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Author	加納, 知行(Kano, Tomoyuki)
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Abstract	<p>Nowadays, the number of conflicts has been increasing with the advancement of urban development projects at the local level of Japan. They are recently observed among neighborhood residents, developers, and administrative authorities. Any municipalities in Japan gotlegally required to draw up their own "city master plans" so that they could present their prospects of urban planning for the future. In spite of that, why do the contents of city master plans come to lose touch with the initial consensus in some situations? In the same way, several scholars have recently emphasized that the right for residents to participate in planning process should be practically realized. On the ground of the background mentioned above, the purpose of this research is to consider an effectiveness of city master plans inlocal governance. In the light of such an aim, this paper, through using a case study method, investigated whether or not city master plans actually worked for maintaining good governance and explored an effective way of enhancing monitoring functions on the planning process. First of all, in an examination of influences exercised by political actors over policy change, a case of partial revision of city master plan in Higashikurume City, Tokyo, illustrated to what extent residents possess the monitoring capabilities. As a result of consideringthis case, two assumptions would be proposed. One is that local governance in the process of city planning depends on political situations besides socio-economic environments around the municipality. The other is that the local chief executive has the most leverage over decision-making in the urban planning process of all political actors; or rather,the city mayor's decision-making, not only institutionally but also operationally, plays a critical role in the revision of city master plans. In addition to that, the author, later in this paper, also examined three cases in the context of tasks which were considered to need to utilize and promote the contents of city master plans. In consequence, it was assumed that what would be required to realize and leverage the contents of city master plans was summed up in two conditions: maintenance of executive system in the municipal office and establishment of collaboration with residents.</p>
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For Whom Does Urban Planning Exist? Residents and Administration in Local Governance on Planning Process in Japan

Tomoyuki Kano

Abstract

Nowadays, the number of conflicts has been increasing with the advancement of urban development projects at the local level of Japan. They are recently observed among neighborhood residents, developers, and administrative authorities. Any municipalities in Japan got legally required to draw up their own “city master plans” so that they could present their prospects of urban planning for the future. In spite of that, why do the contents of city master plans come to lose touch with the initial consensus in some situations? In the same way, several scholars have recently emphasized that the right for residents to participate in planning process should be practically realized. On the ground of the background mentioned above, the purpose of this research is to consider an effectiveness of city master plans in local governance. In the light of such an aim, this paper, through using a case study method, investigated whether or not city master plans actually worked for maintaining good governance and explored an effective way of enhancing monitoring functions on the planning process. First of all, in an examination of influences exercised by political actors over policy change, a case of partial revision of city master plan in Higashikurume City, Tokyo, illustrated to what extent residents possess the monitoring capabilities. As a result of considering this case, two assumptions would be proposed. One is that local governance in the process of city planning depends on political situations besides socio-economic environments around the municipality. The other is that the local chief executive has the most leverage over decision-making in the urban planning process of all political actors; or rather, the city mayor’s decision-making, not only institutionally but also operationally, plays a critical role in the revision of city master plans. In addition to that, the author, later in this

paper, also examined three cases in the context of tasks which were considered to need to utilize and promote the contents of city master plans. In consequence, it was assumed that what would be required to realize and leverage the contents of city master plans was summed up in two conditions: maintenance of executive system in the municipal office and establishment of collaboration with residents.

I. Introduction

1. Issue of This Research

Why do not some conflicts in urban development decrease? They are recently observed among residents, developers, and administration at local level of Japan, in constructing some high-rise buildings or apartments¹.

By the revision of the City Planning Act in 1992, all cities in Japan are legally obliged to settle on their own “city master plan,” which indicates their prospects of urban planning for the future. However, taking circumstances into consideration, the content of the master plan has been estranged from the original consensus: that is, an essential lack of governance is clearly tangible².

The author supposes that such situations result from disregarding for an important role of residents in local governance. Local municipalities are legally-required to reflect residents’ opinions in their master plans, but they have ended in watered-down action plans.

Once Lewis Mumford, a famous architectural critic, pointed out that the best school of grass-roots democracy is the practice of local urban planning³. It has become emphasized that residents’ right to take part in planning process should be positively embodied. Namely, citizens ought to be accepted into the process where they share some pieces of information, debate in equal parts, and decide in a democratic manner⁴.

2. Purpose of This Paper

The purpose of this paper is to consider an effectiveness of city master plans in local governance, and to explore effective ways of promoting, utilizing, and realizing the contents of city master plans. In order to respond to such a research question, this paper takes particular note of two of the following.

One is to examine whether or not city master plans actually work for maintaining good governance. In Japan, urban planning has been traditionally controlled by the heavy hand of government. As for the local administration, local chief executives are expected to have absolute directions over decision-making process on city planning. Thus, in consideration of local governance, it is of much importance to focus on the efficacy of normative guidelines for protecting residents’ participation from abuse of power by the executive (Chapter V).

The other is to consider what should be institutionalized; or, how city master plans

should be put into practice effectively. Toward an enhancement of effectiveness and monitoring functions on the planning process, this paper investigates what kinds of conditions are required on local governance. The author introduces a couple cases where municipalities have been working through such an issue of effective and implementable planning (Chapter VI).

In the light of those aims, this paper, through a hypothesis-generating case study⁵, makes presumable and testable assumptions about planning process in the local governance.

II. What is City Master Plan?

In 1992, by the amendment of the City Planning Act, all municipalities setting up urban planning areas became required to settle on fundamental policies of planning those areas, which are generally called city master plan (*shi tyo son masuta puran*). Local governments are supposed to reflect residents' voices in city master plans, also in the context of each general plan (*sogo keikaku*) and urban planning area master plan (*toshi keikaku kuiki masuta puran*). General plan is regarded as upper level plan of city master plan, and has the force of law because of requiring the decision by the municipal assembly. Urban planning area master plan is supposed to be settled on by the prefectural level, but has not been established a connection with city master plan⁶. Incidentally, Kawakami draws the sharp distinction between the prefectural governments' perceptions for their own roles and the contents of requests for assistance from municipal ones on the basis of his nationwide survey⁷. He discusses an outlook for a new way of city master plans in the wake of devolution of power⁸.

It is possible for local administration to include some ideas on city planning in master plan, especially green issue, disaster and accident prevention, barrier-free environment, landscape preservation and formation. Moreover, municipalities are required to make a system for bringing in residents' demands; for example, holding of public hearings and briefing sessions for residents, creation and distribution of pamphlets for publicity, and carrying out questionnaire surveys. Kato and Takeuchi present a realistic picture of the groundwork and the decision procedure for city master plans in the municipalities of the seven prefectures in central Japan as of 2001⁹.

Therefore, it is necessary to decide master plans under participation and consensus of as many residents as possible. That is because city master plans are basic rules decided only by obtaining local agreements, not by the decision procedure based on the City Planning Act. However, the problem with an institutional aspect is that city master plans are not legally binding; that is, it is permitted for local authorities to merely make an ex-post fact report to the municipal assemblies. Accordingly, formulation, decision, and revision of plans are left to the judgment of the local governments. In order to actualize the contents stated in city master plans, it is required to reflect the concepts in district zoning (*yoto chiiki*) and/or area planning (*chiku keikaku*) with legally binding power. The outline of city master plan

appears in Table 1.

Table 1. Outline of City Master Plan

Character
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Autonomous business: only making an ex post facto report to the municipal assembly •<i>Not legally binding</i>
Target period
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •For about 20 years
Aim of plan
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Ideal of city planning and prospects of city for the future
Main contents
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •General design •Line of respective branches •Design on respective areas •Means of realizing: civic participation, etc.
Who settles on?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Municipal government
Means of realization
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •District zoning •Area planning

Note. The author generated this table by reference to M. Kawakami, *Toshi keikaku*. Tokyo: Morikita Publishing, 2008.

Settling on city master plans began in 1993. As illustrated in Figure 1, about 1100 municipalities had already drawn them up since the beginning. Moreover, if we look at Figure 2 and 3, we will see that local governments, which possessed city master plans early in the progression of the formulation, tend to revise the plan in response to the change of political, social and economic environment.




Figure 1. Number of municipalities deciding on MPs drawn by the author following S. Shiozawa, *Toshi keikaku masuta puran kaitei no kadai: Bizyon zitsugen gata toshi dukuri o ninau shi tyo son masuta puran no kyoyu ka ni muketa kaitei purosesu*. *Nissei Kisoken shoho*, 2009, 56, 108.




Figure 2. Change in number of municipalities deciding on MPs adapted from S. Shiozawa, *Toshi keikaku masuta puran kaitei no kadai: Bizyon zitsugen gata toshi dukuri o ninau shi tyo son masuta puran no kyoyu ka ni muketa kaitei purosesu*. *Nissei Kisoken shoho*, 2009, 56, 109.




Figure 3. Change in number of municipalities deciding on MPs (cumulative) drawn by the author based on Figure 2.

III. Preceding Studies

Because city planning as a subject of scientific analysis include myriad factors, it has been studied through some academic discipline. As examples of this, we could list engineering (especially, social engineering), economics, and study of law¹⁰.

Among these social scientific analyses, there are a number of arguments which criticize the existing system and institution of urban planning. Some findings discussed in administrative jurisprudence take similar stance toward methodological approach. Although there have been few empirical analyses based on the perspective of social science in Japan, Kitahara works out administrative and political process of urban planning in modern Japan through positive methods including the investigation of administrative officials, case studies, and so on¹¹. From this approach of political science, he regards putting the institution of urban planning into practice as products of political processes in each municipality¹². Kitahara also shows the theoretical model; that is, pluralistic political process embodies the event related to urban planning as a product of the pressure exerted by multitudinous interests in civil society, even if government officials, who are in charge of city planning affairs, do not hope for such circumstances. Likewise, through experiential approach, Soga looks on city planning at the level of local governments as regulatory trade-off between “economic environment” and “central government.” He obtains the result through statistical analysis of data on urban planning and district zoning areas in all 47 prefectures of Japan over the past 28 years¹³.

Generally speaking, these approaches from the perspective of public administration

and political science are supposed to observe and argue how politicians and/or public service officials, who operate a viable system, take actions on the political policy process. Those previous studies also show that it is necessary to take notice of the idea that urban planning contains political and administrative elements, and to put stakeholders, such as local authority, and socio-economic context, comprehensively in perspective of the urban planning policy. Indeed, this study has the same stance to the approach mentioned above. However, taking into account the uniqueness of this study, it is summarized in the following two points: (1) regarding “municipality” as a unit of analysis, because municipalities are located near at hand of residents, who play an important role of local autonomy; (2) analyzing empirically urban planning administration within the theoretical framework which introduces a concept of “public governance” into public administration.

IV. Framework and Theoretical Background

1. Governance for Public Administration

In the fields of social sciences, especially public administration, a technical term, “governance,” has commonly been used. Yet, because a definition of governance depends on researchers, who make use of it, the concept does not still have broad utility as it stands now¹⁴. Meanwhile, just as Oyama points out that a significance of administrative studies from a perspective of public governance lies in reviewing the traditional framework for public administration¹⁵, there is no doubt that the concept is of much account in the realm of public administration studies. Pierre and Peters suggest that governance means a useful point of view about capabilities of governments and relations among civil society and governments¹⁶. In this way, a view of governance is often seen as the manner of administration including traditional “government”¹⁷. Then, what does such a normative perspective as “a new pattern of government” bring into public administration analyses? Oyama refers to trends toward the increasing effectiveness and significance of public policy studies as well as the hitherto undertaken research of administrative system and public management¹⁸. This background corresponds to the issue of public administration presented as follows by Muramatsu: (1) sovereignty (“who governs?”); (2) method (“how governed?”); (3) purpose (“what effects?”)¹⁹.

On the base of these arguments, this paper adopts the following definition of public governance; framework or mechanism for making important decisions or doing the steering in public organizations such as governments, and for monitoring them²⁰. The important point here is that the fact is highlighted that citizens’ monitoring system is involved in policy making and policy implementation²¹. A key to greater understanding of monitoring by political actors is policy evaluation and feedback into policy, when we reflect the above definition on policy process composed of planning, implementation, and assessment of policy²².

2. Theories Concerning Local Governance

2.1 Urban Regime Theory

Urban regime theory has achieved broad acceptance as the dominant paradigm in some analysis toward the modern urban politics and local governance in the United States²³. It is theoretically thought that this theory has its origin in the debate about “CPS (community power structure)” of the 1960’s²⁴. What distinguishes this theory from “economic determinism,” which advocates that city politics are irrelevant to policymaking process and policy outcome²⁵, is that it has been developing an eloquent perspective with a high regard for city’s relatively autonomous decision-making. The theory puts much emphasis on the concept of “regime.” It means the political process, political dynamics, and power relationships within the city. In the regime, officials in urban government persuade, negotiate with, and face off against the influence of formal or informal organizations such as business communities, labor unions, minority groups, and citizens’ groups, etc. Most notably, Stone submits the theoretical model which explains that the city’s policy choices equivalent to policy out




Figure 4. Theoretical model based on urban regime theory drawn by the author.

comes depend on how its regime is formed in the area²⁶. Then, he underscores the roles to be played by the government within the regime. Although urban regime theory has been acknowledged as one of the accepted theoretical models concerning American cities' governance, it is confronted with some theoretical tasks. That is to say, there are criticisms that the theory does not have broad versatility in describing characteristic traits of the regimes common to other countries or communities beyond the values, norms, and practices typical of the cities in the United States²⁷. They also call for making the models based on urban regime theory refine and elaborate²⁸. As well, Soga introduces the notion of "urban governance" into the detailed analysis of urban space control in Japan²⁹, which is probably affiliated with investigations regarding urban regime theory.

Hence, as depicted in Figure 4, the argument described above would lead to a theoretical model. This figure illustrates what factors have affects on the policy process. Presumable factors mainly consist of two components: namely, "socio-economic environment" and "political situation." The former means, for instance in the context of urban planning, declining birthrate and aging population, population change, meanwhile the latter is illustrated with political behaviors of local chief executive, local legislature, residents, developers, and so forth.

2.2 Advocacy Planning Theory

When considering a pattern of local governance, urban regime theory emphasizes that it is necessary to observe how a regime is established in a certain city. However, such an approach seems to be a somewhat superficial discussion. In particular, what means "political situation"? What happens on the policy process? By referring to the definition of public governance, citizens' participation appears to be a key concept for the purpose of speculating political behaviors among some actors³⁰.

Arnstein's famous dictum "a ladder of citizen participation"³¹ is frequently cited as the concept of advocacy planning, which represents the planning style through residents' participation. We see from Figure 5 that she takes a gradual and stepwise approach toward grasping the degree of attainment of citizens' participation. Arnstein's major concern is citizens on the receiving end of projects or programs. It matters whether or not they receive the right to take part in the policy process. The ladder has eight steps, the bottom of which is positioned as "manipulation." This term means the state of affairs under nominal participation ("non-participation"). The rung is, in step with one-up stair ("therapy"), equal to a lack of participation in a substantial way. The more steps we proceed up, the more directly rulers reflect the opinions of local communities on the policy process. At the top of the ladder, "citizen control" finally appears, in which citizens have a leading role in the decision-making. She clearly differentiates "citizen power" from "tokenism." The former is composed of "citizen control," "delegated power", and "partnership." On the other hand, the latter includes the power-holders' perfunctory response to citizens' voice, such as "consultation," "informing," and "placation."




Figure 5. Eight rungs on the ladder of citizen participation adapted from S. Arnstein, A ladder of citizen participation, *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 1969, 35, 217.

Arnstein defines citizen participation as the means by which the have-not citizens can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society³². In the context of community development and advocacy planning, resident's participation stands for the measure through which they can obtain a certain amount of the power of planning, implementation, and assessment. It would enable them to realize the achievement of policy goals in a way preferred by them. At the same time, it would actively promote the efficiency and diversification of policymaking process.

V. Examining Functionality of City Master Plan

1. Method

To what extent do city master plans guarantee the residents' rights to take part in the decision-making process? What is it like for residents, who are not institutionally entitled to set down city master plans directly, to have some sort of capability of monitoring the urban planning process? For the purpose of answering the first research question from that view-

point, this paper discuss in depth a case of the partial revision of the city master plan associated with attracting commercial facilities in the Minamisawa 5th district, Higashikurume City, Tokyo. The reason why it would be appropriate that we focus attention on revised events of city master plans is not just because urban planning is generally so susceptible to the effect of progress of urbanization. But, that is also because it should reflect, with a democratic method, residents' opinions and interests at the same time. It would appear that examining improvements in policy performance on ground of the specific fact that a policy has (not) been evaluated by residents should be absolutely imperative so as to comprehend whether they actually monitor the planning of new program.

The author obtained literature information mainly from major Japanese newspapers and the Higashikurume City's Internet website.

2. Sequence of Events

In 2005, the estate owner and the business operator showed the Higashikurume City an intention to open up commercial facilities for a land use of the empty lot in the former Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank's playground in the Minamisawa 5th district, Higashikurume City, Tokyo. This vacant lot has the ground-floor area of approximately 55,700 square meters. The planned giant commercial facility rises 4 stories above the ground, has the gross floor space of 95,000 square meters, and equips the parking lot which accommodates about 2,000 cars. This total floor area is said to be equivalent to ones of all retail stores within the whole city. It is estimated that the number of cars on the roads adjacent to the facility averages close to 7,600 per day³³.

In response to that, the city authorities decided to embark on the industrial location policy on the basis of "The Higashikurume City Master Plan" first formulated in 2000, which manifested the idea of structuring industrial development areas. The other reasons why the city government accepted this plan is that it could bring certain advantages to a revitalization of industry activities, an improvement in revenue from tax, an encouragement of employment generation, and a maintenance of the local disaster preparedness centers. The city authorities announced a policy to promote the plan to put area planning into practical use. It enabled municipalities to make a voluntary decision to ease restriction on the use district, whereas the district zoning on the site at the time forbade constructing any commercial facilities, which had an area of not less than 500 square meters. Such a use district is called "category 1 medium-to-high rise exclusive residential districts (dai isshu chu ko so zyuko senyo chiiki)" under the City Planning Act.

However, the plan emerged as a formidable challenge to conflict with the provisions of the city master plan, which stipulated that such an enterprise zone belonged to the areas where business-related land utilization would be achieved as an industrial center called "distribution business area (ryutu gyomu chi)." Because an area planning is supposed to maintain compatibility by all means with the city master plan subordinating it, some of the

city council members refuted the city administration's plan. They also expressed the opinion that such a shopping center should not be regarded as a base for industries.

With the requirement of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government's consent to the municipality's decision on district plans that stipulate redevelopment promotion areas, the City Planning Division of the Higashikurume City engaged in six rounds of vigorous discussions with the Land-use Planning Division of the TMG from May 2005 to January 2006. The TMG pointed out that such a district plan stipulating redevelopment promotion areas was difficult to apply under the city master plan as it was at the time. It also recommended that the project for attraction of enterprises should ensure consistency with the city master plan as the basic principle of the city's development.

The city mayor and local officials concerned advocated that they had proposed the area planning in a manner consistent with the city master plan, and then they had been repeating such an account in the city assembly. Yet, according to the TMG's suggestion and indication, they unilaterally drew up "The Proposed Plan for Conversion of Land-use," which translated distribution business area into "neighborhood commercial zone (kinrin shogyo chiiki)" in October 2007.

Moreover, the Higashikurume City Planning Commission's approve the proposed plan, in May of the following year. There were so intense arguments for and against the proposed plan that some of the commission members put forward suggestions for putting off the discussion without a further division. However, after about 7 hours of deliberations, Yoshio Kuwabara, the chairperson of the Higashikurume City Planning Commission, made a judgmental decision on a resolution, and then received 7 out of 13 members' approval in the end³⁴.

As a result, the municipal authorities took action in partial revision of the city master plan by instituting and incorporating the planned project into the city master plan.

3. Discussion

3.1 Point at Issue

According to the Higashikurume City's Internet website, municipal officials explain some reasons behind partial revision of the city master plan as follows: that is because "in the light of the socio-economic conditions in late years and the recent trend of land use around the Minamisawa 5th district, especially the site of the former playground, this proposed project, which leads to the revitalization of the area's economy, would be a desirable option for a good development of the city as a whole." In addition to that, Shigeya Nozaki, the then mayor of Higashikurume City, had been frequently citing his policy that such a district planning would bring about beneficial and positive effects on surge in tax revenues³⁵.

Based on these discourses, the very least we could say is that socio-economic realities surrounding the city have some influence on revising the city master plan.

At the same time, the decision-making behavior of municipal officials resulted in

deepening the prominent conflicts among political actors on local governance. Such a confrontation, in this case, showed up as political protests made chiefly by neighborhood residents' group and some members of the city assembly.

Behind the partial revision of the city master plan, the said project itself faced a long delay. It is because a citizens' group carried on opposition campaigns against it, claiming that it would lead to a lack of environmental consciousness involved with traffic jams in the surrounding area and to a severe economic damage to the existing local shopping area. On September 5, 2006, a citizens' group that considered the construction of a city road connected to the planned site for commercial facilities to be a misuse of public funds, against the mayor of Higashikurume City at the time, made a residents' audit request for a suspension of the road building.

By the same token, the municipal council demanded a clear account of the partial modification with the inadequate resident participation. In response, Higashikurume authorities, facing such criticisms, justified themselves by assuming that they complied with "The Operational Guidelines for City Planning," which had been established by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport. The guidelines say that, "(The city master plans are) about fulfillment of a purpose that each municipality has intended for its future vision. That is why municipal authorities, if necessary, should be allowed to make a judgment on adding alterations to the existing city master plans". They also indicate that, "It is recommended for local governments to formulate and follow up the city master plans with a view to bringing flexibility to description contents and responding agilely to partial changes in such plans. Municipal officials, for instance, set forth the particulars of the city's prospects that they are capable of looking into at the point of formulation, and after a while, they add the matters of to some extent clear outlooks for the future³⁶."

Additionally, the city government also in the assembly confined their remarks to the fact that, after two separate briefing sessions on the proposed plan for local residents, which had been held on May 8 and 10, 2008, they had consulted with the advisory board on city planning.

In the end, a political backlash from some of the residents and city council members ended up achieving an unsuccessful outcome.

3.2 Lessons from the Case

It is presumed that the foregoing theoretical consideration of local governance and citizen participation, and the investigation of the case would lead to tentative assumptions as follows.

To begin with, just as urban regime theory supposes, local governance in the process of city planning depends on political situations besides socio-economic environments around the municipality. It is also assumed that political actors, as well as socio-economic environments around the city, could take significant roles in local planning governance. These focal actors could be classified into two categories: that is, "government actors" and "gov-

ernance actors.” Concretely speaking, the former means administrative authorities composed of the city mayor and urban planners of city officials, whereas the latter, by contrast, refers to monitoring actors, such as the city council members, neighborhood residents’ groups, land holders, NPOs, real-estate agents, developers, business operators, et cetera.

In the second place, of all political actors, the local chief executive has the most leverage over decision-making in the urban planning process. If we posit a premise in a more verifiable manner, it could be translated into an assumption that the city mayor’s decision-making, not only institutionally but also operationally, plays a critical role in the revision of city master plans. To put it the other way around, the legal characteristic of non-binding city master plans actually constituted an institutional barrier for governance actors, best of all the citizens’ group and part of the city assembly members, to monitor and modify the planning process. It appears most likely that local government authorities took advantage of not merely institutional but also operational positions. That is because their policy intention consistently lay in the pursuit of economic benefits and financial gains, which is also true of the first assumption that predicts “local governance...depends on...socio-economic environments around the municipality.”

All circumstances considered, it is probably acknowledged that some performances of residents (and the municipal assembly) would not necessarily prove to be effective in policy feedback. The current situation of residents’ participation could be categorized as “tokenism” or “non-participation” according to the Arnstein’s model. The city master plans, what is more, seem to have a certain degree of institutional limitation in avoiding the risk of arbitrary administration by executive authorities, which might be due to the fact that they are non-binding. At any rate, the case would be able to provide evidence against the claim that the local governance in Japan performs and functions successfully³⁷.

VI. Toward an Effective Realization of City Master Plans

1. Model Case

By following the discussion so far, there is a possibility that city master plans do not institutionally fulfill the expected role as the means by which residents are capable of taking substantive “citizen power.” Then, what sort of measures should be taken in order not to make city master plans a pie in the sky.

In this chapter, this paper attempts to introduce three representative examples in Japan, which might indicate how respective cities have managed their city master plans in order to put those matters into practical use³⁸.

1.1 Toda City in Saitama Prefecture³⁹

After drawing up the Toda City Master Plan, the city administration set up “The Committee for the Promotion of City Master Plan” at the level of division chief in the municipal office.

The committee had been sorting out the plan-related projects and then developed “The Propulsion Program of City Master Plan,” which put into shape tangible programs and their positions in the urban comprehensive plan.

On the ground of the program, the city authorities have been precisely managing the progress concerning the plan-based projects, the implementations of which have been effectively secured through the coordination among the departments involved.

Furthermore, toward partnership-based urban development on the regional scale, the city established “The City Council for the Promotion of City Master Plan,” and called on citizens to cooperate with municipal authorities at every available opportunity, when they need to carry out town improvement projects, and to decide on some policies concerned with city master plans, and so on.

1.2 Soka City in Saitama Prefecture⁴⁰

In Soka City, the officials, after settling on the Soka City Master Plan, instituted detailed area plans for the districts, in which united resident organizations could positively contribute to the community development. The purpose of these plans is that, in order to promote the city master plan, proactive community organizations are entitled to formulate detailed plans based on the situation in each area, and to decide on the role-sharing arrangement and the project programs in consort with the city government.

On the basis of the plans, the city reviewed several specific projects and settled on the program for the promotion of the city master plan. This program institutionalized the promoting projects of area planning, and it permitted in an integrated and consistent manner the budget management of the projects relevant to each presiding division.

Additionally, the municipal officials put in institutional advisors for area planning for residents, as supportive measures for professionals to provide to community organizations. Such registered experts have been sent off to conduct management consultations closely for residents’ groups.

1.3 Ageo City in Saitama Prefecture⁴¹

Following the formulation of the Ageo City Master Plan, the authorities introduced “The Ordinance for the Promotion of City Development,” which intended to put the plan into execution through interactions among stakeholders such as residents, developers, and the city government. The regulation established the approval procedure for determinations of city development plans in detail. It stipulates that the consociation established by voluntary residents wraps up and submits a proposed plan to the city administration, and that the municipality makes it open to public inspection and follows recommendations by the council for local development, as the deliberative organ. The organization is composed of citizens selected from among applicants, members with academic backgrounds, commercial, industrial and agricultural local entities concerned, and involved city officials.

The city is supposed to have every respect for such plans, when setting up and imple-

menting relevant measures. Specifically, the authorities should announce a deal with the consociation, which obliges the concerned developers to comply with the agreement in taking any development actions of buildings and plants within the area related to the deal.

2. What They Have in Common

What is supposed is that the foregoing challenges of leveraging city master plans might lead to the following proposition; in sum, a possible condition requisite for making use of city master plans is that each of the local governments develops both executive systems in the municipal office and collaboration with residents.

2.1 Maintenance of Executive System in the Municipal Office

It would be necessary for local governments at the level of municipality to possess some kind or another structure and system for promoting city master plans.

First is “program of implementation.” Even if, by the formulation of city master plans, general basic rules related to town development are clearly articulated, it would make no sense for municipalities not to set up specific and concrete priorities of implementing measures.

Second is “cooperative structure in the office.” In order to implement measures indeed and to put the plans into action, it would be essential to adjust some kind of system in the municipal office for cooperation among departments associated with the project.

Third is “fiscal measure.” Urban governments need to incorporate city master plans into the financial operations system based on urban comprehensive plans so as to administer budgets for the projects.

Fourth is “system for progress management.” Municipal organizations would be need of the system for measuring the progress of the projects under city master plans.

2.2 Establishment of Collaboration with Residents

It would be required for municipal organizations to lay down rules for promoting consensus among stakeholders and residents’ voluntary development efforts.

First is “structure for citizen participation.” Besides taking a step toward the promotion of resident participation in settling on city master plans, urban governments need to enable residents to take part in the process for decision-making on specific legal urban plans and for implementation of town projects.

Second is “provision of information for residents.” In order to bring forward community development on the basis of consensus among stakeholders, especially residents, municipal authorities would be need of measures to share requisite information with residents and to provide them with it.

Third is “technical and financial assistance to town development.” If residents are willing to get involved in formulation of detailed area plans and in deliberation on measure

implementations, it would be indispensable for them to obtain from municipal governments both technical assistances by experts on planning and financial supports to maintain activities.

Fourth is “human resource development.” Local governments would request local talents, who take the lead in town planning in certain areas, and skilled administrative officials in charge of partnership-based town development through coproduction.

3. Comparative Discussion

This paper examines these three cases in the context of tasks which are considered to need to utilize and promote the contents of city master plans. As depicted in Table 2, Toda City’s measures meet requirements as follows: program of implementation, cooperative structure in the office, system for progress management, structure for citizen participation, and provision of information. Then, Soka City makes efforts to satisfy the following conditions: program of implementation, fiscal measures, structure for citizen participation, provision of information for residents, technical and financial assistance to town development, and human resource development. Finally, Ageo City has realized issues of establishment of collaboration with residents in a comprehensive and systematic fashion.

Table 2. Comparison among Three Cities as for Tasks toward Promotion of MPs

		Toda	Soka	Ageo
Maintenance of executive system	<i>Program of implementation</i>	○	○	○
	<i>Cooperative structure in the office</i>	○		
	<i>Fiscal measures</i>		○	
	<i>System for progress management</i>	○		
Establishment of collaboration with residents	<i>Structure for citizen participation</i>	○	○	○
	<i>Provision of information for residents</i>	○	○	○
	<i>Technical and financial assistance to town development</i>		○	○
	<i>Human resource development</i>		○	○

Note. This table was generated by the author.

In this way, Toda and Soka City get their city master plans institutionalized by means of specific implementation guidelines and outlines, while Ageo City, pursuant to the provisions of the city ordinance, secures and encourages the system of partnership with civil groups in a holistic point of view. Thus, the key to furthering the city master plans might be to move forward with a phased approach on the basis of consensus among stakeholders. To that end, each municipality would require some kind of mechanism to go ahead with the internal administrative work and the cooperation of the community. It is also important to construct an institutional system of information sharing among them on progress of projects under city master plans, so as to get rid of asymmetry of information⁴². As a means of that, like the case of Ageo City, the institution of “Ordinance of Town Planning” could be effective.

According to the above-mentioned discussions, what is required to realize and leverage the contents of city master plans would be summed up in two conditions: maintenance of executive systems in the municipal office and establishment of collaboration with residents.

VII. Conclusions

In the discussions so far, for one thing, there seems to be a possibility that, in a way comparable to socio-economic contexts, political environments within the city could serve as a critical factor determining a process of urban planning policy. What is more, it is also revealed that the current city master plans would be fundamentally and institutionally the defective system, which would lead to a definite risk of arbitrary administration by executive authorities. Therefore, in order for political actors, such as neighborhood residents, to make up for the conceivable deficiency and to monitor a policy process for making a decision in an effective manner, city master plans would have a need for legal binding constraints of local government regulations and ordinances. One final point is that this paper, as remarked above, suggests the ideas related to a way of utilizing and promoting the city master plans. Toward the measures for accelerating the utilization of city master plans, both of two frameworks might be necessary; that is, (1) a structure needed to promote the existing plans in the governmental office, and (2) a structure to make use of residents’ proactive approach for urban development.

This paper would be evaluated as nothing but hypothesis construction through the exploratory case study method. It is true that there is room for further research based on examination of multiple cases or for statistical analysis with empirical data. These investigations remain to be solved for the purpose of facilitating generalizability brought about by testing hypotheses. Nonetheless, the author hopes that this paper will add momentum to an enhancement of good public governance, which responds with sincerity to demands by various political actors that a diverse range of their intentions should be properly reflected in the policy process.

Notes

- ¹ K. Igarashi, & Ogawa, A. *Kenchiku funso: Gyosei, siho no hokai genba*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006.
- ² On this point, Oyama, from the standpoint of the study of public administration, provides a considerable lens through which to look at governance failure underlying the process of nuclear energy policy in Japan (K. Oyama, *Enerugi gabanansu no gyoseigaku*. Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2002).
- ³ H. Mimura, *Chiiki kyosei no toshi keikaku* (2nd ed.). Kyoto: Gakugei Shuppansha, 2005.
- ⁴ Y. Harashina (Eds.), *Shimin sanko to goi keisei: Toshi to kankyo no keikaku zukuri*. Kyoto: Gakugei Shuppansha, 2005, 11-40.
- ⁵ A. Lijphart, Comparative politics and the comparative method, *American Political Science Review*, 1971, 65, 682-693.
- ⁶ A. Kato, & Takeuchi, D. (Eds.), *Shin toshi keikaku gairon*. Tokyo: Kyoritsu Shuppan, 2004.
- ⁷ M. Kawakami, Shi ku cho son ni yoru toshi keikaku masuta puran no kadai. In City Planning Institute of Japan (Ed.), *Toshi keikaku no chiho bunken: Machizukuri e no zissen*. Kyoto: Gakugei Shuppansha, 1999, 135-145.
- ⁸ The survey research by Kitahara similarly indicates the attitudes of civil service in charge of city planning as a result of the decentralization (T. Kitahara, Japanese urban planning under the decentralization reforms [in Japanese]. *Nomos*, 2005, 17, 25-52).
- ⁹ A. Kato, & Takeuchi, D. (Eds.), *Shin toshi keikaku gairon*. Tokyo: Kyoritsu Shuppan, 2004, 105.
- ¹⁰ K. Soga, Institutions, economics, and politics: A quantitative analysis of the Japanese city planning [in Japanese]. *Nomos*, 2005, 17, 53-68.
- ¹¹ T. Kitahara, *Gendai Nippon no toshi keikaku*. Tokyo: Seibundoh, 1998.
- ¹² Clingermayer and Feiock make a point that the electoral systems influence styles of land-use regulation such as zoning, according to the result of quantitative analysis (J. C. Clingermayer, & Feiock, R. C., *Institutional constraints and policy choice: An exploration of local governance*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001).
- ¹³ K. Soga, Institutions, economics, and politics: A quantitative analysis of the Japanese city planning [in Japanese]. *Nomos*, 2005, 17, 53-68.
- ¹⁴ A. Nakamura, Gyosei, gyoseigaku to “gabanansu” no san keitai. *Nenpo Gyosei Kenkyu*, 2004, 39, 2-25.
- ¹⁵ K. Oyama, *Enerugi gabanansu no gyoseigaku*. Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2002.
- ¹⁶ J. Pierre, & Peters, B. G., *Governance, politics and the state*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.
- ¹⁷ K. Oyama, *Enerugi gabanansu no gyoseigaku*. Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2002, 4; T. Miyakawa, & Yamamoto, K. (Eds.), *Paburikku gabanansu: Kaikaku to senryaku*. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, 2002, 16.
- ¹⁸ K. Oyama, *Enerugi gabanansu no gyoseigaku*. Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2002.
- ¹⁹ M. Muramatsu, *Gyoseigaku Kyokasho: Gendai gyosei no seiji bunseki* (2nd ed.). Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2001.
- ²⁰ Y. Sone, *Nippon gabanansu: “Kaikaku” to “sakiokuri” no seiji to keizai*. Tokyo: Toshindo, 2008; K. Oyama, *Kokyo gabanansu*. Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2010.
- ²¹ K. Oyama, *Kokyo gabanansu*. Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2010.
- ²² According to Matsushita, “policy” means, in a broad sense, scientific methods and techniques

of solving problems (K. Matsushita, *Seisakugata shiko to seiji*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1991).

²³ D. L. Imbroscio, Overcoming the neglect of economics in urban regime theory. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 2003, 25(3), 271-284.

²⁴ F. Hunter, *Community power structure: A study of decision makers*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1953; R. A. Dahl, *Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961.

²⁵ P. E. Peterson, *City limits*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

²⁶ C. N. Stone, *Regime politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1989.

²⁷ J. Pierre, Comparative urban governance: Uncovering complex causalities. *Urban Affairs Review*, 2005, 40(4), 446-462; K. Mossberger, & Stoker, G., The evolution of urban regime theory: The challenge of conceptualization. *Urban Affairs Review*, 2001, 36(6), 810-835.

²⁸ S. Komatsu, *Amerika toshi kyoiku seiji no kenkyu: 20 seiki ni okeru Shikago no kyoiku tochi kaikaku*. Kyoto: Jimbun Shoin, 2006; M. Honda, Some aspects of research on urban education policy in Japan [in Japanese]. *Kokuritsu Kyoiku Seisaku Kenkyuujo kiyou*, 2008, 137, 233-245.

²⁹ K. Soga, A comparative study of 'urban governance' (1)-(6): U.K., France and Japan [in Japanese]. *The Journal of the Association of Political and Social Sciences (Kokka Gakkai zasshi)*, 1998-2000, 111(7-8), 1-75; 112(1-2), 61-150; 112(5-6), 35-112; 112(9-10), 1-85; 113(1-2), 34-98; 113(3-4), 1-68.

³⁰ Nakamura similarly indicates this point (A. Nakamura, Gyosei, gyoseigaku to "gabanansu" no san keitai. *Nenpo Gyosei Kenkyu*, 2004, 39, 2-25).

³¹ S. Arnstein, A ladder of citizen participation, *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 1969, 35, 216-224.

³² S. Arnstein, A ladder of citizen participation, *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 1969, 35, 216.

³³ Ogata shogyo shisetsu tyakko mitei. (2007, October 12). *The Yomiuri Shimbun*, p. 31.

³⁴ Tochi riyo henko o shonin. (2008, May 22). *The Asahi Shimbun*, p. 29.

³⁵ Higashikurume City, Chiku keikaku sakutei made no keii.

http://www.city.higashikurume.lg.jp/kensaku/sisei/tosikeikaku/m5_keikaku_keii.html, (accessed 2012-03-30).

³⁶ The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport. Toshi keikaku unyo shishin. 2006-11-30. http://www.mlit.go.jp/crd/city/plan/unyou_shishin/pdf/shishin_h1811.pdf, (accessed 2012-03-30).

³⁷ Yin makes it clear that the single-case design would be appropriate for researchers to cite an extreme, unique, or revelatory case; a representative or typical case; or a longitudinal case (R. K. Yin, *Case study research: Design and methods* (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2009).

³⁸ S. Shiozawa, Toshi keikaku masuta puran no zikkosei aru suishin ni mukete: Zikkosei no kagi o nigiru, gyosei shikko shisutemu to machizukuri suishin shisutemu no seidoka. *Nissei Kisoken report*, 2006, 111, 10-17.

³⁹ Toda City. Toda shi toshi masuta puran ni tsuite. 2012-03-29.

<http://www.city.toda.saitama.jp/438/437495.html>, (accessed 2012-03-30).

⁴⁰ Soka City. Soka shi toshi keikaku masuta puran.

<http://www.city.soka.saitama.jp/cont/s1801/a02/a01/03.html>, (accessed 2012-03-30).

⁴¹ Ageo City. Ageo shi toshi keikaku masuta puran 2010. 2011-3-31.

<http://www.city.ageo.lg.jp/page/044111033101.html>, (accessed 2012-03-30).

⁴² G. Akerlof, The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1970, 84, 488-500.

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