to focus on the process of becoming fluently bilingual and consider the effects of fluent bilingualism on de-stigmatizing the ethnic roots of the CJ hāfu.

Additionally, the 1.5G are also often stigmatized because of their roots and are simultaneously able to feel Japaneseness because of their fluency in the Japanese language. According to the Filipino 1.5G's cases, even if they can keep their fluency in their parent's mother language in the ethnic community, their fluency in Japanese becomes dominant over the language of the Philippines because most of the other children who communicate with them in public school are Japanese. For this reason, their "legitimate ethnicity" as Filipino becomes weak, and they often show a sense of belonging to Japan (Miura, 2015). Compared with the Filipinos, CC 1.5G may consider themselves more as Japanese. It is relatively easier for them to learn Japanese, because both Japanese and Chinese use Chinese characters, although there are some differences in the form of those characters. Therefore, even though 1.5G are not of Japanese origin, it is possible that CC 1.5G consider themselves as both Chinese and Japanese.

Among the second-generation immigrants, we should focus on the informants who have experience of migrating or going for a homeland trip before they graduated high school. Most of Kibria's respondents practiced homeland trip after they graduated high school (Kibria, 2002). Those respondents, who virtually "adult," are able to decide their acts on their own. However, migration (Zhao, 2010; Miura,

2015) and long-term homeland trip (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001) are often decided by first-generation immigrants when second-generation immigrants are still “child,” without their determination. To prevent downward assimilation, Portes and Rumbaut appeal that those parents must often make a long-term homeland trip, even if it is against children’s determination. In fact, there is a case that a Dominican 1.5G who protested a long-term homeland trip at first made academic success after the trip; the parents expected that he would be able to enter college (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001).

However, if children migrate or go for homeland trips before graduating from high school, they must confront the difference between the norms that they learned in the host country and the norms of parent’s homeland that their new schoolmates and teachers have internalized. In other words, they must “survive” in the classroom. Zhao’s study shows the malady of forced migration. Even after coming to Japan, a respondent had protested to his parents and teachers, such as by missing exams. Finally, he dropped out of high school. It lowered his self-esteem (Zhao, 2010). Some homeland trips are short-term, such as family trips during vacation (Miura, 2015), but if first-generation immigrants want to make their children fluently bilingual, children will “spend a year or two there” (Kibria, 2002: 309; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). Thus, like migration, long-term homeland trip also makes second-generation immigrants must survive in the schools of parent’s homeland.

Especially in Japan and China, there is no clear agreement about the range of atonement for the WW2 and the domination problem between both governments. Thus, I expect that some second-generation Chinese have to confront the difference of political positionality when they undergo migration or long-term homeland trips during school age. Therefore, when the second-generation immigrants become fluently bilingual by migration or long-term homeland trip before graduating from high school, we have to examine why they can be fluently bilingual; it may be because of their favorable ethnic roots by the ethnic community, or homeland trip, as segmented assimilation theory said, or because they must survive the conflict of cultural values between the host country and parent’s homeland. Thus, the second research question was: How can the fluently bilingual second-generation Chinese maintain their language ability?

Following the study of MIURA Akiko, who analyzed the identities of both the Filipino/Japanese *hāfu* and the Filipino 1.5G while focusing on the influence of each social category, I conducted interviews with the second-generation Chinese, including both the CJ *hāfu* and CC 1.5G.

Framework

In immigrant studies, Stuart Hall states that identity is not only “what we really are,” but also “what we have become” (Hall, 1990: 225). Based on this idea, some researchers claim that we should focus on the “route,” instead of adhering to the “roots” in analyzing the identity of second-generation immigrants (Shibuya, 2013; Miura, 2015). This means that we should focus on the life course of each person.

Based on these ideas, I analyzed the identity of the second-generation Chinese using the framework of stigma from Goffman (Goffman, 1963), and ASHINO Eri, who analyzed the concept of “self” in Goffman’s interaction theories (Ashino, 2018).




Figure 1. Goffman's Stigmatization Model in the example of Chinese/Japanese hāfu in Japan

In his work, *Stigma*, Goffman divided the concept of identity into four types. First, at the scene of an interaction between a majority⁶⁾ and minority, the majority bestows upon the minority the character or attribute which goes along with the "normative expectation." It is the expectation based on the "normal," ordinary values in society. This character is "a virtual social identity" (Goffman, 1963: 2). However, based on one's "personal identity", for example, the true identity based on the data on the ID card (Goffman, 1963: 55–8), the minority has the character and attribute that is categorized as not normal. This is "an actual social identity" (Goffman, 1963: 2). The decision on which part of an actual social identity to reveal is made through the "ego identity," "the subjective sense of his [/her] own situation and his [/her] own continuity and character that an individual comes to obtain as a result of his [/her] various social experiences" (Goffman, 1963: 105). Thus, as Ashino states, stigma, the negative divergence between two social identities, "is not solid, but [can] be changed by a situation of the self" (Ashino, 2018: 60).

Based on this interpretation, I came up with an illustration to summarize this theory (Figure 1). (1) A Japanese person (A), asks the other person (B), "After all, we get along more with the Japanese than with foreigners. Isn't it?". Here, A bestows upon B a virtual social identity as "a fellow citizen." (2) However, in reality, B is CJ hāfu. Then, the ego identity of B must decide which part of their personal identity to reveal to A, such as "I was born in Japan," "I have a Japanese parent," "I also have a Chinese parent," etc. (3) If B does not reveal their Chinese roots and just says "I agree," there is no gap between A's normative expectation and B's response. In other words, B has practiced "passing." (4) However, whether B reveals their Chinese roots or not, there is a negative divergence between the virtual social identity that they perceive and the actual social identity (the Chineseness) that B really has. This is known as stigmatization. Therefore, if B goes to China and receives a virtual social identity as a Chinese from the majority, their Japanese roots may also be stigmatized. Furthermore, if B can find peers who

have the same or similar positionality, namely, other CJ hāfu, they will be relieved from the tension caused by the stigmatization of either their Chinese or Japanese roots. At that time, B de-stigmatizes their roots with their social capital.

Ashino states that, similar to stigma, the concept of “self” in Goffman’s theory is also fluid. It accumulates the experience of selecting appropriate information to respond to the other’s normative expectations or choosing to reveal the truth. Thereafter, it reflects the experience or knowledge gained by this choice. During the interaction, the person decides how far they should go based on the expectation of others. Then, the person controls their own information, makes their own images, and shows them to others. Subsequently, the revealed images return to them through the interpretation and evaluation of the others. Finally, to reflect the revealed images, the identity of the person is re-formed. Ashino claims that the concept of self in Goffman’s theory of interaction becomes reflective through this repeated re-forming (Ashino, 2018).

Based on this framework, we can show the social identity of the second-generation Chinese to confirm when and how the stigmatization/de-stigmatization of ethnic roots happened during their life course and which social category (hāfu, Japanese, or Chinese) they reveal to others as their actual social identity. This means finding out how the second-generation Chinese reflect the result of stigmatization/de-stigmatization in their images of self. Because of this, the framework of stigma helps to analyze the identity of the second-generation Chinese while focusing on the “route” as a previous work (Shibuya, 2013) suggests. Additionally, when second-generation Chinese practices transnational engagement, like participating in the ethnic community or going for a homeland trip, this framework makes us understand the change of social norms for the respondents.

Therefore, I conducted semi-structured interviews to find out the events in the life course of the second-generation Chinese, to reveal both the process of stigmatization/de-stigmatization of their ethnic roots and the process of becoming fluently bilingual.

Methods

I interviewed 13 respondents, some of whom had a Chinese parent and a Japanese parent (CJ hāfu), and some of whom had Chinese parents and moved to Japan before turning 18 (CC 1.5G)⁷⁾. I had conducted fieldwork in communities of Tohoku and Kanto regions which have lots of Chinese immigrants, and also employed snowball sampling to search for interviewees on SNS from October 2017 to January 2018. The cases which I describe in this article are not of members of these communities; I found them by snowball sampling.

I interviewed each respondent for 60 to 90 minutes once or twice, at a cafe. The main interview questions were as follows.

1. Basic attributes: gender, age, school grade, etc.
2. In terms of the category “hāfu” (only for CJ hāfu): Do you like or dislike being regarded as “hāfu?” Do you know any other names for this category (mixed race, multiracial, *daburu*, etc.)?

3. Chinese roots: What are the advantages and disadvantages of your roots? Do you tell others about your Chinese roots?
4. Media: Which media do you use to get information about Japan/China?
5. Japaneseness and Chineseness: When you observe yourself, how much Japaneseness and Chineseness do you have in your mind?
6. Others: Do you use the Chinese language while working or in your daily life? What would you like to request of the host society?

Results

Among the interviewees, only a few second-generation Chinese had the fluent bilingual ability. Thus, the second-generation Chinese who could practice passing as both Japanese and Chinese were very few. Five respondents answered that they only used greeting words in Mandarin, two respondents spoke accented Japanese (therefore, I noticed that they had foreign roots), and three respondents sometimes used it at work or when they went to study abroad (not China or Taiwan) and had a chance to talk with Chinese students a little. Consequently, three respondents were fluently bilingual.

As I mentioned earlier, this study focuses on the transnational experience, while fluent bilingual informants were students and had to survive. One of these informants became fluently bilingual during a homeland trip, but he made this trip by himself, because it was a foreign study program at his university. However, other fluent bilingual informants had an experience that they got as a migrant or from a homeland trip made without their determination. These two informants practiced passing or covering, though they succeeded in academic achievement because they had experiences that felt unfavorable in the context of both Japanese and Chinese society. Because of the limitations of this paper, I introduce these two noteworthy cases. Table 1 shows the demographic information of the respondents.

Case 1. SAITO Toshinobu—CJ hāfu.

Until he moved to Japan when he turned 15, he used the Chinese family name ZHANG (張), which has one Chinese character. The reason was that his mother worried that if he used his Japanese family name, SAITO (斉藤), which has two Chinese characters, he would be bullied⁸⁾. Furthermore, he had been using the Internet since he was seven years old and knew that Japanese and Chinese often exchanged insults online. For these reasons, Toshinobu was aware that his Japanese roots, such as his

Table 1. Demographic information of respondents

Name (fictitious name)	Gender	Age	Area	Positionality	Education
SAITO Toshinobu	Male	20	Urban	CJ hāfu	University student
HOSHINO Kana	Female	26	Urban	CC 1.5G	University graduate
Based on the thesis that I wrote in my maiden name (Yoshikawa, 2019)					

Japanese name and cultural patterns, were stigmatized in China.

After moving to Japan, he was disturbed by the TV coverage of China, because it focused only on the negative aspects, and the positive aspects were often not reported. In addition, at a restaurant, he heard bigoted remarks directed against Chinese people.

Toshinobu: I heard two waitrons talking. At first, one of them said, "Oh, is he Japanese? [referring to Toshinobu]." ...And the other answered, "Maybe he is." Then they said, "Yesterday, Chinese came here, and..." I heard all their badmouthing [of Chinese people]. ...Yes, it was no problem, as I was considered Japanese, but... well, how to explain... I noticed [at that time] that some people think like that.

Based on these facts, to the question of what he would ask of the Japanese society, he answered, "I would like to eliminate discrimination." At first, Toshinobu could not speak Japanese well. It was hard for him to make friends. For this reason, he watched show-business news regularly to learn Japanese words deeply understand the topics that interested Japanese youths the most and communicate with his classmates. Thanks to these efforts, during the interview, he was able to speak Japanese fluently and without a Chinese accent. Additionally, he used a Japanese-sounding name at that time; therefore, I did not notice that he was CJ hāfu before he told me. Toshinobu said that the reason is that he did this as he was careful to make an effort to fit in with the majority.

Toshinobu: In the view of Chinese people, maybe I am really Japanese-like, and in the view of Japanese people, I might be told, "You are so Chinese!" ... When I meet a Japanese person, I try to hide my Chinese identity if possible. When I meet a Chinese person, I also try to hide my Japanese identity... if possible. ...All hāfu people behave like I do, don't they? ...

Toshinobu made a distinction between European/Japanese hāfu and himself, saying "Maybe European hāfu get some advantage from their roots, such as a cool or beautiful appearance, but (East) Asian hāfu...only a few advantages." While he showed his identities as both a Chinese and Japanese, he also mentioned the commonality of "all hāfu people" to me.

On historical topics such as the Tiananmen Square protest, the incident that the Japanese often point out as the token of regulation for freedom of speech by the Chinese government, Toshinobu said he was neutral. He said, "I can't badmouth the Chinese when I face a Japanese person." But apart from such specific topics, he was consciously switching his identity. The reason he behaved this way was that he had been able to maintain personal relationships and communication skills not only with the Japanese but also with the Chinese. He got a part-time job and used Mandarin frequently. Furthermore, while he made efforts to adapt to the Japanese society, he also participated in volunteer activities in which he related his own experiences to that of the Chinese students who, like him, had moved to Japan. For many of them, he became a role model of academic achievement. Nevertheless, he never

talked about the trouble related to ethnic identity with those students, because at the part-time job, he communicated with the Chinese customer by telephone over a short time. During his volunteer time, the students only talked about some fun things with him, such as show-business. However, while many second-generation immigrants forget their mother language when they stay in the host country (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), Toshinobu was able to retain it.

Case2. HOSHINO Kana—CC 1.5G.

Kana's parents were both Chinese, and she was born in China. However, she moved to Japan before she started elementary school; her first language was Japanese. Before she acquired Japanese nationality and got married, her name was LAN Ka (蘭珂). Perhaps, her Chinese roots were clear from her name, but she said that those in her class "treated me the same as other classmates." At least at that time, her Chinese background was not stigmatized. Therefore, she considered herself as the same as her Japanese friends.

For junior high school, she moved to China because of her parents' work and had to confront the language barrier. She could understand what her classmates were saying because her mother spoke Mandarin with her during their time in Japan, but she could not answer well in Mandarin. She said, "I really wanted to be friends with my classmates, but I couldn't tell them so." Even though she could not speak Chinese well, neither the school nor other public institutions offered her any support to learn Chinese, because she was already slated to return to Japan in two years; so she had to make independent efforts.

At first, her schoolmates were so curious about her that students from other classes came to her class to simply stare at her, because it was rare for any student to have lived in Japan. When she became fluent in Mandarin, she said that most of her classmates "became nice to me and paid no attention to my identity or my background as someone who had lived in Japan," but not everyone reacted that way.

Kana: Some friends were nice to me, but of course, some never talked to me. Someone put newspaper or magazine articles on my desk every time something happened between Japan and China. ...They said to me, "Something happened [did you know?]," and put it [on my desk]. I never paid attention because I had other problems to deal with. ... Sometimes, a few classmates were hard on me like that, and they said "Oh, you are Japanese," but I didn't worry about it that much, maybe because I thought, "My blood is Chinese, just as theirs is; I am no different from anybody else. Why do they say such things?"

Researcher: Uh... You said you had thought about identity a lot [before], how about at that time?

Kana: It was so complex. ... I thought, "I'm not the same as my classmates, I can go back to Japan someday. Sorry!" (*a bit ironically*) ... Uh... Yes, I thought, I'm not the same as them... on the other hand, when I was told, "You are Japanese, you are Japanese," at school, I also thought, "I am Chinese too, I'm the same as them. ..." It was really complex.

Although both her parents were Chinese, Kana was so strongly identified as “Japanese” by a few of her classmates. She still retained the Japaneseness in her mind, but she also started to categorize herself as Chinese because of her bloodline in order to counter discrimination by some of her schoolmates. After she noticed that her Japanese identity was being stigmatized in China, this differentiation became even more pronounced, when her class studied about WW2.

Kana: In the History class, after all, Japan was criticized... well, you know, the textbook’s contents are different from the Japanese version... so, when we studied that part [of the World War 2], I felt... something like hate for the Japanese... The teacher also spoke in that way... and, uh, even my friends, at that time, really hated Japan... so somehow, I was really uncomfortable, because they asked me whether Japanese really commit such [terrible] acts...

Researcher: Uh, they asked you...

Kana: Yes. I was just a junior high school student at that time, and I did not know about it before... because I hadn’t yet learned about it in Japan. So, it was my first time learning about this history, and I suffered because they asked me whether it was true, even though I really didn’t know, and they showed anger [against the Japanese] I suffered as a result of this complicated relationship between Japan and China. ... Finally, they said, “It’s not your fault,” and perhaps they accepted me, but even so, I was still told, “But I hate the Japanese” I just shrug it off, but it is difficult for me [to handle this topic] ...

Kana had never learned about the Nanjing Massacre in elementary school in Japan, and she was really shocked about this gap. Because of these matters, Kana started switching identities and behaving depending on the social context. As she put it: “My identity is Chinese, because I want to be friendly with my classmates today,” or “I also felt that I’m Japanese, because there is a place for me in Japan.”

Kana: My identity changed each day, because it had been affected by my pride as a Japanese and my wish to be friendly with classmates [in my mind] I didn’t make any conclusion at that time. I couldn’t figure out who I am.

She started switching her identity when she had to confront discrimination and historical arguments. Like Toshinobu, Kana’s Chinese language ability also improved quickly, and she understood the relevance of WW2. She became friends with her classmates in China. However, she had retained her Japanese identity because she was scheduled to return to Japan, the other country that still held a place for her. This means that she kept a transnational network while she lived in China.

After returning to Japan in the last grade of junior high school, she felt that most Japanese paid no attention to the Nanjing Massacre or other historical problems between Japan and China, and she thought, “The Japanese don’t want to be friendly with the Chinese.” Then she worried that the others would discover her Chinese roots because of her name, LAN Ka (蘭珂). At the time of the interview,

she was using a Japanese name, HOSHINO Kana (星野珂奈), because she changed her given name when she and her family took Japanese nationality, and her family name was also changed when she married a Japanese man. She had been careful not to reveal her Chinese identity to Japanese people in general.

However, even though she changed her given name, she reveals her Chinese roots to the Japanese sometimes, if the person does not seem discriminatory. Because of this opening up, she discovered that one of her acquaintances was also a CJ hāfu. In other words, she still had some Chineseness. She never gave a clear reason for this, but it may be because she had maintained relationships with Chinese people. She had some Chinese colleagues at her part-time job when she was a high school student. Afterward, she studied the Mandarin again when she became a full-time officer and obtained a high score in HSK (Chinese standard test). Therefore, she could utilize her language ability in her business trips to China and could communicate with colleagues who came from a Chinese branch.

On the other hand, she prefers communicating with the CJ hāfu, who had more in common with her as a second-generation Chinese than the first-generation Chinese. She said that she appealed to her Japanese identity when she communicated with the first-generation Chinese because she worried that if they got to know her roots, they would expect better language abilities from her. Another reason was that she felt the first-generation Chinese were bolder than she was while communicating with Chinese colleagues at her part-time job in high school, even though she sometimes played with them during the holidays. Therefore, to her Chinese colleagues, she presented herself as “just a really eager learner” of the Mandarin, but she got along better with other second-generation Chinese.

However, she did not talk much about her identity crisis with the CJ hāfu acquaintance, because she had only found him recently. She had been so worried about her identity alone for a long time that she asked me how other second-generation Chinese were handling this problem.

Discussion

To reveal the social identities of the second-generation Chinese, I have described the process of stigmatization/de-stigmatization of their life courses. In the results, both Toshinobu (a CJ hāfu) and Kana (a CC 1.5G) had experienced receiving negative attitudes from both the Japanese and Chinese society. For this reason, they often switched their social identity depending on the situation, such as changing their family or given name to take on names that were the same as those of the majority in the host society, even after they could be fluently bilingual. In other words, they could practice passing or covering as if they were from both the majority and the minority.

In terms of the first research question, “Who can be peers to provide the social capital to de-stigmatize the ethnic roots of the second-generation Chinese,” respondents created a boundary between the first-generation Chinese and most of the Japanese, and they did not always consider both as peers to whom they could reveal their actual social identity and de-stigmatize their roots. For Toshinobu, the Japanese media's unfavorable treatment of China and discrimination in daily life caused his Chinese roots to be stigmatized. In addition, he had the experience of his mother changing his family name and hate speech about Japan in Chinese social media before he came to Japan. Similarly, Kana considered herself

Japanese, and her social category was stigmatized because of the historical tragedy in China. After that, she noticed that the Japanese never cared about the Nanjing Massacre as fulfilling the normative expectation of Chinese society. She felt that her Chineseness was stigmatized in Japanese society so much that she practiced covering by changing her given name. These two respondents had to switch their identity depending on the person they were encountering.

This type of identity, which is reported in *hāfu* studies (Osanami-Törnngren, 2017), is known in the multiracial studies of North America as “protean identity.” Kerry Rockquemore and her colleague coined this concept in their research on African/European biracials. The authors assert that the person who shows this type of identity speaks Standard English and is fastidious about table manners when they are with the majority group, namely the Caucasians. By contrast, when they are with African-American people, they speak in the vernacular and puts their elbows on the table. However, the authors say that someone with a protean identity adjusts not only their behavior but also their identity. It can be said that the ability to practice switching is a “gift of being biracial;” The authors pointed out that the person who has protean identity utilizes this “capacity in all interactions as a survival tool” (Rockquemore & Brunnsma, 2008: 47, 101).

This concept is only based on the conflict between racial groups within one nation. In contrast, the second-generation Chinese must confront the political conflict among two nations, a bigger conflict than between racial groups within one nation. When Kana was blamed by schoolmates, she identified herself as a Chinese by blood. The concept of blood also becomes the identifying factor for multiracial people in North America. Because of the one-drop rule, they had been long denied their “Whiteness” or their identity as “multiracial” (Rockquemore & Brunnsma, 2008). Even in the 21st century, second-generation immigrants still internalize the discourse of bloodline (Kibria, 2002), and the Filipino/Japanese *hāfu* who have the same appearance as the Japanese often identify themselves by bloodline (Miura, 2015). Unlike *hāfu*/multiracial people, both of Kana’s parents are Chinese. Therefore, she could identify herself as a Chinese when bestowed with the normative expectations of Chinese society by her schoolmates in China.

Nevertheless, she did not only try to assimilate with Chinese society, but also kept her Japaneseness in her mind. This is may be because her family had already decided to go back to Japan after two years. The study of Peggy Levitt that described the transnational relationship between the US and Dominica shows that the possibility of migration often prevents children from concentrating on contemporary school life and makes them focus on the life in a new world of nonmigrant children. When first-generation immigrants migrated to the US, their children often lost the drive for learning in Dominican schools, though they were still in Dominica. It seems that studying hard in Dominica did not means anything for the children because they would “be migrating as soon as” their parents get their visas and “can go to school in Boston” (Levitt, 2001: 84). Similarly, the high possibility of migration may prevent complete assimilation with China because she “can go back to Japan.” Thus, it can be said that the possibility of migration is also one of the factors of identification.

On the other hand, a study based on Rockquemore’s work suggests that CJ *hāfu* has an advantage in

improving their mental health (Lusk et al, 2010). According to the study, compared with the respondents who considered themselves multiracial sometimes (protean identity) or at all times, the respondents who did not acknowledge their biracial identity showed lower self-esteem and higher levels of depression. The authors suggest that the latter respondents “may be struggling with their identity development or identifying in a way that does not truly represent who that individual is racially” (Lusk et al, 2010: 121). While Kana suffered from an identity crisis alone, Toshinobu could at least express part of himself by using the word *hāfu* (a well-known social category) than by the term “second-generation immigrants.”⁹⁾ This means that CJ *hāfu* more easily found peers among all *hāfu* people in the online community or got opinions of other peers from the media. CJ *hāfu* people are less advantaged than European/Japanese *hāfu* people (Keane, 2019), but in terms of finding peers and expressing themselves, CJ *hāfu* people are more advantaged than CC 1.5G people.

By contrast, Kana was considered Japanese by her schoolmates in China, and her Japaneseness was stigmatized, especially when she was studying about the history of WW2. In this situation, it was hard to comprehend her positionality. There are huge differences between Japanese and Chinese textbooks in terms of casualty figures and the length of descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre (the genocide that was committed by Japanese forces during the Sino-Japanese War in the city of Nanjing from December 1937 to February 1938). According to Zheng Wang, China has given an official estimate of 300,000 victims and has included this figure in students' history textbooks. In contrast, Japanese textbooks have only a few volumes about the massacre, and many of them do not state the numbers of the victims, but instead use ambiguous terms such as “massive” (Wang, 2017). Furthermore, the Japanese government has not given an official estimate of the casualties, even though the Japanese government's statement that “it cannot be denied,” virtually shows that it admits the massacre. This is because various sources give different numbers of victims¹⁰⁾. For instance, according to the records kept by Western residents and the municipal authority, the whole of the population of Nanjing was estimated at 250,000 from late-December to mid-January at that time (Askew, 2017). If we adopt these numbers, the victims are certainly fewer than the numbers given in Chinese textbooks¹¹⁾. Therefore, this controversial issue is not mentioned much in Japan, at least as compared to China.

Based on this background, it is not surprising that Kana was seriously shocked by the gap in recognition of the Nanjing Massacre between Chinese and Japanese societies. After her return to Japan, she was shocked again by the negligent attitude toward the massacre, and she felt that the Japanese did not give priority to having friendly relations with the Chinese. Meanwhile, she was afraid of the stigmatization of her Chinese roots because of her Chinese-like name. Therefore, she changed her given name to sound Japanese, and all her family members were naturalized to Japan. Even though she had Chinese colleagues at her part-time job when she was a high school student, she set a boundary between them because she felt that the first-generation Chinese immigrants were different from her in terms of their sense of ethnicity.

After returning to Japan, Kana revealed her Chinese roots to Japanese people who did not seem discriminatory. Among passing, compared to an active way of a person trying to hide their stigma

completely, a more passive way was reported in a study of Brazilian immigrants in Japan. A respondent, who has the same appearance as the majority of Japanese society, said that he never discloses his ethnicity personally, but answers when someone asks about his origin. The author named this as “passive passing” (Tsuda, 2003). Kana never told me the clear reason why her passing was passive, but it may be that, unlike Toshinobu, she was not discriminated by the Japanese directly, or she had to come out if she wanted to find peers and know how to handle her identity crisis from other second-generation Chinese unconsciously¹²⁾. Consequently, she found a CJ hāfu man who had similar feelings as she had as a second-generation Chinese, even though he was not a CC 1.5G. This means that even though there are some differences between hāfu and 1.5G among second-generation immigrants, co-ethnics can be peers and de-stigmatize their ethnic roots, as alluded to in previous literature (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Miura, 2015). However, it also means that the majority who are not discriminative can also provide social capital, such as “the wise” (Goffman, 1963), or contribute to “bridging social capital,” the social capital within the network, which the person creates with someone outside the group (Putnam, 2000).

In terms of the second research question regarding, “How fluently bilingual second-generation Chinese could maintain their language ability,” these examples show that even though they set boundaries between the majority and themselves, the respondents wanted to make friends so much that they learned the second language to be able to practice passing or covering. According to Rumbaut’s study, 61.4% of 1,958,781 immigrant children who migrated between the ages of 6 and 12 years answered that they could speak the language of the host country very well. In contrast, only 37.2% of 2,918,628 children who migrated between the ages of 13 and 17 years gave the same answer (Rumbaut, 2004). In this study, a respondent who moved to Japan when she was 15 years old (same age as Toshinobu) spoke accented Japanese, from which I recognized her foreign roots. Nevertheless, Toshinobu improved his Japanese language ability as he could practice passing on his own effort. He watched various TV dramas and searched for information about Japanese pop-culture. The efforts were not only for academic achievement but mainly to make friends in a Japanese school. Kana also must survive in China without any support, though there was no benefit, whereas Kibria’s respondent felt that the second-generation immigrants can de-stigmatize their “racial” roots, because her roots in the host society were not stigmatized yet at that time. But after she was back in Japan, she retained her proficiency in Mandarin by communicating with Chinese colleagues at a part-time and full-time job. It can be said that these situations provided them the ability to get an advantage in the global market. However, both of them were stigmatized for their Chineseness/Japaneseness, while they made much effort to adapt to the host society.

Previous studies have described the route to becoming fluently bilingual within the ethnic community, the place where immigrant children are in a favorable context (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), or going on a fun family trip to the other home country where relatives welcome them (Miura, 2015). However, even though the theory regards a homeland trip positively for the second-generation immigrants, it is not the same for everyone. Kana’s case showed that even if a second-generation immigrant could be fluently bilingual, neither does it help in improving their self-esteem nor in de-stigmatizing their roots,

because they will be stigmatized with another identity in a negative social context, if the relationship between the host country and the parent's homeland is bad. In this research, the reason the respondents maintained their fluent bilingual ability was not only to succeed academically or to get a better job but also to survive the assimilative pressure at school.

Conclusion

This article reconsiders fluent bilingualism and social capital, of which the segmented assimilation theory often underscores positive effects (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), within the framework of stigma. The results showed that even among the second-generation Chinese who succeed in being fluently bilingual, passing or covering as both Japanese and Chinese is practiced. Based on these results, it seems that the networking among co-ethnics and a homeland trip, which are often underscored by the segmented assimilation theory, should be re-examined more when the relationship between the host country and the parent's homeland is still seriously negative.

Contrary to previous literature in multiracial studies, which reported such switching of identities (Osanami-Törngren, 2017; Rockquemore & Brunisma, 2008), not only *hāfu*/multiracial, but also the 1.5G, who have no bloodline of the majority, switched their identities. In the case of this study, as the previous work showed, "bloodline" was utilized to show the legitimate ethnicity as Chinese (Kibria, 2002), when the CC 1.5G was blamed for her Japaneseness during a homeland trip. However, the high possibility of migrating back to Japan also made CC 1.5G keep her Japaneseness, though her "blood" was not Japanese. It can be said that the possibility of migration is also an important factor of identification that the second-generation immigrant shows while switching identity, same as bloodline. Additionally, in the cases in this article, the identities of second-generation immigrants are not limited within the social categories that the first-generation immigrants often appeal to by bloodline. Thus, I suggest, it is possible that "the others" who belong to another social category, such as the *hāfu* or the majority who are not discriminative, also contribute to the de-stigmatization for 1.5G, although the advantages and disadvantages of *hāfu* and 1.5G are not the same.

This case study was based on a limited number of interviewees. A larger sample of the other respondents who practice transnational engagement, might help to generalize the findings of multiracial studies to the people like 1.5G, who often have a sense of belonging in both the host country and the parent's homeland and suffer from the conflict between those countries, in the same way as multiracial people. With the intention of including some self-discipline, we should consider whether the features of *hāfu*/multiracial, the social categories which are recently focused on rapidly, are really specific to *hāfu*/multiracial or can they be applied to other ethnic or racial minorities as well.

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Notes

- 1) *Jyūmin Kihondaichō ni motodsuku Jinkou, Jinkoudoutai, oyobi Setaisuu (Heisei Sanjū Ichinen Ichigatsu Tsuitachi Genzai)* [Population, population movement, and numbers of household, based on basic resident register (in January 2019)], Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Available at: http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/01gyosei02_02000193.html (Accessed 31 July 2019).
- 2) In this article, I only mention immigrants from the People's Republic of China. There are 649,078 Chinese people living in Japan. *Immigration Control of Japanese and Foreign Nationals*, Ministry of Justice, Available at: http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/m_hisho06_00044.html (Accessed 8 September 2019).
- 3) *2017 Hate Crime Report*, Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, Available at: <http://hrc.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/2017-Hate-Crime-Report.pdf> (Accessed 30 November 2019).
- 4) The concept of “1.5-generation” is based on the study by Rumbaut in 2002 (Rumbaut, 2002). He also published another analysis in 2004, in which the definition of 1.5-generation is narrower (Rumbaut, 2004). However, to adjust to the other previous works, I used the 2002.
- 5) According to the poll after 2005, more people from both countries answered “unfavorable / relatively unfavorable” than those who answered “favorable / relatively favorable” about each country in all years. *The 14th Joint Public Opinion Poll between Japan and China: Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2018*, The Genron NPO, Available at: <http://www.genron-npo.net/en/archives/181011.pdf> (Accessed in July 2019).
- 6) Goffman calls the person who has no stigma “the norm” (Goffman, 1963); however, to adjust to other previous works, I used the word “majority.”
- 7) I conducted this research for my master's thesis written under my maiden name (Yoshikawa, 2019).
- 8) In general, the family names of Chinese people are usually represented with one Chinese character (Zhong, 2016).
- 9) There are already many foreigners living in Japan, but Japanese society tries to avoid using the word “immigrants,” and tries to underscore them foreigners who are just temporary visitors to the host country.
“Japan quietly accepting foreign workers — just don't call it immigration.” *The Japan times*, 2016, Available at: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/11/03/national/japan-quietly-accepting-foreign-workers-just-dont-call-immigration/#.XdjWMej7RPY> (Accessed in November 2019).
- 10) Q6: *What is the view of the Government of Japan on the incident known as the “Nanjing Incident”?*, *History Issues Q&A, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq16.html (Accessed in July 2019).
- 11) This analysis also showed that the Japanese army killed at least 5,000 civilians illegally in any case (Askew, 2017). The author never agrees with the claim by the right-wing Japanese that there were no or only a few dozen victims.
- 12) In Japan, the term “1.5G” is only used in academic spheres, not in general settings.

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