

Title	Moral judgment and virtue in the early period of Philippa Foot
Sub Title	
Author	五味, 竜彦(Gomi, Tatsuhiko)
Publisher	慶應義塾大学倫理学研究会
Publication year	2015
Jtitle	エテイカ (Ethica). Vol.8, (2015.), p.164- 164
JaLC DOI	
Abstract	
Notes	欧文要旨
Genre	
URL	https://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AA12362999-20150000-0164

慶應義塾大学学術情報リポジトリ(KOARA)に掲載されているコンテンツの著作権は、それぞれの著作者、学会または出版社/発行者に帰属し、その権利は著作権法によって保護されています。引用にあたっては、著作権法を遵守してご利用ください。

The copyrights of content available on the Keio Associated Repository of Academic resources (KOARA) belong to the respective authors, academic societies, or publishers/issuers, and these rights are protected by the Japanese Copyright Act. When quoting the content, please follow the Japanese copyright act.

Moral judgment and virtue in the early period of Philippa Foot

Tatsuhiko GOMI

This paper examines important arguments by Philippa Foot (1920-2009) in her early period, to clarify their theoretical features and purpose. Although Foot is known as a philosopher who advocated the importance of the concepts of virtue in contemporary moral philosophy, it is not easy to understand why she did so, since, especially in her early writings, the theoretical relationship between virtuous terms and moral terms seems to be complicated and unclear.

Thus, the present study begins with Foot's linguistic analysis of moral terms, to examine why she emphasized the role of concepts of virtue in moral judgment. The discussion then turns to the theory about moral argument, in which she tried to prove that factual premises are valid evidence for evaluative conclusions. The analysis then leads to an explanation of how the concept of virtue makes each moral judgment understandable, providing evidence upon which they can be based. In conclusion, one can see the theoretical connection of virtue, moral judgment, and self-interest in Foot's early theory, thereby understanding its features.